Com. v. Hill, N. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S39036-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    NATHANIEL NYIEM HILL                       :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 648 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 12, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-41-CR-0001758-2019
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                              FILED MARCH 20, 2023
    Appellant Nathaniel Nyiem Hill appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following his convictions for possession with intent to distribute a
    controlled substance (PWID) and related offenses. Appellant argues that the
    Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence identifying him as the
    perpetrator of the offenses. Following our review, we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
    On July 16, 2019, Trooper Andrew Corl of the Pennsylvania State
    Police was working with the [confidential informant (CI)], as he
    had done twice before, to arrange a purchase of heroin. The
    following day, July 17, 2019, Trooper Corl instructed the CI, who
    goes by the name “Amy” when purchasing drugs, to reach out to
    her dealer who she stated she knew as [“Naj”1]. At 2:06 p.m.,
    ____________________________________________
    1 Throughout its opinion, the trial court states that “Naz” was the individual
    who sold the drugs to the CI. However, the record reflects that the CI knew
    that individual as “Naj.” See N.T. Trial, 9/13/21, at 18, 85. For purposes of
    consistency, we have amended the quotations from the trial court’s opinion
    accordingly.
    J-S39036-22
    the CI texted a [phone] number she used to arrange for the
    purchase of drugs, which had a 272 area code, and asked for a
    “honey bun,” which is a bundle of heroin. The CI received a text
    back instructing her to call the number, which she did, and at
    which point a meeting location for the sale of the drugs was
    determined.
    Thereafter, Trooper Corl took the CI to Rural Avenue between Fifth
    and Fourth Streets [in Williamsport]. Trooper Corl parked his
    unmarked car along Fifth Street and Louisa Street, such that Rural
    Avenue was to the north and 4th Street was to the east. Trooper
    Corl provided the CI with $70.00 of pre-recorded money and the
    CI texted the 272 number that she had arrived at 2:43 p.m.
    Between approximately 2:51 p.m. and 2:54 p.m., the CI texted
    [Naj] to inquire when he would be at the meeting location because
    it was “about to pour again.”
    At some point thereafter, Trooper Corl observed two black males
    walk past his vehicle and then walked east on an unnamed alley
    between Rural Avenue and Louisa Street. Both males were
    wearing black button down shirts and one of them had on a white
    undershirt and a ball cap. Trooper Corl later determined that the
    male wearing the white undershirt was [Appellant] based on his
    own comparison of [Appellant’s] license and JNET photographs.
    The next thing Trooper Corl saw was the CI walking back toward
    him at which time she gave him ten (10) small blue bags
    containing a white powder, later determined to be a combination
    of heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl. Trooper Corl did not see the buy
    occur, but when the CI was briefed, [the CI] told him that she
    dealt with the male with the white undershirt, known to her as
    [Naj].
    Detective Tyson Havens of the Lycoming County Narcotics
    Enforcement Unit testified that he witnessed the same two males
    that walked by Trooper Corl’s vehicle walking south on Fourth
    Street at which time he was able to obtain video surveillance of
    them as well as still shots. Detective Havens testified that he
    “knew [Appellant’s] face from prior contact but that there were no
    tattoos on [Naj]’s neck as of July 17, 2019.[”]
    The CI testified that on July 17, 2019, she texted the 272 number,
    which she used frequently to purchase heroin and that in the past,
    she has dealt with many people using that same number. When
    she was directed to call the person with whom she was texting,
    she knew she was speaking with [Naj] because she recognized his
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    voice. [Naj] said he would send someone to sell her the drugs,
    but that he ended up coming himself with another individual
    unknown to the CI. When [Naj] arrived, he was wearing a white
    undershirt and was taller than the other individual. After the three
    of them had turned down the alley, the CI gave the $70 to [Naj]
    and [Naj] is the one who handed her the drugs.
    The CI testified that she knew the person in the white undershirt
    to be [Naj] because she has bought drugs from him for two years
    on and off and because of the gap in his teeth. At the time of
    trial, the CI identified [Appellant] as the person she knows to be
    [Naj] and the person who sold her the drugs on July 17, 2019.
    The CI later admits, though, that at the time of trial, [Appellant’s]
    teeth “did not look as gapped out” as they did at the time of the
    buy. The CI admitted that she was using drugs as of July 2019
    but even so, she was able to interact with others and know with
    whom she was speaking.
    At the time of trial, the Commonwealth introduced two (2)
    surveillance videos. On the first video, the CI is seen walking
    north on Fifth Street with two black males, their backs facing the
    camera. The males are both wearing black button down shirts
    with black pants. One of them has a hat on, and is taller than the
    other. Eventually, the three make a right hand turn onto the
    unnamed alley running parallel between Rural Avenue and Louisa
    Street, leaving the camera’s line of sight. No transaction is
    captured on video.
    The second video, taken by Detective Havens, shows the same
    two males walking south on Fourth Street without the CI, toward
    the camera. It is clear in the video that the male wearing the
    white undershirt and hat has a large circular tattoo on the under
    part of his left forearm, closer to his elbow than to his wrist.
    The JNET photographs taken of [Appellant] on July 2, 2019 as well
    as [Appellant’s] driver’s license photograph, compared with the
    still shots of the video taken by Detective Havens, shows that the
    male in the white undershirt is [Appellant]. Additionally, the JNET
    photographs clearly show a large, round tattoo on the left
    underside of [Appellant’s] forearm. However, it does not appear
    that [Appellant] had a tattoo on his neck as of July 2, 2019.
    Trial Ct. Op. & Order, 1/28/22, at 2-5 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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    J-S39036-22
    On December 5, 2019, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with
    PWID, delivery of a controlled substance, criminal use of a communication
    facility, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug
    paraphernalia.2 Ultimately, following a bench trial on September 13, 2021,
    the trial court found Appellant guilty of all charges. Appellant subsequently
    filed a post-trial motion challenging the weight of the evidence, which the trial
    court denied. See Trial Ct. Op. & Order, 1/28/22.
    On March 25, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
    term of four to nine years’ incarceration. The trial court issued an amended
    sentencing order on April 12, 2022, which added a term of twelve months’
    reentry supervision, consecutive to the previously imposed sentence.        Am.
    Sentencing Order, 4/12/22. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal3 and a
    ____________________________________________
    235 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a), 35 P.S. §§ 780-
    113(a)(16), (a)(32).
    3 Appellant erroneously stated that the appeal was from the September 13,
    2021 verdict and the March 25, 2022 judgment of sentence. See Notice of
    Appeal, 4/21/22; see also Commonwealth v. O’Neill, 
    578 A.2d 1334
    , 1335
    (Pa. Super. 1990) (stating that “in criminal cases appeals lie from judgment
    of sentence rather than from the verdict of guilt”). In cases where the trial
    court amends the judgment of sentence during the period it maintains
    jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, the direct appeal lies from the
    amended judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Garzone, 
    993 A.2d 1245
    , 1254 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2010). Therefore, the appeal is properly from the
    April 12, 2022 amended judgment of sentence, and we have amended the
    caption accordingly.
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    J-S39036-22
    court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.4       The trial court issued a Rule
    1925(a) opinion adopting the analysis set forth in its January 28, 2022 opinion
    and order denying Appellant’s post-trial motion. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/3/22, at
    1-2.
    On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for review:
    Whether there existed sufficient evidence to find [Appellant] guilty
    of [PWID], delivery of a controlled substance, criminal use of a
    communication facility, possession of a controlled substance and
    possession of drug paraphernalia.
    Appellant’s Brief at 4 (footnotes omitted).5
    ____________________________________________
    4 Here, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement does not identify the elements
    Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to prove at trial. See Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) Statement, 5/5/22, at 1. It is well settled that a vague challenge to
    the sufficiency of the evidence may result in waiver. See Commonwealth
    v. Roche, 
    153 A.3d 1063
    , 1072 (Pa. Super. 2017). Instantly, the trial court
    addressed Appellant’s sufficiency claims, and the case against Appellant was
    relatively straightforward. Therefore, we decline to find waiver.        See
    Commonwealth v. Laboy, 
    936 A.2d 1058
    , 1060 (Pa. 2007) (per curiam).
    5 We note that in his argument section, Appellant also challenges the
    credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. However, such claims go to the
    weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Wilson,
    
    825 A.2d 710
    , 713-14 (Pa. Super. 2003) (explaining that our review of the
    sufficiency of evidence does not include an assessment of credibility, which is
    more properly characterized as a challenge to weight of evidence). Further,
    Appellant included a weight-of-the-evidence claim in his Rule 1925(b)
    statement, but he did not include that issue in his statement of questions on
    appeal, nor did he develop a proper weight claim in his brief. Accordingly,
    Appellant’s weight claim is waived. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 
    151 A.3d 1117
    , 1122, n.12 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).
    In any event, were we to reach Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the
    evidence, we would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to identify him as
    the individual who sold the drugs to the CI. Id. at 8-9. In support, Appellant
    asserts that “[t]here was no witness presented that was able to testify that
    they witnessed the controlled drug transaction.” Id. at 8. Further, Appellant
    notes that although the police were recording the CI while he was outside of
    the police vehicle, there was no footage of the controlled buy. Id. Appellant
    also claims that, at the time of his arrest, he did not have “any buy money”
    in his possession, nor did he have the cellular phone used to set up the
    purchase.      Id.    Finally, Appellant argues that there “was no evidence
    presented connecting [Appellant] to the number associated with the cellular
    phone that was contacted to set up the buy.” Id.
    When reviewing a sufficiency claim, our standard of review is as follows:
    Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
    question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
    of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
    we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
    reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
    to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
    need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
    province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
    to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
    evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
    every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
    ____________________________________________
    denying Appellant’s motion for new trial and would affirm on the basis of the
    trial court’s opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. & Order at 5-8.
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    J-S39036-22
    the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
    factfinder.
    Commonwealth v. Palmer, 
    192 A.3d 85
    , 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
    omitted and formatting altered).
    This Court has held that, “[i]n addition to proving the statutory elements
    of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth must
    also establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.”
    Commonwealth v. Smyser, 
    195 A.3d 912
    , 915 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
    omitted). Further, “[i]t is settled that a positive identification by one witness
    is sufficient for conviction.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    180 A.3d 474
    , 478
    (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
    Appellant’s claim relates solely to the sufficiency of the identification
    evidence. Accordingly, we will limit our review to whether the Commonwealth
    established the identification element. See Commonwealth v. Cain, 
    906 A.2d 1242
    , 1244 (Pa. Super. 2006) (declining to address the sufficiency of
    evidence as to every element of a crime where an appellant only challenges
    identification evidence).
    [E]vidence of identification need not be positive and certain to
    sustain a conviction. Although common items of clothing and
    general physical characteristics are usually insufficient to support
    a conviction, such evidence can be used as other circumstances
    to establish the identity of a perpetrator.             Out-of-court
    identifications are relevant to our review of sufficiency of the
    evidence claims, particularly when they are given without
    hesitation shortly after the crime while memories were fresh.
    Given additional evidentiary circumstances, any indefiniteness
    and uncertainty in the identification testimony goes to its weight.
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    Commonwealth v. Orr, 
    38 A.3d 868
    , 874 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc)
    (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also Johnson, 
    180 A.3d at 478
    . “[T]he Commonwealth may establish the essential elements of the crime
    wholly by circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 
    934 A.2d 1233
    , 1237 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).
    Instantly, the trial court addressed the evidence presented at trial as
    follows:
    [Appellant] [] asserts that there is no evidence of the buy itself
    and that the only photographs are of himself in the area where
    the buy occurred and around the same time of the buy.
    With this [] assertion, [Appellant] purports to admit that the
    photographs introduced as Commonwealth’s Exhibits 12 and 13 in
    fact depict him. Either way, . . . the male depicted in the
    photographs wearing the white undershirt is clearly [Appellant]
    when compared with his JNET and driver’s license photographs
    and because of his forearm tattoo. Additionally, the CI specifically
    testified that the person who handed the drugs to her was the
    man in the white undershirt and that the man the in the white
    undershirt was [Appellant]. . . .
    It is important to note that the CI also testified to the following
    specific facts: that she recognized [Appellant’s] voice when they
    spoke on the phone to arrange the drug buy; that she recognized
    him when he showed up to sell her the drugs, even though she
    was expecting someone else; that it was [Appellant] who handed
    her the drugs; and that [Appellant] tried to give her significantly
    more drugs than what she had originally wanted.
    The CI’s testimony, when corroborated with the other evidence
    and testimony presented at trial, the [c]ourt was convinced, and
    remains convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]
    committed the crimes with which he was charged. The CI did not
    have drugs on her person before she left Trooper Corl’s vehicle
    but had them when she came back from her meeting with the two
    males. [Appellant] and his companion arrived at the exact same
    location as was pre-arranged between the CI and [Naj]. The
    timeline of text messages and phone calls between the CI and
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    [Naj] line up with when [Naj] and his companion arrived.
    Although there is no surveillance of the drug transaction itself, this
    is not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove its case. Taking
    into consideration all of the evidence presented, the [c]ourt finds
    that the Commonwealth has proven its case beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Trial Ct. Op. & Order at 6-8.
    Based on the totality of the circumstances and our review of the record,
    in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
    verdict winner, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to establish
    Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator. See Palmer, 
    192 A.3d at 89
    .
    As noted by the trial court, the Commonwealth presented two witnesses
    who identified Appellant as the perpetrator at trial. Specifically, the CI made
    an in-court identification of Appellant and noted that she knew him as Naj.
    See N.T. Trial, 9/13/21, at 85. The CI also stated that she had purchased
    drugs from Appellant on multiple occasions, that Appellant was the individual
    who sold her the drugs during the controlled buy, and that Appellant had been
    wearing a white undershirt at the time of the transaction. 
    Id. at 88
    . Trooper
    Corl also testified that Appellant had been wearing a white undershirt when
    Appellant arrived at the agreed-upon time and location for the controlled buy.
    See id. at 37.     Trooper Corl further stated that he observed the drug
    transaction via video, and that after the CI returned to the police vehicle with
    the drugs, the CI reported that she had purchased the drugs from the man in
    the white undershirt, who she knew as Naj.         Id. at 39, 43.     Finally, the
    Commonwealth introduced photographs and video that depicted Appellant
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    J-S39036-22
    wearing a white undershirt at the scene of the controlled buy. Id. at 40, 42.
    On this record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence establishing
    Appellant’s identity. See Orr, 
    38 A.3d at 874
    ; Smyser, 
    195 A.3d at 915
    ;
    Johnson, 
    180 A.3d at 478
    . For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to
    relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 03/20/2023
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