Com. v. Hull, J. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S73003-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JOHN HULL                                  :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 475 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 21, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-40-CR-0000565-2018
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                               FILED MARCH 10, 2020
    Appellant, John Hull, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    following his conviction of aggravated assault.1 We affirm.
    In an information filed on March 3, 2018, Appellant was charged with
    several crimes in relation to his striking David Beavers in the head multiple
    times with a pool stick.         On January 7, 2019, Appellant pled guilty to
    aggravated assault in exchange for the Commonwealth dropping the
    remaining charges.
    The trial court explained the subsequent procedural history as follows:
    On February 21, 2019, [Appellant] was sentenced to a
    minimum term of 40 months to a maximum term of 96 months
    incarceration at a state correctional institution followed by 24
    months of consecutive special probation. [Appellant] was also
    ordered to pay restitution. On March 4, 2019, [Appellant] filed a
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4).
    J-S73003-19
    Petition for Reconsideration of Sentence through defense counsel
    William Thompson, Esquire. Before [Appellant’s] Petition was
    decided by this court, Mark Mack, Esquire, entered his appearance
    for [Appellant] on March 19, 2019, and filed a Notice of Appeal on
    March 20, 2019. After being ordered to do so, [Appellant] filed a
    [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement] on April 14, 2019.              The
    Commonwealth filed a Response on May 6, 2019. [Appellant’s]
    Petition for Reconsideration of Sentence was denied by this court
    on May 7, 2019.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/19, at 1 (footnote omitted). On May 7, 2019, the
    trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion.
    Thereafter, the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).2
    Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
    1. Did the lower court err in accepting the Appellant’s guilty plea
    that was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently tendered?
    ____________________________________________
    2We note that the instant appeal was filed prematurely while Appellant’s post-
    sentence motion was pending before the trial court. “No direct appeal may
    be taken by a defendant while his or her post-sentence motion is pending.”
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, cmt. See Commonwealth v. Claffey, 
    80 A.3d 780
    , 783
    (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting that appeal filed while timely post-sentence motions
    were pending may be premature). The trial court denied Appellant’s post-
    sentence motion after this appeal was filed.
    In similar cases, wel have addressed a premature appeal when “the
    subsequent actions [of the] court fully ripened it.” Commonwealth v.
    Cooper, 
    27 A.3d 994
    , 1004 (Pa. 2011). See also Commonwealth v. Little,
    
    879 A.2d 293
    , 296 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2005) (permitting premature appeal of
    petition for reconsideration when order denying petition was entered between
    filing of notice of appeal and consideration by appellate court);
    Commonwealth v. Hamaker, 
    541 A.2d 1141
    , 1142 n.4 (Pa. Super. 1988)
    (permitting a premature appeal of post-trial motions and citing Pa.R.A.P. 905
    (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but
    before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such
    entry and on the day thereof.”)). Accordingly, we consider this appeal to be
    timely.
    -2-
    J-S73003-19
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    In his sole issue, Appellant argues that his guilty plea should be
    withdrawn because it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
    Appellant’s Brief at 14-28. Appellant asserts that his guilty plea colloquy was
    insufficient because it did not include the nature of the charge under the plea
    agreement, the factual basis for the plea, and the permissible consequences
    or sentence of the offense. Id. at 14.
    With respect to challenges to the validity of a guilty plea on direct
    appeal, this Court has stated the following:
    Settled Pennsylvania law makes clear that by entering a
    guilty plea, the defendant waives his right to challenge on direct
    appeal all nonjurisdictional defects except the legality of the
    sentence and the validity of the plea.
    Indeed, a defendant routinely waives a plethora of
    constitutional rights by pleading guilty, including the
    right to a jury trial by his peers, the right to have the
    Commonwealth prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt, and his right to confront any witnesses against
    him. Furthermore, a defendant is permitted to waive
    fundamental constitutional protections in situations
    involving far less protection of the defendant than that
    presented herein.
    A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a
    guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the
    plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within
    ten days of sentencing. Failure to employ either measure
    results in waiver. Historically, Pennsylvania courts adhere to
    this waiver principle because it is for the court which accepted the
    plea to consider and correct, in the first instance, any error which
    may have been committed. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 
    237 Pa. Super. 336
    , 
    352 A.2d 140
    , 141 (1975) (holding that common
    and previously condoned mistake of attacking guilty plea on direct
    appeal without first filing petition to withdraw plea with trial court
    -3-
    J-S73003-19
    is procedural error resulting in waiver; stating, “(t)he swift and
    orderly administration of criminal justice requires that lower
    courts be given the opportunity to rectify their errors before they
    are considered on appeal”; “Strict adherence to this procedure
    could, indeed, preclude an otherwise costly, time consuming, and
    unnecessary appeal to this court”).
    Likewise:
    Normally, issues not preserved in the trial court may
    not be pursued before this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
    For example, a request to withdraw a guilty plea on
    the grounds that it was involuntary is one of the claims
    that must be raised by motion in the trial court in
    order to be reviewed on direct appeal. Similarly,
    challenges to a court’s sentencing discretion must be
    raised during sentencing or in a post-sentence motion
    in order for this Court to consider granting allowance
    of appeal. Moreover, for any claim that was required
    to be preserved, this Court cannot review a legal
    theory in support of that claim unless that particular
    legal theory was presented to the trial court. Thus,
    even if an appellant did seek to withdraw pleas or to
    attack the discretionary aspects of sentencing in the
    trial court, the appellant cannot support those claims
    in this Court by advancing legal arguments different
    than the ones that were made when the claims were
    preserved.
    Commonwealth v. Rush, 
    959 A.2d 945
    , 949 (Pa. Super. 2008),
    appeal denied, 
    601 Pa. 696
    , 
    972 A.2d 521
     (2009).
    Further, a defendant who attempts to withdraw a
    guilty plea after sentencing must demonstrate
    prejudice on the order of manifest injustice before
    withdrawal is justified. A plea rises to the level of
    manifest injustice when it was entered into
    involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.
    Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 
    72 A.3d 606
    , 609-610 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some
    citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
    -4-
    J-S73003-19
    Our review of the certified record reflects that Appellant did not preserve
    his challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea by either objecting during
    the plea colloquy or filing a timely post-sentence motion seeking to withdraw
    the guilty plea.3 Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(a)(i). Accordingly, Appellant waived
    any challenge to his guilty plea on direct appeal. Lincoln, 
    72 A.3d at
    609-
    610.
    Moreover, if we were to ignore the waiver of Appellant’s challenge to his
    guilty plea, we would affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion addressing
    the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of Appellant’s plea. See Trial
    Court Opinion, 5/21/19, at 2-4.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 03/10/2020
    ____________________________________________
    3 We note that, although Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, his claims
    therein were limited to requests for reconsideration of his sentence. Post-
    Sentence Motion, 3/4/19, at 1-3. Appellant did not seek permission to
    withdraw his guilty plea.
    -5-