Com. v. Hibbs, J. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JASON A. HIBBS, :
:
Appellant : No. 1540 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered May 22, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0026811-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: Filed March 18, 2020
Jason A. Hibbs (Appellant) appeals from the May 22, 2019 order
denying his petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County (Court of Common Pleas). Upon review, we vacate the
order and remand for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
By way of background, on October 19, 2018, the Commonwealth filed
a criminal complaint in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, charging
Appellant with one count of driving under the influence (DUI). On February
19, 2019, in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, Appellant litigated a motion
to suppress, inter alia, the results of a blood analysis. Specifically, Appellant
argued that his consent to the blood draw was not voluntary because he
alleged he “had been in and out of consciousness after a serious car wreck,
was handcuffed to a hospital bed when he came to, was surrounded by at
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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least three police officers, was threatened with jail time should he refuse to
sign the consent form, and was denied water to drink before signing[.]”
Appellant’s Brief at 3. At the conclusion of the hearing, the municipal court
denied Appellant’s motion.1 We set forth the municipal court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law verbatim as follows.
Reasonable suspicion and probable cause, blood and
statement denied. I adopt the officer’s[2] testimony and
[Appellant’s] testimony as my findings of fact.
As to my findings of law I adopt the Commonwealth’s
argument. Let me put a few things on the record. I was
thinking this case would be like Commonwealth v. Pena[, a
non-precedential case wherein the Superior Court affirmed the
municipal court’s] granting of a [m]otion to suppress [] where
[Pena] suffered a concussion and [] the blood was taken.
The big difference here is [Appellant] is able to tell me
chapter and verse what happened that day so I can’t rule under
Pena [] because he was apparently up. I asked the questions
on the protocol for the concussion because [] Pena was
apparently concussed in that case but [Appellant] gave a
beautiful chapter and verse of what happened at the hospital.
Everything is denied.
N.T., 2/19/2019, at 33-34.
1 Following the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth was granted
permission to amend the information to include two counts of DUI, 75
Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(1), (d)(2). N.T., 2/19/2019, at 34-35.
2 We note that two officers testified at the suppression hearing. The
municipal court’s lack of clarity in its findings of fact, as discussed infra,
renders it impossible for this Court to tell whether this was a typographical
error (that should have placed the apostrophe at the end of “officers”) or if
the court was adopting the testimony of only one of the officers.
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Following a very short, stipulated bench trial, the municipal court
found Appellant guilty. N.T., 2/19/2019, at 36. On February 26, 2019,
Appellant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 72 to 144 hours,
concurrent with five months of probation.3
On March 6, 2019, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the
Court of Common Pleas. On May 22, 2019, a hearing on the petition was
held. The Court of Common Pleas reviewed the municipal court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law, noting that the findings of fact were unhelpful,
especially because the adopted testimony was “in some respects []
completely inconsistent.” N.T., 5/22/2019, at 11. Nonetheless, it denied
Appellant’s petition because it did not “see enough in this record for [the
Court of Common Pleas] to reverse the finding of the judge who saw and
heard all of this evidence.” Id. at 12.
This timely-filed appeal followed.4 On appeal, Appellant argues that
the Court of Common Pleas erred in affirming the municipal court’s denial of
his motion to suppress.
3 Appellant’s sentence was imposed at his conviction for 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3802(d)(2). His conviction at subsection (d)(1) merged with his conviction
at subsection (d)(2) for sentencing.
4 Both Appellant and the Court of Common Pleas have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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In reviewing this claim, which is unique to Philadelphia County, we are
guided by this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Neal, 151 A.3d 1068(Pa. Super. 2016).
A suppression hearing is an evidentiary proceeding in which “the
Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward with the
evidence and of establishing that the challenged evidence was
not obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights. The defendant
may testify at such hearing ….” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). At the
conclusion of the suppression hearing, “the judge shall enter on
the record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law
as to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the
defendant’s rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute,
and shall make an order granting or denying the relief sought.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I).
When the Municipal Court (1) denies a motion to suppress, (2)
finds the defendant guilty of a crime, and (3) imposes sentence,
the defendant has the right either to request a trial de novo or to
file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1006(1)(a). If the
defendant files a certiorari petition challenging the denial of a
suppression motion, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County sits as an appellate court and reviews the record of the
suppression hearing in the Municipal Court. Importantly, when
performing this appellate review, the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County applies precisely the same standard that the
Superior Court applies in appeals from common pleas court
orders denying motions to suppress. Specifically,
[the court of common pleas] is limited to
determining whether the suppression court’s factual
findings are supported by the record and whether
the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
the suppression court, [the court of common pleas]
may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, [the court of common pleas is] bound by
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[those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s
legal conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal
of the determination of the suppression court turns
on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on the court [of
common pleas], whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the
facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the court[ ]
below are subject to [ ] plenary review.
Neal, 151 A.3d at 1070-71 (some citations omitted).
In Neal, the municipal court denied Neal’s motion to suppress without
entering any findings of fact and conclusions of law. As such, because the
Court of Common Pleas could not “perform appellate review of a Municipal
Court order denying a suppression motion until the Municipal Court
enter[ed] findings of fact and conclusions of law[,]” this Court vacated the
order denying Neal’s petition for writ of certiorari and remanded for the
municipal court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 1071.
We conclude that the same remedy is required here. As detailed
above, the municipal court purported to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the Court of Common
Pleas states that the municipal court “accepted as true the Commonwealth’s
version of events and adopted its argument.” Court of Common Pleas
Opinion, 8/12/2019, at 2. However, the record indicates that while the
municipal court adopted the Commonwealth’s argument for its conclusion of
law, its findings of fact consisted of an adoption of the testimony of one or
more officers and Appellant, whose testimonies were, as noted by the Court
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of Common Pleas, “in some respects [] completely inconsistent.” N.T.,
5/22/2019, at 11. See also N.T., 2/19/2019, at 33.
We conclude that a blanket adoption of testimony offered at a hearing,
without resolving any of the inconsistencies therein, is tantamount to
entering no findings of fact at all. Moreover, notwithstanding its Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion, it is clear from the record that the Court of Common Pleas
was hampered in performing its appellate review by the municipal court’s
failure to enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its
denial of Appellant’s suppression motion. See N.T., 5/22/2019, at 11.
Accordingly, we vacate the order denying Appellant’s petition for writ
of certiorari and remand for the municipal court to enter specific findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Following entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the Court of Common Pleas shall reconsider Appellant’s
petition for writ of certiorari.
Order vacated. Remanded for proceedings consistent with this
memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/18/20
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