Com. v. Brown, N. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S07044-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,            :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee              :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    NOEL L. BROWN,                           :
    :
    Appellant             :    No. 2388 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 1, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000258-2016
    BEFORE:        NICHOLS, J., KING, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                    FILED MARCH 24, 2020
    Noel L. Brown (Appellant) appeals pro se from the July 1, 2019 order
    dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.        Upon review, we dismiss this appeal
    based on Appellant’s deficient brief.
    A prior panel of this Court provided the following background.
    [O]n June 29, 2016, A.C., the fifteen-year-old victim in
    this case, was reported as a runaway. A.C. had answered an
    online advertisement seeking escorts and strippers. On that
    day, A.C. left her mother’s house with Appellant. By tracking
    A.C.’s cellular telephone, Pennsylvania State Police were able to
    locate A.C. at a local motel. When the police arrived, they
    noticed that A.C. appeared intoxicated; A.C. stated that
    Appellant had given her vodka. The troopers transported A.C. to
    the State Police barracks and questioned her regarding the
    events of the prior evening. A.C. told the troopers that she had
    answered an online advertisement for escorts, and Appellant
    picked her up and drove her to the motel. At the motel,
    Appellant provided A.C. with liquor and A.C. fell asleep. Police
    discovered that after A.C. fell asleep, Appellant undressed A.C.,
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S07044-20
    exposed her breasts, took a photograph of the minor’s breasts,
    and placed the photograph online in an effort to utilize A.C. as a
    prostitute. Police also recovered a document signed by A.C.
    wherein she agreed to work for Appellant, and Appellant would
    act as her pimp.
    Police arrested Appellant and charged him with numerous
    crimes in connection with the aforementioned events. [Prior to
    trial, Appellant indicated that he wanted to proceed pro se.
    Accordingly],     there    was    a   colloquy    consistent    with
    Commonwealth v. Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
    , 82 (Pa. 1998), and      1
    a thorough discussion of the factors outlined in Pa.R.Crim.P.
    121(A)(2) concerning pro se representation. … The trial court
    ultimately permitted Appellant to proceed pro se, but the trial
    court appointed standby counsel.           Following a jury trial,
    Appellant was found guilty of interference with custody of
    children, dissemination of photos of child sex acts, corruption of
    minors, furnishing liquor to minors, and trafficking in minors.
    ______
    1 In []Grazier, [] the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
    that when a defendant wishes to waive counsel, an on-the-
    record determination should be made that said waiver is
    knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
    On February 3, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
    an aggregate term of 180 to 384 months of incarceration.
    Appellant filed post[-]sentence motions that were denied, and on
    February 9, 2017, Appellant filed a timely appeal. Throughout
    the proceedings Appellant remained pro se.
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    179 A.3d 590
    (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished
    memorandum at 2-3) (citations to the record and some footnotes omitted).
    On direct appeal to this Court, we were “constrained to conclude that
    none of the issues [raised by Appellant was] supported by cogent legal
    argument or citation to relevant authority; rather, Appellant’s argument
    [was] a nonsensical invective on the proceedings in the trial court.”
    Id. (unpublished memorandum
    at 4).       Accordingly, due to the “overwhelming
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    J-S07044-20
    deficiencies in Appellant’s brief,” this Court concluded that Appellant had
    waived all issues on appeal and affirmed his judgment of sentence.
    Id. (unpublished memorandum
    at 4-5).           Appellant untimely filed petitions for
    allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court, which were denied.
    On October 25, 2018, Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition.
    Counsel was appointed and, following investigation of Appellant’s numerous
    claims, counsel filed a no-merit letter and motion to withdraw pursuant to
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth
    v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On May 1, 2019, the
    PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without
    a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and granted counsel’s motion to
    withdraw. Appellant pro se filed a response, and the PCRA court dismissed
    Appellant’s PCRA petition on July 1, 2019.         Appellant filed a motion for
    reconsideration, which the PCRA court denied on July 17, 2019.          Appellant
    pro se filed the instant notice of appeal on August 16, 2019.1
    As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether we have
    jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.    A notice of appeal shall be filed within
    1 On September 13, 2019, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why
    the appeal should not be quashed as interlocutory. In his pro se response,
    Appellant stated that he was appealing from the July 1, 2019 dismissal of his
    PCRA petition. See Appellant[’s] Show of Cause for Granting Appeal of
    PCRA Petition, 9/23/2019. Accordingly, this Court discharged the rule to
    show cause and deferred consideration to this panel. We are satisfied that
    this appeal is not interlocutory and need not address this issue further.
    -3-
    J-S07044-20
    30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.
    Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
    The timeliness of an appeal and compliance with the statutory
    provisions granting the right to appeal implicate an appellate
    court’s jurisdiction and its competency to act.            Absent
    extraordinary circumstances, an appellate court lacks the power
    to enlarge or extend the time provided by statute for taking an
    appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 105. Thus, an appellant’s failure to
    appeal timely an order generally divests the appellate court of its
    jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    106 A.3d 583
    , 587 (Pa. 2014) (some internal
    citations omitted).    “[T]he prisoner mailbox rule provides that a pro se
    prisoner’s document is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison
    authorities for mailing.”   Commonwealth v. DiClaudio, 
    210 A.3d 1070
    ,
    1074 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    Instantly, for Appellant’s notice of appeal to be considered timely, he
    had to file it within 30 days of the July 1, 2019 order dismissing his PCRA
    petition, namely by July 31, 2019.        As such, Appellant’s August 16, 2019
    notice of appeal is facially untimely.
    On October 1, 2019, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why
    the instant appeal should not be quashed as untimely filed. In his pro se
    response, Appellant alleged that he timely filed a notice of appeal
    immediately after the PCRA court denied his motion for reconsideration.
    Appellant further averred that he filed a second notice of appeal, the August
    notice of appeal that was received by this Court, when he did not receive a
    response from the PCRA court. See Appellant[’]s Show of Cause in Favor of
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    J-S07044-20
    Appeal, 10/9/2019.      According to Appellant, he believed that “the second
    copy of his notice of appeal ha[d superseded] the first, or the first notice of
    appeal was some[]how disc[a]rded.”
    Id. at 1
    (unnumbered).
    This Court ordered Appellant to file proof of the date that Appellant
    mailed the first notice of appeal.      Per Curiam Order, 10/11/2019.        In
    response, Appellant submitted copies of two postage cash slips to support
    his contention that he filed the first notice of appeal on July 23, 2019, and
    the second notice of appeal on August 13, 2019.         Letter from Appellant,
    10/21/2019 (Exhibits 1 & 2). The July postage cash slip is hand-dated “07-
    22-19,” but the date stamp of when it was received is illegible.       See
    id. (Exhibit 1).
    This Court discharged the rule to show cause and referred the
    issue to this panel.
    Upon review, this Court is unable to verify an exact date of when the
    postage cash slip in Exhibit 1 was received.     Nonetheless, we are able to
    conclude from the faint outline of “JUL” that it was received in July. Because
    Appellant’s notice of appeal had to have been filed by July 31, 2019, the last
    day in July, in order to be considered timely, we are satisfied that this notice
    of appeal mailed in the month of July was timely filed. Insofar as the July
    notice of appeal failed to reach this Court, we deem this a breakdown in the
    operation of the courts and accept Appellant’s August 2019 notice of appeal
    as if timely-filed.    See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    151 A.3d 621
    , 624
    (Pa. Super. 2016).
    -5-
    J-S07044-20
    Before reaching the merits of any purportedly-raised claims, however,
    we observe that “[a]ppellate briefs must conform materially to the
    requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this
    Court may [] dismiss an appeal if the defect in the brief is substantial.”
    Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 
    160 A.3d 798
    , 804 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (citation omitted).   “Although this Court is willing to construe liberally
    materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special
    benefit. Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules
    set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.”
    Id. (citation omitted).
    [I]t is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are
    sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the
    claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record
    and with citations to legal authorities. This Court will not act as
    counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an
    appellant. If a deficient brief hinders this Court’s ability to
    address any issue on review, we shall consider the issue waived.
    Commonwealth v. Adams-Smith, 
    209 A.3d 1011
    , 1018 (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Instantly, Appellant fails to comply with multiple rules of appellate
    procedure. Compare generally Appellant’s Brief with Pa.R.A.P. Chapter 21
    (relating to briefs and reproduced records); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2111
    (requiring appellant’s brief to contain, inter alia, a separate and distinct
    statement of jurisdiction; order in question; statement of scope and
    standard of review; statement of questions involved; statement of the case;
    summary of the argument; argument; and conclusion with relief sought);
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    J-S07044-20
    Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (requiring a statement of questions involved that states
    concisely the issues to be resolved); Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (requiring the argument
    section to be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be
    argued).   Moreover, Appellant has failed to develop any issue in any
    meaningful fashion capable of review. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
    Appeal dismissed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/24/2020
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2388 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 3/24/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021