Com. v. Coffer, J. ( 2020 )

J-S31041-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JEFFERY COFFER :
:
Appellant : No. 52 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 12, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0001899-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JEFFERY COFFER :
:
Appellant : No. 53 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 12, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0001900-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JEFFERY ALAN COFFER :
:
Appellant : No. 54 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 12, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0001280-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
J-S31041-19
:
v. :
:
:
JEFFERY ALAN COFFER :
:
Appellant : No. 55 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0001386-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
:
JEFFERY ALAN COFFER :
:
Appellant :
: No. 56 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 12, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0001466-2017
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 25, 2020
Jeffery Alan Coffer (“Coffer”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on September 12, 2017, following his guilty plea to numerous charges
in five separate cases. Coffer’s counsel has filed an Anders1 brief and a
petition to withdraw as counsel. Upon review, we grant counsel’s petition to
withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.
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1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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Coffer entered a negotiated guilty plea in September 2017 to the
following offenses: Home Improvement Fraud, Possession of a Controlled
Substance, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Robbery-Threat of Serious
Bodily Injury, Terroristic Threats, Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition,
Receiving Stolen Property, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, Theft by
Deception, Forgery, and Access Device Fraud.2 The court imposed the agreed-
upon sentence, for an aggregate sentence of six to 12 years of incarceration,
on September 12, 2017. Coffer did not appeal at that time. However, on May
9, 2018, Coffer filed a Post Conviction Relief Act petition, in which he requested
that his appellate rights be reinstated nunc pro tunc. The court granted
Coffer’s request, and this timely appeal followed.
Counsel for Coffer identifies the following issues in his Anders brief:
1. Whether [Coffer] knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
entered his guilty plea, when he did not understand the
terms of the plea bargain?
2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain [Coffer’s]
conviction…on the charge of Robbery-Threat of
Immediate Serious Injury?
Anders Brief at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We must first determine whether counsel has satisfied the procedural
requirements for withdrawing as counsel. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin,
928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc) (stating that “[w]hen faced
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2 73 P.S. § 517.8(a)(2), 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16)(32), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§
3701(a)(1)(ii), 2706(a)(1), 3921(a), 3925(a), 2705, 3922(a)(3), 4101(a)(2),
and 4106(a)(3), respectively.
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with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of any
possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s request to
withdraw”). In order to withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel
has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2)
furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise
the defendant that he or she has the right to retain private
counsel or raise additional arguments that the defendant
deems worthy of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc). Further, in the Anders brief, counsel seeking to withdraw must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the
record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that
the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the
relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or
statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the
responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the
proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal
is in fact wholly frivolous.” Id. at 355, n.5 (quoting Commonwealth v.
McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185, 1187 (Pa. 1981)).
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Here, we find that counsel has complied with all of the above technical
requirements.3 In his Anders brief, counsel has provided a summary of the
procedural history and facts of the case with citations to the record. Further,
counsel’s brief includes two issues that could arguably support the appeal, and
counsel’s assessment of why those issues are frivolous, with citations to the
record and relevant legal authority. In addition, counsel served Coffer with a
copy of the Anders brief and advised him of his right to proceed pro se or
retain a private attorney to raise any additional points he deemed worthy of
this Court’s review. Petition to Withdraw, 11/12/19, at ¶ 23. Coffer has not
responded to counsel’s petition to withdraw. As we find counsel has met the
technical requirements of Anders and Santiago, we will proceed to determine
if the issues counsel identified are wholly frivolous.
The first issue presented in counsel’s Anders brief is whether Coffer
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his guilty plea when he
allegedly did not understand the terms of the plea bargain. Anders Br. at 2.
Initially at the guilty plea and sentencing proceeding, the Commonwealth
believed that the plea bargain agreed to by the parties was for an aggregate
sentence of seven to 14 years of incarceration, whereas Coffer asserted that
the plea bargain was for an aggregate sentence of six to 12 years in prison.
N.T., 9/12/17, at 2-3. However, the Commonwealth acknowledged that it was
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3We note that this is counsel’s second Petition to Withdraw as Counsel. We
denied counsel’s first Petition to Withdraw as Counsel on October 22, 2019,
without prejudice, for failing to set forth his reasons for concluding that the
appeal was frivolous.
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mistaken and agreed that the plea bargain was, in fact, for six to 12 years in
prison. Id. at 4-5. Coffer stated he was satisfied with the plea bargain and
said, “Well of course I’m going to say yes” to the Commonwealth’s offer. Id.
at 3. The court completed the guilty plea colloquy and accepted the plea, and
imposed the agreed-upon sentence. Id. at 9-10.
To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 522 (Pa.Super. 2003). The court
therefore must conduct an on-the-record inquiry to determine whether the
plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered. Commonwealth v.
Hodges, 789 A.2d 764, 765 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citing Pa. R.Crim.P. 590(a)).
The court must develop a record that affirmatively shows that the defendant
understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which the defendant is pleading
guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) the right to a jury trial; (4) the
presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of potential sentences
and fines; and (6) that the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement
unless it accepts it. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013
(Pa.Super. 2016). There is a presumption that a plea was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary, and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise.
Pollard, 832 A.2d at 523.
In deciding whether a guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary, a court is free to consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the entry of the plea. Commonwealth v. Allen, 732 A.2d 582,
588-89 (Pa. 1999). Further, a defendant who elects to plead guilty is required
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to answer all questions during the plea colloquy truthfully and may not later
assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict the defendant’s
statements during the colloquy. Pollard, 832 A.2d at 523.
Here, Coffer executed a written guilty plea form wherein he stated that
he understood that he did not have to plead guilty, he had the right to a trial,
the Commonwealth bore the burden at trial of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and he was presumed innocent until proven guilty. The trial
court also conducted an on-the-record colloquy in which Coffer acknowledged
that he completed the guilty plea form and understood all the rights he was
giving up, including his right to go to trial. N.T., 9/12/17, at 6. He admitted
that he was a repeat felony offender, and stated that because he had
previously pled guilty in other cases “quite a few times,” he was familiar with
the plea bargain process. Id. Coffer said he was taking two medications but
that they did not affect his ability to understand what was happening; rather,
he “absolutely” knew what was occurring. Id. at 5-6.
The court then questioned Coffer about the facts of each case and Coffer
admitted to committing the crimes. Coffer explicitly admitted robbing a gas
station while falsely claiming to have a weapon, failing to build roofs on two
houses after receiving payment, stealing a credit card and using it at various
stores and ATMs, and possessing drug paraphernalia. Id. at 6-9.
Upon review, we find the trial court made the required inquiries and the
record provides no basis for concluding that Coffer’s guilty plea was not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The sentence imposed was entirely
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consistent with the terms of the plea agreement and there were no defects in
the plea colloquy. Coffer unequivocally testified during the colloquy that he
entered into the plea agreement voluntarily and understood its terms, and
those statements bind him. Pollard, 832 A.2d at 523. Accordingly, Coffer’s
claim that he did not understand the terms of the plea agreement is frivolous.
The second issue presented in counsel’s Anders brief is whether there
was sufficient evidence to sustain Coffer’s conviction for robbery-threat of
serious bodily injury. Anders Br. at 2. However, Coffer’s guilty plea acted as
a waiver of any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and had the effect
of admitting all the elements of the robbery charge.4 See Commonwealth v.
Tareila, 895 A.2d 1266, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“The entry of a guilty plea
constitutes a waiver of all defects and defenses except lack of jurisdiction,
invalidity of the plea, and illegality of the sentence”). Indeed, Coffer explicitly
admitted at the guilty plea hearing all of the facts necessary to sustain his
robbery conviction:
THE COURT: There’s a robbery charge, Graft Sunoco,
Connellsville.
[COFFER]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: By Bud Murphy’s?
[COFFER]: Yes, sir.
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4 The crime of robbery-threat of serious bodily injury is defined as follows: “A
person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he…threatens
another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily
injury[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
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THE COURT: $124.00?
[COFFER]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: What exactly did you do?
[COFFER]: I was sick that day. I wanted more drugs and
walked in there and told the, asked the attendant if he was
closed for the evening, he said no. I warned him I had a
weapon and kind of like acted like I did and asked that he
give me the money and he did.
THE COURT: But you didn’t have a weapon.
[COFFER]: No, sir.
N.T., 9/12/17, at 6-7.
As previously discussed, any claim that Coffer’s guilty plea was not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is frivolous. Thus, he has waived his right
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, and the second issue
is frivolous.
We therefore agree with Coffer’s counsel that the issues counsel
identified are wholly frivolous, and our independent review of the record has
disclosed no non-frivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s petition to
withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/25/2020
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