Com. v. Hyman, F. ( 2020 )

J-A28029-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
FRANK HYMAN
Appellant No. 186 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered December 19, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0002579-2007
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J. FILED MAY 20, 2020
Appellant, Frank Hyman, appeals from an order dismissing his petition
for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546, without a hearing. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows:
On December 19, 2006, around noon, Todd Yow was sitting on
the porch of his West Philadelphia home with Timothy “Boo Boo”
Scott, the victim, and a third man named “Keen.” From the porch,
Scott saw [Appellant] drive by in a silver Hyundai. Minutes later,
[Appellant] parked the car around the corner and, accompanied
by his friend Leon “Gutty” Blackball and a third man, walked to
Yow’s house in search of the victim.
As they approached, someone in [Appellant]’s group said, “There
go that ‘N’ word right there,” and [Appellant] said, “This lititle
motherfucker was supposed to be trying to kill me.” Scott replied,
“No, not me.” Undeterred by Scott’s plea, [Appellant] armed
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A28029-19
himself with a .380 semiautomatic handgun and, along with one
of his cohorts, shot at Scott more than ten times from five feet
away. During the ambush, [Appellant] shot Scott through his face
and hand. Although two men were shooting at him at the time,
Scott was “absolutely” sure that [Appellant] was the one who shot
him “[b]ecause he was the main one that [the victim] was
focusing on and he was doing the talking.” After shooting Scott
in the face, [Appellant] and his cohorts fled.
Yow immediately called the police while Scott frantically ran
through Yow’s house, leaving a trail of blood behind him.
Eventually Scott reemerged from the front door and Yow gave him
a towel to hold over his bloodied face until an ambulance arrived
to take him to a hospital. Scott later underwent surgery,
permanently lost four teeth, and could not eat solid food for more
than a month.
Yow and Scott testified to similar versions of events while
[Appellant] testified to an entirely different set of events.
According to [Appellant], he had gone to see Scott because he
thought Scott was “probably in some type of trouble.” When he
arrived, Scott supposedly accused [Appellant] of having gotten
Scott into trouble with his mother. [Appellant] testified that he
was intimate with Scott’s mother at the time of the shooting.
[Appellant] testified that when he turned to leave the argument,
he heard gunshots behind him. He then returned with his
companions to his car, where they regrouped and one man
allegedly confessed to [Appellant] that he shot Scott. In spite of
[Appellant]’s reluctance to be a “snitch”, he stated at trial that his
friend, Leon “Cutty” Blackball, told him that he, Blackball, was the
shooter as they drove away from the scene. [Appellant]
nonetheless chose to give Blackball and the third man a ride to
the 5200 block of Greenwall Street in Philadelphia, where the
other men took the gun used in the shooting from the car because,
[Appellant] explained, “I wasn’t going to [let them] leave it with
me.”
The car [Appellant] was driving and claimed to own was stolen.
Carol Ann Sucharski testified that sometime before December 1,
2006, she lent her car to another person but it was never
returned. She reported the car stolen to police, who later
recovered it in Philadelphia on January 13, 2007. When police
returned the car to Sucharski, she found a loaded .380 handgun,
[Appellant]’s driver’s license, a retail-store card, an appointment
-2-
J-A28029-19
card, and so much clutter that the car “looked lived in.” She
immediately called the police, who went to her home to recover
the items. Thereafter, the police questioned Scott about
Sucharski’s car. He positively identified it from photographs as
the car that [Appellant] was driving just before [Appellant] shot
him.
On December 10, 2010, a jury sitting before the Honorable Ellen
Ceisler found [Appellant] guilty of attempted murder and
aggravated assault.1 On April 21, 2011, after reviewing the
presentence report and a mental health evaluation, Judge Ceisler
sentenced [Appellant] to 20 to 40 years’ incarceration for
attempted murder.2 [Appellant] filed an appeal. On October 25,
2013, the Superior Court affirmed [Appellant]’s judgment of
sentence. [Appellant] filed a petition for allocator to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on March 18,
2014.
On August 5, 2014, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA petition. On
May 3, 2016, [Appellant] filed an Amended PCRA petition. On
February 10, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a Motion to Dismiss.
On June 26, 2017, Judge Ceisler dismissed [Appellant]’s PCRA
petition. [Appellant] appealed the dismissal. On June 26, 2018,
the Superior Court remanded [Appellant]’s PCRA petition because
the PCRA Court failed to send a [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907 Notice of Intent
to Dismiss prior to dismissing [Appellant]’s PCRA petition. On
September 26, 2018, this case was administratively assigned to
this Court. On November 20, 2018, following a thorough review
of the record, this Court sent [Appellant] a [Rule] 907 Notice of
Intent to Dismiss. On December 17, 2018, [Appellant] filed a
Response to the [Rule] 907 Notice. On December 19, 2018, this
Court dismissed [Appellant]’s PCRA petition for lack of merit. On
January 16, 2019, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal.
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/29/19, at 2-4 (record citations omitted).
____________________________________________
1 The jury found Appellant not guilty of possession of an instrument of crime.
It also made a special finding that Scott suffered serious bodily injury.
2 Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction merged for purposes of
sentencing.
-3-
J-A28029-19
Appellant raises two issues in this appeal:
I. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
petition alleging trial counsel and/or appellate counsel was
ineffective.
II. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA petition
without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the
amended PCRA petition regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Appellant’s Brief at 8.
A petitioner may obtain relief under the PCRA by pleading and proving
“ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular
case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9543(a)(2)(ii). Counsel’s effectiveness is presumed, and the petitioner bears
the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Urwin, 219 A.3d 167,
172 (Pa. Super. 2019). To establish ineffectiveness of counsel, the petitioner
must plead and prove: (1) his underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2)
counsel’s actions lacked any reasonable basis; and (3) counsel’s actions
prejudiced him. Id. Failure to satisfy any of these three prongs requires
dismissal of the claim. Id.The petitioner establishes prejudice by demonstrating that “counsel’s
chosen course of action had an adverse effect on the outcome of the
proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (Pa. 2002).
“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
-4-
J-A28029-19
different.” Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[A] criminal defendant alleging
prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id.When reviewing a PCRA order, we examine whether the record supports
the PCRA court’s factual findings and whether its legal conclusions are free
from error. Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 206 (Pa. 2016).
We view the PCRA court’s findings and evidence of record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121,
131 (Pa. 2012). The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported
by the record, are binding, but we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions
de novo. Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 2013). The
petitioner has the burden of persuading us that the PCRA court erred and that
such error requires relief. Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144-
45 (Pa. 2018).
At the time of trial, Scott, the victim, was charged with robbery and
other felonies at CP-51-CR-0001938-2011 and was awaiting his preliminary
hearing. In his first claim of ineffectiveness, Appellant claims that trial counsel
negligently failed to cross-examine Scott about whether he was promised
anything on his pending charges in return for testifying against Appellant.
Appellant argues that cross-examination on this subject would have disclosed
Scott’s potential bias in favor of the Commonwealth. Although Appellant’s
-5-
J-A28029-19
argument has some theoretical appeal, no relief is due because he cannot
demonstrate prejudice.
There is no evidence that the Commonwealth promised any leniency to
Scott. Nevertheless, defense counsel should have asked Scott “whether he
expected or hoped for favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony.”
Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826, 840 (Pa. Super. 1997). This
is because “even if no actual promises of leniency have been made, a witness
may hope for favorable treatment from the prosecutor if the witness presently
testifies in a way that is helpful to the prosecution.” Id. at 839-40 (citing
Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 1986)).
Nevertheless, Appellant cannot establish prejudice, because Yow, an
independent eyewitness, testified credibly and unequivocally that Appellant
shot Scott. Appellant was unable to establish that Yow harbored any bias
against him. Indeed, Appellant admitted that he had no problem with Yow
and “didn’t even know him.” N.T., 12/9/10, at 23-24. Conspicuously absent
from Appellant’s brief is any mention of Yow’s testimony. Appellant’s Brief at
17-18. For this reason, counsel’s failure to cross-examine Scott does not
undermine confidence in the outcome of this case. See Commonwealth v.
Beasley, 678 A.2d 773, 783 (Pa. 1996) (in homicide case, PCRA petitioner’s
claim that Commonwealth concealed plea agreement with eyewitness did not
warrant relief; eyewitness’s testimony was not essential to truth-determining
-6-
J-A28029-19
process, because two other credible witnesses unequivocally testified
petitioner was the shooter).
In his next claim of ineffectiveness, Appellant argues that defense
counsel erred by stipulating to the fact that Appellant had two juvenile
adjudications for felony theft. We disagree.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609 provides in relevant part:
(a) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime, whether
by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo contendere, must be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement.
(b) This subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed
since the witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it,
whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if:
(1) its probative value substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect; and
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable
written notice of the intent to use it so that the party
has a fair opportunity to contest its use.
Id. Under Rule 609, “where the date of conviction or last date of confinement
is within ten years of the trial, evidence of the conviction of a crimen falsi is
per se admissible.” Comment, Pa.R.E. 609.
The trial court properly admitted Appellant’s theft adjudications under
Rule 609. Theft is a crime of dishonesty. Commonwealth v. Cole, —A.3d
—, 2020 WL 400234, *3 (Pa. Super., Jan. 24. 2020) (citing Commonwealth
v. LaMassa, 532 A.2d 450, 452 (Pa. Super. 1987)). Juvenile adjudications
for crimen falsi are admissible for impeachment purposes. Commonwealth
-7-
J-A28029-19
v. McKeever, 689 A.2d 272, 274 (Pa. Super. 1997). Appellant testified in his
own defense during trial and admitted that he was released from confinement
from his juvenile theft adjudications less than ten years before trial. N.T.,
12/8/10, at 105-06. Moreover, the trial court correctly instructed the jury
that these adjudications were only admissible to help the jury assess the
credibility of his testimony. N.T., 12/9/10, at 95-96.
Appellant suggests that juvenile adjudications entered more than ten
years before trial, such as his theft adjudications, are more prejudicial than
probative. Appellant’s Brief at 19. We disagree. Under Rule 609, the court
need only balance the prejudice of crimen falsi evidence against its probative
value when more than ten years have passed since the witness’s adjudication
or confinement. Pa.R.E. 609(b). Since Appellant was released from
confinement for his theft adjudications less than ten years before trial, his
adjudications were per se admissible. Comment, Pa.R.E. 609.
Appellant also claims that introduction of the adjudications was
unnecessary because the court instructed the jury that it could gauge
Appellant’s credibility by considering his interest in the outcome of the case,
and this instruction “served the same purpose” as the adjudications. Id.Appellant cites no law for this proposition; nor do we know of any. In our
view, it was permissible to introduce Appellant’s adjudications and to instruct
the jury concerning Appellant’s interest in the outcome of the case.
-8-
J-A28029-19
Next, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth had other ways to
attack his credibility without introducing his prior adjudications. Id. Appellant
does not describe what alternatives the Commonwealth had—and even if other
alternatives existed, the Commonwealth still had the right to attack
Appellant’s credibility through all valid means at its disposal, including his theft
adjudications.
In his third claim of ineffectiveness, Appellant argues that his attorney
on direct appeal failed to object to the trial court’s “inappropriate” comments
and the prosecutor’s “misstatements” at sentencing. Appellant also argues
that direct appeal counsel failed to raise mitigating factors that warranted a
shorter sentence. No relief is due.
At sentencing, the trial court applied the deadly weapons enhancement
to the Sentencing Guidelines, stating: “It’s not even prima facie, it’s beyond a
reasonable doubt in my personal opinion, why did the jury not find him not
guilty of the gun? Frankly, I just don’t know. So for this reason, I believe the
deadly weapon enhancement is applicable in this case.” N.T., 4/21/11, at 12.
Appellant argues that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the court’s expression of its “personal feelings.” Appellant’s Brief at 20.
According to Appellant, the deadly weapons enhancement was inapplicable
since the jury had acquitted Appellant of possession of an instrument of crime,
regardless of the court’s personal feelings.
-9-
J-A28029-19
PCRA relief is unavailable when an issue is “previously litigated.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). An issue is previously litigated when, inter alia, “the
highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a
matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9544(a)(2).
Appellant’s objection to direct appeal counsel’s failure to challenge the
court’s comment fails because this issue was previously litigated on direct
appeal. Direct appeal counsel argued in her appellate brief that the trial court
erred by imposing the deadly weapon enhancement at sentencing. The trial
court reasoned in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion that the deadly weapon
enhancement applied, citing the same “beyond a reasonable doubt” comment
that Appellant objects to presently. Trial Ct. Op., 2/21/12, at 11. This Court
held on direct appeal that the trial court “adequately addressed and properly
rejected the merits of this claim of sentencing error.” Commonwealth v.
Hyman, 1422 EDA 2011, at 4 (Pa. Super., Oct. 25, 2013) (unpublished
memorandum). In effect, we ruled that the trial court’s comment at
sentencing was proper. Moreover, this Court is the “highest appellate court
in which Appellant could have had review” of this issue “as a matter of right.”
- 10 -
J-A28029-19
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2). Thus, Appellant’s present argument is simply a
rehash of a sentencing issue that has been previously litigated.3
Next, Appellant argues that the prosecutor made multiple
misstatements during sentencing that direct appeal counsel failed to
challenge. We address each statement below.
During sentencing, the prosecutor stated that (1) Appellant attempted
to intimidate Scott into recanting his accusation against Appellant, (2)
Appellant was playing games with the justice system, (3) Appellant’s
____________________________________________
3 We also note in dicta that application of the deadly weapons enhancement
did not violate Appellant’s rights under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
99 (2013), or Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). As this Court
explained:
In both [Alleyne and Apprendi], the Supreme Court determined
that certain sentencing factors were considered elements of the
underlying crime, and thus, to comply with the dictates of the
Sixth Amendment, must be submitted to the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt instead being determined by the
sentencing judge. However, this inquiry is not relevant to our
case because of the nature of the DWE.
Alleyne and Apprendi dealt with factors that either increased the
mandatory minimum sentence or increased the prescribed
sentencing range beyond the statutory maximum, respectively.
Our case does not involve either situation; instead, we are dealing
with a sentencing enhancement. If the enhancement applies, the
sentencing court is required to raise the standard guideline range;
however, the court retains the discretion to sentence outside the
guideline range. Therefore, neither of the situations addressed in
Alleyne and Apprendi are implicated.
Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1270 n.10 (Pa. Super.
2014).
- 11 -
J-A28029-19
witnesses at trial were liars, and (4) Appellant himself lied on the witness
stand during trial. N.T., 4/21/11, at 15-17. The trial record provided ample
reason for the prosecutor to make these statements. Both Appellant and Scott
were incarcerated as Appellant was awaiting trial in this case. Scott’s
statement to police, implicating Appellant in the shooting, circulated around
the prison, which, Scott explained, potentially put his life in jeopardy. One
month before trial, several inmates forced Scott to sign a phony statement
purporting to repudiate his allegations against Appellant. N.T., 12/07/10, at
82-85, 96-100. Appellant attempted to corroborate this phony repudiation
through defense witness Dexter Newsuan, who testified, inter alia, that (1) he
watched the shooting; (2) Appellant was not the shooter; and (3) Scott
confided to him in prison in October 2009 that he had lied about Appellant
being the shooter. In rebuttal, the Commonwealth presented evidence that
Newsuan and Scott were incarcerated in different facilities in October 2009,
belying Newsuan’s testimony about meeting Scott in prison. N.T., 12/8/10,
at 115, 158-60; N.T., 12/09/10, at 62-64. Finally, Appellant testified in his
own defense and made the dubious assertion that he was with Scott when he
heard (but did not see) someone else shoot Scott. N.T., 12/9/10, at 5-9, 14,
24, 29, 57. Given this evidence, the prosecutor was well within his authority
when he told the court at sentencing that Appellant attempted to intimidate
Scott and to corrupt the judicial process with Newsuan’s and his own false
testimony.
- 12 -
J-A28029-19
The prosecutor stated that Appellant had access to weapons while on
the run after the shooting. N.T., 4/21/11, at 17. Once again, the trial record
supports this statement. The evidence shows that Appellant was driving a
stolen Hyundai that belonged to Carol Ann Sucharski. N.T., 12/7/10, at 127-
28. The car was stolen several weeks before the shooting, and Philadelphia
police recovered the car several weeks after the shooting. Id. Inside the car
was Appellant’s license and BJ’s card. N.T., 12/8/10, at 15-16. When the
police returned the car to Sucharski, she found a gun in the vehicle that did
not belong to her. N.T., 12/7/10, at 127-28. She returned the gun to the
police. Id. This evidence supports the prosecutor’s position that Appellant
was on the run after the shooting and had access to at least one weapon
during that time. While the prosecutor stated that Appellant had access to
“weapons” during this time period, we cannot see how this minor discrepancy
prejudiced Appellant.
The prosecutor remarked that it looked like Appellant was living out of
a stolen car because he knew he was wanted for the shooting. N.T., 4/21/11,
at 18. Sucharski’s trial testimony supports this remark. Sucharski testified
that when she reacquired her car, “it was junked up. It looked lived in. There
was various items, men’s and women’s clothing, food, trash, identification,
specifically, ID with [Appellant’s name] on it . . .” N.T., 12/7/10, at 127. This
testimony, combined with the fact that Appellant was not arrested until three
- 13 -
J-A28029-19
days after the shooting, indicates that he was living in the car during that
time.
The prosecutor stated that Appellant’s criminal record shows that he is
a violent person, since he has a weapons conviction for which he was on
probation at the time of the shooting, nine adult arrests with one county
sentence, and five juvenile arrests with four adjudications of delinquency and
multiple commitments to juvenile facilities. N.T., 4/21/11, at 18-19.
Appellant complains that the Commonwealth did not allege or prove this claim
during trial. The simple answer is that Appellant’s prior criminal record would
have been inadmissible during trial, and its introduction likely would have been
reversible error. Moreover, the trial court stated that it reviewed Appellant’s
pre-sentence investigation report prior to sentencing, id. at 2, so it would
have known about Appellant’s criminal history even if the prosecutor had not
mentioned it. Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa. Super.
2014) (“[where] the trial court has the benefit of a pre-sentence report, we
presume that the court was aware of relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with any
mitigating factors”).
The prosecutor argued that there were strike marks on both the house
to the left and to the right of the house, and one bullet went through the
window of the neighbor’s house and lodged into the sofa. N.T., 4/21/11, at
14. The record demonstrates that there were strike marks at one residence,
- 14 -
J-A28029-19
874 North Markoe Street, but not multiple residences. N.T., 12/8/10, at 29-
31 (Detective Park’s testimony concerning strike marks). There was no
evidence that a bullet lodged in a sofa inside a neighbor’s residence. Appellant
does not explain, however, how the prosecutor’s inaccuracies prejudiced him.
Nor do we discern any prejudice, since the core evidence clearly establishes
that Appellant attempted to murder Scott by shooting him. Commonwealth
v. Rios, 920 A.2d 790, 808-09 (Pa. 2007) (PCRA petitioner claimed that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor’s argument
that lack of shell casing at murder scene indicated calculated execution of
conspiracy to murder decedent; although there was no evidence that
petitioner or his accomplice removed shell casing from scene, petitioner was
not entitled to relief because no prejudice arose from this minor addition to
prosecutor’s argument).
The prosecutor stated, “And I would gather, although no one fully
admitted this,” that the dispute between Appellant and Scott “was over
drugs.” N.T., 4/21/11, at 15. The prosecutor candidly admitted that he had
no evidence to support this assertion, and that he was merely drawing an
inference as to the cause of the dispute from the circumstances. Since the
prosecutor admitted that he was only drawing an inference instead of
declaring facts, we see nothing alarming about his argument. More
importantly, we cannot see how the prosecutor’s statement prejudiced
- 15 -
J-A28029-19
Appellant, because even if Appellant had a different motive, his heinous crime
warranted the lengthy sentence meted out by the court.
Next, Appellant argues that direct appeal counsel failed to raise relevant
mitigating factors that warranted a shorter sentence. This argument fails
because Appellant fails to identify which mitigating factors direct appeal
counsel should have raised. Moreover, (1) as observed above, the trial court
reviewed Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation, (2) defense counsel argued
at length for a standard guidelines sentence, N.T., 4/21/11, at 17-23, and (3)
both defense counsel and direct appeal counsel argued that the deadly
weapons enhancement should not apply. Given all of these safeguards, and
given the heinous nature of Appellant’s crime, we have no reason to question
the trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing Appellant to twenty to
forty years’ imprisonment.
Finally, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s petition. As the foregoing discussion
demonstrates, it is clear from the record that none of Appellant’s claims
warrant relief. Thus, no evidentiary hearing was necessary.
Order affirmed.
- 16 -
J-A28029-19
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/20/2020
- 17 -