Com. v. Alexander, L. ( 2020 )

J-A26045-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LOUIS ALEXANDER :
:
Appellant : No. 1309 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005336-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 09, 2020
Appellant, Louis Alexander, appeals from the June 30, 2020, order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which dismissed
Appellant’s first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, without an evidentiary hearing. After a careful
review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant was
arrested on October 17, 2012, and charged with various offenses, including
first-degree murder, in the death of Daquan Windley. Represented by
counsel, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on August 10, 2015. This Court
has previously summarized the evidence from Appellant’s jury trial as follows:
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A26045-20
On May 4, 2012, Daquan Windley was standing outside of a
bar at 15th and Huntingdon Streets in Philadelphia. Mr. Windley
walked across the street to the trunk of a vehicle where a couple
of people had gathered. [Appellant] came across the street and
shot Windley several times. Windley ran down the street and
[Appellant] chased him and shot him two more times. Daquan
Windley collapsed on a porch. The police responded, and upon
finding Windley[,] they scoop[ed] him up and t[ook] him to
Temple Hospital. Fourteen days later Windley succumbed to his
wounds and died. Although a complaint was filed on June 13,
2012, [Appellant] was not apprehended until October 17, 2012[.]
***
There were numerous surveillance cameras in, as well as
outside the bar at 15th and Huntingdon Streets. The jury was able
to see [Appellant] as well as the decedent in the bar and when
each of them left the bar. Windley stands outside of the bar and
[Appellant] goes to the corner where a car pulls up and hands
[Appellant] an object which is not discernable in the video.
[Appellant] then crosses the street to where the decedent was
standing with a few other people and shoots Windley several
times. [Appellant] continues to shoot the decedent as he runs up
the street. (N.T. 8/17/2015, pp. 8-13).
In addition to the tape-recording of the murder, the parties
stipulated that the individual in the video wearing the tan hooded
jacket and blue jeans was [Appellant]. This is the individual [who]
is shown inside and outside of the bar, crossing the street and
approaching the decedent immediately prior to the gunshots, and
running after the decedent with his arm extended while hearing
more shots. (N.T. 8/11/2015, pp. 18, 79-80, 83-88; N.T.
8/12/2015, p. 2). The medical examiner testified as to the cause
of death and that the wounds received by the decedent were
consistent with the video. (N.T. 8/11/2015, pp. 83-88). Tyreeke
Smith was at the scene of the murder shooting dice, and although
when he testified he claimed not to recall what happened that
evening, his statement on the morning following the murder
declares that he saw “Louie” go up to the decedent and shoot
[him], then run back, past Smith with a gun in his hand. (N.T.
8/12/2015, pp. 18-20, 23-24). Reginald Green also testified that
he was outside of the bar at the time of the shooting, and although
he did not see the shooting, he did see [Appellant] running away
after the crime. (N.T. 8/12/2015, pp. 106-109). Detective
Marano told the jury about interviewing Tyreeke Smith following
the incident and how that eyewitness had stated he had seen the
-2-
J-A26045-20
entire incident including [Appellant] walking up to the decedent
and firing four or five shots and then as Windley runs away,
[Appellant] chasing after him and firing three or four more shots.
(N.T. 8/12/2015, pp. 121-123).
Commonwealth v. Alexander, No. 1404 EDA 2016, at 2, 5 (Pa.Super. filed
7/10/17) (unpublished memorandum) (citation omitted).
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree
murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and possessing an instrument of
crime. On December 18, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate of life in prison, and Appellant filed a timely, counseled motion for
reconsideration of his sentence. The motion was denied by operation of law.
Appellant filed a timely direct appeal, and this Court affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence on July 10, 2017.1 Appellant filed a petition for
allowance of appeal, which our Supreme Court denied on December 5, 2017.
On September 26, 2018, Appellant filed a timely, counseled PCRA
petition, and on December 29, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a motion to
dismiss, to which PCRA counsel filed a response. On March 2, 2020, the PCRA
court provided Appellant with notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition
without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
____________________________________________
1 On appeal, Appellant contended the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions, and the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We
found no merit to either claim.
-3-
J-A26045-20
On June 30, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition,
and this timely, counseled appeal followed on July 7, 2020. All Pa.R.A.P. 1925
requirements have been met.
On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of
Questions Presented” (verbatim):
1. Did the PCRA court err in summarily dismissing the claim that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial
court’s failure to repudiate its error in instructing the jury that
“if the Commonwealth’s evidence does not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, then your verdict
should be guilty,” in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution?
2. Did the PCRA court err in summarily dismissing the claim that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a litany of
comments by the trial prosecutor improperly referring to facts
not in evidence and vouching for the credibility of his witnesses
and the integrity of the case, in violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 3 (suggested answers omitted).
Initially, as a general proposition, we note “[o]ur standard of review of
the denial of PCRA relief is clear; we are limited to determining whether the
PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and without legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Wojtaszek, 951 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(quotation marks and quotation omitted).
Further, inasmuch as Appellant’s claims present allegations of
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, we apply the following well-
established legal principles:
-4-
J-A26045-20
In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or
sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated
circumstances found in Section 9543(a)(2), which includes the
ineffective assistance of counsel. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)(i).
It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective, and
to rebut that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency
prejudiced him. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, the
petitioner has the burden to prove that (1) the underlying
substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose
effectiveness is being challenged did not have a reasonable basis
for his or her actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner
suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance.
The failure to satisfy any one of the prongs will cause the entire
claim to fail.
Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915, 919–20 (Pa.Super. 2016)
(quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted).
We need not analyze the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim
in any particular order. Rather, we may discuss first any prong
that an appellant cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the
applicable facts and circumstances of the case. [C]ounsel cannot
be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 635 Pa. 665, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (2016)
(citations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d
409, 419 (2009) (“A failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test
requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.”).
Further,
To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different. [A] reasonable probability is a probability that is
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding.
-5-
J-A26045-20
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (2014) (citations,
quotation marks, and quotations omitted).
In his first claim, Appellant contends trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to object properly to an erroneous jury instruction regarding the
Commonwealth’s burden of proving guilt, as well as to the supplemental
instruction given by the trial court.
During its charge to the jury, it is undisputed that the trial court initially
misread a sentence in the instruction pertaining to the Commonwealth’s
burden of proving Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Relevantly,
the trial court stated the following:
Now a fundamental principle of our system of criminal law
is that a Defendant is presumed to be innocent. The mere fact
that a Defendant is arrested and is accused of a crime is not any
evidence against him. Furthermore, a Defendant is presumed
innocent throughout the trial and unless and until you conclude,
based on a careful and impartial consideration of the evidence,
that the Commonwealth has proven him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
It is not a Defendant’s burden to prove that he is not guilty.
Instead, it is the Commonwealth that always has the burden of
proving each and every element of the crime charged and that the
Defendant is guilty of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The
person accused of a crime is not required to present evidence or
to prove anything in his own defense.
If the Commonwealth’s evidence fails to meet its burden,
then your verdict must be not guilty; on the other hand, if the
Commonwealth’s evidence does not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty, then your
verdict should be guilty.
Although the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that
the Defendant is guilty, this does not mean that the
Commonwealth must prove its case beyond all doubt and to a
-6-
J-A26045-20
mathematical certainty nor must it demonstrate the complete
impossibility of innocence.
***
So to summarize: You may not find the Defendant guilty
based on a mere suspicion of guilt. The Commonwealth has the
burden of proving the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. If it meets that burden, then the Defendant is no longer
presumed innocent and you should find him guilty; on the other
hand, if the Commonwealth does not meet its burden, then you
must find him not guilty.
N.T., 8/17/15, at 152-53 (bold added).
In response to the bolded sentence, trial counsel objected at the
conclusion of the trial court’s instruction as follows:
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Judge,…when you started talking about the
weight of the evidence, et cetera, et cetera, I honestly think you
got it backward. I think you said if they are not convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt and the DA didn’t prove it, then the verdict
must be guilty. I actually think you said that. I think you got it
backward.
[ADA]: Is it more productive to highlight it?
THE COURT: If they are not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt, then they must find the Defendant not guilty.
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: All right.
THE COURT: If they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt,
then they should find him guilty.
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: That’s fine.
THE COURT: I will do that.
Id. at 179-80 (bold in original).
The trial court then gave the following supplemental instruction to the
jury:
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I want to reiterate. If the
Commonwealth has not proven each and every element of the
-7-
J-A26045-20
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
Defendant not guilty. If, on the other hand, the Commonwealth
has proved each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you should find the Defendant guilty.
Id. at 180-81 (bold in original).
Appellant contends the trial court’s supplemental jury instruction did not
“cure” the error contained in the initial instruction. In this vein, Appellant
contends the trial court caused confusion by indicating it was “reiterating” the
Commonwealth’s burden when, in fact, the trial court should have
“repudiated” the initial erroneous instruction regarding the Commonwealth’s
burden. Accordingly, Appellant avers trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
request that the trial court specifically repudiate its initial misstated instruction
and/or in failing to object to the trial court’s supplemental instruction. We
conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
The scope of appellate review of a jury charge for reversible
and prejudicial error requires that the charge be evaluated and
considered as a whole. The general effect of the jury charge
controls because error will not be predicated upon isolated
excerpts from the charge. Further, a trial court’s deviation from
the express language of the statutory instruction or a technical
inaccuracy in the jury instruction which nevertheless adequately,
accurately, and clearly expresses the law to the jury will not
mandate reversal.
Commonwealth v. Trill, 543 A.2d 1106, 1114 (Pa.Super. 1988) (citations
omitted).
Here, there is no dispute the trial court erroneously added the word
“not” to a sentence in the excerpt of the instruction bolded supra.
Furthermore, there is no dispute trial counsel properly brought the
-8-
J-A26045-20
misstatement to the trial court’s attention and ensured the trial court
emphasized the proper burden of proof in a supplemental instruction.
Viewing the charge as a whole, and considering the trial court repeated
the instruction on the Commonwealth’s burden of proof correctly to the jury
numerous other times throughout the charge, we find no prejudicial error.
See Trill, 543 A.2d at 1114 (“It would be fatuous to require a trial judge to
perform…a lengthy charge flawlessly on each attempt.”). Moreover, the trial
court had broad discretion in phrasing the supplemental instruction, so long
as the law was clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury.
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 553 Pa. 648, 720 A.2d 473 (1998). We conclude
such occurred in this case, and therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on
his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
In his next claim, Appellant contends trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to object to various instances of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred
during the prosecutor’s opening and closing statements.
Before elaborating on the specifics of Appellant’s claim, we
recognize that a claim of ineffective assistance grounded in trial
counsel’s failure to object to a prosecutor’s conduct may succeed
when the petitioner demonstrates that the prosecutor’s actions
violated a constitutionally or statutorily protected right, such as
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination or the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, or a
constitutional interest such as due process. To constitute a due
process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of
sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s
right to a fair trial. The touchstone is fairness of the trial, not the
culpability of the prosecutor. Finally, [n]ot every intemperate or
improper remark mandates the granting of a new
trial;…[r]eversible error occurs only when the unavoidable effect
-9-
J-A26045-20
of the challenged comments would prejudice the jurors and form
in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such
that the jurors could not weigh the evidence and render a true
verdict.
Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 36 A.3d 121, 144 (2012)
(citations, quotation marks, and quotations omitted).
Further, it is well-settled that a prosecutor has reasonable latitude
during his opening and closing arguments to advocate his case, comment on
the evidence and appropriate inferences to be drawn therefrom, respond to
arguments of opposing counsel, and fairly present the Commonwealth’s
version of the evidence to the jury with oratorical flair. See Commonwealth
v. Hanible, 612 Pa. 183, 30 A.3d 426, 465 (2011); Commonwealth v.
Kennedy, 598 Pa. 621, 959 A.2d 916 (2008). Moreover, the court must
evaluate a prosecutor’s challenged statement in the context in which it was
made. See Hanible, supra.In an effort to demonstrate the arguable merit of the ineffectiveness
claim as it relates to trial counsel’s failure to object to alleged prosecutorial
misconduct that occurred during opening statements, Appellant initially points
to the following excerpts from the prosecutor’s opening statement:
Let me go back to what I just said. This is not a murder
mystery. It is not a whodunit. You will watch him at that bar for
approximately fifty minutes before the murder, wearing his tan
hooded jacket and blue jeans and you are actually going to view
the individual, this Defendant, shoot and kill another human being
on tape and his friends, you will see on the video too, because
when homicide detectives did their investigation and realized that
the tape was there, it allowed them to identify the killer but, more
importantly, his friends who were there, who saw it and we
- 10 -
J-A26045-20
brought them to Homicide and outside of his presence
when the Defendant, their friend, wasn’t there, they told
us who did it and they told us what happened and they gave
us statements. They signed the statements, reviewed them and
said Louis did it[.]
***
I ask that you use your common sense. Each one of you
has a lifetime of experience to draw from. Each one of you comes
from somewhere different. That body of knowledge that you
accumulate during the course of your life is your common sense.
Don’t check it at that door just because this is a formal courtroom
and you are not used to sitting as jurors because when we bring
these witnesses into this courtroom, his friends, his people,
and we force them reluctantly to sit in this chair and talk
about a murder, what do you think they are going to do?
What would you expect them to do? Maybe a sudden case
of amnesia. I don’t remember. I don’t know what you are
talking about. I wasn’t there. I never said that to
detectives. I don’t know him but your common sense, as
you watch these witnesses sit here and you learn of their
allegiances to this Defendant, will tell you everything you
need to know when you evaluate their credibility and how
they behave in court because they aren’t my friends. These
are his. (Indicating).
N.T., 8/11/15, at 42-43, 44-5 (bold added).
Appellant contends the statements bolded in the first paragraph of the
excerpt above constituted prosecutorial misconduct since the prosecutor
improperly assured “the jury that the police and [the prosecutor] were on the
same side[,]” thus improperly vouching for the credibility of the police, who
investigated the murder. Moreover, Appellant contends bolded portions in
both paragraphs pertaining to the prosecutor’s characterization of the
eyewitnesses as Appellant’s “friends” was not supported by the evidence, and
therefore, the prosecutor committed misconduct in making these statements.
- 11 -
J-A26045-20
In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the PCRA court relevantly indicated:
[Appellant] alleges that this was a blatant attempt to align
the prosecutor’s office with the investigating police and thereby
vouch for the credibility of the police investigation and testimony.
Such a limited interpretation is not warranted. ‘Us’ clearly
referred to everyone who was evaluating the testimony
presented: the jurors, the court[,] as well as the attorneys….The
context was clear when the statement was [made]—that anyone
looking at the evidence presented would see that the witnesses’
testimony would show that the defendant was the murderer.
Clearly such argument was warranted and did not prejudice the
jury.
Appellant further complains that calling the witnesses
‘friends of the defendant’ was improper as that was a fact not in
evidence. The record clearly shows that this was a reasonable
inference and the prosecutor committed no misconduct by stating
such.
[For instance,] Tyreeke Smith testified that he had a friendly
relationship with the defendant although he and the decedent
were closer. In his interview with the police[,] he was asked why
he didn’t tell the police what he had seen, [and] he responded he
was scared and he “just got out of the car with Louie. Me and him
really not close like me and [Windley] was but still I be with Louie.”
(N.T. 8/12/15, p. 26). Reginald Green testified at trial “Yeah. I
know him….My friend Lou.” (N.T. 8/12/15, p. 101).
[In any event], [defense counsel] in his opening statement
clarified his position:
No matter how many times [the prosecutor] says the
fact that these witnesses are his are my client’s
friends, or his boys, or whatever, that’s not evidence
that they are my client’s friends. These are not my
client’s friends at all. The fact that they were at the
same bar that night and they may know of my client
does not make them his boys or his friends. In fact,
they have said that they were the friends of the victim,
not my client. So, again, it is not what [the
prosecutor] says. It is what you hear from that
witness stand. (N.T. 8/11/15, p. 50).
PCRA Court Opinion, filed 7/2/2020, at 12-13.
- 12 -
J-A26045-20
Accordingly, the PCRA court concluded Appellant was not entitled to
relief on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. We agree with the
PCRA court’s sound reasoning. See Johnson, supra. When read in context,
the prosecutor’s comments did not constitute improper vouching for the
credibility of the police, but were comments fairly presenting the
Commonwealth’s version of the evidence with oratorical flair. Hanible,
supra. Further, the prosecutor’s statements were supported by the evidence
and the appropriate inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. Thus, Appellant
is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Appellant next points to the following excerpt from the prosecutor’s
closing statement, which the prosecutor made immediately after playing the
videotape of the murder:
There is nobody else there at that moment in time but the
dude that we stipulated is Louie and Daquan Windley and then,
and then we talk about the evidence that’s there, we all heard
about semi-automatic weapons. What do they do when you shoot
one? It drops a fired cartridge casing rightward and rearward.
Yes, I called police officers and sometimes police
officers take things loosely and arbitrarily draw lines like
that. That is not what we do when we are dealing with life.
We do it exactly, exactly. So when officers come in here
and they make a mistake because they are human, yes,
because I wanted exact, I said, Officer Taggart, do me a
favor. Go out there and I know it is a lot to ask of you. I
will owe you a lot later. You will be on your hands and
knees at 15th and Huntingdon in the middle of the day,
looking at a piece of paper. Get it right, please. Get it right.
Any doubt? Red to red. What’s above it? Yellow to yellow.
What’s below it? Yellow to yellow, red, white, red, white, pebble,
this weird double pebble, double pebble. It is like a fingerprint
that’s out there in this random distribution of pebbles into the
- 13 -
J-A26045-20
sidewalk and, yes, they got it right, at least as it relates to this
fired cartridge casing, and where is it? Well, where would you
expect it to be? One, two, the red band and building. (Indicating).
Take me back to that video at 19:54.
Let’s see where Louis was standing as to the evidence he
left behind.
***
What you see here, it is a red building. It is the abandoned
building that we are talking about here. When he fired and those
people reacted, where is he? What is he standing in front of, and
what is he shooting, and what does that leave behind? Fired
cartridge casings.
We don’t do things arbitrarily like this. We do things
exactly and they are exactly where you would expect them to be.
N.T., 8/17/15, at 134-36 (bold added).
Appellant contends the statements bolded in the excerpt above
constituted prosecutorial misconduct since the prosecutor improperly
suggested the police and the prosecutor are aligned, thus improperly vouching
for the credibility of the police, who gathered the ballistics evidence.
Specifically, he contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility
of the police’s testimony and evidence regarding the location of the fired
cartridge casings.
In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the PCRA court relevantly stated:
A review of the entire transcript clearly shows that the
prosecutor’s remarks were a fair response to the arguments
presented by the defense. Trial counsel had attacked the
investigation by the police, strenuously arguing they failed to
prepare complete diagrams or pictures with the correct context
and that crime scene officers had gone out to the crime scene the
weekend prior to trial, attempting to fix their failure. (N.T.
8/17/15, pp. 99-109). The Commonwealth addressed trial
- 14 -
J-A26045-20
counsel’s attacks, acknowledged the deficiencies[,] and explained
what supplemental work was performed by crime scene unit
officers. The prosecution’s statements were not improper, were
made to combat the tirade against the officers in this case by the
defense in his closing, were minimal[,] and clearly were not such
as to unavoidably deny the defendant a fair trial.
PCRA Court Opinion, filed 7/2/2020, at 14.
We agree with the PCRA court’s sound reasoning. The prosecutor’s
remarks were supported by the record and fairly responded to arguments
made by defense counsel. See Hanible, supra. In this vein, we note Officer
John Taggart testified that, during trial, the prosecutor directed him to return
to the scene of the murder in order to clarify precisely where the fired cartridge
casings were located. N.T., 8/17/15, at 16-29. Thereafter, in his closing
argument, defense counsel attacked the reliability of the crime scene
investigation based, in part, on the delay and Officer Taggart’s testimony.
See N.T., 8/17/15, at 99-101. Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court
that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to this portion of the
prosecutor’s closing statement. Johnson, supra, 139 A.3d at 1272(“[C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless
claim.”).
Finally, to the extent Appellant contends the PCRA court erred in
dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing, we note that it is well-
settled that “[t]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA
petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that no genuine
issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.”
- 15 -
J-A26045-20
Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa.Super. 2008). In the case
sub judice, the PCRA court properly concluded that Appellant did not raise a
genuine issue of material fact, and there is no legitimate purpose that would
be served by further proceedings. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not abuse
its discretion in failing to hold a hearing. See id.For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of
Appellant’s first PCRA petition.
Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/9/20
- 16 -