Com. v. Akbar, S. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SALIM ABDUL AKBAR :
:
Appellant : No. 3022 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 12, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000223-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 23, 2020
Appellant, Salim Abdul Akbar, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County for, inter alia,
possession of oxycodone and possession of oxycodone and marijuana as
contraband. Appellant alleges the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress and abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance
on the morning of trial. We affirm.
Appellant has not challenged the essential facts found credible by the
suppression court, but rather, challenges the legal conclusions reached by the
suppression court. On October 6, 2016, Lower Providence Township Police
Officer Jeremy Bonner was on patrol with his certified narcotic detection dog,
Brutus. While on patrol, at 1:15 in the morning, Officer Bonner checked the
New York registration tag of a red Nissan Altima and discovered that its
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registration had expired on September 30, 2016. He pulled the Altima over.
As Officer Bonner approached the car, he smelled a strong odor of burnt
marijuana.
When Officer Bonner asked Appellant, who was the driver of the Altima,
for his paperwork, Appellant notified the officer that the car was a rental. He
told the officer that he was not named on the rental agreement and that he
did not have a copy of the rental agreement. Appellant explained that his
sister, who was not present in the car, had rented the car and that he was
due to take the rental car back to the rental agency that day. Three other
occupants were in the Altima with Appellant, including Anthony Wise, who was
in the rear seat on the driver’s side. Wise was holding a burnt, blunt-style
cigar.
Officer Bonner called for backup. When the other officers arrived at the
scene, Officer Bonner ran Appellant’s information through the system and
discovered that Appellant had a suspended license. The officers removed all
of the occupants from the car. At that time, Officer Bonner had Brutus conduct
an exterior sniff of the Altima. Brutus alerted positively for narcotics between
the front and rear passenger side doors of the car. Officer Bonner then
searched the interior of the car and found two bags of marijuana. Another
officer found a handgun in the glove compartment of the car.
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Appellant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, possession of
oxycodone, possession of oxycodone and marijuana as contraband,1 and
firearms not to be carried without a license. Appellant was formally arraigned
on February 28, 2018. Appellant ultimately retained Basil Beck, Esquire to
represent him and counsel entered his appearance on behalf of Appellant on
June 14, 2018. On December 13, 2018, Appellant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence claiming, inter alia, that Officer Bonner had not had probable
cause to search the rental car.
The trial court held a suppression hearing on March 26, 2019. As an
initial matter, the Commonwealth argued that Appellant’s suppression motion
was patently untimely. The court reserved its ruling on the timeliness issue
until after it heard the suppression evidence. The Commonwealth then argued
that Appellant had the burden of establishing that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the rented Altima and in response, defense counsel
called Appellant to the stand.
Appellant testified that his sister had rented the Altima and that he was
not listed as an authorized driver in the rental agreement. When asked for the
name of his sister, Appellant replied that the person named as the lessee on
the rental agreement was actually “not his real sister.” N.T., Suppression
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1The police found drugs on Appellant after he was brought to the Montgomery
County Correctional Facility, forming the basis for the possession of
contraband-controlled substance charge pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5123(a).
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Hearing, 3/26/19, at 7. He stated that his “sister,” who did not testify at the
suppression hearing, had given him permission to drive the car. Appellant
further testified that at the time of the stop, he was under the belief that the
rental agreement was due to expire on the Monday following the stop. He
acknowledged, however, that he had since seen a copy of the rental
agreement and it had actually expired on September 30, 2016, six days before
the stop. See id., at 8.
After Appellant testified, the Commonwealth called Officer Bonner to
testify. Officer Bonner described the circumstances surrounding the stop and
subsequent search of the rented Altima, as recounted above.
Immediately following the hearing, the trial court denied the
suppression motion on several grounds. The trial court found that the motion
was, in the first instance, untimely. It also determined that even if Appellant
had timely filed the motion, Appellant was not entitled to relief because he did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rented Altima and even if
he did, Officer Bonner had probable cause to search the Altima. The court
scheduled the matter for a jury trial.
Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted Appellant of possession of
oxycodone, possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of oxycodone
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and marijuana as contraband.2 The trial court, meanwhile, convicted Appellant
of possession of a small amount of marijuana and driving an unregistered
vehicle. The trial court sentenced Appellant to two to five years’ imprisonment
on September 11, 2019. Appellant then filed a post-sentence motion on
September 23, 2019, which the court denied four days later. On October 21,
2019, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Appellant complied with the trial
court’s directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and the court issued a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion in response.
As a threshold matter, the trial court found that Appellant’s notice of
appeal was untimely because his post-sentence motion had not been timely
filed. The trial court noted that a written post-sentence motion must ordinarily
be filed no later than ten days after the imposition of sentence. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (A)(1). Because Appellant’s judgment of sentence was
imposed on September 11, 2019 and Appellant did not file his post-sentence
motion until September 23, 2019, the trial court determined that Appellant’s
post-sentence motion was untimely. This, in turn, led the court to conclude
that his notice of appeal filed on October 21, 2019 was untimely. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (A)(3) (providing that if the defendant does not file a timely
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2The jury could not reach a decision regarding the charge of firearms not to
be carried without a license and a mistrial was therefore declared as to that
charge.
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post-sentence motion, his notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the
imposition of sentence).
As Appellant points out, however, because the tenth day after the
imposition of his sentence fell on Saturday, September 21, 2019, his post-
sentence motion filed on the following Monday was timely. See 1 Pa. C.S.A. §
1908 (excluding weekend days and legal holidays from the computation of the
time period for a filing when the last day of the time period falls on a weekend
or legal holiday); Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 617-18 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (noting that the due date for a post-sentence motion was not
tolled by Section 1908 because the last day of the ten-day period for the filing
of that post-sentence motion did not fall on a weekend or legal holiday).
Accordingly, we discern no issue with the timeliness of Appellant’s notice of
appeal, which was filed within 30 days of the trial court’s denial of what we
have determined to be his timely post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
720(A)(2)(a) (providing that when the defendant files a timely post-sentence
motion, he must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the order deciding
the motion).
That is, however, not the case with Appellant’s motion to suppress. We
agree with the trial court that Appellant did not timely file his suppression
motion pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A), which provides:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the omnibus pretrial
motion for relief shall be filed and served within 30 days after
arraignment, unless opportunity therefor did not exist, or the
defendant or defense attorney, or the attorney for the
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Commonwealth, was not aware of the grounds for the motion, or
unless the time for filing has been extended by the court for cause
shown.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A).
Here, Appellant was arraigned on February 28, 2018 and trial counsel
entered his appearance for Appellant on June 14, 2018. Appellant, however,
did not file his motion to suppress until December 13, 2018. Appellant
acknowledges that his motion was untimely and does not argue that any of
the reasons listed in Rule 579(A) for excusing untimeliness are applicable to
the late filing of his motion. Instead, Appellant argues that the trial court
should have excused the late filing of his suppression motion pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B), which reads:
Unless the opportunity did not previously exist, or the interests of
justice otherwise require, such [motion to suppress] shall be made
only after a case has been returned to court and shall be contained
in the omnibus pretrial motion set forth in Rule 578. If timely
motion is not made hereunder, the issue of suppression of such
evidence shall be deemed to be waived.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). The Comment to Rule 581 reiterates that the “failure to
file the motion within the appropriate time limit constitutes a waiver of the
right to suppress.” Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 581.
Appellant argues, nonetheless, that the court should have exercised its
discretion to invoke the “interests of justice” exception and found that his
more than ten-month tardy suppression motion was timely pursuant to that
exception. Appellant appears to claim that the trial court’s failure to do so only
results in the wasting of judicial resources because the court actually held the
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suppression hearing and because he may ultimately file a PCRA petition. This
claim fails.
In the first place, Appellant did not challenge the trial court’s
determination that his suppression motion was untimely in his 1925(b)
statement. Rather, Appellant’s 1925(b) statement only challenged the denial
of his suppression motion on the basis that the trial court improperly
concluded that Officer Bonner had probable cause to search the rental car. As
a result, Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by not
finding that the “interests of justice” required it to consider his suppression
motion timely is waived. See Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309
(Pa. 1998).
Even if Appellant had preserved this issue, we would find that it does
not afford him any basis for relief. Appellant’s suppression motion was filed
ten months after the deadline provided for by Rule 579(A) and six months
after counsel entered his appearance. Appellant had ample time to file his
motion and offered no explanation for failing to do so, much less one that fits
within the exceptions delineated by Rule 579(A). Given these circumstances,
we see no error on the part of the trial court in ruling that Appellant’s motion
to suppress was untimely.
We are simply not persuaded by Appellant’s assertion that the “interests
of justice” required the court to reach a contrary conclusion merely because
the court reserved its ruling on the timeliness issue until after it heard the
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suppression evidence. Appellant claims the suppression hearing represents a
waste of judicial resources if his motion is dismissed as untimely. He argues
that avoiding this waste of judicial resources qualifies as an interest of justice.
We disagree. While the term “interests of justice” is necessarily vague
and undefined by rule or caselaw, it functions as a catch-all for unforeseen
situations where the court is convinced that justice will not be served by strict
application of the rule. Here, the suppression court was not convinced that
justice would be served by allowing the untimely motion to suppress. Given
the dearth of evidence or argument provided by Appellant about why the
motion was filed so late, we cannot discern any abuse of the trial court’s
discretion. Similarly, Appellant’s ability to file a petition for collateral relief
does not alter our conclusion. This avenue for relief still exists, if Appellant
can establish a right to relief.
Despite the fact that the trial court ruled that Appellant’s suppression
motion was untimely, the court nevertheless concluded that even if the motion
had been timely, it still would have denied the motion both because Appellant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the rented Altima and because
Officer Bonner had probable cause to search that vehicle. Appellant argues
that the court erred in reaching both of those conclusions.
When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this Court
is limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
See Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757, 763 (Pa. Super. 2018). We
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are likewise limited to determining whether that record supports the trial
court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
findings are correct. See id. Where the record supports the trial court’s factual
findings, we may only reverse if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.
See id.Appellant takes issue first with the trial court’s finding that he did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rented Altima. Again,
Appellant did not challenge this finding in his 1925(b) statement, and his claim
on appeal that he did have an expectation of privacy in the rental car is
therefore waived. See Lord, 719 A.2d at 309. Even if we were to deem this
claim properly preserved, we would find it offers him no basis for relief.
Generally, a defendant charged with a possessory offense has automatic
standing to challenge a search. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d
108, 117 (Pa. Super. 2005). In order to prevail, however, the defendant must
show as a preliminary matter that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the area searched. See id., at 117-118. Such an expectation of privacy is
present when the defendant, by his conduct, exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy and that subjective expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable in light of all of the surrounding
circumstances. See id., at 118.
Here, the trial court relied on Jones in support of its finding that
Appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car. In Jones,
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this Court held that the driver of a rental car does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that car when he is not a named lessee or an
authorized driver on the rental agreement, the named lessee is not in the car,
and the rental agreement has expired. See id., at 112, 120. The trial court
concluded that “the same facts are present here” and that therefore, pursuant
to Jones, Appellant had no expectation of privacy in the rental car. Trial Court
Opinion, 12/17/19, at 8.
Appellant asserts, for the first time in this appeal, that Jones is not
controlling because it was abrogated by Byrd v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 1518 (2018),
and that under Byrd, he had an expectation of privacy in the rented Altima.
We do not agree that Byrd applies to the facts here.
In Byrd, the appellant was pulled over for a traffic stop while he was
driving a rental car that his friend had rented earlier that day and given him
the keys to immediately after renting the car. The appellant, who was the sole
occupant of the car at the time of the stop, handed the investigating officer
his interim license and a copy of the rental agreement and told the officer that
a friend had rented the car. When the officer noticed that the appellant was
not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement, the back-up officer
stated that the appellant therefore had no reasonable expectation in the car,
and the officers proceeded to search the vehicle and its trunk. The officers
found a laundry bag full of heroin in the trunk, and the appellant challenged
the search. The appeal reached the United States Supreme Court, which held
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that “as a general rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession or control of
a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental
agreement does not list him or her as an authorized driver.” Id., at 1524.
Unlike the driver in Byrd, Appellant was not the sole occupant of the
rental car and was driving a car in which the rental agreement had expired,
along with the rented Altima’s registration. Therefore, the Altima was not
legally on the road. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301(a). Moreover, as the
Commonwealth points out, Appellant, unlike the driver in Byrd, was also
unlawfully driving the rental car because his license had been suspended. See
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543. And while Appellant maintains that his “sister” gave him
permission to drive the Altima, he failed to provide any evidence in support of
this unsubstantiated assertion or account for the fact that the “sister” was the
named lessee on a rental agreement that had expired and was therefore no
longer valid. Accord Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 14 A.3d 907, 911 (Pa.
Super. 2011) (holding that a driver failed to satisfy his burden of establishing
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a car, where the car was owned by the
driver’s girlfriend and the driver did not put forth any evidence that the
girlfriend gave him permission to drive the car).
Based on these circumstances, we agree with the Commonwealth that
Appellant has not demonstrated that, although he was not an authorized
driver on the rental agreement, he was otherwise in “lawful possession and
control” of the rented Altima. Instead, we find that the trial court properly
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concluded that Appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the rental car. See Jones, 874 A.2d at 112.
Lastly, the court found that the search, even if Appellant had standing
to challenge it, was constitutional as Officer Bonner had probable cause to
search the car. Although Appellant challenged the court’s finding that Officer
Bonner had probable cause in his 1925(b) statement, that challenge is without
merit.
Police may search an automobile without a warrant as long as they have
probable cause to do so, as an automobile search does not require any
exigency beyond the inherent mobility of that automobile. See
Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180, 186 (Pa. Super. 2017); In re
I.M.S., 124 A.3d 311, 316-317 (Pa. Super. 2015). A determination of
probable cause requires only that the totality of circumstances demonstrates
a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found in a particular
place. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 210 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2019).
In finding that Officer Bonner had probable cause here, the trial court
observed that Officer Bonner smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana
immediately upon approaching the Altima during a lawful traffic stop, which
occurred at 1:15 in the morning. He then saw one of the Altima’s occupants
holding a burnt blunt-style cigar, which Officer Bonner knew from his
experience and training to be used to smoke marijuana. In addition, Officer
Bonner’s certified drug detection dog, Brutus, conducted an exterior sniff
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search of the vehicle and positively indicated that there were drugs inside the
car. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that
Officer Bonner had probable cause to search the interior of the Altima. See
Green, 168 A.3d at 187 (holding that a police officer’s reasonable suspicion
that a vehicle contained drugs ripened into probable cause to search the
vehicle without a warrant when a canine’s sniff search positively alerted to the
presence of narcotics inside the vehicle); Commonwealth v. Fudge, 213
A.3d 321, 327 (Pa. Super. 2019) (holding that a police officer had probable
cause to search the cab of a tractor trailer when the officer, inter alia, smelled
burnt marijuana emanating from the cab).
Appellant argues, however, that once Officer Bonner identified the
source of the marijuana smell as coming from the blunt-style cigar held by
Wise he did not have probable cause to search the interior of the car because
he had no reason to believe there would be additional contraband concealed
in the car. According to Appellant, only an “unexplained smell of marijuana in
a car … would give probable cause to believe there is hidden marijuana in the
car” and allow for a search of the interior of the car. Appellant’s Brief, at 24.
We agree with the trial court that this argument “flies in the face of logic.”
Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/19, at 9. As the court stated:
[Appellant argues that] because the officer could surmise that the
smell came from a blunt and one crime was potentially identified,
no further investigation was required. However, the opposite is
true, [as] the smell of the marijuana coming from the vehicle and
the blunt were both factors in the necessity of the exterior search,
which led to the necessity of the interior search.
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Id.Indeed, as the court indicates, Appellant’s argument ignores the fact
that the search of the interior of the car was not based solely on the odor and
the blunt, but also on the fact that Brutus conducted an exterior sniff search
of the car and alerted to the presence of narcotics inside the car. Appellant,
however, also takes issue with this exterior search conducted by Brutus. He
asserts that Brutus’s positive alert should be entirely discounted from the
probable cause equation because the dog was merely smelling the same burnt
blunt that Officer Bonner had smelled. In response, the Commonwealth
counters:
As Officer Bonner explained, Wise, who was holding the blunt, was
seated in the rear driver’s side of the Nissan. But Brutus alerted
to the passenger side of the car, between the front and rear
seats, not to the driver’s side or the rear of the car. [Appellant’s]
theory that Brutus was just smelling the same burnt marijuana
that Officer Bonner smelled does not explain why [Brutus] alerted
to the opposite side of the car, between the front and the rear.
The positive alert on a different area of the car suggested that
there were additional drugs in the car and, along with the other
circumstances here, provided probable cause.
Commonwealth’s Brief, at 16 (emphasis in original).
We agree. In sum, then, we conclude that the trial court properly found
that Appellant’s motion to suppress was untimely and that even if it had been
timely, Appellant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence because he
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the rented Altima and because
Officer Bonner had probable cause to search that car.
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In his next and final claim, Appellant argues that the trial court abused
its discretion when it denied his oral motion for a continuance on the morning
of trial. Specifically, Appellant claims that he moved for a continuance so that
he could retain new counsel and the trial court’s denial of that motion violated
his Sixth Amendment right to have the counsel of his choosing. This claim
fails.
The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the
trial court abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Norton, 144 A.3d
139, 143 (Pa. Super. 2016). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment. See id. Rather, a trial court abuses its discretion only when it
overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment that is manifestly
unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. See id.When considering a motion for a continuance to retain new counsel, the
trial court must weigh the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice against
the state’s interest in the efficient administration of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Broitman, 217 A.3d 297, 300 (Pa. Super. 2019). To that
end, this Court has looked to the following factors when determining whether
a trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance for the defendant
to retain new counsel: (1) whether the trial court conducted an extensive
colloquy into the underlying causes of the defendant’s dissatisfaction with
current counsel; (2) whether the defendant’s dissatisfaction with current
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counsel constituted irreconcilable differences; (3) the number of prior
continuances; (4) the timing of the motion for continuance; (5) whether
private counsel had actually been retained; and (6) the readiness of private
counsel to proceed. See id.Here, on the morning of trial, the trial court began the proceedings by
informing Appellant that it had conferred with Appellant’s privately-retained
defense counsel, Basil Beck, who had told the court that Appellant had “some
issues.” N.T., Trial, 4/23/19, at 4. The discussion that followed about this
matter can be found in its entirety both in the record, see id., at 4-9, as well
as in Appellant’s brief, see Appellant’s Brief, at 11-16, but we provide a brief
recitation of that discussion here.
Appellant confirmed that he had “some issues” with Beck, and when
asked if he wanted Beck to represent him, Appellant replied that he did not
and had “sufficient reasons why.” N.T., Trial, 4/23/19, at 4. The court told
Appellant in no uncertain terms that it was not going to postpone the case and
Appellant could either represent himself pro se or have Beck represent him.
Appellant said he understood but that he and counsel had been “going back
and forth.” Id., at 5. The court again advised Appellant of his options. At
that point, a plea offer was briefly discussed, but Appellant rejected the offer.
When Appellant again started to explain his reason for wanting to replace
Beck, the court stopped Appellant and told him to take a few minutes and
speak with Beck. The court took a recess.
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After the recess, Beck told the court that he did not get the chance to
speak with Appellant during the recess because Appellant had gone outside to
smoke a cigarette. Appellant, nonetheless, stated that he would proceed with
Beck as counsel because he did not want to represent himself. Beck asked for
five more minutes so he could speak with Appellant because he thought he
“found a way of working this out for everybody.” Id., at 8. Appellant agreed
to speak to Beck and the court took a second recess. Following the recess, the
jury was selected and trial began.
The Commonwealth argues that it is not at all clear whether Appellant
ever actually requested a continuance to retain new counsel. To be sure, there
is no denial of any continuance on the record as the issues Appellant had with
Beck appeared to have been resolved after the second recess. In any event,
the trial court treated the above exchange as a request for a continuance in
its 1925(a) opinion, and concluded that it had not abused its discretion by
denying the request.
We agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying any
request for a continuance that was made. The record reflects that Appellant
not only failed to appear for certain pre-trial hearings, causing the issuance of
bench warrants for his arrest, but requested and received a multitude of pre-
trial continuances during the long history of this case. Moreover, as the
Commonwealth points out, it does not appear that the differences between
Appellant and Beck were irreconcilable but to the contrary, had been
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resolved.3 As for the other factors we look to when considering whether a
motion for a continuance to retain new counsel has properly been denied, we
note the following explanation given by the trial court in denying Appellant’s
request:
[Appellant] requested the continuance immediately prior to the
start of trial. He had not retained new counsel. A postponement of
the trial would have an undue burden for the Commonwealth’s
witnesses and who were ready to proceed. The continuance
request was neither done in a reasonable time nor a reasonable
manner. To continue this matter would certainly ‘clog the
machinery of justice’ … because [the continuance request] was
nothing more than a last minute attempt to delay trial without
cause.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/19, at 13. Based on all of these circumstances, we
see no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying any motion
for a continuance to retain new counsel made by Appellant.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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3 Appellant complains that the trial court did not give due consideration to his
interest in retaining new counsel because the court did not give him the
opportunity to fully explain the issues he was having with Beck. While the
Commonwealth suggests that it can fairly be presumed that the court was
aware of Appellant’s issues from its discussion with Beck prior to trial, that
discussion was not made a part of the record. However, the record is clear
that the trial court did give Appellant the opportunity - twice - to speak with
Beck about his issues. There is nothing on the record to indicate Appellant did
not resolve his issues after speaking with Beck during the second recess, and
Appellant does not argue otherwise.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/23/20
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