Com. v. Rohades, C. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S66019-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CLARENCE ROHADES                           :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 300 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 31, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0406261-2004,
    CP-51-CR-0406311-2004, CP-51-CR-0406331-2004
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                            FILED OCTOBER 27, 2020
    Appellant Clarence Rohades appeals pro se from the order dismissing
    his first Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, petition
    without a hearing. For the reasons herein, we are constrained to again vacate
    and remand for further proceedings because the PCRA court did not comply
    with this Court’s prior mandate ordering findings of fact and conclusions of law
    addressing Appellant’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 claim.
    We state the facts as set forth in this Court’s prior remand decision:
    On March 2, 2004, Appellant was arrested and charged with
    offenses stemming from the robberies of several different
    businesses in Philadelphia.[1] Appellant’s cases did not proceed to
    ____________________________________________
    1 All three of the above-captioned dockets reflect the Commonwealth’s motion
    to consolidate.      The certified records transmitted to this Court were
    incomplete, but the trial court apparently granted the Commonwealth’s
    J-S66019-19
    a jury trial until July 2008. Following trial, the jury convicted
    Appellant of three counts of robbery, three counts of possessing
    instruments of crime and one count of simple assault.
    Additionally, the trial court convicted Appellant of three violations
    of the Uniform Firearms Act. The trial court sentenced Appellant
    to an aggregate term of 77 ½ to 155 years’ imprisonment. A
    panel of this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and our
    Supreme Court denied his subsequent petition for allocatur.
    On November 17, 2011, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA
    petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel who later filed an
    amended petition. The PCRA court issued notice of its intent to
    dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing, and ultimately
    dismissed the petition.
    Commonwealth v. Rohades, 
    2018 WL 3748675
    , *1 (Pa. Super. filed Aug.
    8, 2018) (unpublished mem.) (Rohades I).
    The Rohades I Court vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing
    based on the following:
    Here, based upon our review of the record, we are unable to
    determine whether Appellant’s Rule 600 motion would have been
    meritorious. While the PCRA court concludes in its opinion that
    the Rule 600 motion is baseless, it fails to undertake any analysis
    of which party occasioned the repeated delays in this case. Our
    independent review of the docket also fails to illuminate this issue.
    For instance, the docket indicates many of the delays, but without
    reference to which party requested them. Therefore, we lack the
    necessary information to determine if a Rule 600 motion would
    have been successful.
    Id. at *2. The Rohades I Court therefore was “constrained to vacate the
    PCRA court’s order and remand this case to the PCRA court to conduct an
    ____________________________________________
    motion. The Commonwealth’s appellate brief also notes that Appellant’s cases
    were consolidated for trial. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8.
    -2-
    J-S66019-19
    evidentiary hearing.” Id. This Court specifically ordered “the PCRA court to
    review the docket entries in conjunction with the evidentiary hearing to
    determine whether Appellant, the Commonwealth, or the court occasioned the
    repeated delays. The PCRA court shall then render the necessary findings of
    fact and conclusions of law with respect to” Appellant’s Rule 600 claim. Id.
    According to the record, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on
    December 4, 2018. Following the hearing, Appellant’s then-PCRA counsel, J.
    Matthew Wolfe, Esq., filed a motion to withdraw and a Turner/Finley2 letter
    on December 10, 2018. Attorney Wolfe reasoned that after reviewing the
    record, including the previously-unavailable quarter sessions file, Appellant’s
    Rule 600 claim lacked merit. Turner/Finley Ltr., 12/10/18, at 2. The PCRA
    court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on December 10, 2018, which stated
    that Appellant’s issues lacked merit and that Attorney Wolfe also determined
    that Appellant’s issues lacked merit.
    On December 31, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
    petition for lack of merit. Order, 12/31/18. The order listed all three docket
    numbers and was docketed at all three cases.        The order did not inform
    Appellant of his right to appeal, the time period within which he had to file a
    notice of appeal, or the need to file separate notices of appeal.    Also, the
    ____________________________________________
    2Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988).
    -3-
    J-S66019-19
    records transmitted to this Court do not include any orders granting Attorney
    Wolfe’s motion to withdraw. Critically, the records do not reflect that the PCRA
    court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law per the mandate of the
    Rohades I Court.
    On January 18, 2019, pro se Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
    listing all three above-captioned docket numbers.       All three dockets and
    records reflect and include Appellant’s notice of appeal.3 The PCRA court did
    not order Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and did not prepare a
    Rule 1925(a) opinion.4
    On August 7, 2019, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why we
    should not quash Appellant’s appeal under Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
     (Pa. 2018).5 Appellant filed a pro se response stating that he did
    not file additional notices of appeal because he was unaware of Walker.
    ____________________________________________
    3As we explain below, Appellant stated that he did not file multiple notices of
    appeal.
    4 We note that Appellant filed a motion for transcript of, among other things,
    the December 4, 2018 PCRA evidentiary hearing. Mot. for Transcripts,
    2/27/19. The record transmitted to this Court did not include a transcript of
    that evidentiary hearing. Upon informal inquiry with the PCRA court, we were
    advised that the hearing was not transcribed.
    5 In Walker, our Supreme Court held that “where one or more orders resolves
    issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment,
    separate notices of appeal must be filed. Failure to do so, requires the
    appellate court to quash the appeal.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, ___ A.3d
    ___, ___, 
    2020 WL 3869723
    , *3 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citations
    omitted and formatting altered).
    -4-
    J-S66019-19
    Appellant’s Resp. to Rule to Show Cause, 8/21/19.           Appellant, however,
    argued that his charges were consolidated and resulted in one trial, unlike
    Walker, which involved multiple defendants. 
    Id.
     This Court discharged its
    rule to show cause and referred the issue to this panel.
    We decline to quash because the record does not reflect that the PCRA
    court advised Appellant of his right to appeal and the time limits within which
    he must file his notice of appeal. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(E); see generally
    Commonwealth v. Larkin, ___ A.3d ___, ___, 
    2020 WL 3869710
    , *2 n.2,
    *3 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (stating, “we may overlook the requirements
    of Walker where, as here, a breakdown occurs in the court system, and a
    defendant is” not informed of his appellate rights”). Cf. Commonwealth v.
    Patterson, 
    940 A.2d 493
    , 499 (Pa. Super. 2007) (refusing to quash because
    the trial court did not comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 and notify the defendant
    that “he had to file an appeal within thirty days of the imposition of sentence”).
    Appellant raises one issue: “Whether the court erred by denying
    Appellant’s PCRA petition alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to move
    for a dismissal before trial due to a Rule 600 violation; where the record
    supports arguable merit for this claim.” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    We need not summarize Appellant’s argument because the PCRA court
    did not comply with our explicit mandate to render findings of fact and
    conclusions of law regarding Appellant’s Rule 600 claim.               While we
    acknowledge that Attorney Wolfe filed a Turner/Finley letter asserting that
    -5-
    J-S66019-19
    Appellant’s Rule 600 claim lacked merit, the fact remains that the Rohades I
    Court had ordered the PCRA court to make findings of fact and conclusions of
    law addressing the Rule 600 claim. Rohades I, 
    2018 WL 3748675
     at *2; see
    Carmen Enters., Inc. v. Murpenter, LLC, 
    185 A.3d 380
    , 389 (Pa. Super.
    2018) (stating, a “trial court has an obligation to comply scrupulously,
    meticulously, and completely with an order of the appellate court remanding
    a case to the trial court. The trial court is required to strictly comply with the
    mandate of the appellate court.” (citations omitted and formatting altered)).
    We add that the PCRA evidentiary hearing was also not transcribed, which
    inhibits appellate review. We are therefore, once again constrained to remand
    to the PCRA court, which “shall then render the necessary findings of fact and
    conclusions of law with respect to” Appellant’s Rule 600 claim. Rohades I,
    
    2018 WL 3748675
     at *2.
    Order vacated.         Case remanded with instructions.6       Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
    ____________________________________________
    6 Because the records do not include the orders formally granting Attorney
    Wolfe’s petition to withdraw and the records do not reflect the PCRA court’s
    independent review of the record, Attorney Wolfe remains counsel of record.
    See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 
    981 A.2d 875
    , 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009). We note
    that the appeal inventories transmitted to this Court state that counsel was
    granted leave to withdraw. We also order the PCRA court to transcribe the
    December 4, 2018 PCRA evidentiary hearing.
    -6-
    J-S66019-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/27/2020
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 300 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 10/27/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/27/2020