Adoption of: C.C.M.C., Appeal of: A.R.C., Jr. ( 2020 )

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J-S21032-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.C.M.C. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: A.R.C., JR., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 62 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 2, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
at No(s): No. 65 OF 2019
IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.C.M.C. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: A.I.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 63 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 2, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
at No(s): 065 of 2019
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2020
A.R.C., Jr. (“Father”), and A.B. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents” or “the
parents”) appeal from the Orders granting the Petitions, filed by the
Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (“WCCB” or the “Agency”), seeking
to involuntarily terminate their parental rights to their biological child,
J-S21031-20 & J-S21032-20
C.C.M.C. (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2),
(5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.
In its Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court set forth the
factual background and procedural history of this appeal as follows:
[Child] was born [in March 2012] into the custody of her
parents…. By June 2012, there had been a referral to the
[Agency] (for conditions of housing and hygiene, bedbugs and
bites over [Child’s] body, cat urine and feces, etc.).
[Child] was adjudicated dependent on October 13, 2017, on
the basis that the conditions remained unabated. … [T]he
descriptions of the conditions, in part, were:
several general protective service referrals regarding …
housing, [sic] conditions, hygiene, lack of food in the
home, bedbugs, fleas, gnats, flies, cat urine and feces on
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1 In an Order entered on September 11, 2019, the trial court appointed Leslie
Uncapher, Esquire (“Attorney Uncapher”), to serve as Child’s guardian ad
litem (“GAL”) and legal interests counsel. At the time of the hearings, Child
was seven years and seven months old, but she has special needs, receives
physical and speech therapy, and had an Individualized Education Program,
as she has developmental and learning delays, and “emotional
characteristics.” N.T., 10/17/19, at 11-13, 19-22; see also In re Adoption
of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (holding that 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2313(a) requires that counsel be appointed to represent the legal interest
of any child involved in a contested involuntary termination proceeding. The
Court defined a child’s legal interest as synonymous with his or her preferred
outcome); In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018) (concluding that the trial
court did not err in allowing the children’s GAL to act as their sole
representative during the termination proceeding because, at two and three
years old, they were incapable of expressing their preferred outcome). We do
not comment on the quality of Attorney Uncapher’s representation of Child.
See In re: Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 669 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en
banc), appeal granted in part, 221 A.3d 649 (Pa. 2019) (holding that this
Court has the authority to raise, sua sponte, only the issue of whether the trial
court appointed any counsel for the child, and not the authority to delve into
the quality of the representation).
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the floor of the home, which caused a strong ammonia
smell throughout the home and outside the front door of
the home … food encrusted and moldy dishes, pots and
pans piled in the sink…[.]
Also, established through the dependency proceeding were
findings as to both [P]arents having untreated mental health
issues. [Child] was then (by [the] Order of October 13, 2017)
removed from [Parents’] custody and placed with her foster
parents. This has been the status now for over two years.
[Mother] reported to the caseworker that she suffered from
PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder], depression and anxiety,
and had [previously received] open[-]heart surgery to deal with a
heart condition.
[Father] was found having a diagnosis of chronic
undifferentiated schizophrenia, depression and anger issues, and
habitual alcohol abuse.
The dependency review evidence of April 9, 2018, records
that[,] during the review period from October 2017 until April
2018, neither parent had visits with [Child]. Twenty[-]three visits
were missed, because, in consideration of hygiene issues, neither
parent could receive medical clearance.
By [the] October 2018[] dependency review [hearing,]
[Child] was expressing a desire to see [Mother and Father], but to
live with her foster parents. Also[,] by that time, the parents were
demonstrating substantial compliance with the permanency plan,
and moderate progress. [Mother] was in mental health
counseling, had a WCSI [Westmoreland Casemanagement and
Supports, Inc.,] representative, and was applying for
[Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)].
[Father] was receiving SSI/[Social Security Disability
(“SSD”)], had been recommended for intensive outpatient
treatment for drug and alcohol and mental health issues, and was
participating in a dual diagnosis program through Merokee [sic].
Among other things, parent-child interactional therapy was
offered to both parents.
By the April 10, 2019, dependency review hearing, [Child]
expressed her desire to continue living with her foster parents,
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but the parents showed progress - Mother, “minimum”, [Father],
“moderate” [-] according to the findings made at that time.
On June [19], 2019, the [Agency] filed [ ] written
[P]etition[s] [seeking the termination of Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights to Child].
As to [Father], the [P]etition alleges that, even after
receiving many services, [Father] has been unable to demonstrate
an ability to care for [Child], and, in order to do the minimum,
required the presence and guidance of others. As to [Mother],
[the Petition alleges that Mother’s] mental heal[th] rendered her
barely able to care for herself, and unable to care for a child.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 1-3 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
On October 17, 2019, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
Petitions. At the hearing, the Agency presented the following witnesses: Neil
Rosenblum, Ph.D. (“Dr. Rosenblum”); Jonathan Fornal (“Mr. Fornal”); Richelle
O’Malley (“Ms. O’Malley”); Kelsey Dolan (“Ms. Dolan”); Melissa Husenits;
Megan Schweppe; Alyssa Anderson; and Molly Clayton (“Ms. Clayton”).
Mother testified on her own behalf. Father also testified on his own behalf.
On December 2, 2019, the trial court entered Orders granting the
Petitions and involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Father and Mother
to Child, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8),
and (b).
On December 9, 2020, and December 30, 2020, Father and Mother,
respectively, timely filed their Notices of Appeal, along with Concise
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Statements of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).2
Father raises one issue:
Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating Father’s parental rights
due to Father’s inability to parent the Child, when the Agency
continued to schedule joint visits with the Mother and the Father[,]
even though it became clear that Mother’s presence inhibited
Father’s progress?
Father’s Brief at 4.
Father claims that the trial court improperly concluded that Father had
demonstrated an inability to perform parental duties, “when he was never
afforded the opportunity to engage in services independent of Mother.” Id.
at 9. Father contends that he put forth a “good-faith intent and effort[,] and
likely was hindered to an extent by his limited cognitive abilities.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Father concedes that “concerns remained for
Father’s ability to care for himself and [ ] Child at the time of termination.”
Id. Father argues, however, that the testimony of his providers at the
termination hearing showed that “Mother served as a major impediment to
Father’s progress.” Id. According to Father, the actions of Mother’s relatives
brought his own housing into question. Id. Father claims that, because of
Mother's behavior during the parents’ visits with Child, there was never a full
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2 We have listed the appeals of both parents consecutively and disposed of all
issues in one Memorandum, as did the trial court, for ease of disposition.
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evaluation of his own, independent, parenting ability. Id. Father asserts that,
despite the Agency’s knowledge that Mother was causing him a problem with
the visits, the Agency never afforded him independent visits, and never
provided him an opportunity to show he was capable of managing a residence
and providing basic necessities for Child, independent of Mother. Id. at 9.
Father urges that, absent these opportunities, the Agency could not
demonstrate that he was unable or unwilling to perform parental duties for
Child. Id.
Father argues that he
put forth the best effort that he could to the best of his ability. In
re Burns, 379 A.2d [535,] 541 [(Pa. 1977)]. The lack of progress
that he made in his independent parenting ability was not the
result of Father’s inability or ambivalence, but was a result of the
manner in which visits were being provided to Father. The
Agency, through its providers, recognized this problem, but did
nothing to address the concern.
Accordingly, it is averred that any lack of progress on the
part of the Father was due to this breakdown in the services
provided to Father. As such, it cannot be shown that Father was
unable to overcome his parenting deficits if afforded the
opportunity for independent interaction with the Child. See 23
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(1) [sic] (requiring a showing of “(1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.”)[].
Father’s Brief at 9-11.
Mother raises the following issue for our review:
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Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
evidence that the [Agency] met its burden, under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§[ ]2511(b)[,] when the interactional evaluation expert opined
that it would be in the best interest of [Child] to maintain periodic
contact and visitation with her Parents?
Mother’s Brief at 4.3
Mother argues as follows:
In the case at bar, Dr. Rosenblum stated [ ] Child was comfortable
greeting her Parents and was pleased to see her Mother. Overall,
[ ] Child was comfortable with her Parents during the interactional
evaluation.
Dr. Rosenblum noted that it would be in the best interest of [ ]
Child to maintain periodic contact and visitation with her Parents.
Ms. O'Malley’s observations of Mother and [ ] Child establish the
Mother’s affection and love for [ ] Child. As important was Ms.
O'Malley’s observation that [ ] Child was willing to receive Mother’s
affection and even sought it out.
Additionally, [ ] Child resided with Mother from birth, March of
2012, until October of 2017[,] when the [Agency] took custody.
Mother cared [sic] and had custody of [ ] Child for over five years.
An inference can be drawn that a bond exists between Mother and
Child that if terminated would not best serve the developmental,
physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
This is supported by the testimony of Dr. Rosenblum that it would
be in the best interest of [ ] Child to maintain periodic contact and
visitation with her Parents.
Thus, the [Agency] has not met its burden with regard to [section]
2511(b)[,] and Mother’s parental rights should not be terminated.
Mother’s Brief at 11-12.
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3Mother stated her issue somewhat differently in her Concise Statement, but
we find it sufficiently preserved for review.
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Mother apparently concedes that the Agency satisfied its burden with
regard to section 2511(a), and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as
to only section 2511(b). Mother argues that, while she had care and custody
of Child from the time of Child’s birth in March 2012, until the removal of Child
from Mother’s care and custody in October 2017, Child developed a bond with
Mother. Id. at 9. Mother contends that the Agency failed to satisfy its burden
with regard to section 2511(b), because there continues to be a bond between
Mother and Child, and severance of that bond would not best serve the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of Child. Id.
In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept
the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., … 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. Id.; [In re] R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567,] 572
[(Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an
abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also
Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., … 34 A.3d 1, 51
(Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003).
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases.
We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
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record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066
(Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier
of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue.” Id. This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision
regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection
of section 2511(a), along with consideration of 2511(b). See In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Section 2511(a)(2) and (b)
provides as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements:
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272
(Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under
section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are
not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may
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include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In its Opinion accompanying the termination Orders, the trial court
stated as follows:
The birth parents first came to the attention of the [WCCB] in
2014. A case file was opened[,] and services provided for a period
of about 15 months, and then services were closed.
By September 2016, there was a second referral, and[,] in
June 2017, a third.
The various witnesses describe a history in which substantial
services and assistance have been provided, but, ultimately, with
very little success. Both [P]arents have lived with chronic mental
health and emotional issues that have led to abominable housing
and living conditions, [and] failed attempts at childcare and child
communications.
Over these years, this challenged seven-year-old [C]hild
has found normalization and security in her foster home, and now
has anxiety and nervousness in her parents’ custody.
Today, the parents do not possess the ability to meet
[Child’s] developmental needs, even though each [P]arent is
well[-]intended and would wish to be able to do so and have their
daughter returned to them.
The extensive testimony from a variety of professionals
convinces [the trial court] that the continuing inability and
incapacity of [Parents] have caused [Child] to be without essential
care, and that, despite repeated efforts by [Parents], cannot be
provided by either parent.
***
Moreover, after substantially more than six months, one can
find no reasonable basis to believe there is any substantial change
in the situation and conditions which led to [Child’s] removal, and
the evidence offers little hope that anything can change or that
conditions which prevailed can be remedied.
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All of the predicate conditions required by 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2) … and (b) have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence as to each parent.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/19, at 1-2. In its supplemental Opinion, the trial
court further expounded that Parents have
demonstrated a chronic incapacity to care for and raise this seven-
year-old-child.
….
The testimony at the trial was essentially that various
providers and caseworkers offered and provided services, but,
despite all-out efforts, were unable to obtain success. In the final
analysis, the parents are unable to adequately care for [Child].
Even so, [Child] can survive and thrive through the care of the
foster parents, whom she now views as “primary”.
The testimony (and report) of [Dr. Rosenblum], clearly
captures the essence of this matter. Page 15 of his report
[states]:
[At this] time it does not appear as if either parent has
been able to adequately address their mental health or
adjustment concerns which led their daughter, [Child], into
care in the first place. Neither parent displays the
independence in their personal functioning that would be
needed to function effectively and maintain a healthy,
productive lifestyle, let alone provide suitable care and
reliable attention to the emotional developmental needs of
their daughter.
[Child] additionally has special needs, and is a child who
requires a very high level of care and attention. As such[,]
this evaluator does believe that a goal change to adoption
is consistent with [Child’s] needs and welfare at this time.
I would recommend a referral for adoption mediation. It
is my understanding that foster mother, [K.M.], will be
amenable to [Child] having some continued contact with
her birth parents under appropriate circumstances and
supervision. I do believe that it would be in [Child’s] best
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interest to be able to maintain periodic contact and
visitation with her birth parents. At the same time, it is
my clinical opinion that only through a goal of adoption will
[Child] be afforded an opportunity to remain in a stable
and secure family environment that is capable of reliably
meeting her needs at this time and in the years to come.
Neil D. Rosenblum, Ph.D., Licensed Clinical Psychologist
CONCLUSIONS
Evidence supporting the termination of parental rights is
clear and convincing. Not only did the parents initially
demonstrate a history of neglect, but[,] even after extensive
services, have not demonstrated the ability to provide the [C]hild
with essential care. Moreover, the psychological assessments are
detailed and clear in concluding that neither parent has the
capacity to provide the level of care needed for this [C]hild’s
physical and mental wellbeing. The requirements of [] 23
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2) … have been reviewed. [Child] has
made remarkable advancements in the custody of the foster
parents, and termination and adoption will best serve the needs
and welfare of [Child].
Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 1, 3-4.
Thus, based on the testimony of the providers, caseworkers, and Dr.
Rosenblum, the trial court found that the termination of Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights to Child is warranted pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(2), as
Father and Mother clearly lack parental capacity, and the evidence showed
that they will be unable to remedy that situation within a reasonable period of
time, if ever. See id. Recognizing that Mother did not challenge termination
pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the record nonetheless supports the trial
court’s findings and conclusions, as to both Mother and Father. In particular,
we note the following evidence, presented at the hearing.
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At the time of the hearing, Child had been in care for twenty-two
months. N.T., 10/17/19, at 170. Ms. Clayton, an Agency supervisor, testified
that Child’s family had an open case with the Agency for fifteen months,
beginning on May 28, 2014, because of concerns regarding housing
conditions, underuse of community resources, and the parents’ mental
health. Id. at 169. On August 17, 2015, the Agency closed the case because
Mr. Fornal was able to improve their housing by getting them a new home,
and was able to set Child up with Head Start. Id. Nine months later, on May
16, 2016, the Agency received another referral raising the same concerns of
mental health and housing conditions, and services were put in place. Id. at
169-70. The Agency closed the second case on February 10, 2017. Id. at
170. Four months later, the Agency received the current referral on June 12,
2017. Id. at 170.
Ms. Clayton stated that Parents parented Child better with the services
provided than they parented on their own. Id. at 170. Ms. Clayton testified
that the same concerns were always present in the Parents’ supervised visits
with Child: Parents’ lack of structuring; Parents’ failure to bring food and
snacks for Child; Parents’ issues interacting with Child’s homework; and
Mother’s negativity toward Father. Id. at 176-77. The Agency had both
Mother and Father visit together to lessen the emotional trauma on Child,
because the visits were traumatic for Child, and because Parents had been a
“couple,” so one visit would be less stressful on Child than two separate
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visits. Id. at 177. Moreover, no one had made a request for separate
visits. Id.
Ms. Clayton testified that Mother and Father are making arrangements
for different housing, but she would not consider their housing to be
stable. Id. at 177-78. Father completed his court-ordered drug and alcohol
evaluation and his court-ordered mental health evaluation at SPHS on April
17, 2018. Id. at 178-79. The testimony reflects that Father had successfully
completed drug and alcohol treatment on March 29, 2019. Id. at 179. Father
attends some Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and was not ordered to do
drug screens. Id. Father attended mental health treatment at SPHS until
mid-August 2018. Id. Father then was accepted into dual diagnosis
treatment, where his treatment is ongoing. Id. Father has attended visits
with Child along with Mother, except when Mother was ill. Id. at 180. Father
allowed Mother to take the lead at visits until April 2019, when he began to
engage more with Child, and became better able to pick up on her social cues
and offer her comfort. Id. at 180-81. Father has not consistently provided
Child with food, and has issues in assisting Child with her homework. Id. at
181. Father has SSI income, but does not manage his own
money. Id. Father was court-ordered to complete anger management
classes, and he did so at JusticeWorks on December 6, 2018. Id.
The Agency provided transportation to visits for both parents through
ProjectStar, but they were not able to utilize them. Id. at 181-82. Ms.
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Clayton is unaware of any services that the Agency could have provided, but
did not provide, which would have assisted reunification between Child and
the parents. Id. at 183. Ms. Clayton has seen improvements in the parents’
abilities to parent Child, but not any improvements that would be sustained
without direct assistance from a provider. Id. at 184. She opined that
Parents will not be able to remedy the reasons for which Child was removed
from their home (deplorable housing conditions and lack of food), and sustain
it, in the future. Id. at 185. She has observed the same cycle of problems
over the five years prior to the hearing with no sustainable change, so she
could not approximate when they would be able to remedy the
situation. Id. at 186.
Ms. Clayton further opined that termination would best serve Child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Id. at 187-
88. Ms. Clayton explained that Child does not need to worry about her basic
needs being met in her foster home, and that she seeks out her foster parents
for comfort. Id. at 188. Child’s foster parents are helping her to improve
socially and academically. Id. at 188-89. Ms. Clayton testified that the
Agency is not recommending termination because of environmental factors
beyond the parents’ control. Id. at 189.
At the time of the hearing, Child had been in her pre-adoptive foster
home since April 2018, for approximately sixteen months. Id. at 170. Ms.
Clayton had observed Child in her foster home, where she is making progress.
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Id. Child states that it is her home, and she is excited to show the
caseworkers her room, her work, and her “sisters.” Id. Ms. Clayton testified
that Child becomes dysregulated following visits with Parents. Id. at 189-91.
Ms. Clayton testified that the pre-adoptive foster parents are open to a referral
for a post-adoption contact agreement under the Post-Adoption Contact
Agreement Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731 et seq. N.T., 10/17/19, at 191-92.
Also, at the hearing, Dr. Rosenblum testified as to his evaluations of the
interactions of Child with her foster mother (K.M.), Mother, and Father. Dr.
Rosenblum performed an interactional evaluation with Child and her foster
mother, K.M., as well as interactional evaluations between Child and Mother
and Father, and individual evaluations of Child, Mother and Father. Id. at 6-
7. Dr. Rosenblum testified that, while Parents had explanations for their
difficulties, they were continuing to struggle with their individual adjustments
and lifestyle issues, and were not able to provide a safe, stable, and secure
home for Child. Id. at 41. The following exchange occurred between counsel
for the Agency and Dr. Rosenblum, by which he provided his expert opinion
within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty:
Q. [The Agency:] What are your recommendations and
conclusions in this case?
A. [Dr. Rosenblum:] My conclusions are that [P]arents both
present with very chronic mental health and adaptive living
problems that significantly impact and interfere with their ability
to function effectively as adults, and clearly would interfere with
their ability to provide a stable, secure home for their daughter
and provide consistent, appropriate attention to her emotional and
developmental needs. I believe that the delays that [Child] has
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experienced and the impact on her emotional security at the time
of the removal have been clearly documented. [Child] is now in
a safe, stable, and secure home environment that has an
outstanding track record of responding to her needs effectively.
It is my recommendation to the [c]ourt that it consider a
goal change to adoption that, in my opinion, is consistent with
[Child’s] needs and welfare.
Q. Would you have concerns, if the child were to live with her
biological [P]arents, that they could provide her with the basic
necessities of life?
A. I believe there is documentation that [Parents were
unsuccessful in providing Child with the basic necessities of life].
I believe, based on their continued difficulties with their personal
adjustment and lifestyle issues, that there’s no reason to believe
that they’re capable of meeting her needs now.
Q. If parental rights were terminated, would the [c]ourt be
terminating a necessary and beneficial relationship for [Child]?
A. No. I always recommend consideration of contact and
visitation, but I cannot say that this is a relationship that is
necessary or beneficial to [Child] at this time. Clearly, this is a
child who is clinging to the security and stability that she
experienced in her foster home. Her developmental well-being
will be reassured and confirmed by her continued presence in this
[foster] home, which is what I would recommend as an adoptive
outcome.
N.T., 10/17/19, at 41-43. The trial court admitted Dr. Rosenblum’s Report
and Recommendations, dated May 15, 2019, as Agency Exhibit 2. Id. at 43.
Further, the trial court found Father’s arguments concerning his ability
to care for Child, in light of his level of intelligence and difficulties, and the
need for additional time to develop his parenting skills with the provision of
additional services, such as separate visits, unpersuasive. Although Father
relies on In re Burns, that case does not support his argument. In that case,
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our Supreme Court affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental rights,
rejecting her argument that her health, financial and emotional problems
justified her failure to make any effort to perform her parental duties. In re
Burns, 379 A.2d at 541.
Moreover, with regard to section 2511(a)(2), our Supreme Court has
rejected the argument that the provision of reasonable efforts by the county
children’s services agency is a factor in termination of the parental rights of a
parent to a child. See In the Interest of: D.C.D., a Minor, 105 A.3d 662,
672-74, 676 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting the suggestion that an agency must provide
reasonable efforts to enable a parent to reunify with a child prior to the
termination of parental rights, and further rejecting the suggestion that
section 2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act should be read in conjunction with
section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, particularly section 6351(f)(9)(iii)). Thus,
based on our Supreme Court’s holding in In the Interest of: D.C.D., a
Minor, Father’s argument that the Agency should have made reasonable
efforts to allow him to demonstrate his ability to parent Child, exclusive of
Mother, lacks merit.
Thus, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in concluding
that Father’s and Mother’s parental rights should be terminated under section
2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.
Next, we address section 2511(b). We have explained that the focus in
terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is
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on the child pursuant to section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956
A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in
support of termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated
the following:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and
welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In
re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620
A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination
of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
When evaluating a parental bond, the court is not required to use expert
testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.
Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations
omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and make it
part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances … where direct
observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not
necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).
A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis:
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concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent …. Nor
are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in [and] of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs
of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763-64 (affirming the involuntary
termination of the mother’s parental rights, despite the existence of some
bond, where placement with the mother would be contrary to the child’s best
interests, and any bond with the mother would be fairly attenuated when the
child was separated from her, almost constantly, for four years).
Our Supreme Court has observed that the mere existence of a bond or
attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a
termination petition, and that “[e]ven the most abused of children will often
harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive parent.” See In re:
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535). The
Supreme Court instructed, “[t]he continued attachment to the natural
parents, despite serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and
failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the
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children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267
(quoting In re Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M., 839 A.2d 410, 418
(Pa. Super. 2003) (Tamilia, J. dissenting)).
This Court has explained that a parent’s own feelings of love and
affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. In
re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Further, this Court has stated: “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super.
2004) (internal citations omitted). It is well-settled that “we will not toll the
well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of
C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super.
2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that
[a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.”)).
In this matter, the trial court found that Child had suffered from years
of neglect by her parents, and it adopted the clinical opinion of Dr. Rosenblum
that “only through a goal of adoption will [Child] be afforded an opportunity
to remain in a stable and secure family environment that is capable of reliably
meeting her needs at this time and in the years to come.” Trial Court Opinion,
1/24/20, at 3-4. The competent evidence in the record supports the trial
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court’s conclusion that “termination and adoption will best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.” Id.; see also In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Accordingly, we affirm the Orders of the trial court.
Orders affirmed.
Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum.
Judge Dubow concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/28/2020
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