Com. v. Birster, M. ( 2020 )


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  • J-A22043-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    MARISSA DIANE BIRSTER
    Appellant                    No. 468 MDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered February 7, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
    Criminal Division at No: CP-49-CR-0001088-2019
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                    FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2020
    Appellant, Marissa Diane Birster, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed on February 7, 2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of
    Northumberland County. For the reasons set forth below, we remand.
    At the conclusion of a revocation of probation hearing conducted on
    February 7, 2020, the trial court determined Appellant violated her
    supervision. With respect to her conviction for endangering the welfare of
    children (“EWOC”), the court revoked her probation and resentenced her to a
    term of two years plus one day to four years in a state correctional institution,
    with credit for time served. With regard to her conviction for possession of a
    controlled substance, the court revoked Appellant’s probation and resentenced
    her to a county sentence of three to six months in the Northumberland County
    J-A22043-20
    Jail, concurrent with her EWOC sentence.1            The court announced that
    Appellant could be paroled immediately on the state sentence for EWOC.
    Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence on February 10,
    2020, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court improperly permitted hearsay
    testimony of Probation Officer Kasey Fisher in violation of Appellant’s
    Confrontation Clause rights.        The testimony at issue related to Appellant’s
    alleged conversations with her own probation officer, Matt Naracavage, who
    was unavailable to testify at the hearing because he was on paternity leave.
    Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, 2/10/20, at ¶¶ 7-17. Appellant also
    complained that she was resentenced without being afforded the right of
    allocution. Id. at ¶¶ 18-22. By order entered on February 12, 2020, the trial
    court denied the motion.         Appellant’s counsel, Jerry Grill, Esquire, of the
    Northumberland County Public Defender’s Office, filed a timely appeal. On
    March 26, 2020, Attorney Grill filed a Criminal Docketing Statement with this
    Court.
    On March 30, 2020, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a Rule
    1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days
    of the order. The order provided that “[a]ny issue not properly included in
    the Statement . . . shall be deemed waived for purposes of the appeal.” Order,
    ____________________________________________
    1The possession charges were filed under a separate Northumberland County
    docket number, CR-1090-2019. Appellant did not pursue an appeal to this
    Court from that conviction.
    -2-
    J-A22043-20
    3/30/20, at 1 (footnote omitted). The order was served on Attorney Grill, as
    reflected on the docket. However, no Rule 1925(b) statement was filed on
    Appellant’s behalf.       On April 30, 2020, the trial court entered an order
    indicating it would not issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion “because no statement
    [was] filed within the allotted time.” Order, 4/30/20, at 1.
    On May 18, 2020, this Court issued a briefing schedule, directing that
    Appellant file her brief on or before June 26, 2020. The schedule was served
    on counsel for the Commonwealth and on Michael D. Suders, Esquire, of the
    Northumberland County Public Defender’s Office, who is listed as counsel of
    record for Appellant on this Court’s docket.
    Appellant filed a brief in accordance with the schedule and asks this
    Court to consider three issues:
    A. Whether the probation officer notes are admissible under the
    business records exception to the hearsay rule?
    B. Whether [Appellant] has a right to speak at a revocation
    hearing?
    C. Whether the Superior Court must dismiss this case given the
    failure of hearing counsel to file a concise statement of matters
    on appeal?
    Appellant’s Brief at 6.
    With regard to the third issue, Appellant attempts to explain her failure
    to file a concise statement.          Specifically, in her Statement of the Case,
    Appellant   suggests       that   a   COVID-19    Emergency   Order   signed   by
    Northumberland County President Judge Charles H. Saylor on March 18, 2020,
    -3-
    J-A22043-20
    “extend[ed] all deadlines.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. 2 Appellant further notes
    that after filing a docketing statement with this Court, “[t]he defense attorney
    sent a resignation letter on March 25, 2020.” Id.3 Appellant acknowledges
    the trial court’s March 30, 2020 order directing the filing of a Rule 1925(b)
    statement, but notes that President Judge Saylor issued an order on April 2,
    2020, extending judicial emergency procedures until April 30, 2020. Id. at 8.
    In the argument section of the brief, Appellant suggests that because
    “there was no effective notice [to file a Rule 1925(b) statement] demonstrated
    on the record given the resignation of hearing counsel and outside the
    President Judge[’s] Emergency Orders that extended to April 30 2020, the
    case should be remanded for a new hearing or opportunity to file” a Rule
    1925(b) statement. Id. at 15. While remand is necessary, we do not base
    remand on Appellant’s reasoning.
    First, even if counsel who filed the appeal did resign, it is clear Appellant
    was represented at all times by the Northumberland Public Defender’s Office.
    ____________________________________________
    2 The order, in fact, did not “extend[] all deadlines.” The March 18, 2020
    order provided, in relevant part, that “the court is authorized to suspend time
    calculations for the purpose of trial computation relevant to court cases or
    other judicial business, as well as time deadlines, subject to constitutional
    restrictions.” Order, 3/18/20, at ¶ 1 (some capitalization omitted).
    3The March 25, 2020 letter is not part of the record in this case. Regardless,
    even if Attorney Grill resigned from the Public Defender’s Office, there is no
    suggestion that the Defender’s Office sought leave to withdraw as Appellant’s
    counsel.
    -4-
    J-A22043-20
    It was incumbent on that office to comply with the trial court’s Rule 1925(b)
    directive. Second, the trial court issued two emergency orders on March 18,
    2020, one that authorized the court to suspend time calculations for, inter
    alia, deadlines,4 and another that postponed certain proceedings. Although
    the court was authorized to extend deadlines, the trial court nevertheless
    issued an order on March 30, 2020, directing Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b)
    statement within 21 days of the order. The President Judge’s April 3, 2020
    emergency order extended the judicial emergency through April 30, 2020, and
    cancelled the May 2020 term of criminal court. However, the order had no
    impact on the trial court’s March 30, 2020 order directing Appellant to file a
    Rule 1925(b) statement.
    As our Supreme Court reiterated in Commonwealth v. Hill, 
    16 A.3d 484
     (Pa. 2011):
    Our jurisprudence is clear and well-settled, and firmly establishes
    that: Rule 1925(b) sets out a simple bright-line rule, which
    obligates an appellant to file and serve a Rule 1925(b) statement,
    when so ordered; any issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b)
    statement will be deemed waived; the courts lack the authority to
    countenance deviations from the Rule’s terms; the Rule’s
    provisions are not subject to ad hoc exceptions or selective
    enforcement; appellants and their counsel are responsible for
    complying with the Rule’s requirements; Rule 1925 violations may
    be raised by the appellate court sua sponte, and the Rule applies
    notwithstanding an appellee’s request not to enforce it; and, if
    Rule 1925 is not clear as to what is required of an appellant, on-
    the-record actions taken by the appellant aimed at compliance
    may satisfy the Rule. We yet again repeat the principle first stated
    ____________________________________________
    4   See n.1.
    -5-
    J-A22043-20
    in [Commonwealth v. Lord, 
    719 A.2d 306
     (Pa. 1998),] that
    must be applied here: “[I]n order to preserve their claims for
    appellate review, [a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial
    court orders them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on
    Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Any issues not raised in a
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” 719 A.2d
    at 309.
    Id. at 494 (footnote omitted). Here, in accordance with our Supreme Court’s
    directive in Hill, Appellant’s failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement results in
    the waiver of all issues on appeal.
    However, we are also cognizant that Rule 1925(c)(3) provides:
    If an appellant represented by counsel in a criminal case was
    ordered to file a Statement and failed to do so . . . such that the
    appellate court is convinced that counsel has been per se
    ineffective, and the trial court did not file an opinion, the appellate
    court may remand for appointment of new counsel, the filing of a
    Statement nunc pro tunc, and the preparation and filing of an
    opinion by the judge.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3).
    In Commonwealth v. Thompson, 
    39 A.3d 335
     (Pa. Super. 2012), this
    Court explained:
    Paragraph (c)(3) of Rule 1925 codifies the procedure established
    by this Court in Commonwealth v. West, 
    883 A.2d 654
     (Pa.
    Super. 2005). Note to Pa.R.A.P. 1925; see Commonwealth v.
    Hill, 
    16 A.3d 484
    , 496 n. 15 (Pa. 2011). “Direct appeal rights
    have typically been restored through a post-conviction relief
    process, but when the ineffectiveness is apparent and per se, the
    court in West recognized that the more effective way to resolve
    such per se ineffectiveness is to remand for the filing of a
    Statement and opinion.” Note to Pa.R.A.P. 1925; see West,
    
    supra at 657
    .
    Id. at 339.
    -6-
    J-A22043-20
    Appellant was represented by counsel. Appellant was ordered to file a
    Rule 1925(b) statement and failed to do so, leading us to conclude her counsel
    was per se ineffective.5 Further, the trial court did not file a Rule 1925(a)
    opinion due to Appellant’s failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement.     Under
    these circumstances, and as authorized by Rule 1925(c)(3), we therefore
    remand to the trial court for appointment of new counsel, the filing of a Rule
    1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc, and the issuance of a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
    Case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
    Memorandum. Jurisdiction retained.
    ____________________________________________
    5This Court has recognized that “[t]he complete failure to file the 1925 concise
    statement is per se ineffectiveness because it is without reasonable basis
    designed to effectuate the client’s interest and waives all issues on appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Burton, 
    973 A.2d 428
    , 432 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc).
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 468 MDA 2020

Filed Date: 10/30/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2020