Com. v. Law, S. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEPHEN E. LAW
Appellant No. 1333 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 6, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0005716-2011
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 16, 2021
Appellant, Stephen E. Law, appeals from the order entered on April 6,
2016, which denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.1 We affirm.
The trial court ably explained the underlying facts of this case:
On February 9, 2011, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Officer
[Confesor] Nieves and his partner, Officer Palmiero, were
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1 On September 15, 2017, we affirmed the trial court’s order in an
unpublished opinion. Commonwealth v. Law, 178 A.3d 158 (Pa. Super.
2017) (unpublished memorandum) at 1-8, vacated by 209 A.3d 911 (Pa.
2019). However, on May 17, 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
vacated our order and remanded the case “for proceedings consistent with
[the Supreme Court’s] decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto,” 207 A.3d
812 (Pa. 2019). Further, on November 26, 2019, we entered an order,
which placed this case on hold pending the en banc resolution of
Commonwealth v. Atkinson, ___ A.3d ___, 1562 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super.
2021) (en banc), concerning the proper application of Perfetto. Now that
Atkinson has been decided, we can decide the current appeal.
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patrolling in full uniform and marked vehicles in the 12th
District [of Philadelphia]. Officer Nieves observed Appellant
driving a Dodge Neon, leaning down in the driver seat and
reaching over to the passenger seat of the vehicle while
drifting into the adjacent right lane. [The] officers initiated
a traffic stop and Appellant stopped on signal. The officers
observed that Appellant’s eyes were watery and bloodshot
and that his movements were very quick.
When the officers returned to the patrol car to conduct their
investigation, they observed Appellant continue to lean into
the passenger seat. Based upon Appellant’s actions and
prior record, the officers suspected that he might be armed.
The officers asked Appellant to step out of the car and
observed him throw something into the dashboard. Officers
patted Appellant down for weapons with negative results,
and placed him in the back of the patrol car. Officers then
searched a compartment in Appellant’s dashboard and
recovered a Marlboro cigarette package containing two and
a half white pills, half a blue pill[,] and a small plastic bag
containing a green leafy substance.
At some time during the investigation but before Appellant
was handcuffed, Appellant stated that he smoked marijuana
two days earlier and had taken Xanax hours earlier.
Appellant was subsequently arrested on the scene.
...
[The Commonwealth] charged [Appellant] with [driving
under the influence (“DUI”), possession of a controlled
substance, and possession of a small amount of
marijuana.2] Appellant was also charged with a summary
traffic offense: careless driving pursuant to [75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6308(a)]. . . .
On April 13, 2011, Appellant [pleaded guilty to the
summary traffic offense of careless driving in the
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2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802 and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and (31), respectively.
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Philadelphia Traffic Court3]; the other charges were not
adjudicated on that date. On October 19, 2015, Appellant
moved to dismiss the three remaining misdemeanors . . . ,
arguing that the Commonwealth was barred from
prosecuting him under the compulsory joinder provision of
[18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(ii)] because he had been previously
convicted of a traffic violation in the Traffic [Court. The trial
court] denied Appellant’s motion. . . .
On December 3, 2015, Appellant was found guilty[, in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court,] of DUI, possession of a
controlled substance, and possession of a small amount of
marijuana and, on February 3, 2016[,] he was sentenced to
three days to six months [in jail] and a concurrent period of
[12 months of probation]. On April 6, 2016, [the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas denied Appellant’s
petition for writ of certiorari and,] on April 26, 2016,
Appellant[] filed a timely notice of appeal. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 7/26/16, at 1-3 (citations and some capitalization
omitted).
Appellant raises one claim on appeal:
Did not the lower court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion
to dismiss pursuant to [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(ii)] where
[Appellant] had previously been convicted of an offense
which arose from the same criminal episode in the same
judicial district as the offense in the instant case?
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3 Effective June 19, 2013, the legislature amended 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1121 and
“merged the Philadelphia Traffic Court into the Philadelphia Municipal Court
by reorganizing the Municipal Court into two divisions: General Division and
Traffic Division.” Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 207 A.3d 812, 816 n.1 (Pa.
2019). As the Perfetto Court noted, “the Philadelphia Traffic Court was a
constitutionally designated court; however, on April 26, 2016, the
Pennsylvania Constitution was amended to eliminate finally the Philadelphia
Traffic Court.” Id.-3-
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Appellant’s Original Brief at 3.4
In interpreting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, also known as the compulsory
joinder statute, “our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review
is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 71 (Pa. 2008).
Penal statutes are to be strictly construed. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1).
Further, we note that the following principles govern our interpretation of a
statute:
When construing provisions utilized by the General
Assembly in a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every
statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions. However, when the words of a statute are clear
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Words
and phrases shall be construed according to the rules of
grammar and according to their common and approved
usage. In other words, if a term is clear and unambiguous,
we are prohibited from assigning a meaning to that term
that differs from its common everyday usage for the
purpose of effectuating the legislature's intent. Additionally,
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4Appellant’s supplemental brief phrases this claim a little differently. Within
Appellant’s supplemental brief, Appellant declares:
Does 18 Pa.C.S. § 112 allow the Commonwealth to
prosecute [Appellant], even though dismissal is required by
18 Pa.C.S. § 110 and the Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Perfetto?
Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 3.
Appellant’s supplemental claim is substantively identical to his original claim.
We will address all of Appellant’s issues in this memorandum.
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we must remain mindful that the General Assembly does
not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or
unreasonable.
It is axiomatic that the plain language of a statute is the
best indication of the legislative intent that gave rise to the
statute.
Words and phrases shall be construed according to the rules
of grammar and according to their common and approved
usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are
defined in this part, shall be construed according to such
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1003-1104 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations, quotations, and corrections omitted).
“The compulsory joinder statute is a legislative mandate that a
subsequent prosecution for a violation of a provision of a statute that is
different from a former prosecution, or is based on different facts, will be
barred in certain circumstances.” Id., citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. “The
policies served by the statute are two-fold: to protect accused persons from
governmental harassment of undergoing successive trials for offenses
stemming from the same episode, and to promote judicial economy and
finality by avoiding repetitious litigation.” Commonwealth v. George, 38
A.3d 893, 896 (Pa. Super. 2012). “By requiring compulsory joinder of all
charges arising from the same criminal episode, a defendant need only ‘once
run the gauntlet’ and confront the awesome resources of the state.” Id.,quoting Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 180 (Pa. 1983).
In pertinent part, section 110 states:
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§ 110. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is
based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to
when prosecution barred by former prosecution for same
offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
...
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, if such offense was
known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time
of the commencement of the first trial and occurred
within the same judicial district as the former
prosecution unless the court ordered a separate trial of
the charge of such offense[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110.
Section 110(1)(ii) “contains four requirements which, if met, preclude
a subsequent prosecution due to a former prosecution for a different
offense:”
(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an
acquittal or conviction;
(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal
conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the
former prosecution;
(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before
the commencement of the trial on the former charges; and
(4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial
district as the former prosecution.
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Fithian, 961 A.2d at 71-72. “Each prong of this test must be met for
compulsory joinder to apply.” Id. at 72.
Also relevant to the case at bar is 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 112. Section 112,
which is entitled “[f]ormer prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or
when fraudulently procured by the defendant,” declares, in relevant part:
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of section 109
of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former
prosecution for same the offense) through section 111 of
this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former
prosecution in another jurisdiction) under any of the
following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was before a court which
lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 112.
Our Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Perfetto guides, but does not
control, our resolution of this matter. In Perfetto, Marc Perfetto
(“Perfetto”) was driving his car in Philadelphia when he was arrested and
charged with three counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and cited
for the summary offense of driving without lights when required. 5 In 2014,
Perfetto was tried and found guilty, in the Philadelphia Municipal Court –
Traffic Division (“Traffic Division”), on the summary traffic offense. When
the Commonwealth attempted to prosecute Perfetto for the DUI charges,
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5 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802 and 4302(a)(1), respectively.
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Perfetto filed a motion to dismiss. Perfetto, 207 A.3d at 815. Perfetto
argued:
because he already had been convicted of the summary
traffic offense, the compulsory joinder statute prohibited the
Commonwealth from subsequently prosecuting him for the
DUI charges, as all four prongs of . . . Section 110(1)(ii)
were met: (1) [Perfetto’s] former prosecution on his
summary offense resulted in a conviction; (2) the DUI
prosecution arose from the same criminal episode as the
summary offense prosecution - a single traffic stop; (3) the
prosecutor was aware of all of the charges when the
summary offense prosecution commenced; and (4) all of
[Perfetto’s] charges occurred within the same judicial
district - the First Judicial District, i.e., Philadelphia.
Id. at 815.
The trial court agreed with Perfetto and dismissed the DUI charges.
After an en banc panel of this Court reversed the trial court’s ruling, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Perfetto’s petition for allowance of
appeal. The Supreme Court reversed this Court’s en banc opinion and
reinstated the trial court’s order. In reversing this Court’s opinion, the
Perfetto Court agreed with the trial court’s analysis and held that
“straightforward application of the plain language of Subsection 110(1)(ii) of
the compulsory joinder statute to the circumstances presented in this appeal
makes clear that the Commonwealth is precluded from prosecuting Appellant
for his DUI charges.” Id. at 822.
Further, the Supreme Court held that Section 112(1) of the Crimes
Code did not apply to the case. As the Perfetto Court explained:
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Pursuant to Subsection 112(1), a prosecution is not barred
within the meaning of the compulsory joinder statute when
the “former prosecution was before a court which lacked
jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 112(1). The former prosecution in this case occurred in
the Traffic Division. . . . [T]he Traffic Division is not a
“court” unto itself; rather, it is a division of the Philadelphia
Municipal Court. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the
question under Subsection 112(1) is whether the
Philadelphia Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over
Appellant or the offense.
. . . Section 1121 of the Judicial Code speaks directly to the
organization and jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal
Court; indeed, it is entitled “Philadelphia Municipal Court.”
42 Pa.C.S. § 1121. Subsection 1121(b)(3) clearly and
unambiguously states that the General Division shall
exercise full jurisdiction of the Municipal Court under 42
Pa.C.S. § 1123(a) (relating to jurisdiction and venue). 42
Pa.C.S. § 1121(b)(3). In other words, unlike the limited
jurisdiction of the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia
Municipal Court to consider only summary traffic offenses,
id. § 1121(c)(3), the General Division has jurisdiction to
adjudicate any matter that is properly before the Municipal
Court. Thus, . . . the reality is that [Perfetto’s] former
prosecution for his summary offense was before a court
(namely, the Philadelphia Municipal Court) that had
jurisdiction to adjudicate all of [Perfetto’s] charges, albeit in
the court's General Division.
Id. at 822-823 (footnote omitted).
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled, the compulsory joinder statute
precluded the Commonwealth from prosecuting Perfetto for his DUI charges.
Id. at 824.
Also important to the case at bar is our recent opinion in
Commonwealth v. Atkinson, ___ A.3d ___, 1562 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super.
2021) (en banc). In Atkinson, an en banc panel of this Court interpreted
and applied Perfetto to facts that are substantively identical to the one at
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bar. Specifically, as is true in the case at bar, in Atkinson, the defendant,
Daiychelle Atkinson (“Atkinson”), was convicted of her summary traffic
offense at a time when the Traffic Court of Philadelphia was a separate court
and possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the summary traffic offense. The
Atkinson Court held that, since the Traffic Court of Philadelphia was a
separate court and possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the summary traffic
offense, neither Perfetto nor the compulsory joinder rule prohibited the
Commonwealth from subsequently prosecuting Atkinson for the other
charges that arose out of her single criminal episode.
In Atkinson, Atkinson was driving her vehicle in Philadelphia when
she was arrested and charged with DUI and cited for the summary traffic
offense of disregarding a traffic device. On March 13, 2013,6 Atkinson was
tried and convicted of the summary traffic offense in the Traffic Court of
Philadelphia. When the Commonwealth then sought to prosecute Atkinson
for the DUI charge in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, Atkinson filed a
motion to dismiss. She argued that the compulsory joinder rule prohibited
her DUI prosecution, as that charge arose out of the same criminal episode
as her summary traffic conviction, the prosecutor knew of the offense at the
time of her first trial, and the DUI charge occurred within the same judicial
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6 The legislature effectively abolished the Traffic Court of Philadelphia on
June 19, 2013. This was after Atkinson’s March 13, 2013 summary traffic
conviction in that court.
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district as the summary traffic conviction. The municipal court denied her
motion to dismiss and, after the common pleas court affirmed the municipal
court’s ruling, Atkinson filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Atkinson, ___
A.3d at ___, 1562 EDA 2016, at *2.
On appeal, we held that neither our Supreme Court’s opinion in
Perfetto nor the compulsory joinder rule prohibited Atkinson’s subsequent
prosecution for DUI. We reasoned:
Here, there is no dispute that Atkinson’s prosecution on the
summary traffic offense resulted in a conviction, the
prosecution on her misdemeanor charge would be based on
the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal
episode, the Commonwealth knew of the misdemeanor
charge before the summary trial, and the misdemeanor
charge arose in the same judicial district and at the same
time as the traffic offense of which Atkinson has already
been convicted. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii). However,
unlike Perfetto, at the time Atkinson was prosecuted and
found guilty of her summary offense, neither the Traffic
Division nor the General Division of the Municipal
Court existed. Rather, the Municipal Court and the Traffic
Court of Philadelphia were separate entities. See Act
1997-2 (S.B. 178), P.L. 3, § 1, approved Feb. 14, 1997, eff.
Jan. 5, 1998 (former section 1121 designating Philadelphia
Municipal Court and former section 1321 designating Traffic
Court of Philadelphia);[fn.5] see also Perfetto, 207 A.3d at
816 n.1 (“The amended statute merged the Philadelphia
Traffic Court into the Philadelphia Municipal Court by
reorganizing the Municipal Court into two divisions: General
Division and Traffic Division.”) (emphasis added).
[fn.5] At the time Atkinson was adjudicated for her
summary offense, the Municipal Court and Traffic Court
of Philadelphia were designated as “Minor Courts” in this
Commonwealth. The Philadelphia Municipal Court was
its own entity . . . , while the Traffic Court of
Philadelphia was its own entity under Subchapter B of
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Chapter 13, Traffic Courts. The Municipal Court is now
comprised of Civil, Criminal[,] and Traffic Divisions.
Thus, at the time Atkinson was tried on her summary
offense, the Commonwealth could not have also adjudicated
her on her DUI in Traffic Court, which had exclusive
jurisdiction over Motor Vehicle Code violations. Similarly,
the Commonwealth could not have tried Atkinson’s
summary traffic offense in Philadelphia Municipal Court
(Criminal Trial Division). Therefore, the Commonwealth has
not placed [Atkinson] in jeopardy of life or limb regarding
her DUI offense, and the Philadelphia Municipal Court
(Criminal Trial Division) may properly assert its separate,
original jurisdiction over that charge under section 112(1).
Accordingly, our holding in this case does not run afoul of
the Supreme Court’s holding in Perfetto or the compulsory
joinder rule and the trial court properly denied Atkinson’s
motion to dismiss.
Atkinson, ___ A.3d at ___, 1562 EDA 2016, at **6-7 (some footnotes,
quotations, and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
As was true in Atkinson – and unlike in Perfetto – in the case at bar,
Appellant pleaded guilty to his summary traffic offense in the Traffic Court of
Philadelphia,7 at a time when “neither the Traffic Division nor the General
Division of the Municipal Court existed.” Id. at *6 (emphasis omitted). The
case at bar is thus controlled by our en banc opinion in Atkinson. We,
therefore, paraphrase Atkinson and hold as to Appellant:
at the time [Appellant pleaded guilty to his] summary
offense, the Commonwealth could not have also adjudicated
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7 As noted above, Appellant pleaded guilty to his summary traffic charge in
the Traffic Court of Philadelphia on April 13, 2011. The legislature did not
effectively abolish the Traffic Court of Philadelphia until June 19, 2013.
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[him] on [his other criminal charges] in Traffic Court, which
had exclusive jurisdiction over Motor Vehicle violations.
Similarly, the Commonwealth could not have tried
[Appellant’s] summary traffic offense in Philadelphia
Municipal Court (Criminal Trial Division). Therefore, the
Commonwealth has not placed [Appellant] in jeopardy of
life or limb regarding [his other criminal offenses], and the
Philadelphia Municipal Court (Criminal Trial Division) may
properly assert its separate, original jurisdiction over that
charge under section 112(1). Accordingly, our holding in
this case does not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Perfetto or the compulsory joinder rule and the trial
court properly denied [Appellant’s] motion to dismiss.
See Atkinson, ___ A.3d at ___, 1562 EDA 2016, at **6-7 (some footnotes,
quotations, and citations omitted).
We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling in this case.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Solano did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/16/21
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