Com. v. Cruz, J. ( 2023 )

J-S06040-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSE E. CRUZ :
:
Appellant : No. 1288 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-54-CR-0000748-2019
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 21, 2023
Appellant, Jose E. Cruz, appeals from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Schuylkill County dismissing his first petition filed pursuant
to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
Herein, Appellant contends that trial counsel ineffectively failed to interview
witnesses necessary to present a mental infirmity defense at his trial. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
The record in the present matter establishes that on March 8, 2019,
shortly after midnight, police officers from the City of Pottsville Police
Department responded to an emergency call reporting a male firing a gun at
a Pottsville residence. N.T., 8/6/19, at 4. When the officers arrived, they
encountered Appellant standing on the front porch with his hands in his
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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pockets. N.T. at 5. Appellant ignored officers’ requests that he desist, and
he “trotted” away in what the testifying officer described as a “half-jog” for
about two blocks, with the officers trailing cautiously close behind him. N.T.
at 6.
Appellant led the officers to a gated lot when he abruptly pulled a semi-
automatic handgun from his pocket, put it to his temple, and unsuccessfully
attempted to fire it. N.T. at 7. The officer testified that he heard the gun
“click” without firing, and he watched Appellant bring the gun back down,
attempt to chamber a round by manipulating the gun, and bring it to his head
a second time in disregard of officers’ pleas to drop the gun. At that moment,
however, one officer stunned Appellant with a taser, but Appellant retained
control of the firearm while lying down and pointed it at a trooper from the
Pennsylvania State Police. N.T. at 8. As the state trooper dropped to the
ground for his safety, an officer fired at Appellant and followed his shot by
running to Appellant and placing him in custody. N.T. at 9-10.
On March 11, 2019, Appellant was charged with Criminal Attempt to
Commit Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer, Assault of a Law Enforcement
Officer (five counts), Aggravated Assault (five counts), Aggravated Assault
(five counts), Possession of a Firearm, Firearms not to be Carried without a
License, Prohibited Offensive Weapons, Resisting Arrest, Recklessly
Endangering Another Person, Criminal Attempt to Commit Simple Assault,
Possession with Intent to Deliver, Possession of a Controlled Substance, and
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Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.1 Appellant qualified for court-appointed
counsel (“Trial Counsel”), who represented him throughout the pre-trial
proceedings, including the August 6, 2019, Omnibus Pretrial Hearing, after
which the trial court dismissed the charges of Criminal Attempt to Commit
Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer, Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer,
Aggravated Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer, Aggravated Assault with a
Deadly Weapon, and Criminal Attempt to Commit Simple Assault.
The PCRA Court aptly provides the ensuing procedural history:
On February 2, 2021, [Appellant] entered a general plea of guilty
to the [remaining charges]. On March 18, 2021, [the trial court]
sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate confinement sentence of
not less than ten and one-quarter to not more than twenty and
one-half years in a state correctional institution.
On January 18, 2022, [Appellant] filed his pro se motion under
[the PCRA] asserting he is eligible for relief due to: I) a violation
of the Constitution of Pennsylvania or the United States
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place; II)
ineffective assistance of counsel; and III) a plea of guilty was
unlawfully induced. PCRA Petition, 1/18/22, at 2.
The [PCRA] Court appointed [PCRA counsel] on January 26, 2022,
as [Appellant’s] PCRA counsel. [PCRA counsel] did not file any
amendments to the PCRA petition. An evidentiary hearing
concluded on May 23, 2022, at which time [Appellant],
[Appellant’s mother], and trial counsel . . . each testified. Counsel
presented oral argument but declined to submit any briefs.
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/9/22, at 1-2.
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1 18 Pa.C.A. §§ 901(a)/2507(a), 2702.1(a), 2702(a)(2), 2702(a)(4),
6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 907(b), 5104, 2705, 901/2701(a), and 35 P.S. §§
780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), and (a)(32).
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On August 9, 2022, the PCRA court entered its order and opinion
denying PCRA relief. Pertinent to the present appeal, the court opined that
Appellant failed to prove trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to investigate or call witnesses to support a mental health defense where
evidence was lacking to support such a defense. Id. at 3-10. This timely
appeal followed.
Herein, Appellant raises one issue for this Court’s review:
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview
potential witnesses in order to present a mental infirmity defense
at the time of trial?
Brief for Appellant at 3.
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is
whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free
of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1105 (Pa. 2012)
(citation omitted). A PCRA court's credibility findings are to be accorded great
deference, and, where supported by the record, such determinations are
binding on a reviewing court. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 305
(Pa. 2011) at 305 (citations omitted).
Trial counsel is presumed to be effective, and the appellant has the
burden of proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Howard, 749 A.2d
941, 946 (Pa. Super. 2000). To carry this burden, the appellant must plead
and prove:
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(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
basis existed for counsel's action or failure to act; and (3) [s]he
suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice
measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v.
Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (employing ineffective
assistance of counsel test from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)).... Additionally, counsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Finally,
because a PCRA petitioner must establish all Pierce prongs to be
entitled to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements of
an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim fails
under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on that
basis.
Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citations
modified); see also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380 (Pa. 2011)
(“When evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential.” (citation and quotes omitted)).
“Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or
ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel
was ineffective.” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. 2012)
(citing, inter alia, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);
Commonwealth v.Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001).
To establish the reasonable basis prong, we look to see whether trial
counsel's strategy was “so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have
chosen that course of conduct.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 640 A.2d
1251, 1265 (Pa. 1994). An attorney's trial strategy “will not be found to have
lacked a reasonable basis unless it is proven that an alternative not chosen
offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually
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pursued.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (Pa. 1998).
Further, if an appellant has clearly not met the prejudice prong, a court may
dismiss the claim on that basis alone and need not determine whether the
other two prongs have been met. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d
352, 357 (Pa. 1995).
At issue in the present matter is whether trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to interview and call for trial potential medical
fact and expert witnesses whose testimonies purportedly would have
supported a mental infirmity defense. See Appellant’s Brief at 3.
To establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness,
Appellant must show: “(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available;
(3) counsel knew [ ] of the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was
willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony was so
prejudicial to [appellant] to have denied [him] a fair trial.” Commonwealth
v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 302 (Pa. 2011).
However, “the question of failing to interview a witness is distinct from
failure to call a witness to testify.” Commonwealth v. Dennis, 950 A.2d
945, 960 (Pa. 2008). A claim that trial counsel did not interview or investigate
a known witness “presents an issue of arguable merit where the record
demonstrates that counsel did not perform an investigation.”
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 712 (Pa. Super. 2013). Further,
failing to investigate a known witness can be unreasonable per se; however,
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an appellant must still show prejudice from the failure. Id., citing Dennis,
950 A.2d at 960.
In Appellant’s counseled brief, he maintains that he informed trial
counsel on numerous occasions that he was under the care of mental health
care professionals at the time of the incident underlying his charges and
provided counsel with their contact information. He claims that “[d]espite
being provided this information, trial counsel failed to request medical records
or interview the potential witnesses to question the Appellant’s competency
to stand trial or any mental infirmity defenses that may be available if he had
chosen to go to trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.
The PCRA court, however, discerned no arguable merit to the forgone
mental health defense theory underpinning Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim
against trial counsel. To this end, the PCRA court authored a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion in which it recounts the evidence offered at the PCRA hearing,
observes Appellant’s failure to produce medical evidence in the form of records
or testimony to support his ineffectiveness claim against trial counsel, and
explains, as finder of fact, that it found trial counsel credibly testified that she
did, in fact, investigate Appellant’s medical history and sought in vain to obtain
relevant evidence sufficiently probative of Appellant’s mental infirmity at the
time of the alleged crime:
On page seven of his PCRA petition, [Appellant] indicates that Dr.
Kotwal will offer testimony that [Appellant] was seen for severe
mental illnesses over the years, prescribed antipsychotics
medications, had schizophrenia, that the condition causes
individuals to not understand reality and that he was “able, willing
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to testify at trial.” Despite this declaration, [Appellant] did not
call Dr. Kotwal to testify at the PCRA hearing [or] offer any of Dr.
Kotwal’s purported medical records into evidence.
Similarly, [Appellant] also listed Marco Morales as a witness.
([PCRA Petition] at p. 7). [Appellant] wrote that Mr. Morales
would testify he is a therapist who counseled [Appellant] over a
number of years for mental illness and that [Appellant] stopped
attending counseling and taking prescriptions a few weeks prior
to the crimes. [Appellant] further indicated Mr. Morales would
testify that he too was able, willing, and available to testify at trial.
Neither [Appellant] nor his PCRA counsel called Mr. Morales as [a]
witness at the PCRA hearing [or] offered any evidence of
treatment records.
At the PCRA hearing, [Appellant] testified he suffers from PTSD,
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, depression and anxiety. He
claim[ed] he suffered from these conditions when he committed
the crimes. [N.T., 5/23/22, at 7-8]. [Appellant] stated that he
attempted to shoot himself during the incident that resulted in his
arrest. [Appellant] informed [trial counsel] about his mental
health and asked her to get his past medical treatment records.
[N.T. at 8]. [He] testified that [trial counsel] never obtained any
records and never explored the mental infirmity defense. [N.T. at
8-9]. Appellant insists that he told [trial counsel] he wanted her
to file a motion to determine competency to stand trial as well as
to pursue an insanity defense. [N.T. at 9, 12].
[Appellant] testified he currently takes prescriptions for his
diagnoses but failed to tell the [PCRA] court the medication name
or when he started them. [N.T. at 10].
...
[Trial Counsel] testified that she has been a criminal defense
attorney for over [] 20 years and has handled over [] 200 criminal
jury trials. [N.T. at 17].
...
In regard to [Appellant’s] contention that she should have raised
a mental illness defense, [trial counsel] specified she did not
believe his mental health conditions would rise to the level of an
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affirmative defense. She did not feel [Appellant] was “legally”
incompetent. [N.T. at 20, 43, 45].
...
She elaborated it was also problematic that there were no recent
mental health treatment records contemporaneous to the criminal
incident. In her experience as a criminal trial defense attorney,
she felt it would be impossible to get a doctor to speculate as to
[Appellant’s] state of mind at the time of the criminal acts absent
record of contemporaneous mental health treatment. [N.T. at 27-
28].
In addition, [trial counsel] did not feel [Appellant’s] being suicidal
at the time of this criminal acts overrode his knowledge that he
was illegally in possession of firearms and drugs, again especially
considering the strong Commonwealth body worn and porch
camera video evidence. [N.T. at 25, 27, 32, 43, 43-44].
[Trial counsel] indicated that [Appellant’s mother and brother
reached out to her and offered that [Appellant] had past mental
health treatment. She testified that his family provided her with
just one old treatment report that was not helpful in any way.
[N.T at 28, 41].
[Trial counsel] obtained [Appellant’s] medical authorization to
obtain his records. She reiterated she could not locate any records
with the exception of receiving three pages of irrelevant, unhelpful
records from three years before the criminal episode. [Trial
counsel] added that even if she had been able to obtain mental
health treatment records, she did not feel they would have been
helpful unless they were contemporaneous with the criminal
episode. [N.T. at 46].
Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/22, at 3-4, 4, 5, 6-7 (bracketed citations to May 23,
2022, PCRA hearing notes of testimony added).
Viewing this evidence in its role as finder of fact, the PCRA court
determined that trial counsel did not ignore available and admissible evidence
tending to establish a viable defense, but, to the contrary, exercised due
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diligence in making what proved a futile attempt to obtain medical records
indicating mental infirmity during the time in question. Accordingly, the PCRA
court discerned no arguable merit to Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim. PCRA
Court Opinion at 10. Our review of the record supports the PCRA Court’s
determination in this regard. See N.T. 5/23/22 (PCRA Hearing).
Furthermore, even if we assumed arguendo that Appellant’s claim has
arguable merit, Appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. As noted
supra, prejudice is established by evidence demonstrating a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s negligence the defendant would have
obtained a better result. At the PCRA hearing, however, Appellant failed to
show that either medical records or treating medical professionals were
available to establish the existence and extent of his mental infirmity at the
time in question. It was Appellant’s burden to show prejudice resulted from
counsel’s ineffectiveness, and such prejudice could not be demonstrated
without such evidence.
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As our review of the record supports the PCRA Court’s determination,
we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/2023
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