Com. v. Parkhurst, J. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S04003-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    :
    JOSEPH A. PARKHURST                  :
    :
    Appellant          :   No. 924 MDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 13, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-66-CR-0000172-2017
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    :
    JOSEPH A. PARKHURST                  :
    :
    Appellant          :   No. 925 MDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 13, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-66-CR-0000173-2017
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    :
    JOSEPH ALAN PARKHURST                :
    :
    Appellant          :   No. 926 MDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 13, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-66-CR-0000190-2017
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    J-S04003-21
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                FEBRUARY 24, 2021
    Appellant, Joseph Alan Parkhurst, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered on September 13, 2017, as made final by the denial of his
    reinstated post-sentence motion on June 16, 2020. We affirm.
    On July 7, 2017, Appellant entered guilty pleas at each of three trial
    court dockets. Specifically, he pleaded guilty to robbery,1 graded as a felony
    of the first degree, at docket number CP-66-CR-0000172-2017 (“172-2017”),
    criminal attempt to commit robbery,2 graded as a felony of the first degree,
    at docket number CP-66-CR-0000173-2017 (“173-2017”), and theft by
    unlawful taking,3 graded as a felony of the third degree, at docket number
    CP-66-CR-0000190-2017            (“190-2017”).   At   the   plea   hearing,   the
    Commonwealth made the following offer of proof:
    [At docket number 172-2017, the evidence would show that, on
    April 27, 2017], in Wyoming County, Pennsylvania, [Appellant],
    during the course of committing a theft at Bowman’s Creek
    Service Center, he had intention to place the store clerk in fear of
    immediate serious bodily injury by brandishing a knife and
    demanding money from the store clerk and received
    approximately $400.000 in US currency.            The next case,
    [173-2017, the evidence would show that, on April 28, 2017], in
    Wyoming County, Pennsylvania, [Appellant], with the intent to
    commit the crime of [r]obbery, did enter the Dollar General Store
    with his face concealed, brandished a knife, and demanded money
    from the store clerk, which constituted a substantial step towards
    the commission of said crime, that being [r]obbery. And then the
    ____________________________________________
    1. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
    2. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).
    3. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3921(a).
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    third case, [190-2017, the evidence would show that, on April 29,
    2017], in Wyoming County, Pennsylvania, [Appellant] did
    unlawfully take or exercise unlawful control over a 1997 Toyota
    4Runner belonging to Robert Ruppert with the intent to deprive
    the owner thereof.
    N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/7/17, at 14-15.
    Thereafter, on September 13, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant
    as follows: 36 to 72 months’ incarceration at docket number 172-2017, 24 to
    48 months’ incarceration at docket number 173-2017, and 12 to 24 months’
    incarceration at docket number 190-2017.           N.T. Sentencing Hearing,
    9/13/2017, at 9-11. The court directed that Appellant serve each sentence
    on a consecutive basis; hence, Appellant’s aggregate sentence totaled 72
    months to 144 months’ imprisonment. Id. The trial court further ordered
    Appellant to pay restitution and obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation with
    follow through for any recommended treatment. Id. at 9-11. After the trial
    court reinstated Appellant’s post-sentence rights, Appellant filed a post-
    sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the trial court denied.
    See Order of Court, 6/16/2020. This appeal followed.4
    Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
    ____________________________________________
    4. Appellant timely filed separate notices of appeal at each trial court docket
    to which his judgment of sentence pertained. See Commonwealth v.
    Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
     (Pa. 2018). This Court then consolidated Appellant’s
    separate appeals. On July 14, 2020, the trial court entered an order directing
    Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). Appellant timely complied. The trial court
    issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on September 1, 2020.
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    Did the trial court abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law
    when it failed to consider [Appellant’s] background, was
    improperly guided solely by the egregiousness of the crimes [for]
    which [Appellant] was convicted, and, singularly and in the
    aggregate, imposed a manifestly excessive sentence by running
    each sentence consecutive?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Appellant takes issue with the trial court’s decision to impose his
    sentences consecutively, as opposed to concurrently, and argues that the trial
    court sentenced Appellant “at the highest end of the standard range of the
    guidelines” by “focusing solely on what [the trial court] perceived to be the
    seriousness of the offenses negating any mitigating information.” Appellant’s
    Brief at 21. Appellant’s issue therefore implicates the discretionary aspects of
    sentencing.
    When an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence,
    the right to appeal is not absolute. Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 
    20 A.3d 1215
    , 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Instead, the appellant must petition this Court
    for review.   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).       An appellant challenging the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by
    satisfying a four-part test:
    We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
    appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
    and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
    sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect,
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
    that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
    Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
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    Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
    65 A.3d 932
    , 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
    case citations omitted). An appellate court will not review the merits of an
    appeal unless the appellant meets all four criteria.          Commonwealth v.
    Luketic, 
    162 A.3d 1149
    , 1159-1160 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“Only if the appeal
    satisfies these requirements may we proceed to decide the substantive merits
    of Appellant’s claim.”).
    Appellant filed timely notices of appeal, properly preserved his claims,
    and filed an appropriate 2119(f) statement in his brief.        Thus, we turn to
    whether he raised a substantial question. A substantial question is raised by
    demonstrating that the trial court’s actions were inconsistent with the
    Sentencing Code or contrary to a fundamental norm underlying the sentencing
    process. Commonwealth v. Bonner, 
    135 A.3d 592
    , 603 (Pa. Super. 2016).
    This issue is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
    Id.
     This Court will not look
    beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f)
    statement     to   determine    whether     a   substantial    question   exists.
    Commonwealth v. Radecki, 
    180 A.3d 441
    , 468 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
    omitted).
    Appellant argues within his Rule 2119(f) statement that this appeal
    presents a substantial question because the trial court erred in focusing only
    on the egregiousness of the crime without consideration of mitigating
    circumstances, which resulted in a failure to evaluate Appellant’s rehabilitative
    needs.   Appellant also claims that the consecutive nature of his separate
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    sentences produced a manifestly excessive punishment.              See Appellant’s
    Brief, at 12-13.
    Standing separately, claims asserting a failure to consider mitigating
    factors and claims challenging the imposition of consecutive sentences do not
    raise a substantial question. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (mitigating factors); Commonwealth v.
    Gonzalez–Dejesus, 
    994 A.2d 595
    , 598 (Pa. Super. 2010) (consecutive
    sentences). When brought together, however, a “challenge to the imposition
    of consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, together with a claim that the
    trial court failed to consider the defendant’s rehabilitative needs upon
    fashioning its sentence, presents a substantial question.” Bonner, 135 A.3d,
    at 603-604, citing Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d 763
    , 770 (Pa.
    Super. 2015) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    126 A.3d 1282
     (Pa. 2015).                  As
    Appellant raises such a combined claim, we shall proceed to the merits of his
    discretionary sentencing challenge.
    As we previously stated:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the [trial
    court], and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
    manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of
    discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
    [trial] court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment
    for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill[ ]will, or arrived at a
    manifestly unreasonable decision.
    Commonwealth v. Blount, 
    207 A.3d 925
    , 934-935 (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    218 A.3d 1198
     (Pa. 2019).
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    When this Court reviews the discretionary aspects of a sentence, its
    analysis is governed by Sections 9781(c) and (d) of the Pennsylvania
    Sentencing Code. Section 9781, in pertinent part, states,
    § 9781. Appellate review of sentence
    ...
    (c) Determination on appeal.--The appellate court shall vacate
    the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with
    instructions if it finds:
    (1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
    sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;
    (2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
    guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
    application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
    (3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing
    guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
    In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence
    imposed by the sentencing court.
    (d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the appellate
    court shall have regard for:
    (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
    and characteristics of the defendant.
    (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
    defendant, including any presentence investigation.
    (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
    (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c) and (d). Throughout his brief, Appellant concedes that
    his sentences fall within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines. E.g.,
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    Appellant’s Brief at 11, 21. Therefore, we may vacate and remand only if the
    sentence is clearly unreasonable.
    The trial court has the power to impose sentences consecutively or
    concurrently, in its discretion. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a). Moreover, as we
    have previously stated, “where a sentence is within the standard range of the
    guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the
    Sentencing Code.”    Moury, 
    992 A.2d, at 171
    .      Therefore, the trial court’s
    discretion in “imposing a sentence on each offense at the highest end of the
    standard range of the guidelines,” Appellant’s Brief, at 21 (emphasis
    added), is not clearly unreasonable.      Indeed, Appellant’s sentence, both
    separately and in the aggregate, falls within the standard range of the
    Sentencing Code.      See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 9/13/17, at 10-12.
    Appellant’s challenge to the consecutive nature of his sentence is without
    merit.
    Appellant next argues that the trial court solely relied on the
    egregiousness of the offenses in imposing its sentence and failed to consider
    mitigating circumstances, including Appellant’s background, his addiction, and
    “his lack of a criminal record, employment history, and the rehabilitative needs
    of the [a]ppellant[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 12. The trial court must consider
    the factors of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) in fashioning its sentence, namely, “the
    protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and
    community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant[.]” Commonwealth
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    v. Shugars, 
    895 A.2d 1270
    , 1274 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). We
    have stated:
    When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the
    particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
    defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer to
    the defendant's prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics
    and potential for rehabilitation. Where pre-sentence reports exist,
    we shall ... presume that the sentencing judge was aware of
    relevant information regarding the defendant's character and
    weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory
    factors. A pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks
    for itself.
    Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 761 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    Appellant contends that the trial court solely focused on the seriousness
    of the offense in imposing its sentence. Paraphrasing the trial court, Appellant
    argues, “[a]s the trial court stated at sentencing, the reason for the hefty
    sentence imposed was based upon the seriousness of the offenses and any
    lesser sentence would depreciate their seriousness.” Appellant’s Brief at 18,
    citing N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 9/13/17, at 10-12. Significantly, Appellant’s
    quote omits the trial court’s emphasis on Appellant’s actions. Specifically, the
    trial court stated:
    Reasons for sentence, the serious nature of the offense. Any
    lesser of a sentence would depreciate the serious nature of the
    [Appellant’s] actions and the sentence is within the standard
    range guidelines.
    ...
    Total aggregate sentence, seventy-two months to one hundred
    and forty-four months in a state correctional facility. Reasons for
    sentence, the serious nature of the offense, the totality of the
    [Appellant’s] actions warrant consecutive sentences and
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    the sentence is within the standard range guidelines and there is
    no reason for the [c]ourt to deviate from the same.
    N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 9/13/17, at 10-12 (emphasis added).          The trial
    court’s emphasis on Appellant’s actions demonstrates its consideration of the
    impact of Appellant’s actions on the victims and community as well as
    Appellant’s rehabilitative needs as required by Section 9721(b). Additionally,
    the trial court ordered a drug and alcohol evaluation from which Appellant was
    to follow any recommended treatment plan.            N.T. Sentencing Hearing,
    9/13/17, at 10. This rebuts Appellant’s assertion that the trial court did not
    consider Appellant’s addiction and his rehabilitative needs in fixing the
    challenged sentence.
    Furthermore, prior to sentencing, the trial court reviewed a presentence
    investigation report (“PSI report”). See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 9/13/17, at
    6.5 Appellant’s counsel had no additions or corrections for the report. 
    Id.
    Because the trial court had the benefit of a PSI report, we presume it was
    aware of and considered the relevant information as part of its sentencing
    determination.     Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d at 761
    .      The trial court also had the
    benefit of comments from Appellant’s counsel at sentencing.          See N.T.
    Sentencing Hearing, 9/13/17, at 6-7. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that
    the trial court was aware of and considered mitigating factors when imposing
    ____________________________________________
    5. The trial court, in asking defense counsel whether he was in receipt of the
    PSI report and whether he had any additions or corrections to make,
    demonstrated its awareness and possession of the PSI report. See N.T.
    Sentencing Hearing, 9/13/17, at 6.
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    Appellant’s sentence. The trial court adequately evaluated the factors outlined
    in Section 9721(b). Therefore, Appellant’s contrary argument is meritless.
    For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 02/24/2021
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Document Info

Docket Number: 924 MDA 2020

Filed Date: 2/24/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024