Com. v. Riddic, S. ( 2021 )

J-S47035-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
STANLEY ALEXANDER RIDDIC, :
:
Appellant :
: No. 260 MDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 12, 2020
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006792-2015
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2021
Stanley Alexander Riddic (Appellant)1 pro se appeals the order entered
February 12, 2020, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.
A prior panel of this Court provided the following factual background.
On September 15, 2015, around 1:23 p.m., York Area
Regional Police responded to a radio dispatch of an armed bank
robbery. Corporal Ray Krzywulak arrived first on the scene, in
less than a minute. He observed a silver Chevrolet Impala with
Maryland tags near an intersection by the bank.
The corporal saw the driver talking with another person in
the vehicle, even though no one else could be seen. Corporal
Krzywulak activated his flashing lights. The driver of the Impala
responded by attempting evasive action. In a few minutes,
backup arrived. Corporal Krzywulak, Detective Donald Hopple,
1 Appellant’s name is also spelled “Riddick” in the record.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Jr., and Sergeant Peter Montgomery blocked the Impala,
bringing it to a stop. Appellant was found crouching between the
front seat and the back seat. Another co-defendant was
crouched in the front passenger seat area. Appellant asked the
police how they were able to apprehend them. He also asked the
police to apologize to the bank tellers.2 The police took all three
men into custody. It turned out that the vehicle was rented in
Maryland under Appellant’s name.
_____
2 Appellant later denied these inculpatory statements in
court, although he again apologized to the bank
employees, while at the same time continuing to deny
responsibility for the robbery. (See e.g., N.T. Sentence,
6/27/[20]17, at 15).
The police later identified the driver/lookout as Derek
Lozzi. The other two suspects were identified as Dennis Harris
(found in the front seat) and Appellant, Stanley Riddic, (found
between the front seat and the back seat). In a search of the
surrounding area, police found a plastic bag near the bank with
money stained by an exploding dye pack. The suspects’ clothing
was stained with indelible ink from the dye pack. The bank
employees who were robbed identified the robbers by general
body shapes, complexion and clothing.3 Their identifications
were corroborated by video surveillance tape and still
photographs from the video.
_____
3 Both bank robbers wore nylon stocking masks during the
robbery.
Commonwealth v. Riddic, 195 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished
memorandum at 2-3). Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with
robbery, theft by unlawful taking (moveable property), receiving stolen
property, criminal conspiracy (robbery), and robbery (financial institution).
Appellant, Harris, and Lozzi were scheduled to be tried together starting on
May 15, 2017.
[On May 15, 2017,] Lozzi, the lookout/would-be getaway
driver, entered a guilty plea. The other two defendants[,
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Appellant and Harris,] were to be tried together [on that date].
However, [] Harris twice complained of chest pains [and was
twice transported to and released from the hospital, where]
medical personnel found nothing on examination. Appellant
repeatedly asked for a continuance, claiming he was about to
hire private counsel. Appellant had already rejected three court-
appointed counsel. The trial court declined to postpone the trial[,
directed all parties to appear the next morning, and warned
Appellant and Harris that it would proceed in absentia unless
provided with medical documentation of an inability to
participate].
[The next day, May 16, 2017,] Appellant failed to appear.
It eventually developed that Appellant had gone to an
emergency room in a Maryland hospital, complaining that he had
been in a motor vehicle accident the night before. [After the
court was unable to verify Appellant was medically unable to
attend his trial, h]e was tried in absentia. [Harris refused to be
transported from prison to court to appear for his trial and was
also tried in absentia. On May 17, 2017, t]he jury convicted both
Appellant and Harris of all charges.
On June 27, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
an aggregate term of not less than seven nor more than
fourteen years of incarceration in a state correctional institution.
Id. (unpublished memorandum at 3-4). On August 27, 2018, this Court
affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and on February 20, 2019, our
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Id.,appeal denied, 202 A.3d 682 (Pa. 2019).
On June 25, 2019, Appellant pro se timely filed the instant PCRA
petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel,2 who subsequently filed a
2 On August 5, 2019, Appellant pro se filed a motion to dismiss counsel,
seeking to remove the first attorney appointed by the PCRA court. The PCRA
court permitted the first attorney to withdraw and on August 7, 2019,
appointed Aaron N. Holt, Esquire, as counsel. When referring to PCRA
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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petition to withdraw and Turner/Finley3 no-merit letter on November 11,
2019. Therein, PCRA counsel summarized the claims Appellant wished to
raise: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to (1) prevent his trial
in absentia from proceeding; (2) seek a colloquy informing Appellant he
would waive the right to testify if he was tried in absentia; (3) file a motion
to recuse the trial judge; (4) file a motion to dismiss under Rule 600; (5) file
a motion to suppress his statements to police officers; (6) present co-
defendant Harris as an alibi witness; (7) cross-examine bank teller witnesses
and present any witnesses or evidence for the defense at trial; (8) request
the trial court give the jury a Kloiber4 instruction that it should view with
caution the identification testimony of the bank teller witnesses, and (9)
challenge the sufficiency and weight of the evidence in a post-sentence
motion. Turner/Finley Letter, 11/11/2019, at 3-16 (pagination supplied)5
Appellant also wished to raise the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
counsel in this memorandum, we are referring to Attorney Holt. Also on
August 5, 2019, Appellant pro se filed a second PCRA petition and
memorandum of law, as well as a motion to recuse the trial judge, who was
the same judge who presided over the PCRA court. The PCRA court
subsequently denied the motion to recuse.
3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
4 Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820, 826-27 (Pa. 1954).
5 PCRA counsel identified the claims Appellant wished to raise from the PCRA
petition and memorandum of law filed on August 5, 2019, which included all
of the claims Appellant raised in his June 25, 2019 petition as well as new
claims.
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for failing to (1) raise issues regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, and (2)
brief meritorious issues. Id. at 16-17 (pagination supplied). PCRA counsel
examined each issue and concluded none was meritorious. Id.
On December 6, 2019, the PCRA court entered an order granting PCRA
counsel’s petition to withdraw, and on December 11, 2019, the court entered
notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant twice requested, and was twice granted, an
extension of time to respond, but did not file a response within the extended
timeframe. Appellant pro se filed the instant appeal on February 7, 2020.6
The PCRA court entered a final order denying PCRA relief on February 12,
2020, and issued an opinion addressing the eleven issues Appellant raised in
his June 25, 2019 petition.7
On appeal, Appellant raises five issues for our review. We are mindful
of the following.
6 Appellant filed his notice of appeal from the Rule 907 notice. Appellant’s
appeal, therefore, was premature as this is not a final, appealable order.
Commonwealth v. McGarry, 172 A.3d 60, 64 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing
Pa.R.A.P. 301; Commonwealth v. Swartzfager, 59 A.3d 616, 618 n.3 (Pa.
Super. 2012)). However, as noted infra, on February 12, 2020, the PCRA
court entered an order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. “Accordingly, this
appeal was perfected by the entry of a final order and its merits are properly
before this Court.” McGarry, 172 A.3d at 64 n.1 (citing Commonwealth v.
Cooper, 27 A.3d 994, 1004 (Pa. 2011); Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5)).
7Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion, the PCRA court referred us to its February 12, 2020 order and
opinion.
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This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is
limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
record and we do not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is
supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.
Similarly, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the
PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have
no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference
to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of
law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary. Finally, we may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any
grounds if the record supports it.
Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Perry, 128 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2015)).
It is well settled that there is no absolute right to an evidentiary
hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine
from the record that no genuine issues of material fact exist,
then a hearing is not necessary. To obtain reversal of a PCRA
court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an
appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of fact
which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief,
or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a
hearing.
Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citations, original brackets, and quotations marks omitted).
We begin by distilling whether Appellant has preserved any of the
claims he presents for our review. Appellant’s first two issues baldly claim he
was subject to unjust prejudice and racial bias by the PCRA court.
Appellant’s Brief at 5. These claims are waived for having failed to raise
them in his concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. See Rule
1925(b) Statement, 3/4/2020, at 1-2; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not
included in the [s]tatement [of errors complained of on appeal]... are
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waived.”); Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super.
2020) (“It is well-established that any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b)
statement will be deemed waived for appellate review.”).
Turning to Appellant’s remaining issues, Appellant makes vague claims
that PCRA counsel erred in determining his PCRA petition was without merit;
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a prompt investigation and
for relying solely on information from the Commonwealth; and he is entitled
to a new trial. Appellant’s Brief at 5. Before we address the merits of these
issues, we first examine whether deficiencies in his brief render these issues
waived.
We first point out the headings dividing Appellant’s argument section
confusingly do not correspond to the issues he lists in the statement of
questions section of his brief, and his argument is not divided into as many
parts as the issues he purports to raise. Compare Appellant’s Brief at 5
with id. at 8-11 (pagination supplied); Addendum to Appellant’s Brief,
8/10/2020, at 2-3.8 See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided
into as many parts as there are questions to be argued[.]”).
8 Appellant sought, and this Court granted, leave to file an addendum to the
argument section of his brief. To the extent Appellant argues therein a
violation of his constitutional right to counsel, see Addendum to Appellant’s
Brief, 8/10/2020, at 3, this issue is waived for failure to raise it in his concise
statement of matters complained of on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii);
Bonnett, 239 A.3d at 1106.
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Moreover, in the argument section of his brief Appellant fails to cite
any references to the record in support of any of his issues. See Pa.R.A.P.
2132 (relating to references to the record in briefs). Nor does Appellant cite
to cases with any explanation of their relevance or provide this Court with
any meaningful application of them to facts relevant to his case. Indeed,
Appellant’s argument section is devoid of any factual references. Although
his brief contains citations to legal authority as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119,
they are underdeveloped and unhelpful because Appellant presents a
jumbled recitation of the law where he confusingly weaves between
purported quotes of case law, without the use of quotation marks or block
quotes, and supposed argument from his own case. Further, he sets forth
unsupported arguments and/or case law that do not relate to the issues he
presented in his statement of questions. Compare Appellant’s Brief at 5
with id. at 8-11 (pagination supplied).
“When an appellant’s argument is underdeveloped, we may not supply
it with a better one. In such situations, we shall not develop an argument for
an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an
argument; instead, we will deem the issue to be waived.” Commonwealth
v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 884-85 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation,
internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119;
Commonwealth v. Hallman, 67 A.3d 1256, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(“[T]his Court may not act as counsel for an appellant and develop
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arguments on his behalf.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (“[W]here an
appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to
relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).
We conclude that Appellant’s argument section and addendum
constitute the type of cursory legal discussion which is wholly inadequate to
preserve any of his issues for appellate review. See Johnson, 985 A.2d at
925. Appellant’s single-sentence arguments fail to provide any meaningful
discussion or reasoned development of his issues. As we will not develop
Appellant’s arguments for him, we deem these issues to be waived. See id.
Moreover, we emphasize that Appellant’s pro se status does not
relieve him of his duty to follow our Rules of Appellate Procedure. “Although
this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant,
pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary,
any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a
reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will
be his undoing.” Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1037-38
(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Appellant failed to preserve any of his issues for appellate
review, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying his PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/25/2021
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