In Re: Grant, J., Appeal of: Grant, J. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S46021-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: JERMAINE GRANT                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: JERMAINE GRANT              :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1686 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Dated June 4, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-MD-0007198-2018
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    JUDGMENT ORDER BY SHOGAN, J.:                        Filed: March 11, 2021
    Appellant, Jermaine Grant, appeals pro se from the order entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on June 4, 2019, denying his
    motion for return of property.   Because jurisdiction properly lies with the
    Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, we transfer this appeal.
    On October 9, 2018, Appellant filed a motion for return of property
    requesting the return of $2,180.00 that was seized as evidence at the time of
    his arrest on May 16, 2013. Motion, 10/9/18. On October 23, 2014, Appellant
    was acquitted of the narcotics charges related to the arrest.     Trial Court
    Opinion, 10/29/19, at 1. On March 5, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a motion
    to dismiss Appellant’s request. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on
    June 4, 2019.    In reaching its determination, the trial court relied upon
    Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    107 A.3d 709
     (Pa. 2014) (“Allen II”), an appeal
    J-S46021-20
    from a Commonwealth Court decision involving a motion for return of
    property. Appellant filed this timely appeal from the trial court’s decision.
    Prior to addressing this appeal, we consider whether the Commonwealth
    Court has jurisdiction over this matter. See Blount v. Philadelphia Parking
    Authority, 
    965 A.2d 226
    , 229 (Pa. 2009) (stating that a reviewing court may
    raise the issue of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over an
    action sua sponte).       The Commonwealth Court has explained that actions
    involving a petition for return of property, although “quasi-criminal in
    character,” are civil proceedings. Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    59 A.3d 677
    ,
    679 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (“Allen I”), aff’d but criticized, 
    107 A.3d 709
     (Pa.
    2014).1 As such, this appeal implicates claims within the jurisdiction of the
    Commonwealth Court. See In re One 1988 Toyota Corolla (Blue Two-
    Door Sedan) Pa. License TPV 291, 
    675 A.2d 1290
    , 1296 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1996) (holding that the Commonwealth Court has the authority to hear
    appeals from orders disposing of motions for the return of property).
    The Commonwealth Court routinely reviews decisions involving petitions
    for the return of property. See Allen I, 
    59 A.3d 677
     (affirming dismissal of
    ____________________________________________
    1 We note that in Allen II, our Supreme Court criticized Allen I, holding that
    the Commonwealth Court erred by relying “on a statute of limitations analysis
    to resolve the timeliness" of the motion filed by the appellant, concluding
    instead that the “failure to file a return motion during the pendency of the
    criminal charges against him or within thirty days following dismissal of the
    charges result[ed] in waiver, precluding review of his stand-alone return
    petition.” Allen II, 
    107 A.3d 709
    , 718.
    -2-
    J-S46021-20
    motion for return of property); Commonwealth v. Perez, 
    941 A.2d 778
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2008) (affirming denial of a motion for the return of seized property);
    In re One 1988 Toyota, 
    675 A.2d 1290
     (affirming the denial of the
    appellant’s motion to return an automobile and granting the Commonwealth’s
    petition to have the automobile forfeited as derivative contraband). As noted
    above, our Supreme Court’s decision in Allen II, 
    107 A.3d 709
    , the case relied
    upon by the trial court in reaching the instant determination, is an appeal from
    a Commonwealth Court decision. As we have long stated, “[W]e should be
    most cautious in assuming jurisdiction over matters that properly belong
    before the Commonwealth Court.” Lara, Inc., v. Dorney Park Coaster Co.,
    Inc., 
    534 A.2d 1062
    , 1066 (Pa. Super. 1987).         Hence, we conclude that
    jurisdiction properly lies with our sister court, and we transfer this appeal to
    the Commonwealth Court. Pa.R.A.P. 752(a).2
    Appeal transferred to Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    ____________________________________________
    2 “The Superior Court and the Commonwealth Court, on their own motion or
    on application of any party, may transfer any appeal to the other court for
    consideration and decision with any matter pending in such other court
    involving the same or related questions of fact, law or discretion.” Pa.R.A.P.
    752(a).
    -3-
    J-S46021-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/11/21
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1686 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 3/11/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024