Com. v. Watson, A. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S43021-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    ALEX WATSON                              :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 787 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 24, 2022,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001353-2017.
    BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                         FILED MARCH 27, 2023
    Alex Watson appeals pro se from the order denying his first petition filed
    pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We
    affirm.
    On May 18, 2015, Watson shot and killed the victim.         Following his
    arrest, he was charged with first-degree murder and related charges. He
    appeared for a jury trial on October 30, 2018. However, the jury could not
    reach a unanimous verdict, and the trial court declared a mistrial. Prior to his
    second trial, Watson filed a motion to proceed pro se, which the trial court
    granted. The court appointed Watson’s counsel from his first trial as standby
    counsel.
    J-S43021-22
    Watson’s second jury trial commenced on April 29, 2019. Previously,
    this Court reproduced the trial court’s detailed account of the evidence
    presented at the second trial as follows:
    On May 18, 2015, at approximately 10:12 p.m., [the victim]
    was with his sister, Shaheen Ahmed, at her home on Allison Street
    in Philadelphia. Before [the victim] left Ahmed’s home, he told
    [Ahmed] he was “going to meet Dil and Master and Conestoga.”
    Ahmed did not know Dil’s real name, but knew he was “Aaron’s
    little brother, Leslie.” [Watson] whose legal name is Leslie
    Williams, also lived on Allison Street. Both [Watson’s] and
    Ahmed’s homes are about two blocks from the 1300 block of
    Conestoga Steet, where [the victim’s] murder later occurred.
    At approximately 11:41 p.m., on the 1300 block of
    Conestoga Street, between Master and West Thompson Streets,
    [Watson shot the victim] eighteen times, killing him. Within
    seconds of hearing the gunshots, Philadelphia Police Officers
    Michael Carey and Michael Paige arrived at the crime scene, where
    [the victim] was lying on his back with no sign of life. They
    observed multiple fired cartridge casings []. [The victim] who
    suffered from multiple gunshot wounds to the chest, was
    pronounced dead at the scene. The officers secured the crime
    scene and waited for the other responding officers to arrive.
    Philadelphia Police Officers Andre Dunkley and Marvin
    Wilkins arrived to the scene about one minute after Officers Carey
    and Paige. Officer Dunkley observed the 18 [fired cartridge
    casings] on the ground trailing from [the victim’s] body, in the
    middle of the block, to the rear of a silver Buick Enclave that was
    parked at the end of the block, near the corner of Conestoga and
    West Thompson Street. When looking inside the passenger side
    window, Officer Dunkley saw a silver handgun with a black handle
    and the slide locked back. At 12:40 a.m., the Philadelphia Crime
    Scene Unit arrived and recovered all 18 [fired cartridge casings]
    from the street, [the victim’s] cell phone, and a 9 millimeter
    [R]uger handgun from the car.
    Around 2:45 a.m., Officer Wilkins, who remained at the
    scene to guard the Buick, observed a [Nissan] car pull up to the
    corner of Conestoga and West Thompson Streets. Quinn Wise got
    out of the car, walked towards the Buick and attempted to open
    the front driver’s side door. When stopped by officers, Wise
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    J-S43021-22
    claimed it was her vehicle. When questioned by detectives at the
    Homicide Unit, Wise stated that her daughter’s father, [Watson],
    told her that the vehicle was on Conestoga Street and asked her
    to go get it for him. A swab of Wise’s DNA was taken.
    Keith Schofield arrived in the Nissan with Wise. During an
    interview with Homicide Detectives, Schofield told detectives that
    earlier in the evening, he was near Fairmount Park on Kelly Drive
    with Diashauna Coleman. At approximately 1:34 a.m., after
    Schofield drove Coleman home, he returned to a missed call from
    [Watson]. [Watson] asked Schofield to meet him on Master Street
    between 52nd and 53rd Street. When Schofield arrived, [Watson]
    proclaimed, “I f***ed up . . . I might have f***ed up.” [Watson]
    then instructed Schofield to take Wise to get the car from
    Conestoga Street. Schofield identified [Watson] in a photograph
    as the individual that told him to retrieve the car.
    The Homicide Unit focused their investigation on [Watson].
    On November 20, 2015, in an attempt to locate [Watson] and
    obtain his DNA, Philadelphia Detective Joseph Bamberski and
    Untied States Marshals Fugitive Task Force Agent Timothy
    Stevenson went to 1336 N. Allison Street, [Watson’s] approved
    parole residence. [Watson’s] mother and brother, Aaron Williams,
    indicated that [Watson] was not home. On November 23, 2015,
    Detective Bamberski and Agent Stevenson went back to
    [Watson’s] address, and were again unsuccessful in locating him.
    On February 24, 2016, [Watson] was located by Detective
    Bamberski and Agent Stevenson at an apartment on the 5100
    block of Regent Street in Philadelphia, In furtherance of their
    investigation, [Watson] was brought to the Homicide Unit for
    questioning and a buccal swab.
    A search of [Watson’s] cell phone [] revealed that on
    November 21, 2015, [Watson] had taken a screenshot of a
    conversation in which he was discussing the United States
    Marshals waiting outside his home with a search warrant. On
    November 27, 2015, [Watson] downloaded a PDF of the “Most
    Wanted” list from the Pennsylvania State Police website.
    Detective [James] Dunlap reviewed the phone records for
    [Watson’s] phone number and discovered that on the night of the
    murder between 10:01 p.m. and 1:53 a.m., [Watson’s] phone was
    within the geographical area of the crime scene.
    Brittany Rehrig, a forensic scientist at the Philadelphia
    Forensic Lab, conducted DNA analysis of the handgun and the
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    J-S43021-22
    Buick. [Watson’s] DNA was found on the handgun’s slide, grip,
    and trigger, and the Buick’s steering wheel. Wise’s DNA was
    detected as a major source on the handgun’s magazine. Her DNA
    was also found on the gearshift and radio control area. The results
    for [Watson’s] DNA on the front and rear driver’s side door
    handles, magazine, gearshift, and radio control area were
    determined to be inconclusive, but his DNA was not excluded as a
    source.    A defense expert, Katherine Cross, concurred with
    Rehrig’s overall conclusions that [Watson’s] DNA was present as
    a major source on the handgun. On December 13, 2016, after
    [Watson’s] DNA was confirmed as a match, an arrest warrant was
    prepared.
    According to Police Officer Kelly Walker, an expert in the
    Firearms Identification Unit, all 18 [cartridge casings] were fired
    from the same handgun, the 9mm Ruger recovered from the
    Buick. The firearm was capable of holding 18 bullets, 17 in the
    magazine and one in the chamber.
    At trial, the Commonwealth presented a Certificate of Non-
    Licensure showing that on May 18, 2015, [Watson] was not
    licensed to carry a firearm.
    [In his defense, Watson] presented two lifelong friends as
    witnesses, Joshua Edwards and Bayyan Finney, who attempted to
    provide an alibi defense. Finney, who was in custody at the time
    of trial, also testified that the night before his testimony, he made
    a phone call to his friend, “Mock,” who was on the phone with
    [Watson] at the time of his call. Mock put Finney on speakerphone
    so the three of them could have a conversation. [Watson] asked
    Finney to trade shoes with him before court, because Finney had
    dress shoes, and [Watson] did not want to wear his Reebok Classic
    sneakers to trial. During cross-examination, Finney denied that
    [Watson] attempted to bribe him with a new pair of shoes in
    exchange for his testimony.
    Commonwealth v. Watson, 
    240 A.3d 906
     (Pa. Super. 2020), non-
    precedential decision at 2-5).
    On May 3, 2019, the jury convicted Watson of all charges. That same
    day, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of life in prison
    without parole. Watson filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial
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    J-S43021-22
    court denied on May 13, 2019. Watson appealed, raising four issues, including
    a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. On
    September 4, 2020, we rejected Watson’s claims and affirmed his judgment
    of sentence. Watson, supra. On March 31, 2021, our Supreme Court denied
    Watson’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Watson, 
    251 A.3d 780
     (Pa. 2021).
    On September 2, 2021, Watson filed a pro se PCRA petition and the
    PCRA court appointed counsel. On October 13, 2021, PCRA counsel filed a
    “no-merit” letter and motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v.
    Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On October 14, 2021, the PCRA court issued
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Watson’s petition without a
    hearing.
    On November 29, 2021, Watson filed a response to the court’s Rule 907
    notice in which he claimed that PCRA counsel was ineffective for not filing an
    amended petition and claimed that the trial court’s April 27, 2019, waiver-of-
    counsel colloquy was defective.
    Thereafter, the PCRA court permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw and
    appointed replacement counsel to conduct an independent investigation of
    Watson’s claims.     On January 20, 2022, replacement counsel filed a
    Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter and motion to withdraw. That same day, the
    PCRA court issued another Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Watson’s
    petition without a hearing.   The PCRA court granted Watson’s motion for an
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    J-S43021-22
    extension of time in which to file a response. Watson filed his response on
    February 7, 2022.        By order entered February 24, 2022, the PCRA court
    permitted new counsel to withdraw and denied Watson’s petition.1 This appeal
    followed.      Both Watson and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.
    1925.
    Watson raises the following five issues on appeal:
    I.      Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
    no merit in [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
    counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the
    claim that [Watson’s] waiver of counsel was invalid
    and PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
    the claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal
    counsel in that regard.
    II.     Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
    no merit tin [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
    counsel was ineffective in the manner by which he
    litigated [Watson’s] claim of insufficient evidence to
    support the conviction and PCRA counsel was
    ineffective for failing to raise the claim of ineffective
    assistance of direct appeal counsel in that regard?
    III.    Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
    no merit in [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
    counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim of
    abuse of discretion, where the trial court denied
    [Watson’s] request for a mistrial after a witness’s
    prejudicial comments and PCRA counsel was
    ineffective for failing to raise the claim of ineffective
    assistance of direct appeal counsel in that regard?
    IV.     Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
    no merit in [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
    ____________________________________________
    1Review of the docket in this case reveals the PCRA court entered a second
    order dismissing Watson’s petition on February 28, 2022. While it is unclear
    why this order was necessary, Watson has timely appealed from either date.
    -6-
    J-S43021-22
    counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the
    claim of judicial impropriety, where the trial court
    adopted a prosecutorial function and PCRA counsel
    was ineffective for failing to raise the claim of
    ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel in that
    regard?
    V.    Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
    no merit in [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
    counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim of
    abuse of discretion, where the trial court allowed a
    witness to testify after she previously heard the
    testimony of all the other witnesses and PCRA counsel
    was for failing to raise the claim of ineffective
    assistance of direct appeal counsel in that regard?
    Watson’s Brief at 4-5.
    This Court’s standard of review for an order dismissing a PCRA petition
    is to ascertain whether the order “is supported by the evidence of record and
    is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless
    there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth
    v. Barndt, 
    74 A.3d 185
    , 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
    The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without
    a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no
    genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant
    is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no
    legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings.
    To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a
    petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he
    raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in
    his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court
    otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.
    Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 
    108 A.3d 739
    , 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations
    omitted).
    -7-
    J-S43021-22
    To be eligible for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must plead and
    prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
    resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors or defects in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    section 9543(a)(2), and that the issues he raises have not been previously
    litigated or waived. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 
    725 A.2d 154
    , 160 (Pa.
    1999). An issue has been "previously litigated" if the highest appellate court
    in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled
    on the merits of the issue, or if the issue has been raised and decided in a
    proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence. Carpenter, 725
    A.2d at 160; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2), (3).          If a claim has not been
    previously litigated, the petitioner must then prove that the issue was not
    waived. Carpenter, 725 A.2d at 160. An issue will be deemed waived under
    the PCRA “if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial,
    at trial, during unitary review, on appeal, or in a prior state post-conviction
    proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).
    In each of his appellate issues, Watson raises a layered claim of
    ineffectiveness. As part of these assertions, Watson alleges the ineffective
    assistance of PCRA counsel for the first time on appeal pursuant to
    Commonwealth v. Bradley, 
    261 A.3d 381
     (Pa. 2021). To obtain relief under
    the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must
    establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's ineffectiveness
    so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
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    J-S43021-22
    guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    966 A.2d 523
    , 532 (Pa. 2009). “Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to
    be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon
    a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” 
    Id.
     This requires the petitioner to
    demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel
    had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3)
    counsel’s act or omission prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 533.
    In making a layered claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner “must
    properly argue each prong of the three-prong ineffectiveness test for each
    separate attorney.” Commonwealth v. Rykard, 
    55 A.3d 1177
    , 1190 (Pa.
    Super. 2012). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical
    inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective
    did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel.”   Commonwealth v.
    Burkett, 
    5 A.3d 1260
    , 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).           “If that attorney was
    effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
    raise the underlying issue.” 
    Id.
    Here, the PCRA court has authored a thorough and well-reasoned
    opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a). The Honorable Barbara A. McDermott has
    addressed each of Watson’s layered ineffectiveness claims with proper citation
    to legal authorities and citation to the certified record. In addition, she has
    explained why an evidentiary hearing was not necessary before disposing of
    Watson’s ineffectiveness claims.
    -9-
    J-S43021-22
    We discern no legal errors in Judge McDermott’s analysis, and we find
    her factual findings and credibility determinations fully supported by our
    review of the record. As such, we adopt Judge McDermott’s 1925(a) opinion
    as our own in affirming the order denying Watson’s post-conviction relief. See
    PCRA Court’s Opinion, 2/24/22, at 14-17 (explaining that because Watson’s
    waiver of counsel colloquy was sufficient, appellate counsel cannot be
    ineffective for failing to object and preserve the issue for appeal; PCRA counsel
    cannot be found ineffective for failing to assert meritless claims); at       7-9
    (rejecting Watson’s layered claim of ineffectiveness because, although this
    Court    found   Watson’s   Rule   1925(b)    statement   deficient,   the   court
    nevertheless ruled on the merits that there was sufficient evidence to support
    each of Watson’s convictions; Watson’s claim that counsel should have argued
    the “equipoise” principle fails because nothing in the record indicated that “two
    contrary interpretations of evidence could have been presumed by the jury’);
    at 9-10 (explaining that Watson’s claim of improper admission of prior bad act
    evidence was previously litigated on direct appeal; nonetheless, because
    Watson’s claim is based on “a complete misstatement” of the challenged
    testimony, Watson’s layered ineffectiveness claim fails); at 11-13 (explaining
    that Watson’s claim of judicial impropriety was waived for lack of objection at
    trial and was otherwise without merit; Watson’s layered ineffectiveness claim
    failed because the trial court did no more than ask the witness to clarify her
    answer); and 10-11 (rejecting Watson’s layered ineffectiveness claim
    - 10 -
    J-S43021-22
    concerning testimony at his second trial from the victim’s sister; no
    sequestration violation occurred because the sister did not testify at Watson’s
    first trial, and she was properly sequestered for the second trial).2
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/27/2023
    ____________________________________________
    2The parties are directed to attach Judge McDermott’s February 24, 2022,
    opinion to this memorandum in any future appeal.
    - 11 -
    Circulated 02/28/2023 10:42 AM
    IN THE COU11T OF COMMON PLEAS
    FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
    COMMONWEALTH Or PENNSYLVANIA                           :CP-51-CR 0001353-2017
    v,
    FILED
    ALEX WATSON,                                                                      FEB 2
    142022
    PCRA Unit
    Petitioner                                                     CP Criminal Listings
    ORDER AND OPINION
    McDermott, J.                                                              February 24, 2022
    Procedural History
    On December 19, 2016, the Petitioner, Alex Watson, was arrested.and charged with
    Murder and related offenses. On October 29,.2018, the Petitioner appeared before this Court and
    elected to proceed with ajury trial. On November 6, 2018, the jurors were unable to reach a
    unanimous verdict, and this Court declared amistrial. On March.7, 2019, the Petitioner filed a
    Motion to Proceed prase. On April 29, 2019, this Court granted the Petitioner's Motion and
    permitted him to represent himself.'
    On May 3, 201.9, ajury.convicted the Petitioner of First-Degree Murder, Firearms Not to
    be Carried Without aLicense ("VUFA 6.106"), Carrying aFirearm on the Public Street in
    Philadelphia ("VUFA 6108"), and Possessing an Instrument of Crime ("PIC" ): This Court
    immediately imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for rust -
    Degree Murder,
    concurrent; terms of three to six years imprisonment for VUFA 6106, and one to two years
    imprisonment for VUFA 61.08, for atotal sentence of life imprisonment 2That same day, this
    IThis Court appointed standby counsel.
    2This Court itnposed no further penalty for PIC.
    1
    Court appointed standby counsel, James F. Berardinelli, as appellate counsel because the
    Petitioner did not want to represent himself on appeal.. On May 10, 2019, counsel filed aPost-
    Sentence, Motion, which this Court denied on May 13, 2019.
    On June 7, 2019, the Petitioner. filed aNotice of Appeal and the Superior Court affirmed
    his judgment of sentence on September 4, 2020. On March 31, 2021, the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal.
    On.September 9, 2021, the Petitioner filed.a pro se Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA")
    petition, his first. On September 10, 2021, this Court appointed George S. Yacoubian, Jr. as
    PCRA counsel. On October 13, 2021, appointed PCRA counsel filed ano-merit letter pursuant.to.
    Commonivealth tip. Finley;
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa, Super. 1988), On October 14,.2021, this Court filed
    aNotice of Intent to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
    On November 29, 2021, the Petitioner filed an Objection to the 907 Notice raising claims
    that PCRA counsel was ineffective for not filing an :Amended, Petition and. that this Court's April
    27, 2019 colloquy was defective. This Court appointed Gary S. Server as PCRA counsel to
    conduct an independent investigation of the Petitioner's claims, On January 20, 2022,
    replacement PCRA counsel filed ano-merit letter, That same day, this Court filed aNotice of
    Intent to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On February 2, 2022, after he filed aMotion for
    an Extension of Time, this Court granted the Petitioner an additional twenty days to file
    - an
    objection,. On February 7, 2022, the Petitioner filed an Objection to this Court's 907 Notice. On
    February 8, 2022, the Petitioner attempted ₹ofile apro se Amended PCRA Petition a
    The claims raised in the Petitioner's pro se Amended PCRA Petition are essentially the same as those raised in his
    initial.pro se PCRA petition, his November 29, 2021 Objection, and his ``February 7, 2022 Objection.
    2
    Facts
    In its September 4, 2020, Opinion, the Superior Court adopted this Court's summary of
    the facts in part and recited them as follows:
    On May 18, 2015, at approximately 10:12 pm., Victirn Was
    with his sister, Shaheen Ahmed, at her home on Allison Street in
    Philadelphia. Before the Victim left Ahmed's home, he told her he
    was "going to meet Dil at Master and Conestoga.." Ahmed did not
    know Dil's real name, but knew he was "Aaron's little brother,
    Leslie." Petitioner, whose legal name is Leslie Williams, also lived
    on Allison Street, Both Petitioner and Ahmeds' homes are about
    two blocks from the 1300 block of Conestoga Street, where the
    Victim's murder later occurred.
    At approximately 1.1:41 p,m., on the 1300 block of
    Conestoga Street, between Master and West Thompson Streets,
    Petitioner shot Victim eighteen times, killing him. Within seconds
    of hearing the gunshots, Philadelphia Police Officers Michael
    Carey and Michael Paige, arrived at the crime seen, where the
    Victim was lying on his back with no. sign of life. They observed
    multiple fired cartridge. casings. Victim, who suffered from
    multiple gunshot wounds to the chest, was pronounced dead at the
    scene. The officers secured the crime scene and waited for the
    other responding officers to arrive.
    Philadelphia Police Officers Andre Dunkley and Marvin
    Wilkins arrived at the scene about one minute after Officers Carey
    and Paige. Officer Dunkley observed the 18 fired cartridge casings
    on the ground trailing from the Victim's body, in the middle of the
    block, to the rear of asilver Buick Enclave that was parked at the
    end of the block, near the corner of Conestoga and West
    Thompson Street. When looking inside the passenger side window,
    Officer Dunkley saw asilver handgun with ablack handle and the,
    slide locked back. At 12:40 a.m., the Philadelphia Crime Scenc
    Unit arrived and recovered all 18 fired cartridge casings from the
    street, the Victim's cell phone, and a9millimeter Ruger handgun
    from the car.
    Around 2:45 a.m., Officer Wilkins, who remained at the
    scene to guard the Buick, observed aNissan car pull up to the
    corner of Conestoga and West Thompson Streets. Quinn Wise got
    out of the car, walked towards the Buick. and attempted to open the
    front driver's side door. When stopped by officers, Wise claimed it
    was her vehicle. When questioned by detectives at the Homicide
    Unit, Wise stated that her daughter's father, Petitioner, told her that.
    the vehicle was on Conestoga Street and asked her to go get it for
    him. A swab of Wise's DNA was taken.
    3
    Keith Schofield arrived in the Nissan with Wise. During an
    inteiview with Homicide Detectives, Schofield told detectives that
    earlier in the evening, he was near Fairmount Park on Kelly Drive
    with Diashauna Coleman. At approximately 1:34 a.m., after
    Schofield drove Coleman home, he returned amissed call from
    Petitioner. Petitioner asked Schofield to meet him on Master Street
    between 52n d and 53Td Street. When Schofield arrived, Petitioner
    proclaimed, "If# * * ed up ... Imight have f* * $ ed up.' ,'Petitioner
    then instructed Schofield to take Wise to get the car from
    Conestoga Street. Schofield identified Petitioner in aphotograph as
    the individual that told him to retrieve the car.
    The Homicide Unit focused their investigation on
    Petitioner. On November 20, 2015, in an attempt to locate
    Petitioner and obtain his DNA,, Philadelphia Detective Joseph
    Bamberski and United States Marshals Fugitive Task Force Agent
    Timothy Stevenson went to 1336 N, Allison Street, the Petitioner's
    approved parole residence. Petitioner's mother and brother, Aaron.
    Williams, indicated that Petitioner was not home. On November
    23, 2015, Detective Bamberski and Agent Stevenson went back to
    Petitioner's address, and were again unsuccessful in locating him.
    On February 24, 2016, Petitioner was located by Detective
    Bamberski and Agent Stevenson at. an apartment on the 5100 block
    of Regent Street in Philadelphia. In furtherance of their
    investigation, Petitioner was brought to the Homicide Unit for
    questioning and a. buccal swab.
    A search of the Petitioner's cell phone revealed.that on
    November 21, 201.5, Petitioner had taken ascreenshot of a
    conversation in which he was discussing the United States
    Marshals waiting outside. his home with asearch warrant. On
    November 27, 2015, Petitioner downloaded aPDF of the "Most
    Wanted" list from the Pennsylvania State Police website.
    Detective James Dunlap reviewed the phone records for
    Petitioner's phone number and discovered that on. the night of the
    murder between 1.0;01 p.m. and 1:53 a.m., the Petitioner's phone
    was within the geographical area of the crime scene.
    Brittany Rehrig, aforensic scientist at the Philadelphia
    Forensic Lab, conducted DNA analysis of the handgun and the
    Buick. Petitioner's DNA was found on the handgun's slide, grip,
    and trigger, and the Buick's steering, wheel. Wise's DNA was
    detected as amajor source on the handgun's magazine. Her DNA
    was also found on the gearshift and radio control area. The results
    for Petitioner's DNA on the front and rear driver's side door
    handles, magazine, gearshift, and radio control area were
    determined to be inconclusive, but his DNA was not excluded as a
    source. A defense expert, Katherine Cross, concurred with
    Rehrig's overall conclusions that Petitioner's DNA was present as
    amaj or source on the handgun. On December 13, 2016, after
    4
    Petitioner's DNA was confirmed. as amatch, an arrest warrant was
    prepared.
    According to Police Officer, Kelly Walker, an expert in the
    Firearms Identification Unit, all 18 fired cartridge casings were
    fired from the same handgun, the 9mm Ruger recovered. from the
    Buick. The firearm was capable of holding 18 bullets, 17 in the
    magazine and one in the chamber.
    At trial, the Commonwealth presented aCertificate of Non-
    Licensure showing that on May 18, 201.5, Petitioner was not
    licensed to carry afirearm.
    Petitioner, presented two lifelong friends as witnesses,
    Joshua Edwards and Bayyan Finney, who attempted to provide an
    alibi defense. Finney, who was in custody at the time of trial, also
    testified that the night before his testimony, he made aphone call
    to his friend, "Mock," who was on the phone with Petitioner at the
    time of his call. Mock put Finney on speakerphone so the three of
    them could have aconversation. Petitioner asked Finney to trade
    shoes with him before court, because Finney had dress shoes, and
    Petitioner did not want to wear: his Reebok Classic sneakers to
    trial. During cross-examination, Finney denied that Petitioner:
    attempted to bribe him with anew pair of shoes in exchange for his
    testimony at trial.
    Commonwealth v. Watson, No. 1694 EDA 2019 at *2-5 (September 4, 2020) (non-precedential
    decision) (internal brackets and footnotes omitted).
    Discussion
    In his PCRA Petition, the Petitioner raises four issues for review, that appellate counsel
    was ineffective for not: ( 1) properly developing his sufficiency claim and not arguing the
    "equipoise principal" on appeal; (2) properly developing his claim of improper admission of his
    prior bad act; (3) appealing this Court's ruling to allow awitness to testify who the Petitioner
    alleges violated the. sequestration order,• and, (4) appealing this Court's discretion to question a
    witness, Quinn Wise ("Wise") .4
    4Petitioner's claim of ineffectiveness regarding appellate counsel's failure to properly develop his claim of improper
    admission of his prior bad act was not included his pro se PCRA petition filed on September 2, 2021, but was
    subsequently raised in letters with his initial PCRA counsel and was addressed in his initial PCRA counsel's Finley
    letter,
    5
    This Court must first address the timeliness of the instant petition before reaching the
    merits of the Petitioner's claims. A PCRA petition must be filed within. one, year of the date the
    Petitioner's judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of three delineated timeliness
    exceptions are met. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), Ajudgment becomes final at the conclusion of
    direct review, or at the expiration of the time for seeking review. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(3). A final
    order of the Superior Court is any order that concludes an appeal, and aPetition for Allowance of
    Appeal with the. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania must be filed within thirty days after the entry
    of the Superior Court. Order. Pa.R.A.P. 1112, Pa.R.A.P. 1113. A petition for awrit of certiorari
    seeking review of ajudgment from alower state court is timely when it is filed within ninety
    days after the entry of the order denying discretionary review. U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.
    The PCRA time requirement is jurisdictional in nature, and atrial court cannot. ignore it
    to reach apetition's merits. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
    234 A.3d 735
    , 736 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (citing CorninonNJealth v. Albrecht, 
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1093 (Pa. 2010)).
    This Court finds that the. instant petition.is timely. The Petitioner's judgment of sentence
    became final on rune 29, 2021, when the ninety-day period to seek apetition fora iirit of
    certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. The Petitioner had one year from that
    date to bring atimely PCRA claim. The. instant petition was filed. on September 2, 2021;
    therefore, the instant petition is timely.
    Defendants• who represent themselves are not entitled to relief under the PCRA for claims
    of ineffective assistance based on their own failure, or that of standby counsel, at trial.
    Cornnionwealth v. Fletcher, 
    986 A.2d 759
    ,374 (
    Pa. 2009). Therefore, the. Petitioner's decisionto
    waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial precludes any of the Petitioner's claims
    alleging his own ineffectiveness or that of standby counsel.
    6
    To obtain relief on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, apetitioner must satisfy
    the performance and prejudice test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)
    . Commonwealth v, Montalvo, 205 A,3d 274,286 (Pa. 2019). In Pennsylvania, courts
    apply the Strickland test by examining whether; (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2)
    counsel lacked areasonable basis for his actions or failure to act; and, (3) the petitioner was
    prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance such that there is areasonable probability that the
    result of the. proceeding would have been different absent counsel's error or omission, 
    Id.
         (Citing
    Commonwealth v. Pi.'erce,, 
    527 A.2d 973
    , 975 (Pa. 1987)): A petitioner's failure to satisfy any
    prong. of this three-part ineffectiveness test is fatal to the claim. Commonwealth   Y,   Wholaver, 
    177 A.3d 13
    .6, 144 (Pa. 2018). Courts are not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness
    claim in any particular order; if aclaim fails under any prong of the ineffectiveness test, acourt
    may proceed to that element first. Commonwealth v, Sepulveda, 
    55 A.3d 1108
    , 1.117--18 (Pa.
    2012).
    To succeed on. astand-alone claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, "aPCRA
    petitioner must demonstrate that appellate counsel was ineffective in the manner by which he
    litigated. the claim on appeal." Commonwealth v. Koehler, 
    36 A.3d 121
    , 142 (Pa. 2012). A
    petitioner must establish exactly how appellate counsel was ineffective either "by offering
    additional evidence or controlling authority, missed by direct appeal counsel, that would have
    changed the appeal outcome; or by specifically alleging the winning claim or distinct legal
    theory that appellate counsel failed to recognize; and then by showing how the appeal, as
    pursued, was incompetent by comparison." Id- (citing Commonwealth v.. Paddy, 
    15 A.3d 431
    ,
    476 (Pa, 2011)).
    The Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective: for failing to properly
    develop his sufficiency claim fails. The Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective for
    7
    failing to specify in his 1925(b) Statement which elements of the crimes were insufficiently
    proven at trial. The. Petitioner also claims his initial PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to
    raise aclaim that appellate counsel was ineffective: for waiving his. sufficiency arguments on
    direct appeal.
    On direct appeal, the Petitioner's claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence was
    addressed and rejected by the Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Watson, No. 1694 EDA
    2019 at * 8-10 (September 4, 2020) (non-precedential decision). Whilethe Superior Court did
    find the Petitioner's 1925(b) Statement deficient, the Superior Coui L, ruled on the merits and
    agreed with this. Court that there was sufficient evidence to support each of the Petitioner's
    convictions. 
    Id.
    Both initial PCRA counsel and subsequent PCRA counsel. addressed the Petitioner's
    ineffectiveness claim regarding appellate counsel's lack. of specificity in. developing Petitioner's
    sufficiency claim in their Tinley letters and concluded Petitioner's claim had no merit. Initial
    PCRA counsel found, and this Court agrees, that appellate counsel's failure to properly develop
    Petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim does not amount to ineffective assistance because
    the Commonwealth established each of the elements of the charged offenses beyond areasonable
    doubt,at trial and there was no plausible sufficiency claim which could be made by appellate
    counsel, Replacement PCRA counsel determined that Petitioner's sufficiency claim was not
    waived due to appellate counsel's lack of specify and neither prior counsel. was ineffective
    because no plausible sufficiency claim could. be made.
    The Petitioner argues that both appellate counsel and initial PCRA counsel were
    ineffective for failing to argue the."equipoise principal." The "equipoise principal" holds that if
    the evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish adefendant's guilt is equally
    consistent with adefendant's innocence, then there is insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.
    8
    Commonwealth v. Garcia, 
    251 A.3d 1225
    , * 7 (Pa. Super. March 11, 2021) (unreported
    memorandum) (citing Commonwealth v. Tribble, 
    467 A.2d 1130
     (Pa. 1983)). Nothing in. the
    record indicates that two contrary. interpretations of evidence could have been presumed by the
    jury. The Petitioner has not offered any additional evidence or controlling authority which would
    have changed. the appeal outcome or alleged a. legal theory that appellate counsel failed to
    recognize.
    Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly develop on
    direct appeal his claim of improper admission of his.pdor bad act and the denial of his request
    for amistrial. Petitioner claims that when. Agent Stevenson visited his registered address on
    November 20, 2015, Agent Stevenson. was merely attempting to arrest him because he violated
    his parole when he failed to notify his parole agent of his change in address. Petitioner further
    claims that since Agent. Stevenson was trying to arrest him in an unconnected matter, it cannot be
    used to show evidence of flight and improperly implied to the jury that he committed aprior bad
    act with his violation. of parole.
    Petitioner's argument that this Court: erred in admitting the testimony of Agent. Stevenson
    regarding the Petitioner's parole status has already been rejected by the Pennsylvania Superior
    Court on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Watson, No. 1694 EDA 2019 at * 13,-17
    (September 4, 2020) (icon-precedential decision), As this claim has already been previously
    litigated on direct appeal, it cannot be raised again in aPCRA petition. See. Connnonwealth v.
    Chmiel, 30 A.3d l11.1, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (To succeed on collateral review, the petitioner must
    show that. his claims were. not previously waived or litigated),
    Petitioner's claim also fails as he completely misstates Agent 9tevenson's testimony
    because Agent Stevenson went to the Petitioner's address to effectuate a.DNA search warrant for
    this case. N.T. 5/1/2019 at 39. At trial, Agent Stevenson described the efforts to locate the
    9
    Petitioner. Id. at 40-41. Although Agent Stevenson's testimony did imply to the jury that the
    Petitioner committed aprior bad act, the details of the Petitioner's prior bad act were never
    introduced: The jury was aware of nothing more than the Petitioner's parole status, which was
    relevant to thepolice investigation and the location of the Petitioner. This Court also provided a
    cautionary jury instruction to ensure that the jury consider the evidence only for lawful purposes,
    Since the Petitioner's claim is based on. acomplete misstatement: of the facts and appellate
    counsel. cannot. be held ineffective for failing:to raise frivolous claims and this Court could not
    have erred when it denied his request for amistrial, the Petitioner's claim fails.
    During the Petitioner's mistrial, Shaheen Ahmed, the decedent's sister, was present for
    testimony because she was not listed by either side as apotential witness. N.T. 4/
    29/,19 at 183.
    After the mistrial, Ahmed approached the Assistant District Attorney because she recognized her
    phone number in the Commonwealth's exhibits.. Id. at 186-188. During the instant trial,, after
    being sequestered and over the Petitioner's objection, this Court allowed Ahmed to testify that
    on the night the decedent died, he used her cell phone to call the Petitioner. N.T. 5/02/2019 at .,26-
    38. This testimony was supported by her cell and house phone records. Before her testimony, this
    Court gave the following cautionary instruction:
    Now, members of the Jury, there was aprior proceeding in
    this case and in that prior proceeding Ientered a. sequestration
    order like Idid two days ago, maybe three days ago now, saying
    that no witnesses could be present in the courtroom to hear the
    testimony of another witness. And the purpose of the sequestration
    order, Idon't know if I've explained that to. you in the past, but it's
    to prevent the testimony of one witness from influencing the
    testimony of another witness. Now, Iwant you to know that
    Shaheen Ahrned was not listed by either side as apotential witness
    during that hearing and she was present. Ibelieve you're going to
    bear that she is the decedent's sister, so she was present during the
    testimony of other witnesses. Now I'm telling you. this because in
    evaluating her credibility of her testimony which is just coming up,
    you may consider the fact that she was in the courtroom at aprior
    proceeding and may have heard other witnesses testify. Idon't
    think anyone knows exactly how long she was in the courtroom or
    10
    what she heard, but there is an agreement, am Icorrect, that she
    was present. in the courtroom for at least part of the prior
    proceeding. So, Ijust wanted to let you know about that before ,you
    hear her testimony. Is that satisfactory, Mr. Watson?
    Id. at 23-24. In response, the. Petitioner said "
    Yes, Your Honor, thank you . " Id.
    The Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal this
    Court's ruling to allow Ahmed to testily fails. Since. Ahmed was not awitness in.the mistrial and
    was properly sequestered for the second. trial, she did not violate any sequestration order. Ahmed
    gave very limited, record supported testimony regarding the phone call the decedent inade and
    her conversation with the decedent. In an abundance of caution, this Court gave acautionary
    instruction that informed the jury about Ahmed's presence at aprevious hearing. Jurors are
    presumed to follow the court's instructions. Cornnzonwealth. v. Rose 
    172 A.3d 1121
     (Pa. Super.
    2017). The Petitioner did not object to the cautionary instruction and agreed that the instruction
    was sufficient. Therefore, by failing to object, the. Petitioner has waived this claim. See Pa.R.A.P..
    302(x),
    Even if there had been aviolation of asequestration order, the remedy for aviolation of a
    sequestration order is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in exercising its
    discretion, the court considers the seriousness of the violation, its impact on the testimony of the
    witness, and its probable impact on the outcome of the trial, Rose, 
    172 A.3d at
    1131 (citing
    Connnonwealth v. Smith, 
    346 A.2d 757
    , 760 (Pa. 1975)). The trial court's exercise of discretion
    should only be disturbed if there is no reasonable ground for the action. taken. 
    Id.
     There are
    reasonable grounds for this Court's chosen remedy and appellate counsel cannot be held
    ineffective for failing to raise afrivolous claim. Conzrnonwealth v. Plerce, 645 A, 24 189, 194
    (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Bickerstaff, 
    204 A.3d 988
    , 992 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert aclaim on
    direct appeal that this Court abused its discretion to question Wise. The Petitioner's claim fails
    11
    because he did not'object to any of this Court's questioning at trial and, therefore, the issue has
    been waived. Pa.R,A.P. 302(x). Since the Petitioner represented himself and was acting as his
    own trial counsel, he cannot allege his own ineffectiveness for failing to object and preserve the
    issue.
    Even:if Petitioner's claim was not waived, the claim.would still fail. because, pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 614, the trial court may examine awitness when the interest of
    justice so requires. The trial court has.a duty to ask questions when "absurd, ambiguous, or
    frivolous testimony is given or testimony is in need of further elucidation." Commonwealth v.
    Smith, 
    245 A.3d 1120
    , * 6 (Pa. Super. December 31, 2020), re-argument denied (March 9, 202.1),
    appeal denied, No., 175 MAL 2021, (Pa. Aug. 23, 2021) (
    citing Commonwealth v.. Carson, 
    913 A.2d 220
    , 249 (Pa. 2006))..
    On December 3, 2015, Wise called the Petitioner from prison. where they talked about
    their child and the Petitioner hiding from law enforcement. At trial, the Commonwealth asked
    Wise if she recognized her andethe Petitioner's voice. Wise claimed she only recognized her
    voice and that the other voice was the voice of her friend, she identified as "William." N.T.
    4/30/2019 at 130-133. Wise's claim was absurd and aclear attempt to protect the Petitioner,
    Wise had already recanted her previous statement to police incriminating the Petitioner earlier on
    in her testimony. This Court allowed the Commonwealth to play more portions of the. call to
    prove the Petitioner's identity, including where they talk about their child and use terms of
    endearment. This Court did not abuse its discretion when it asked Wise to clarify her testimony
    about the identity of the individual on the call. Cotntnonwealth v, Carson, 
    913 A.2d 220
     (
    Pa.
    2006) (Trial court did not abuse its discretion or show partiality when it questioned awitness on
    his motives).
    12
    Additionally, the jury was well aware that this Court was not questioning Wise's
    credibility because of this Court's introductory instruction. Before opening statements, this Court
    gave the following instruction:
    It's possible that on occasion, Imight ask some questions of
    the witnesses myself. If Ido that, they will not -- my questions will
    not reflect and are not intended. to reflect any opinion on my,part
    aboutthe evidence or the case. My purpose. would be to inquire
    about matters that Ithink should be more fully explored or
    clarified for you.
    N.T. 4129/2019 at 220-221. Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions, so the
    Petitioner's claim fails. See Rose 172 A,3d at 1131-1132.. Appellate counsel cannot be held
    ineffective for failing to raise afrivolous claim.. Pierce, 645 A.2d at 194; Bickerstaff, 
    204 A.3d at 992
    .
    In his Objection to this Court's 907 Notice filed on, November 29, 2021, the Petitioner
    asserted that: ( 1) this Court's April 29, 2019 colloquy was defective; (2) appellate counsel was
    ineffective for not objecting to this Court's April 29, 2019 colloquy and preserving the issue for
    appeal; and, (3) that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims set forth in his
    pro se PCRA Petition. In his February 7, 2022 Objection to the 907 Notice, the Petitioner raised
    an additional claim that subsequent PCRA counsel, Attorney Server, was ineffective for not
    filing an Amended Petition. On February 8,2022, the Petitioner attempted to file apro se
    Amended PCRA Petition. 5
    sThe Petitioner is not permitted to file aprose Amended Petition while still represented by counsel, without this
    Court's perinission. See Commonwealth v: Glacken, 
    32 A.3d 750
    , 753 (Pa, Super. 2011) (quashing Appellant's pro
    se PCRA petition where Appellant is represented by counsel even where Appellant's.counsel has not filed a
    counseled PCRA petition); see also Corunromvealth v. Jette, 
    23 A.3d 1032
    , 1036 (Pa. 2011) (finding "arepresented
    defendant on appeal has only two options: ``( 1) waive counsel and proceed pro se; or (2) proceed with appellate
    counsel and, if warranted, raise appellate counsel's supposed ineffectiveness at alater date, But `` the [one) thing be
    may not do' is raise his own appellate claims while still represented by counsel."'); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 
    626 A.2d 1137
     (Pa. 1993) (prohibiting the court korn accepting pro se filings by arepresented defendant in the interest
    of promoting judicial economy in the appellate courts). Although the Petitioner's appointed counsel, Attorney
    Server; line filed aMotion to Withdraw, this Court has not granted counsel's Motion and the Petitioner is still
    currently represented by appointed counsel. The Petitioner is also not permitted to File an Amended PCRA petition
    13
    When adefendant elects to waive his right to representation, the trial court is required to
    ensure that the waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Pa.R.Crirn.P.
    121(A)(2); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 .A.3d 244, 263 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Phillips,
    
    141 A.3d 512
    , 518 (Pa. Super. 20.16). To ensure adefendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and
    intelligently waiving his right to counsel, acourt must conduct "apenetrating and comprehensive
    colloquy." Comnzonivealth v. Phillips, 
    93 A.3d 847
    , 853 (Pa. Super. 2014). On April 29, 2019,
    this Court conducted athorough colloquy, which establishes that the Petitioner's waiver of his
    right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. This Court's April 29, 2019 colloquy
    was sufficient as it properly advised the Petitioner of all of the elements required under
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 121.
    First, this Court inquired into the Petitioner's Level of schooling, ability to read and write
    English, access to the law library, history of mental illness, and if he was under the effect of any
    medication that would interfere with his ability to understand the proceedings. N.T. 4/29/2019 at
    6-7, 16. Next, this Court addressed each of the elements required under Rule 121(2). The
    Petitioner was aware of his right to be represented by counsel as he expressly stated, "Iwish to
    waive my right to assistance. of counsel." Id at 6. The Petitioner understood. the nature .and
    elements of the charges as this Court stated the charges against him and the Petitioner again
    rejected aplea offer by the Coininonwealth. Id. at 7, 16-17. The Petitioner was also aware of the
    permissible range of sentences as this Court informed the Petitioner that he faced life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole if convicted of first-degree murder. Id at 7. Since
    the Petitioner. has already had amistrial, he was aware of his possible defenses and arguments
    while the initial PCRA is. pending without leave of court. ,
    See Comnranvealth v. Porter, 
    35 A.3d 4
    ,12 (Pa. 2012) (a
    petitioner who wishes to amend apending PCRA petition trust first seek and obtain leave of court); see also
    Pa.R:CrimA 905. The Petitioner never sought leave:of court to amend his initial pro se PCRA petition prior to filing
    his Amended PCRA Petition on February 8, 2022.
    14
    such as the possibility o£ asecond shooter and the strength of the DN.A. evidence. The Petitioner
    informed this Court that he knew which witnesses he intended to call and had decided not to
    present the testimony of experts who conducted cell phone analysis. Id. at 9-13. Petitioner also
    informed this Court that he knew how to pick ajury. Id. at 13. Standby Counsel, Attorney
    Berardinelli, informed this Court that the Petitioner "know[s] the case inside and out as Ido." Id
    at 8. The Petitioner understood that he would have to follow the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
    Procedure, but could confer with standby counsel at the.appropriate times, Id. at 14-15. This
    Court explained to the Petitioner that by representing himself and acting as his own trial counsel,
    he loses the ability to claim that trial counsel was ineffective. Id.. at 7.
    This Court's April 29, 2019 colloquy must be viewed in the context of the entire case.
    Prior to the colloquy on April 29, 2019, there were two other occasions where this Court
    conducted acolloquy of the Petitioner, On April 11, 201.8, this Court conducted acolloquy
    wherein the Petitioner was advised of the nature and elements of the charges against him and the
    range of sentences before rejecting aplea. Offer from the Commonwealth. After amistrial and
    prior to his: subsequent trial, this Court conducted another colloquy on October 19, 2018, wherein
    the Petitioner was again advised of the charges ..against him and the possible penalties he faced
    before he rejected the Commonwealth's offer. The Petitioner stated that lie understood the
    charges, the elements of those charges, and the permissible range of sentences because the
    charges were defined at his mistrial and this Court reminded him about the mandatory sentence
    at the colloquy. N.T, 11/5/2018 at 27-34; N.T. 4/29/2019 at 7.
    This. Court's colloquy was not deficient and showed that the Petitioner.made aknowing,
    voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 
    946 A,2d 645
    ,
    655-656 (Pa. 2008) (Defendant made a.knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel after the trial
    court's extensive colloquy); see also Commonwealth >>. Starr, 
    664 A.2d 1326
    , 1336 (Pa. 1995)
    15
    (Defendant's understanding of his right to, counsel was adequately shown through the
    combination of two different colloquies).
    In his Objection to this Court's 907 Notice filed February 7, 2022, the Petitioner cites
    several cases in support of his   claim. See Commonwealth v. Clybw-n, 
    42 A.3d 296
     (Pa. Super..
    20X2); Commonwealth v. Payson, 
    723 A.2d 695
     (Pa. Super. 1999). Both Clybui-n and Payson
    involved written waiver of counsel forms signed by the defendants which were found to be
    insufficient in establishing aknowing, voluntary, and intelligent waives: of counsel without the
    trial court conducting acomprehensive oral colloquy. In Clybww, the trial court had the
    defendant sign awritten waiver of counsel form, simply asked if the defendant would be
    representing himself, and had the assistant district attorney inform the defendant about the nature
    of the charges and the permissible range of sentences. See Clybur-n, 
    42 A.3d at 301
    . In Payson,
    the Superior Court found. that awritten waiver of counsel form signed before a.magistrate was
    not applicable to awaiver of counsel during asubsequent guilty plea. Payson, 
    723 A.2d at
    703-
    04. The trial courts in Clyburn and Payson did not conduct a. probing colloquy on the record.
    Unlike in Clyburn and Payson, this case does not involve asigned written waiver of counsel
    without aprobing colloquy. This Court conducted an extensive colloquy on the record, which
    properly advised the Petitioner of each of the elements under Rule 121.
    Additionally, each of the cases cited by the Petitioner involved adefendant who raised an
    insufficient colloquy claim on direct appeal. Here, the Petitioner failed to raise aclaim
    challenging the sufficiency of this Court's colloquy on direct appeal and brings his claim in a
    PCRA petition. As the Petitioner failed to raise this claim on direct appeal, the Petitioner's claim
    alleging that the colloquy performed by this Court was defective has     been waived. See
    Commom4)ealth v. Yarbrough, 
    245 A.3d 1107
     (Pa. Super. 2020) (Appellant waived nine           of his
    ten claims by failing to raise these   claims on direct appeal even where he raised the issues in his
    16
    pro se post-verdict motions and he cannot overcome waiver by alleging his own, or stand-by
    counsel's, ineffectiveness); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544.
    petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this
    Court's colloquy at the time it occurred and on direct appeal. Since this Court's colloquy was
    sufficient, appellate counsel   cannot be. held ineffective for failing to object to the colloquy and
    for failing to preserve the issue on appeal because the underlying claim has.no merit. Appellate
    counsel and PCRA counsel also cannot:be held ineffective for failing to assert claims on appeal
    that have no merit. Therefore, the Petitioner's claims that.appellate counsel was ineffective for
    not objecting to this Court's .April 29, 2019 colloquy and each of his prior counsel was
    ineffective for not raising aclaim challenging this Court's colloquy on appeal fail.
    Petitioner's claims that bath PCRA counsel are ineffective for failing to file an Amended
    Petition fail because, as discussed above, his claims have no merit. As PCRA counsel cannot be
    held ineffective for failing to raise frivolous claims, Petitioner's claims fail, Montalvo, 205 A.3d
    at 286. The Petitioner has failed to show how the review and conclusions reached by either
    PCRA counsel in their Finley letters were incompetent.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner's petition is DENIED and Gary S. Server, Esq.
    is permitted to withdraw. The Petitioner is hereby notified that he has thirty (30) days from the
    date of this Order and Opinion to file an appeal with the Superior Court.
    BY THIS COURT
    Barbara. A. McDermott, I
    17
    Coin nonivealth. v. Alex lf'atsou, CP 51-CR-00001353-2017
    PROOF OF SERVICE
    Ihereby certify that. Iam this day serving the foregoing filing upon the person(s), and in
    the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R. Crim. P. 119:
    Philadelphia District .Attorney's
    ney's Office
    Three South. Penn Square
    Philadelphia, PA 19107
    Attn: Tracey Kavanagh
    Type of Service:             Inter-office: Mail
    Alex Watson
    QF-3998
    SCI Huntingdon
    1100 Pike Street
    Huntingdon, PA 16652
    Type of Service:             Certified Mail
    Gary S. Server, Esq.
    52103 Delaire Landing
    Pluladelplua PA 19114
    Type of Service:             Regular Mail
    Dated: February 24, 2022
    Sean McFadden
    Law Clerk to the
    Honorable Barbara A. McDermott
    18