Com. v. Humphries, K. ( 2021 )

J-S07033-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
KAYLA HUMPHRIES :
:
Appellant : No. 1021 WDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 1, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002463-2019
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: March 31, 2021
Appellant, Kayla Humphries, appeals from the order entered in the
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed her first petition
filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts of this appeal are as follows. On February 23, 2019,
Appellant drove to the home of her ex-boyfriend (“Victim”). Victim was
standing outside the residence when Appellant arrived, and a confrontation
ensued. During the confrontation, Appellant brandished a firearm. Victim
pushed Appellant away, entered his vehicle, and fled the scene with his current
girlfriend. Appellant entered her vehicle, followed Victim, and fired shots at
his vehicle.
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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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Victim drove to a local police station and reported Appellant’s actions.
Victim also provided several text and voicemail messages that he had received
from Appellant. Approximately ten minutes after Victim arrived at the police
station, Appellant arrived and reported that Victim had actually shot at her
vehicle. Police subsequently searched both vehicles. Although police did not
find any shell casings in Victim’s vehicle, they recovered one shell casing on
the driver-side floor of Appellant’s vehicle. Police also collected gunshot
residue from Appellant’s hands.
The PCRA court opinion set forth the remaining procedural history of this
appeal as follows:
[Appellant] was charged with two counts of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, one count of stalking, two
counts of recklessly endangering another person, one count
of false reports to law enforcement, one count of possession
of marijuana—small amount, and one count of discharging
a firearm in the city of Pittsburgh. On February 3, 2020,
[Appellant] entered a guilty plea before the [trial court] to
count 1 as amended (simple assault by physical menace),
count 3 (stalking), counts 4 and 5 (recklessly endangering
another person), and count 6 (false reports to law
enforcement). The remaining counts were withdrawn by the
Commonwealth. Pursuant to the terms of the plea
agreement, [Appellant] was sentenced to six months of
house arrest followed by 18 months of probation for count
1; six months of house arrest followed by three years of
probation for count 3; two years of probation for count 4;
six months of house arrest for count 5; and no further
penalty for count 6. All periods of house arrest were ordered
to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to all
periods of probation. Each period of probation was ordered
to run concurrently with each other. Thus, the aggregate
sentence imposed was six months of house arrest followed
by three years of probation along with other conditions.
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On February 13, 2020, [Appellant] filed a pro se motion
seeking to withdraw her guilty plea. [Plea counsel] filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel on the same day. On
February 18, 2020, following a hearing on both motions,
[the trial c]ourt denied [Appellant’s] motion to withdraw her
guilty plea and granted [plea counsel’s] motion to withdraw.
On February 25, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se petition under
the [PCRA]. [The c]ourt appointed [PCRA counsel] to
represent [Appellant] with regard to the claims made in the
PCRA petition and, on June 5, 2020, [Appellant] filed an
amended PCRA petition.[2] On July 31, 2020, the
Commonwealth filed an answer to the amended PCRA
petition. On August 11, 2020, [the c]ourt issued a notice of
intent to dismiss and, on September 1, 2020, [the c]ourt
dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA petition. On September 29,
2020, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal and, on October
29, 2020, Appellant filed her concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal.
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2 “A petition for post-conviction collateral relief shall be filed within one year
of the date the judgment becomes final, except as otherwise provided by
statute.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 901(A). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). “[I]n
circumstances in which no timely direct appeal is filed relative to a judgment
of sentence, and direct review is therefore unavailable, the one-year period
allowed for the filing of a post-conviction petition commences upon the actual
expiration of the time period allowed for seeking direct review, as specified in
the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa.Super.
2019), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 216 A.3d 1044 (2019). In other words,
“A PCRA petition may only be filed after an appellant has waived or exhausted
his direct appeal rights.” Commonwealth v. Leslie, 757 A.2d 984, 985
(Pa.Super. 2000) (emphasis in original). Here, Appellant filed a premature,
pro se PCRA petition on February 25, 2020, prior to the expiration of the time
period allowed for seeking direct review. Nevertheless, the subsequent filing
of a timely, amended PCRA petition occurred after Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final, and it allowed the PCRA court to proceed with its
review of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim.
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(PCRA Court Opinion, filed December 7, 2020, at 1-2) (some capitalization
omitted).
Appellant now raises one issue for this Court’s review:
Did the [PCRA] court abuse its discretion in finding no merit
to the claims raised in the PCRA petition, and denying the
petition without a hearing, where [Appellant] established
the merits of her claim that her guilty plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered, but was unlawfully
induced due to the ineffective assistance of [plea] counsel,
insofar as counsel failed to meet with [Appellant] at the
Allegheny County Jail prior to the plea proceedings, failed to
fully advise her of the charges and possible defenses, and
told [Appellant] that she would only be released from prison
if she entered a negotiated plea?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination
and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway,
14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795(2011). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if
the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd,
923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74(2007). We do not give the same deference, however, to the court’s legal
conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190 (Pa.Super. 2012).
To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a
petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
[she] raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in
[her] favor, would have entitled [her] to relief, or that the
court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.
We stress that an evidentiary hearing is not meant to
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function as a fishing expedition for any possible evidence
that may support some speculative claim of ineffectiveness.
Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1, 17-18, 79 A.3d 595, 604-05 (2013),
cert. denied, 574 U.S. 829, 135 S.Ct. 56, 190 L.Ed.2d 56 (2014) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Appellant contends plea counsel “did not meet with her prior
to the plea proceedings, did not discuss the charges, conduct any
investigation, or discuss defenses or strategy with her, or otherwise prepare
for trial.” (Appellant’s Brief at 12). Appellant claims she informed plea counsel
that she acted in self-defense after Victim pushed her, but plea counsel
dismissed her assertions without explanation. Appellant insists plea counsel
told her “that the only way she would be released from jail was if she entered
a negotiated guilty plea.” (Id.) Under these circumstances, Appellant argues
“she had no real option other than to plead guilty, thereby rendering her plea
involuntary.” (Id.) Appellant concludes that plea counsel’s ineffectiveness
caused her to enter an involuntary guilty plea, and the PCRA court should not
have dismissed her petition without conducting a hearing. We disagree.
Pennsylvania law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). When
asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is required
to demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had
no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and, (3) but for the
errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the
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outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v.
Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). The failure to satisfy any prong
of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Williams, supra.“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the
issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis
for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit….” Commonwealth
v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot be
found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.”
Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).
Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’
test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was
designed to effectuate his client’s interests. If we conclude
that the particular course chosen by counsel had some
reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s
assistance is deemed effective.
Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95 (internal citations omitted).
Prejudice is established when [an appellant] demonstrates
that counsel’s chosen course of action had an adverse effect
on the outcome of the proceedings. The [appellant] must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. In [Kimball, supra], we held that a “criminal
[appellant] alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 21-22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)
(some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty
plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused [the
defendant] to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v.
Allen, 557 Pa. 135, 144, 732 A.2d 582, 587 (1999). “In order to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver, the individual must be aware of both the
nature of the right and the risks and consequences of forfeiting it.”
Commonwealth v. Houtz, 856 A.2d 119, 122 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 700 (Pa.Super. 1999)).
“To determine a defendant’s actual knowledge of the implications and
rights associated with a guilty plea, a court is free to consider the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Allen, supra at 146, 732 A.2d at
588-89. “The entry of a negotiated plea is a ‘strong indicator’ of the
voluntariness of the plea.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783
(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1106
(Pa.Super. 1994)).
“A valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the
charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the
presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court’s
power to deviate from any recommended sentence.” Reid, supra at 782
(quoting Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa.Super.
2005)). “Furthermore, nothing in [Pa.R.Crim.P. 590] precludes the
supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that is read,
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completed and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea
proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212-13
(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 742, 964 A.2d 893 (2009). See
also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.
“A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements [she]
makes in open court while under oath and [she] may not later assert grounds
for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements [she] made at [her]
plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super.
2003). “Our law does not require that a defendant be totally pleased with the
outcome of [her] decision to plead guilty, only that [her] decision be
voluntary, knowing and intelligent.” Id. at 524.
Instantly, Appellant executed a written guilty plea colloquy on February
3, 2020. In the written colloquy, Appellant confirmed her understanding of
the nature of the charges, the factual basis of her plea, her right to a jury
trial, the presumption of innocence, the sentencing ranges, and the court’s
power to deviate from the recommended sentence. (See Explanation of
Rights, dated 2/3/20, at 2-10). Appellant also responded “yes” when asked
if she understood that she was giving up her right to present certain defenses,
including self-defense. (Id. at 5). Further, Appellant indicated that no one
had forced her to enter the plea, she had ample time to consult with plea
counsel, and she was satisfied with counsel’s legal advice and representation.
(Id. at 9-10).
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At the oral plea colloquy, Appellant confirmed that she understood all of
the questions in the written colloquy, she provided honest answers to those
questions, and she was “able to satisfactorily consult with” plea counsel. (N.T.
Plea Hearing, 2/3/20, at 12-13). Nevertheless, when asked whether she had
any questions about the entry of her plea, Appellant stated:
The only [question] that I have for my attorney is how come
[Victim] knocked me down to the ground and made me bang
my head off the ground. And he was standing over me,
threatening me, calling me [a] bitch and so did [Victim’s
girlfriend], but it’s like that gets looked over. This is not the
first time he did this to me.
(Id. at 13-14). In response, the court agreed to make Appellant’s statement
part of the record pertaining to the factual basis for her plea. (See id. at 14).
Thereafter, the oral colloquy continued, and Appellant reiterated that she did
not have any additional questions, she had discussed her rights with plea
counsel, she was satisfied with his representation, and she had not been
coerced into entering the plea. (Id. at 15, 19).
The court subsequently conducted a hearing on Appellant’s pro se
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. At that time, Appellant baldly asserted
that she “never discussed” her case with plea counsel, who only met with her
briefly on the morning of the plea hearing. (See N.T. Hearing, 2/18/20, at
3). Appellant also complained that plea counsel had advised her not to seek
withdrawal of the guilty plea, because such a withdrawal would not be in
Appellant’s best interests. (Id. at 6). Plea counsel emphatically denied
Appellant’s assertions, claiming he explained all of the charges and made
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certain that Appellant was aware of what she was doing. (Id. at 3-4).
Additionally, plea counsel opined that Appellant’s plea was voluntary, as she
received a generous deal for the offenses at issue. (Id. at 5).
Although Appellant continues to complain that plea counsel did not
adequately advise her prior to the plea hearing, the record undermines her
claim. The colloquies reveal that Appellant was aware of her rights, she was
satisfied with plea counsel’s representation, and she was not forced to enter
the plea. Appellant is bound by her statements. See Pollard, supra. Under
the totality of these circumstances, we agree with the PCRA court that
Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim lacks arguable merit. See Allen, supra.Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/31/2021
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