Com. v. Beverly, S. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHATEEK BEVERLY :
:
Appellant : No. 1723 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 17, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002530-2018
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 31, 2021
Appellant, Shateek Beverly, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on May 17, 2019, after a jury found him guilty of firearms not to be
carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia,
and person not to possess or control a firearm.1 After careful review, we
affirm.
The trial court comprehensively summarized the facts adduced at trial,
as follows:
[O]n March 15, 2018, fully uniformed Police Officer
Jeffrey Donahue and his partner, Police Officer Ryndi Green-
Coneby, were traveling in a marked vehicle, in the area of the
1100 block of South Frazier Street in response to a radioed report
of “two black males inside a black car armed with a gun.” Within
a minute of receiving the radio call, the officers arrived at the
location where they observed two (2) black cars with only one of
the vehicles with occupants. The engine was running and some
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106, 6108, and 6105, respectively.
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windows were tinted. As Officer Donahue exited his vehicle, he
could smell a strong odor of burnt marijuana in the air.
Approaching from the rear, Officer Donahue could see two people
in the front of the vehicle, a black Lexus ES350.
As he walked closer, the officer observed Appellant seated
in the driver’s seat and shouted at least twice instructions for the
driver to show his hands. He observed Appellant ignore his
directions and “dip his shoulders forward” in the driver’s seat.
During his [vivid] trial testimony, Officer Donohue physically
demonstrated to the fact-finding jury Appellant’s furtive
movements that he had observed. That demonstration vividly
illuminated Appellant’s frantic attempt to hide something under
his seat.
Appellant eventually cracked the window about a quarter
inch which released smoke and a very pungent odor of marijuana
from the vehicle. Due to natural safety concerns, Officer Donahue
then instructed Appellant to get out of the vehicle. As Appellant
was exiting the vehicle, Officer Donahue could see the back half
of a firearm on the driver’s side floorboard that had been partially
shoved closest to the console.
Appellant was subsequently frisked for the officers’ safety
and placed in the back of the patrol car. Officer Donahue retrieved
a fully loaded and chambered black Taurus G2 9-millimeter
firearm from underneath the driver’s seat. The positioning of the
firearm within the vehicle was displayed to the jury within the
introduced photographs. The physical location of the firearm prior
to law enforcement retrieval had been with the handle in the front
by the driver’s feet and the barrel underneath pointed towards the
back of the vehicle. This position was consistent not only with
Appellant’s observed stashing motion but also reflective of the
driver as the last natural possessor of that weapon.
Moreover, the firearm’s location on the driver’s side of the
floorboard next [to] the driver’s side of the console demonstrated
access within the driver’s wingspan. The driver’s singular
possession of the retrieved firearm [that] had been loaded and
chambered was also reflected by its location within inches behind
and initially blocked by Appellant’s right leg and foot and
underneath where he had been seated.
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It was not until he was retrieving the firearm, that
Officer Donahue had noticed the three (3) additional people in the
backseat of the vehicle. Officer Donahue explained that the back
windshield along with the side rear passenger window had been
heavily tinted which had prevented him and Officer Green-Coneby
from initially seeing the three (3) people in the backseat. Notably,
Appellant had been the only individual that had ignored the
Officer’s commands. Office Donohue testified that just prior to
transportation for arrest processing, another officer thoroughly
searched Appellant’s black puffy coat that he had been wearing
and retrieved a box of ammunition usable for the recovered
firearm from the upper right jacket pocket of that coat.
Police Officer Kevin Day testified that on March 15, 2018, at
approximately 12:10 p.m., he and his partner, Police Officer
Ryan Howell, also responded to the radio call of “two black males
inside a black car armed with a gun” on the 1100 block of South
Frazier Street. They were in full uniform and in a marked police
wagon. Officer Day approached the driver’s side of Appellant’s
vehicle with Officer Donahue and he conducted the pat down of
Appellant which revealed a box of ammunition in the right front
pocket of Appellant’s jacket. Officer Day gave the box [to
O]fficer Donahue. Officer Day stated that in his experience, it is
uncommon for a person to just carry ammunition.
Next, a stipulation was entered by and between counsel,
that Firearm’s Identification Unit Examiner, Leticia Buchanan, was
an expert in firearms identification, analysis, comparison, and with
ammunition. Ms. Buchanan testified that she examined the
firearm, which she identified as a Taurus G2c semiautomatic, 9-
millimeter that comes with a box magazine that holds 12 plus one
in the chamber. She stated that she had also received and
analyzed a Sig Sauer box of ammunition; called hollow point “V–
Crown” 9-millimeter type of ammunition which she had favorably
compared to the same hollow point 9-millimeter type retrieved
from the recovered firearm. That firearm was also deemed upon
testing to be operable. On cross-examination, Ms. Buchanan
stated that DNA testing had not been requested.
* * *
Detective Zachary Jordan testified that he was assigned to
the Gun Violence Reduction Task Force with the Southwest
Detectives Special Investigations Unit that utilize Facebook,
Instagram and YouTube to combat gun crimes in the City.
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According to Detective Jordan, in early March of 2018, he had
received notification of a video publicly posted by Visionary Films
and music producer featuring Appellant, whose social media name
was “Teeko Savage.” With no objection, the video was displayed
during the Detective’s testimony to the jury.
Detective Jordan identified Appellant in the video as one of
the two adult men rapping while easily handling a semiautomatic
weapon; the other man was identified as Domire Crawford, who
also held a firearm. Detective Jordan stated that he had been
aware of previous videos featuring Appellant and that he had
conducted an investigation involving Appellant and firearms on a
previous date, which was not the date of the video.
Detective Jordon retrieved the social media posting that displayed
Appellant’s possession and posturing with firearms within a few
days prior to Appellant’s instant arrest. On cross-examination,
Detective Jordan stated that he was not aware of any fingerprint
or DNA analysis being conducted on the gun.
Upon completion of the prosecution’s case, Appellant
testified that on March 15, 2018, at approximately 12:30 p.m., he
had been sitting in the driver’s seat of a black Lexus, with four (4)
other people that had been parked on the street with only the heat
on electrically. Appellant stated that the weapon in question
belonged to Javon Wallace who was sitting directly behind him in
the vehicle and that he had never touched it.
On cross-examination, Appellant testified that the police had
been conspiring against him; that it wasn’t his gun and that Officer
Day did not really retrieve a box of ammunition from his jacket
pocket because he was not wearing a jacket when he had been
removed from the car and that no one in that vehicle had been
smoking any weed. According to Appellant, he and the other four
men were just sitting in their friend’s car listening to music before
the police showed up and interrupted them. After discussion with
the court and with counsel, Appellant, outside the presence of the
jury, informed the court that he was not going to call Javon
Wallace as a witness.
* * *
A stipulation had been further entered by and between
counsel that if the Clerk of Courts for the First Judicial District of
Pennsylvania, Velma Jones, were called to testify as the
authorized records custodian, she would testify that Appellant had
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a prior adjudication of delinquency for robbery, graded as a felony
of the first degree. That adjudication was docketed by First
Judicial District of Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas under
Docket Number CP-51-JV-0002262-2015 with a disposition date
of September 18, 2017.
At the conclusion of trial on May 17, 2019, Appellant [was]
found guilty by the jury after brief deliberation of the two
respective Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act: Firearms not to
be Carried without a License; and Carrying Firearms on Public
[S]treets or Public Property in Philadelphia. The jury then was
asked to decide the final previously bifurcated charge of Violation
of the Uniform Firearms Act-Possession of a Prohibited Firearm.
The stipulation regarding the testimony of the Clerk of Courts was
read to the jury and after deliberation, they found Appellant guilty
of that offense as well.
Since Appellant had initially entered a plea of guilty to all
charges before the Honorable Diana L. Anhalt, Judge of the First
Judicial District of Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, on
December 5, 2018, the investigative pre-sentence report and
mental health evaluation previously ordered by Judge Anhalt had
been available and reviewed by this Court. Sharie Beverly,
Appellant’s mother, and Maria Hurt, Appellant’s aunt, both
testified on behalf of Appellant. Thereafter, Appellant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of six and one-half (6 1/2) to
seventeen (17) years of incarceration.4
4 Appellant was sentenced to [a] term of three and
one-half (3 1/2) years to seven (7) years of
incarceration on the charge of firearms not to be
carried without a license; followed by one and one half
(1 1/2) to five (5) years of incarceration on each
charge of person not to possess or control a firearm
and carrying firearms on public streets or public
property in Philadelphia.
A Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence was filed on
June 5, 2019 and [was] subsequently denied on June 11, 2019.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 12, 2019.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/20, at 2–8 (record references and some quotations
omitted). Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Appellant raises the following issues for review:
1. Whether the weight of the evidence was enough to
sustain a conviction pursuant to Rule 607, and whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction pursuant to Rule
606 and the weight of the evidence was enough to sustain a
conviction pursuant to Rule 607?
2. Whether the Sentencing Court should have sentenced
[Appellant] to a “mitigated” sentence on May 17, 2019, yet he was
sentenced To Firearms Not to be Carried W/O License, 18 § 6106
§§ A1 F3 Confinement 3 1/2 to 7 years, 18 § 6105 §§ A1 M1
Possession of Firearm Prohibited, Confinement Min. 1 1/2 Year(s)
to Max: 5 Year(s): and 18 § 6108 M1 Carry Firearms Public in
Philadelphia, Confinement Min: 1 1/2 to Max: 5 Year[s] all to be
run consecutively for a minimum of 6 1/2 to 17 years sentence?
3. Whether the evidence of the YouTube video, which shows
[Appellant] in the possession of a firearm should have been
allowed to be shown to the jury and admitted into evidence?
4. Whether “Constructive Possession” was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt?
Appellant’s Brief at 6, verbatim (renumbered for ease of disposition).
We must initially determine whether Appellant has preserved each of his
issues for appellate review. “It [is] ‘elementary that issues not preserved for
appellate review or, even if raised at the trial level, not raised by a party to
an appeal, will not be considered by an appellate court.’” Commonwealth
v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 879 n.3 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v.
McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1978)).
Appellant’s first issue challenges the weight and the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions. Both aspects of his argument are waived.
As to his weight of the evidence claim, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
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Procedure 607 governs challenges to the weight of the evidence and provides,
in relevant part, as follows:
(A) A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new
trial:
(1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing
(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or
(3) in a post-sentence motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). “The purpose of [Rule 607] is to make it clear that a
challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised with the trial judge or
it will be waived.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 60, cmt. “If an appellant never gives the trial
court the opportunity to provide relief, then there is no discretionary act that
this Court can review.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 191 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (footnote and citation omitted).
In his brief on appeal, Appellant does not contend that he complied with
Rule 607. Further, a review of the record confirms that Appellant did not
present a weight claim orally on the record or in writing at any time before
sentencing or in his motion for reconsideration of sentence. Moreover, in his
appellate brief, Appellant’s argument consists solely of a recitation of Rule 607
and the case law outlining appellate review of a weight of the evidence claim.
Appellant’s Brief at 11–12. Accordingly, Appellant’s failure to follow the
mandates of Rule 607 requires that we find waiver of this issue.
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Appellant’s general sufficiency of the evidence claim is likewise
deficient.2 This Court has stated, “In order to preserve a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement must state with specificity the element or elements upon which the
appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient.” Commonwealth v.
Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 982 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (“[T]he Statement shall concisely
identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with
sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.”). “Such
specificity is of particular importance in cases where, as here, [A]ppellant was
convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements that
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Garland, 63
A.3d at 344. Failure to identify what specific elements the Commonwealth did
not prove at trial in a Rule 1925(b) statement renders an appellant’s
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim waived for appellate review. See
Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 261 (Pa. Super. 2015) (finding the
appellant’s issues waived where “1925(b) statement simply declared, in
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2 Appellant’s more specific argument that the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate constructive possession of the firearm at issue is reviewable and
will be discussed infra.
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boilerplate fashion, that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction”).
Here, Appellant posed the following generic question in his Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement: “[W]hether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction pursuant to Rule 606. . . .” Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
Statement, 11/4/19, at 1. Appellant does not specify any element of any of
the convictions that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. Nor does Appellant’s “Statement of Questions Involved” identify what
element(s) of the convictions he is challenging on appeal. Appellant’s Brief at
6. Moreover, in the argument section of his appellate brief, Appellant’s
sufficiency argument consists of one paragraph describing this Court’s
standard of review. Id. at 12. Based on the foregoing, Appellant has failed
to preserve his sufficiency of the evidence challenge for appellate review.
We next address Appellant’s sentencing issue. On May 17, 2019,
Appellant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of three and one-half to
seven years for the conviction of firearms not to be carried without a license,
followed by one and one-half to five years of incarceration for both the person
not to possess a firearm and carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia
convictions. The trial court ordered that all sentences be served
consecutively, resulting in an aggregate term of incarceration of six and one-
half to seventeen years. N.T. (Sentencing), 5/17/19, at 101.
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In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant phrases his sentencing
issue as “whether the sentencing court should have sentenced [Appellant] to
a ‘mitigated sentence’ . . . .” Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement,
11/4/19, at 2. Appellant somewhat expands upon this abbreviated statement
in the argument portion of his brief, wherein he claims that the maximum
sentence of seventeen years was “widely outside the Sentencing Guidelines.”
Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant also posits that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing his sentence because it violated the Pennsylvania
Sentencing Code by disregarding “the general principle that the sentence
imposed should call for 1) confinement consistent with the protection of the
public, 2) the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of
the victim; and 3) the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . .” Appellant’s
Brief at 13.
A claim that a sentence is excessive is a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Challenges to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth
v. Bradley, 237 A.3d 1131, 1138 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth
v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000)). An appellant challenging
the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction
by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
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and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted).
Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a motion to reconsider
sentence nunc pro tunc.3 Appellant represented that the motion was filed late
because of a death in trial counsel’s family. While Appellant’s brief does not
include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, the Commonwealth did not object to
the statement’s absence. Therefore, we will not find it waived on the basis
that the brief does not include the statement. Commonwealth v. Brougher,
978 A.2d 373, 375 (Pa. Super. 2009). Finally, Appellant’s argument that the
trial court abused its discretion in imposing his sentence because it failed to
consider the sentencing factors outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. §9721(b) raises a
substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030,
1042, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2013) (substantial question presented where
appellant alleges sentence manifestly excessive because court did not
consider all sentencing factors). Thus, we will review the substantive merits
of Appellant’s claim.
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3 On June 11, 2019, the trial court granted Appellant’s petition to file a motion
for reconsideration of sentence nunc pro tunc. On that same date, the trial
court denied the motion on its merits.
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At sentencing, the Commonwealth noted that the sentencing guideline
for the carrying firearms without a license charge was thirty-six to forty-eight
months imprisonment plus or minus twelve months. N.T. (Sentencing),
5/17/19, at 90. The sentencing guideline for both person not to possess
firearms and for carrying a firearm in a public street in Philadelphia was nine
to sixteen months incarceration plus or minus three. Id. at 84. The trial court
imposed the Commonwealth-recommended three and-one-half to seven year
penalty for the main charge and one and one-half to five years on each of the
other two firearms convictions. Although the trial court represented that each
of these sentences was “within the recommended standard range of
sentencing,” Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/20, at 32, the eighteen-month
minimum sentence for the non-leading offenses was actually within the
aggravated range. Nonetheless, the sentence was not a deviation from the
Sentencing Guidelines as Appellant suggests. Appellant’s Brief at 12; see
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(sentence falling within aggravated range constitutes a sentence within the
guidelines).
We further conclude that Appellant’s assertion that his maximum
sentence was outside the Sentencing Guidelines is irrelevant. The Sentencing
Guidelines recommend ranges of minimum sentences based on the type of
offense, the defendant’s prior criminal history, and certain aggravating and
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mitigating factors. Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 923 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Pa.
2007).
Appellant’s companion claim that the trial court failed to consider the
sentencing factors in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721, likewise is meritless. It is well settled
that when the trial court has the benefit of a presentence investigation (“PSI”)
report, it is presumed that the court was both aware of and appropriately
weighed all relevant information contained therein. Commonwealth v.
Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. Super. 2002). Herein, the trial court informed
Appellant that the reasons for the length of the sentence included: Appellant’s
“extreme violence” and “extreme indications of very compulsive behavior” in
his actions underlying his prior juvenile dispositions for aggravated assault
and robbery; the “proud way [Appellant] displayed an intent to commit
violence” depicted in the YouTube video played at trial; prior attempts at
rehabilitation “haven’t worked” due to Appellant’s “refusal to change”;
Appellant declined a meeting with the presentence investigator; Appellant did
not “accept responsibility” for his crimes; and Appellant is a “clear and present
danger to the community.” N.T. (Sentencing), 5/17/19, at 94–98. Therefore,
Appellant’s argument that the trial court failed to consider the 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9721 (b) sentencing factors is belied by the record and merits no relief.
Finally, to the extent that Appellant is unhappy with the duration of his
incarceration due to the consecutive nature of the sentences, the decision to
order sentences to run concurrently or consecutively is left to the discretion
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of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 470 (Pa.
Super. 2018). An appellant is not entitled to a “volume discount” for his
crimes by having all of his sentences run concurrently. Commonwealth v.
Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995). “The imposition of
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial
question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the
aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and
the length of imprisonment.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 171–172 (citation omitted).
Herein, Appellant has not asserted any “extreme circumstances.” Radecki,
180 A.3d at 470. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion
in imposing consecutive sentences after reviewing the facts of the case,
Appellant’s history, relevant sentencing factors, and the PSI report.
Appellant’s next issue involves the admission of a YouTube video
depicting Appellant performing a rap song while brandishing a firearm. On
December 4, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the Commonwealth’s
motion to introduce other acts evidence. The motion requested that the
Commonwealth be permitted to introduce the “Testimony of Detective
Zachary Jordan relating to a YouTube Video titled ‘Teeko Savage Featuring
Daz Raw Ready For War (Remix),’ which was published on March 11, 2018,”
four days before Appellant was arrested on the present charges. Motion,
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12/3/18, at unnumbered 1, 4.4 The motions court granted the motion, and
the video was played before the jury during trial.
On appeal, Appellant maintains that the video was admitted in violation
of Pa.R.E. 404(b). Rule 404(b) instructs, in relevant part, that although
“evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character,” it may be admissible to prove “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) and (2). In criminal matters
“this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 404(b).
In his brief, Appellant contends, without elaboration, that admission of
the video was prejudicial because it demonstrated that Appellant “had a
propensity to commit crimes.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant does not,
however, identify any error in the motions court’s reasoning that the video
was admissible because “it tended to prove that [Appellant] had a weapon
similar to the one in [perpetration] of the crime[s] he is currently charged
with.” N.T. (Motion), 12/4/18, at 9. Although the motions court recognized
that the weapon in the video was not the same as the weapon involved in the
subject crimes, “it still shows access to weapons.” Id.
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4 Teeko Savage is Appellant’s social media name. N.T. (Trial), 5/15/19, at
114.
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Appellant also argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence of constructive possession. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant asserts
that the Commonwealth failed to prove he exercised control or dominion over
the firearm because “there were five persons in the vehicle” where the firearm
was discovered, Appellant did not own or operate the car, and Appellant
cooperated with the responding officer. Id. Appellant also contends that
“Officer Roller’s testimony that [A]ppellant made a movement toward the left
rear of the vehicle” does not “provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
[A]ppellant possessed the firearm in question.” Id.
We have considered the arguments of the parties, the relevant law, and
the complete record. The trial court aptly addressed Appellant’s evidentiary
and constructive possession issues in its May 27, 2020 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion. We thus rely on the trial court’s opinion in concluding that these
issues lack merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/31/21
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