Com. v. Coker, C. ( 2021 )

J-S09041-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTOPHER COKER :
:
Appellant : No. 1499 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-1200411-2003
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2021
Christopher Coker (“Coker”) appeals, pro se, from the Order denying his
“Motion to Clarify Judgement of Order.” We affirm.
This Court previously summarized the procedural history underlying this
appeal as follows:
[On July 19, 2005, Coker] was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter and possessing an instrument of crime. On August
30, 2005, the trial court sentenced [Coker] to an aggregate term
of seven to fourteen years’ incarceration[,] followed by a ten-year
probation term. [Coker] did not file a direct appeal, but later filed
a timely PCRA [P]etition[,] seeking the reinstatement of his direct
appeal rights. The PCRA court reinstated [Coker’s] appeal rights
and appointed Richard Brown, Jr., Esquire [(“Attorney Brown”)],
as appellate counsel. [Coker] subsequently presented a challenge
to the trial court’s alleged ex parte interaction with the jury at his
trial to this Court. We affirmed [Coker’s] judgment of sentence
and our Supreme Court denied allocator. [See Commonwealth
v. Coker, 990 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 996 A.2d 1067 (Pa. 2010).]
On November 12, 2010, [Coker] filed [a] PCRA [P]etition,
alleging the ineffectiveness of both trial counsel, Todd Henry,
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Esquire, and appellate counsel, Attorney Brown. The PCRA court
appointed PCRA counsel, Elayne Bryn, Esquire [(“Attorney
Bryn”)]. Attorney Bryn filed a Turney/Finley no-merit letter and
[a P]etition to withdraw as counsel on May 11, 2015. The
following day, the PCRA court granted Attorney Bryn’s request to
withdraw and issued a Rule 907 [N]otice of its intent to dismiss
the [P]etition without a hearing. [Coker] filed a [R]esponse,
requested the appointment of new counsel, and requested a
hearing. The PCRA court granted [Coker’s] request for new
counsel and appointed David Rudenstein, Esquire [(“Attorney
Rudenstein”)], on August 28, 2015.
Shortly thereafter, Attorney Rudenstein filed an [A]mended
[PCRA] [P]etition through which [Coker] raised seven allegations
of ineffective assistance of counsel, renewed [Coker’s] request for
an evidentiary hearing, and requested a new trial. The PCRA court
filed a Rule 907 [N]otice of its intent to dismiss the [Amended
PCRA Petition.] In response, [Coker] filed a [M]otion for leave to
hold an immediate Grazier hearing. The PCRA [court] held the
Grazier hearing, and after determining that [Coker] did not wish
to proceed without counsel, denied the [Amended PCRA Petition]
on June 30, 2016.
Commonwealth v. Coker, 175 A.3d 415 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished
memorandum at 1-2). On appeal, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s Order,
and our Supreme Court denied Coker’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. See
id., appeal denied, 180 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2018).
On June 15, 2020, Coker filed a pro se “Motion to Clarify Judgement of
Order.” In his Motion, Coker acknowledged that the PCRA court’s Order
addressed the issues raised by Attorney Rudenstein in the Amended PCRA
Petition, but argued that the PCRA court erred in failing to address the issues
that he had raised in his pro se November 12, 2010, PCRA Petition. On June
15, 2020, the trial court entered an Order denying Coker’s Motion. Coker filed
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a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise
Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
On appeal, Coker restates the claim raised in his “Motion to Clarify
Judgement of Order,” i.e., that the PCRA court failed to address the issues
raised in his pro se November 12, 2010, PCRA Petition. See Brief for Appellant
at 9-11 (pages unnumbered).
Initially, we consider whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to consider
Coker’s “Motion to Clarify Judgement of Order.” Coker’s Motion purportedly
requests that the PCRA Court reconsider its June 30, 2016, Order that
dismissed his PCRA Petition. However, Coker previously filed a direct appeal
from the PCRA court’s June 30, 2016, Order. See Coker, 175 A.3d 415,
appeal denied, 180 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2018). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1701(a) states that “after an appeal is taken … the trial court or
other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); see also Commonwealth v. Moore, 715 A.2d 448, 453
(Pa. Super. 1998) (stating that “once a party has properly appealed a decision
of the trial court, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to act further on the case.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider
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Coker’s Motion. As the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction, we affirm the PCRA
court’s denial of relief.1, 2
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/7/2021
____________________________________________
1 Even if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider Coker’s claim, it would fail
on the merits. See Commonwealth v. Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706, 713 n.5
(Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that where a PCRA petitioner is represented by
counsel, “the PCRA court is only permitted to address issues raised in a
counseled petition.”).
2 We further note that Coker’s claim is not cognizable under the PCRA. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543 (setting forth the requirements for pleading a case under
the PCRA).
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