Com. v. Ridley, T. ( 2021 )

J-S40044-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TERRENCE L. RIDLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 3244 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0005285-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: APRIL 12, 2021
This matter is an appeal by Appellant, Terrence L. Ridley, from the
judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for Drug Delivery
Resulting in Death, Conspiracy to Commit Drug Delivery Resulting in Death,
Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver a
Controlled Substance (PWID), Criminal Use of a Communication Facility, and
Involuntary Manslaughter.1 This appeal is before us a second time following
a remand to the trial court for a supplemental opinion making findings as to
the periods of pretrial delay that are excludable in determining whether
dismissal of the charges against Appellant was required by Rule 600 of the
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
118 Pa.C.S. § 2506(a), 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18
Pa.C.S. § 7512(a), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a), respectively.
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Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure for failure to bring Appellant to trial
within 365 days. Also before the Court is an application for reargument filed
by Appellant. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate Appellant’s PWID
conviction for lack of jurisdiction, but deny the application for reargument and
affirm Appellant’s other convictions and judgment of sentence.
As we set forth in our prior memorandum decision, this case arises out
of the March 22, 2018 fentanyl overdose death of Amanda Risko. Appellant
was convicted of the above offenses following a bench trial. The trial court
found the following facts:
Risko had just completed … drug treatment at a local drug
rehabilitation center and was released on March 21, 2018. That
same day, immediately upon release from the rehabilitation
center, Risko contacted Appellant's co-defendant, Michael
Santangelo, to get him to reach out to Appellant to buy fentanyl
for her. Santangelo had been buying fentanyl consistently from
Appellant for months prior to March 21, 2018. Both Risko and
Santangelo were very familiar with the quality of the fentanyl they
had previously obtained from Appellant and were impressed with
the potency of the particular brand of fentanyl which was
packaged and identified on the street as “Rolex” brand. At Risko’s
request, Santangelo made contact with Appellant on March 21,
2018; purchased the fentanyl with money provided by Risko and
delivered the fentanyl to second co-defendant of Appellant and
paramour of Risko, Ronald Filderman, who ultimately delivered
the drugs to Risko. Filderman was present with Risko when she
used some of the drugs provided by Appellant and additional bags
of the “Appellant provided” fentanyl was [sic] left with Risko when
Filderman left the residence the next morning. … [U]pon return to
the residence, Filderman found Risko dead in her bed, it now being
March 22nd.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/7/20, at 2-3 (record citations omitted) (quotation marks
in original). Risko and Santangelo lived in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and
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Appellant lived in Trenton, New Jersey. Id. at 3. Santangelo purchased the
drugs that Risko consumed from Appellant in Trenton, New Jersey and brought
them back to Risko and Filderman in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. N.T. Trial,
8/27/19, at 158-65, 185-86; Commonwealth Ex. 15. Risko ingested the drugs
in Bucks County, Pennsylvania and died in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Trial
Court Opinion, 1/7/20, at 12-13. After Risko’s death, Santangelo cooperated
on April 3, 2018 in a controlled drug buy in which he bought “Rolex” fentanyl
from Appellant in Trenton, New Jersey. Id. at 3-4.
Appellant was charged on July 12, 2018 with Drug Delivery Resulting in
Death and other offenses relating to the March 21, 2018 drug sale and Risko’s
death, and was arrested on July 13, 2018. Criminal Complaint; N.T. Trial,
8/28/19, at 17-18. Appellant’s trial was originally scheduled for January 28,
2019, but that trial date was cancelled on January 4, 2019 and no new trial
date was set at that time. Pretrial Ex. 1, Secure Docket Entries at 1, 5-6. On
January 25, 2019, Appellant filed a motion for release on nominal bail
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(B) because he had been held in pretrial
incarceration for over 180 days. Following a hearing on February 1, 2019,
Appellant was released on nominal bail with GPS monitoring. On March 29,
2019, Appellant’s trial was scheduled for June 25, 2019 as a jury trial. Pretrial
Ex. 1, Secure Docket Entries at 8.
On April 4, 2019, Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus asserting,
inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. The Commonwealth filed a motion on April 18,
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2019 to allow evidence of the April 3, 2018 controlled buy to be admitted at
Appellant’s trial pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404 and Appellant opposed this motion.
In addition, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on April 25, 2019.
Following hearings on these motions, the trial court, on May 1, 2019, granted
the Commonwealth’s motion to admit the controlled buy, denied Appellant’s
petition for habeas corpus, and resolved all other outstanding motions. N.T.
Pre-Trial Conference, 5/1/19, at 3-7, 72-85. On June 24, 2019, the
Commonwealth requested a continuance of the June 25, 2019 trial date
because the prosecutor was still trying a case before another judge and
Appellant did not object to that continuance. N.T. Trial, 8/26/19, at 23-24;
Pretrial Ex. 1, Secure Docket Entries at 11.
Appellant’s trial did not begin until August 26, 2019. This trial date was
set by the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas Court Administration after
the continuance of the June 25 date was requested. Trial Court Supplemental
Opinion at 7-8, 10-11; N.T. Trial, 8/26/19, at 25-27. On the morning of
August 26, 2019, before trial started, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss all
charges with prejudice on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to bring
him to trial within 365 days as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A). The trial
court heard from the prosecutor and Appellant’s counsel concerning the
reasons for delay of the trial date and denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss.
N.T. Trial, 8/26/19, at 5-38. Following that ruling, Appellant waived his right
to jury trial and a bench trial was held from August 26 to August 29, 2019.
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Before Appellant’s trial commenced, the Commonwealth and defendants
Santangelo and Filderman jointly requested a continuance of the cases against
them, which the trial court granted, id. at 3-5, and Santangelo and Filderman,
both of who testified as Commonwealth witnesses against Appellant, were not
tried with Appellant.
On September 5, 2019, the trial court found Appellant guilty of Drug
Delivery Resulting in Death, Conspiracy to Commit Drug Delivery Resulting in
Death, PWID, Criminal Use of a Communication Facility, and Involuntary
Manslaughter. On October 11, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 6
to 12 years’ incarceration for Drug Delivery Resulting in Death and imposed
no further penalty for the other offenses. No post-sentence motions were
filed. Appellant filed this timely appeal from the judgment of sentence on
November 8, 2019.
Appellant presented the following issues for our review:
A. The trial court abused its discretion in granting the
Commonwealth’s pre-trial motion to introduce subsequent bad
acts [the controlled drug buy].
B. Did the trial court act erroneously in failing to dismiss several
charges [PWID and Criminal Use of a Communication Facility]
based on lack of jurisdiction?
C. Did the trial court erred [sic] in denying Appellant’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 600?
D. Did the trial court err by finding Appellant Ridley guilty of all
charges when the evidence was not sufficient because the
testimony from the two co-[defendants] was inconsistent and
unreliable.
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Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and trial court answers
omitted). On November 10, 2020, we issued a memorandum decision in
which we rejected Appellant’s first and fourth issues, remanded the case to
the trial court for a supplemental opinion on Appellant’s third issue and
deferred consideration of Appellant’s second issue.
On January 5, 2021, the trial court filed its supplemental opinion. In
addition, on January 12, 2021, Appellant filed an application for reargument
with respect to this Court’s ruling on his fourth issue, asserting that under a
subsequent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision the Commonwealth’s
evidence was insufficient to support his Drug Delivery Resulting in Death
conviction. There are therefore three matters now before this Court: 1)
whether dismissal of all of the charges against Appellant was required by Rule
600 for failure to bring Appellant to trial within 365 days; 2) whether the trial
court erred in failing to dismiss the PWID and Criminal Use of a Communication
Facility charges for lack of jurisdiction; and 3) Appellant’s application for
reargument on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his Drug
Delivery Resulting in Death conviction.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 requires that the
Commonwealth bring a defendant to trial within 365 days from the date on
which the criminal complaint was filed. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a);
Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 947 (Pa. 2018). Rule 600
provides that in determining whether the 365-day period has expired, “periods
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of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when
the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in
the computation of the time within which trial must commence” and that
“[a]ny other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
If the defendant is not brought to trial within 365 days, he may file a
motion at any time before trial requesting dismissal of the charges against
him with prejudice. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1). When such a motion is filed, the
trial court is required to conduct a hearing and identify each period of delay
and attribute it to the responsible party to adjust the 365-day period and
determine the date by which the defendant must be tried. Id.; Barbour, 189
A.3d at 947.
Where delay was not caused by the defendant, the burden is on the
Commonwealth to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it acted with
due diligence to bring the defendant to trial within Rule 600’s time limit.
Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 701 (Pa. 2012);
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 136 A.3d 178, 182-83 (Pa. Super. 2016);
Commonwealth v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352, 359 (Pa. Super. 2014). Whether
the Commonwealth acted with due diligence is a fact-specific inquiry that must
be determined on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994
A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010); Commonwealth v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 956
(Pa. Super. 2017). “Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and
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punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable
effort has been put forth.” Wendel, 165 A.3d at 956-57.
We review a trial court’s denial of a Rule 600 motion to dismiss for abuse
of discretion. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 185 A.3d 364, 370 (Pa. Super.
2018); Thompson, 136 A.3d at 182. In this review, this Court must view the
facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, which in this case is
the Commonwealth. Bethea, 185 A.3d at 370; Wendel, 165 A.3d at 956
(Pa. Super. 2017).
In addition, when considering whether dismissal is required under Rule
600,
this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule
[600]. Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the
protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the
protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right
to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given
to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both
to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating
it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not
designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial
rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner
consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In
considering [these] matters ..., courts must carefully factor into
the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual
accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law
enforcement as well.
Bethea, 185 A.3d at 370 (quoting Wendel) (brackets and ellipsis in original)
(emphasis omitted).
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Here, Appellant’s trial began on August 26, 2019, 410 days after the
criminal complaint was filed on July 12, 2018, and beyond the Rule 600
deadline, unless at least 45 days of delay in bringing him to trial were caused
by Appellant or can be excluded because they occurred despite the
Commonwealth’s exercise of due diligence. There was no evidence or
contention that Appellant requested any continuances or delays of the trial.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/7/20, at 24.
In its supplemental opinion, the trial court found that the
Commonwealth had not met its burden of showing that it acted with
reasonable diligence with respect to any delays prior to June 24, 2019 and
that the time periods prior to the June 24, 2019 request for a continuance
were not excludable. Trial Court Supplemental Opinion at 8-9, 12, 16, 19-20.
The Commonwealth has not challenged these findings.2 The trial court held,
however, that the delay caused by the June 24, 2019 continuance, which was
granted because the prosecutor was on trial in another case, was excludable
and that Appellant was therefore brought to trial within Rule 600’s time limit.
Id. at 17-19, 21-22.
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2Despite the fact that the trial court’s supplemental opinion reached different
conclusions with respect to some of the delays that it referenced in its original
opinion, neither the Commonwealth nor Appellant requested leave to file
supplemental briefs addressing the trial court’s findings in its supplemental
opinion.
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The record is clear that Appellant did not object to the June 24, 2019
continuance. The defendant is not required to object to a trial date set by the
court for a date that is beyond the period prescribed by Rule 600, provided
that he does not indicate that he approves of or accepts that delay. Colon,
87 A.3d at 361; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Pa. Super.
2004) (en banc). Where, however, the defendant agrees to a prosecution
continuance to a date that is beyond the Rule 600 time limit, the failure to
object constitutes a waiver of any Rule 600 claim for that delay. Hunt, 858
A.2d at 1241; Commonwealth v. Walls, 449 A.2d 690, 692 (Pa. Super.
1982). There is no finding here that Appellant agreed to a date beyond the
365-day limit or that the continuance necessarily sought a trial date beyond
that limit. Appellant’s counsel stated at the trial court’s hearing on the Rule
600 motion that she agreed only to a continuance until the prosecutor finished
his other trial, that the continuance did not require a trial date beyond the
Rule 600 time limit because over two weeks remained after June 25, 2019
before the 365 days expired, and that she did not agree to the August 26,
2019 date. N.T. Trial, 8/26/19, at 24-27. The trial court found that Appellant
did not specifically agree to the August 26, 2019 trial date. Trial Court
Supplemental Opinion at 12, 16.3 Accordingly, Appellant’s consent to the June
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3 The Commonwealth argues that the record demonstrates conclusively that
Appellant agreed to a trial date beyond the Rule 600 limit because when it
requested the final continuance, Appellant’s trial was scheduled to begin on
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24 continuance did not constitute a waiver of his right to assert a violation of
Rule 600.
The fact that Appellant is not barred by waiver, however, does not
resolve the issue of whether the delay resulting from the June 24 continuance
is excludable under Rule 600. A continuance caused by the prosecutor being
on trial in another case and to which the defendant does not object constitutes
excludable time under Rule 600. Commonwealth v. Stilley, 689 A.2d 242,
249-50 (Pa. Super. 1997), abrogated on other issue, Commonwealth v.
Butler, 812 A.2d 631 (Pa. 2002). The trial court found in its supplemental
opinion that Court Administration set the August 26, 2019 rescheduled trial
date and that there was no evidence that the Commonwealth requested the
selection of a date more than 365 days after the criminal complaint was filed
against Appellant. Trial Court Supplemental Opinion at 10-12. The trial court
concluded that the court’s ability to set a new date for the trial was limited by
the fact that it was to be a jury trial and that judges’ calendars are generally
scheduled at least three months in advance. Id. at 11. The trial court also
found that there was no understanding when the June 24 continuance was
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July 24, 2019, a date more than 365 days after the criminal complaint was
filed. Appellee’s Brief at 35-37. As we explained in our prior memorandum
decision, this contention is inaccurate. Contrary to the Commonwealth’s
repeated misstatements, the date that trial was scheduled to begin was June
25, 2019, less than 365 days after the criminal complaint was filed, not July
24, 2019. Pretrial Ex. 1, Secure Docket Entries at 1, 8.
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sought and agreed to by Appellant that trial could be rescheduled within the
less-than three-week period that remained within the original Rule 600 time
limit. Id. at 16. Appellant has not challenged any of these findings. Given
these findings and the very limited period of time between the grant of the
continuance and expiration of the 365-day period, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in holding that the entire delay caused by the June 24
continuance was excludable and that the August 26, 2019 trial date therefore
complied with Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Bright, 449 A.2d 596, 598-
99 & n.8 (Pa. Super. 1982); Commonwealth v. Goldwire, 2580 EDA 2018,
unpublished memorandum at 6-10 (Pa. Super. Nov. 6, 2019).4 We
accordingly affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s Rule 600 motion to
dismiss.
In the second issue that is before us, Appellant asserts that his PWID
and Criminal Use of a Communication Facility convictions must be vacated for
lack of jurisdiction because his conduct on which these charges are based
occurred solely in New Jersey. Whether the trial court has subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate a criminal charge is a question of law subject to our
plenary, de novo review. Commonwealth v. Maldonado-Vallespil, 225
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4 Unpublished decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, although not
precedential, “may be cited for their persuasive value.” Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-
(2); 210 Pa. Code § 65.37(B).
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A.3d 159, 161 (Pa. Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Seiders, 11 A.3d 495,
496-97 (Pa. Super. 2010).
The jurisdictional limits of our courts’ power to enforce Pennsylvania
criminal law are defined by Section 102 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,
which provides, in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, a
person may be convicted under the law of this Commonwealth of
an offense committed by his own conduct or the conduct of
another for which he is legally accountable if either:
(1) the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result
which is such an element occurs within this Commonwealth;
* * *
(3) conduct occurring outside this Commonwealth is sufficient
under the law of this Commonwealth to constitute a conspiracy to
commit an offense within this Commonwealth and an overt act in
furtherance of such conspiracy occurs within this Commonwealth
…
18 Pa.C.S. § 102(a)(1), (3). It is the Commonwealth’s burden to prove facts
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Maldonado-Vallespil, 225 A.3d at 166.
If there is no proof that any of the elements of the crime in question occurred
in Pennsylvania or that the requirements of another provision of Section
102(a) are satisfied, a Pennsylvania court lacks jurisdiction over the crime and
the defendant’s conviction must be vacated. Id. at 166.
The elements of the offense of PWID are prescribed by the Controlled
Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, which provides:
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the
Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
* * *
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(30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery,
or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled
substance by a person not registered under this act, or a
practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State
board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent
to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.
35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(30); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 932 A.2d 226, 231
(Pa. Super. 2007). In this case, none of Appellant’s conduct that satisfied any
of the above elements occurred in Pennsylvania. The evidence in the record
showed that Appellant possessed and delivered “Rolex” fentanyl and crack
cocaine in Trenton, New Jersey and did not show that he engaged in any
conduct in Pennsylvania on which the PWID charge was based. N.T. Trial,
8/27/19, at 159-60, 163-65, 185; Commonwealth Ex. 15; N.T. Preliminary
Hearing, 8/28/18, at 51.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to
adjudicate the PWID charge under Section 102(a)(3) of the Crimes Code
because Appellant’s delivery of drugs to Santangelo in New Jersey was part of
a conspiracy that included delivery of those drugs in Pennsylvania. This
argument fails because it is unsupported by the record. The Commonwealth
showed that Santangelo purchased the “Rolex” fentanyl and crack cocaine
from Appellant for Risko and Filderman and that Santangelo, after keeping
several bags of the “Rolex” for himself as compensation for his services, did
deliver the drugs to them in Pennsylvania. N.T. Trial, 8/27/19, at 156-65,
185-86; Commonwealth Ex. 15. The record, however, is devoid of evidence
that Santangelo shared with Appellant the fact that he intended to deliver any
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of the drugs to anyone else or that Appellant knew that drugs Santangelo
bought from him in New Jersey were for any purpose other than Santangelo’s
personal use.
Santangelo’s only testimony concerning his communication with
Appellant in the transaction in question was that he called Appellant to arrange
to buy a “bun” (10 bags of the “Rolex”) for $40 and $20 of crack cocaine. N.T.
Trial, 8/27/19, at 177, 214; Commonwealth Ex. 15. There was no testimony
or other evidence that Santangelo in his communications with Appellant
mentioned anyone else’s name or any intent to deliver the drugs to anyone
else. No other witness testified to any communication with Appellant or to
any conduct of Appellant on which the PWID charge was based. Filderman
testified that he was not a party to any conversation with Appellant concerning
the purchase of the drugs in question and did not hear Risko make any call to
Appellant. N.T. Trial, 8/26/19, at 109.5 Risko’s cell phone records introduced
at trial did not show any communication with Appellant. Defendant Ex. 1. The
Commonwealth does not claim that there was any expert testimony or other
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5 At one point in his second day of testimony, Filderman contradicted this
testimony and claimed that he was present when Risko made a call to
Appellant. N.T. Trial, 8/27/19, at 13-14. Later, however, Filderman admitted
that the testimony that he witnessed such a call was inaccurate and that he
could not say that he was present when any call to Appellant occurred. Id. at
33-34. Filderman also testified that he went with Santangelo and bought non-
“Rolex” heroin from Appellant in Trenton, New Jersey later, after the “Rolex”
purchase, but testified that he did not give any of that heroin to Risko. Id. at
19-20, 59-60, 68-69, 83-84.
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evidence that the quantity of drugs that Santangelo purchased from Appellant
was of a magnitude that showed an intent to distribute or resell the drugs to
others.
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s contentions, Commonwealth v.
Dennis, 618 A.2d 972 (Pa. Super. 1992) does not support jurisdiction here.
In Dennis, this Court held that Pennsylvania had jurisdiction to convict the
defendant of PWID even though his conduct occurred outside of Pennsylvania
because the evidence showed that his actions were part of a scheme to
distribute drugs in Pennsylvania. 618 A.2d at 973-74, 976-77. See also
Commonwealth v. Peck, 242 A.3d 1274, 1281 n.2 (Pa. 2020) (holding that
Dennis was based on the fact that “[t]he defendant there was part of a
conspiracy to distribute drugs in and through Pennsylvania”). Here, there was
no evidence that Appellant was aware of, let alone agreed to, any plan to
subsequently distribute the drugs that he sold in Pennsylvania or anywhere
else. Because no element of the PWID offense in this case occurred in
Pennsylvania, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this charge and erred in
failing to dismiss the PWID charge.
The elements of the offense of Criminal Use of a Communication Facility
are: (1) that the defendant knowingly and intentionally used a communication
facility; (2) that the defendant knowingly, intentionally or recklessly facilitated
an underlying felony; and (3) that the underlying felony occurred. 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 7512(a); Commonwealth v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374, 382 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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The term “communication facility” includes both cell phones and the
communications equipment that transmit cell phone calls. 18 Pa.C.S. §
7512(c) (“the term ‘communication facility’ means a public or private
instrumentality used or useful in the transmission of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part, including, but not limited to, telephone, wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photo-optical systems or the mail”). Evidence that the
defendant discussed the sale of illegal drugs over a cell phone satisfies the
element of use of a communication facility. Moss, 852 A.2d at 382.
Santangelo communicated by cell phone in Pennsylvania with Appellant
in New Jersey concerning the purchase the “Rolex” fentanyl on March 21,
2018. N.T. Trial, 8/27/19, at 214; N.T. Trial, 8/28/19, at 156-59; N.T. Pretrial
Hearing, 4/19/19, at 8, 10. While Appellant used his telephone in New Jersey,
his interstate communication with Santangelo also necessarily utilized cell
towers or cell sites, equipment “used or useful in the transmission of … signals,
…[and] sounds,” that are in Pennsylvania. N.T. Trial, 8/28/19, at 224-31,
255. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (“Cell
phones perform their wide and growing variety of functions by connecting to
a set of radio antennas called ‘cell sites.’.. Cell phones continuously scan their
environment looking for the best signal, which generally comes from the
closest cell site.”); Commonwealth v. John, 854 A.2d 591, 594-96 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over solicitation that occurred in
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communications over the internet between defendant in Delaware and
Maryland and an individual in Pennsylvania). Appellant’s use of a
communication facility therefore occurred in both Pennsylvania and New
Jersey. Because conduct of Appellant that constituted an element of Criminal
Use of a Communication Facility occurred in Pennsylvania, trial court did not
err in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss this charge for lack of jurisdiction.
18 Pa.C.S. § 102(a)(1).6
In his application for reargument, Appellant requests that this Court
vacate his conviction and sentence for Drug Delivery Resulting in Death based
on our Supreme Court’s decision in Peck, which was issued while this matter
was on remand to the trial court for a supplemental opinion on the Rule 600
issue. Appellant argues that under Peck, the Commonwealth must prove as
an essential element of Drug Delivery Resulting in Death that the defendant
delivered the drug in violation of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
Cosmetic Act and no such violation occurs unless the defendant delivered the
drug in Pennsylvania. See 242 A.3d at 1279-1285. Appellant contends that
____________________________________________
6 Because the only delivery and intent to deliver for which the Commonwealth
proved that Appellant was criminally responsible occurred outside of
Pennsylvania, it may be that the Commonwealth failed to prove the essential
element of PWID that the possession or delivery must occur in Pennsylvania
and failed to prove the element of an underlying felony with respect to the
Criminal Use of a Communication Facility charge. See Peck, 242 A.3d at
1281-85. This deficiency, however, is an issue of sufficiency of the evidence,
not jurisdiction, id. at 1275, 1282-85, and, as discussed below, was not raised
by Appellant in this appeal until after our initial decision in this matter.
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because Appellant delivered the drugs in question in New Jersey, the
Commonwealth failed to prove this essential element.
Rule 2543 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that
“reargument will be allowed only when there are compelling reasons therefor.”
Pa.R.A.P. 2543. Compelling reasons that support reargument include the
following:
(1) Where the decision is by a panel of the court and it appears
that the decision may be inconsistent with a decision of a different
panel of the same court on the same subject.
(2) Where the court has overlooked or misapprehended a fact of
record material to the outcome of the case.
(3) Where the court has overlooked or misapprehended (as by
misquotation of text or misstatement of result) a controlling or
directly relevant authority.
(4) Where a controlling or directly relevant authority relied upon
by the court has been expressly reversed, modified, overruled or
otherwise materially affected during the pendency of the matter
sub judice, and no notice thereof was given to the court pursuant
to Rule 2501 (b) (change in status of authorities).
Note to Pa.R.A.P. 2543. The raising of a new issue that was not previously
argued in the appeal and has been waived is not a ground on which
reargumant may be granted. Commonwealth v. VanDivner, 983 A.2d
1199, 1201 (Pa. 2009).
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Peck is a new precedent handed
down after our prior decision, it is neither a change in any authority relied on
by this Court nor a ruling on any issue that this Court addressed in that
decision. The issues decided in Peck were whether violation of the Controlled
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Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act is an essential element of Drug
Delivery Resulting in Death and whether the evidence was insufficient to prove
that element where the drug delivery occurred outside of Pennsylvania. 242
A.3d at 1278-1285.
Appellant did challenge his Drug Delivery Resulting in Death conviction
on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The sole contention that Appellant
raised as to sufficiency of the evidence, however, was that the evidence was
insufficient to show that drugs that he supplied caused Risko’s death.
Appellant’s Brief at 27-29. Prior to this Court’s November 10, 2020 decision,
Appellant did not assert any argument in this appeal that the Commonwealth
failed to show a violation of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
Cosmetic Act or that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove any
elements of any of the crimes for which he was convicted other than causation.
A claim that the evidence is insufficient to prove a particular element of
an offense is waived if it is not raised by the appellant in his brief.
Commonwealth v. Russell, 209 A.3d 419, 429-30 (Pa. Super. 2019);
Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 262 (Pa. Super. 2009). Because
the issue on which Appellant seeks reargument is a sufficiency of the evidence
issue that he did not raise in his brief in this appeal, it is not a ground on which
reargument may be granted. VanDivner, 983 A.2d at 1201.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss, that it lacked jurisdiction over
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the PWID charge against Appellant, and that it had jurisdiction over the
Criminal Use of a Communication Facility charge, and we deny Appellant’s
application for reargument. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s PWID
conviction, but otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment of sentence.
Because the trial court imposed no further penalty for the PWID conviction,
this has no effect on the trial court’s sentencing scheme and no resentencing
is therefore required.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Application for
Reargument denied. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/12/21
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