Com. v. Crews, L. ( 2021 )

J-S08045-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LATEE TAQUAN CREWS :
:
Appellant : No. 1112 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 7, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-54-CR-0001244-2019
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 13, 2021
Appellant, Latee Taquan Crews, appeals the judgment of sentence
following his conviction for Prohibited Offensive Weapon, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908,
based on evidence that he was found in possession of a blackjack, an
enumerated weapon under the statute. He asserts that the Commonwealth
presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion sets forth the pertinent facts
and procedural history, as follows:
[On June 24, 2020, the trial court conducted a one-day jury trial
on a single count under Section 908(a)(1). Specifically,]
[t]estimony was presented at trial by the Commonwealth from
Frederick J. Lahovski, Jr., who had been a McAdoo Borough Police
officer on June 4, 2019. According to Officer Lahovski he saw
Defendant at Fegley's Mini Mart in the center of the Borough late
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S08045-21
in the evening on June 4, 2019 and searched him [incident to
arrest. The officer’s affidavit of probable cause explained he had
learned earlier in the day that there was an outstanding arrest
warrant for Defendant [hereinafter, “Appellant”], but at trial,
evidence was not elicited as to the events precipitating the
search.] The Officer found a blackjack [tucked inside Appellant’s
waistband, hidden underneath his clothing, and he seized it.] [H]e
described [a blackjack] as having been standard issue for police
in the past, [but, while] "still allowed", [is] "pretty obsolete as far
as law enforcement." Trial Transcript, pg. 16 (June 24, 2020).
The physical characteristics of the blackjack were described by the
officer and it was exhibited to each juror.
Appellant testified that he was walking to Fegley's Mini Mart on
the evening of June 4, 2019 with [his little sister] when [she] saw
an item on the ground between the sidewalk and the bricks that
separated the parking lot. Appellant claimed that he picked the
item up and thought that it might have been the property of a
person by the name of Tweety, who[, he claimed, lived behind
Fegley’s and] had a "strange way of using certain things to make
certain things work." N.T. at 26.
According to Appellant, Tweety was a handyman [and] auto
mechanic who worked "on the side", and Appellant thought he
would go to see Tweety since he might have used the item [as a
tool] to hit the starter of a car. N.T. at 27-28. Appellant testified
that he put the item into his pants because, although he had on
jeans and a coat, he had a lot of items in his pockets. Appellant
also presented testimony from his wife, Marlene Peters, who
stated that she had never previously seen the item identified as
the blackjack that Officer Lahovski had found in Appellant’s pants
on June 4, 2019.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/20, at 2-3.
On June 24, 2020, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Appellant
was subsequently sentenced to 12 to 24 months’ incarceration, to be followed
by two years’ probation. On August 24, 2020, Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal.
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On September 18, 2020, Appellant filed a court-ordered concise
statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
in which he raised issues challenging the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence. The court responded with a Rule 1925(a) opinion recommending
that this Court reject Appellant’s sufficiency claim as meritless and his weight
claim as waived for Appellant’s failure to raise it first with the trial court at
either the sentencing hearing or in a post-sentence motion.
In Appellant’s brief filed with this Court, he presents only one question
issue, which is directed to the sufficiency of the evidence:
[Was] the evidence [ ] insufficient to support the jury verdict in
that the Commonwealth did not present testimony as to
ownership of the weapon by Appellant while Appellant and his
witnessed [sic] testified that he had not owner [sic] or possessed
the weapon, as well as the fact that item in question involved an
antiquated article, and same was testified as an item used for auto
repair.
Appellant’s brief, at 4.
We review Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under
the following standard:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-
finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder[,] unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
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Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 867-68 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(internal citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth presented undisputed
evidence that Appellant had hidden on his person a blackjack, which is an
enumerated, per se offensive weapon under Section 908. Section 908
proscribes the possession of prohibited offensive weapons, as set forth in
pertinent part:
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a misdemeanor of the
first degree if, except as authorized by law, he makes repairs,
sells, or otherwise deals in, uses, or possesses any offensive
weapon.
(b) Exceptions.--
(1) It is a defense under this section for the defendant to prove
by a preponderance of evidence that he possessed or dealt with
the weapon solely as a curio or in a dramatic performance, or that,
with the exception of a bomb, grenade or incendiary device, he
complied with the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. § 5801 et
seq.), or that he possessed it briefly in consequence of having
found it or taken it from an aggressor, or under circumstances
similarly negativing any intent or likelihood that the weapon would
be used unlawfully.
...
(3) This section shall not apply to any person who makes, repairs,
sells or otherwise deals in, uses or possesses any firearm for
purposes not prohibited by the laws of this Commonwealth.
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(c) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following words and
phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
...
“Offensive weapons.” Any bomb, grenade, machine gun, sawed-
off shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches, firearm specially
made or specially adapted for concealment or silent discharge,
any blackjack, sandbag, metal knuckles, dagger, knife, razor or
cutting instrument, the blade of which is exposed in an automatic
way by switch, push-button, spring mechanism, or otherwise, any
stun gun, stun baton, taser or other electronic or electric weapon
or other implement for the infliction of serious bodily injury which
serves no common lawful purpose.
(d) Exemptions.--The use and possession of blackjacks by the
following persons in the course of their duties are exempt from
this section:
(1) Police officers, as defined by and who meet the requirements
of the act of June 18, 1974 (P.L. 359, No. 120), referred to as the
Municipal Police Education and Training Law.1
(2) Police officers of first class cities who have successfully
completed training which is substantially equivalent to the
program under the Municipal Police Education and Training Law.
(3) Pennsylvania State Police officers.
(4) Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs of the various counties who have
satisfactorily met the requirements of the Municipal Police
Education and Training Law.
(5) Police officers employed by the Commonwealth who have
satisfactorily met the requirements of the Municipal Police
Education and Training Law.
(6) Deputy sheriffs with adequate training as determined by the
Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency.
(7) Liquor Control Board agents who have satisfactorily met the
requirements of the Municipal Police Education and Training Law.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908 (emphasis added).
Appellant's sufficiency argument focuses on witness testimonies that,
he maintains, provided him with a defense under Section 908(b)(1). The
testimonies included his own, wherein he claimed he had found the blackjack
lying on the ground minutes before he encountered Officer Lahovski and
intended to take it to a nearby handyman/mechanic who, he believed, may
have used it as a tool and lost it, and that of his wife, who stated she had
never seen the blackjack. Intertwined with this argument is Appellant’s claim
that the Commonwealth presented no evidence that he owned the blackjack.
It was for the jury, as finder of fact, to assess whether by a
preponderance of the evidence Appellant’s defense cast doubt upon the
Commonwealth’s case, and the jury clearly refused to accept that his
possession of the blackjack was a transitory consequence of having found it
on the day of his arrest. We discern no reason to disturb this determination.
Relatedly, ownership is not an element of the offense, as the statute
proscribes “possession” of a prohibited offensive weapon.
Appellant’s remaining sufficiency argument centers upon the
testimony of Officer Lahovski that a blackjack has become relatively obsolete
as a law enforcement implement. This point, too, fails to implicate an element
of the offense. Section 908 lists “blackjacks” as per se offensive weapons
prohibited under the statute. Whether police departments elect to equip
officers with blackjacks as standard issue, which they are permitted to do
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under the “Exemptions” section of the statute, is irrelevant to the blackjack
prohibition applicable to private citizens like Appellant.
Finally, to the extent Appellant represents Officer Lahovski’s testimony
as having suggested that the statutory categorization of blackjacks as
offensive weapons is likewise obsolete, he distorts the record. The officer
made no such suggestion, and even if he had, it obviously would have had no
bearing on either the statute’s continued proscription of private blackjack
possession or it’s applicability to the present case. Accordingly, we find
Appellant’s sufficiency challenge devoid of merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/13/2021
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