Com. v. Whitehead, M. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S09036-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    :
    MICHAEL WHITEHEAD                         :
    :
    Appellant              :   No. 254 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 13, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0005247-2012
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                           FILED APRIL 13, 2021
    Michael Whitehead (“Whitehead”) appeals from the Order dismissing his
    Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).
    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    This Court previously summarized the factual history of this case as
    follows:
    On March 7, 2012, at 1:20 p[.]m[.], Philadelphia Police
    Officer Daniel McMonagle [(“Officer McMonagle”)] was on routine
    patrol in a marked patrol car when he observed [Whitehead]
    operating a 2002 silver Chevy Impala on Upsal Street[,] and
    approaching the intersection of Belfield Street. The traffic light at
    the intersection was a “steady red” when [Whitehead] made a
    right turn onto Belfield Street without stopping or using a right
    turn signal. Officer McMonagle stopped [Whitehead’s] vehicle
    because [Whitehead] committed a motor vehicle violation.
    As Officer McMonagle approached the driver’s side of the
    vehicle, he observed [Whitehead] reaching across the vehicle[,]
    as well as leaning forward and reaching toward his sides.
    According to Officer McMonagle, [Whitehead] was “reaching
    J-S09036-21
    around quite a bit” and was “reaching forward, down, and to his
    side all the way across the vehicle.” Officer McMonagle described
    [Whitehead’s] movements as being “more than just going to the
    glove box to get paperwork.”          Based upon the observed
    movements, Officer McMonagle “thought that [Whitehead] was
    possibly trying to conceal a weapon.”
    Officer McMonagle ordered [Whitehead] to stop reaching
    and to provide his driver’s license, registration, and proof of
    insurance. In response, [Whitehead] stuttered and was fumbling
    with paperwork. He produced a photocopy of a driver’s license
    with the name Percey Whitehead[,] and the photo [was] blacked
    out. [Whitehead] stated that he was the owner of the vehicle and
    that he was driving home. [Whitehead] appeared to be nervous
    and “slightly standoffish.”
    During his interaction with [Whitehead], Officer McMonagle
    stood behind the door jam[b] of the vehicle and leaned forward
    toward the vehicle. He specifically testified that the door to the
    vehicle was closed and he “wasn’t in the vehicle.” From that
    viewpoint, he observed a clear, small Ziploc baggy—that he
    immediately recognized as narcotics packaging—on the floor mat
    at [Whitehead’s] feet. Based upon his observation of the narcotics
    packaging, Officer McMonagle removed [Whitehead] from his car
    and frisked him for weapons. [Officer McMonagle’s] partner
    detained [Whitehead] at the back of [the] vehicle; [Whitehead]
    was not handcuffed at this time.
    Officer McMonagle went to the driver’s side of the vehicle to
    retrieve the narcotics packaging. As he was recovering the
    narcotics packaging, he observed that the plastic portion of the
    gear shifter was popped up and was cockeyed, or sitting off []
    center by a quarter to one[-]half of an inch. He thought that the
    dislodged gear shifter was unusual[,] so he used his flashlight to
    look into the gear shifter. When he did so, he immediately
    recognized—based upon his familiarity with firearms—that there
    was a firearm inside the gear shifter from his observation of the
    top of the barrel or the slide of the firearm. He did not touch or
    otherwise manipulate the gear shifter in order to make his
    observations. Officer McMonagle did not recover the firearm, but
    rather requested a search warrant for the vehicle. The narcotics
    packaging and firearm were both recovered and placed on
    property receipts; the firearm was recovered pursuant to a search
    warrant obtained by Detective Linda Hughes.
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    Officer McMonagle regard[ed] the area where [Whitehead]
    was stopped as an “extremely high[-]crime area known for a lot
    of shootings.” In his career as a police officer, Officer McMonagle
    has made more than 100 arrests for illegal narcotics. He is
    familiar with the type of narcotics packaging that he observed in
    [Whitehead’s] vehicle. He also has extensive familiarity with
    firearms.     During cross-examination, [Whitehead’s] counsel
    repeatedly asked Officer McMonagle whether he “leaned in the
    vehicle” or “leaned in[to] the vehicle.” [Whitehead’s] counsel also
    showed the officer an arrest memo, which states that, “Police
    leaned into the vehicle to get a better view.” In response, Officer
    McMonagle testified that he “leaned forward up to the vehicle,”
    “leaned forward to the driver,” and “was not in the vehicle” prior
    to observing the narcotics packaging. He further testified that he
    could see the narcotics packaging from where he was standing
    and without leaning into the car. Officer McMonagle testified that
    his partner, … prepared the arrest memo based, in part, on
    information received from Officer McMonagle, but that it was not
    a verbatim account of his statements to [his partner].
    Commonwealth        v.   Whitehead,      
    125 A.3d 452
       (Pa.   Super.   2015)
    (unpublished memorandum at 1-3).
    On June 6, 2012, Whitehead filed a Motion to suppress the evidence
    seized from his vehicle, asserting, inter alia, that the first, warrantless, search
    of his vehicle was unconstitutional, because it did not meet the “plain view”
    exception to the warrant requirement, and that the subsequent search warrant
    was “issued unlawfully” and “executed unlawfully.” On December 7, 2012,
    the suppression court conducted a suppression hearing, and denied
    Whitehead’s Motion.
    On March 27, 2014, after a bench trial, Whitehead was found guilty of
    possession of a controlled substance, possession of firearm prohibited,
    firearms not to be carried without a license, and carrying firearms on public
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    streets in Philadelphia.1 The trial court subsequently sentenced Whitehead to
    an aggregate prison term of four to eight years.
    On July 17, 2015, this Court affirmed Whitehead’s judgment of
    sentence. See Whitehead, 
    125 A.3d 452
     (unpublished memorandum).
    On September 18, 2015, Whitehead filed a timely, pro se, PCRA Petition.
    On January 11, 2017, Whitehead filed a counseled Amended PCRA Petition,
    alleging, inter alia, that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
    counsel by failing to inform Whitehead of this Court’s decision, and thus
    depriving Whitehead of seeking allocator with the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court.    On November 17, 2017, the PCRA court reinstated Whitehead’s
    appellate rights, nunc pro tunc. Whitehead subsequently filed a Petition for
    allowance of appeal, nunc pro tunc, with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
    which was denied on May 8, 2018. See Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 
    185 A.3d 280
     (Pa. 2018).
    On June 7, 2018, Whitehead filed the instant, pro se, PCRA Petition. The
    PCRA court appointed counsel, and, on January 11, 2019, PCRA counsel filed
    an Amended PCRA Petition. In the Amended Petition, Whitehead alleged that
    Whitehead’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
    ____________________________________________
    1See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1),
    6108.
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    to file a “Franks”2 motion challenging the veracity of Officer McMonagle’s
    statements at the suppression hearing.
    On October 4, 2019, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of
    Intent to Dismiss Whitehead’s Petition without a hearing. On December 13,
    2019, the PCRA court dismissed Whitehead’s PCRA Petition.
    Whitehead filed a timely Notice of Appeal3 and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.
    Whitehead now presents the following claim for our review:
    Did the PCRA court err by dismissing the [PCRA] [P]etition without
    an evidentiary hearing[,] as there was a material issue of fact as
    to whether [] Officer McMonagle actually saw a gun in the gear-
    shift-box of [Whitehead]’s car[,] as that fact was in an [A]ffidavit
    of probable [sic] to search the car which lead [sic] to the gun’s
    recovery?
    Brief for Appellant at 2 (quotation marks omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    2In Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
     (1978), the United States Supreme
    Court held that,
    [w]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing
    that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with
    reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the
    warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary
    to the findings of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires
    that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.
    Franks, 
    438 U.S. at 154
    .
    3 Because the 30th day following the imposition of sentence was Sunday,
    January 12, 2019, Whitehead’s Notice of Appeal was timely filed. See 1
    Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (providing that “[w]henever the last day of any such period
    shall fall on Saturday or Sunday … such day shall be omitted from the
    computation.”).
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    We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in
    the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
    This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
    evidence of the record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling
    if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.
    Commonwealth v. Ford, 
    44 A.3d 1190
    , 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
    omitted).
    Whitehead claims that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his PCRA
    Petition without an evidentiary hearing because his trial counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance by failing to file and litigate a “Franks” motion. Brief
    for Appellant at 5. Whitehead argues that Officer McMonagle did not truly see
    a firearm in the gear-shift-box, because if he had, he would have recovered
    the gun during his initial vehicle search instead of waiting to secure a search
    warrant. Id. at 5-7. Further, Whitehead asserts that his trial counsel should
    have challenged Officer McMonagle’s observations by entering photographs of
    the gear shifter into evidence. Id.
    Counsel is presumed to be effective, and “the burden of demonstrating
    ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.”   Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    10 A.3d 1276
    , 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    To satisfy this burden, an appellant must plead and prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that [] (1) his underlying claim is
    of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by
    counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate
    his interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness there is a
    reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
    proceeding would have been different. Failure to satisfy any prong
    of the test will result in rejection of the appellant’s ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim.
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    Commonwealth v. Holt, 
    175 A.3d 1014
    , 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal
    citations omitted).
    Generally, “[t]he failure to file a suppression motion under some
    circumstances may be evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
    Commonwealth v. Metzger, 
    441 A.2d 1225
    , 1228 (Pa. 1981). “However,
    if the grounds underpinning that motion are without merit, counsel will not be
    deemed ineffective for failing to so move.”      
    Id.
       “[T]he defendant must
    establish that there was no reasonable basis for not pursuing the suppression
    claim and that if the evidence had been suppressed, there is a reasonable
    probability the verdict would have been more favorable.” Commonwealth
    v. Watley, 
    153 A.3d 1034
    , 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
    Whitehead has failed to develop this claim for our review. Whitehead’s
    appellate brief contains only boilerplate citations of this Court’s standard of
    review. Indeed, Whitehead’s brief is devoid of any citations to the record or
    legal precedent supporting his position.    See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing
    that an appellant’s argument shall include “such discussion and citation of
    authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); Commonwealth v. Paddy, 
    14 A.3d 431
    , 443 (Pa. 2011) (providing that “boilerplate allegations and bald
    assertions … cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel was
    ineffective.”); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    985 A.2d 915
    , 924 (Pa.
    2009) (stating that “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of
    a claim with citation to relevant authority[,] or fails to develop the issue in
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    any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).
    Accordingly, Whitehead’s claim is waived.
    Even if Whitehead had preserved this claim for our review, the PCRA
    court addressed it as follows:
    Here, [Whitehead]’s claim … is without merit because police
    had a sufficient legal basis to conduct a limited search of the
    vehicle’s passenger compartment. At the suppression hearing,
    Officer McMonagle testified that [Whitehead]’s vehicle was
    stopped in a high[-]crime area. Once stopped, Officer McMonagle
    observed [Whitehead] making excessive movements inside the
    vehicle, “more than just going to the glove box to get paperwork.”
    Officer McMonagle further observed that [Whitehead] appeared
    nervous and provided Officer McMonagle with an altered driver’s
    license.
    [Whitehead]’s claim that trial counsel acted without a
    reasonable basis by failing to introduce photos of the interior of
    the vehicle in support of [a] “Franks” motion to impeach the
    veracity of the facts supporting the search warrant [also fails].
    Officer McMonagle testified that while he stood outside [of] the
    vehicle, he looked inside and observed a small, clear plastic
    baggie consistent with narcotics packaging on the floor
    mat at [Whitehead]’s feet. Officer McMonagle’s observation of
    the narcotics packing was proper under the plain view doctrine.
    During the suppression hearing, [Whitehead]’s trial counsel
    argued that Officer McMonagle was impeached by statements in
    the arrest memo prepared by another officer that stated “police
    leaned into the vehicle to get a better view.” Officer McMonagle
    did not adopt the statements in the arrest memo. He testified
    that the arrest memo was a summary of his statements and not a
    verbatim transcription. When Officer McMonagle went to retrieve
    the narcotics packaging, he had a clear, close view of an off-
    centered, unusual and “popped-up” gear box. He then used his
    flashlight to look into the gear shifter, and immediately recognized
    the top of a gun barrel—or slide—of a firearm. The suppression
    court determined that Officer McMonagle testified credibly. The
    photos attached to [Whitehead]’s Amended [PCRA]
    [P]etition show a gear shifter with the plastic portion
    missing, which is consistent with Officer[] McMonagle’s
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    testimony. [Whitehead]’s claim is meritless because Officer
    McMonagle was conducting a constitutionally permissible search
    at the time he observed the popped[-]up gear shifter.
    Accordingly, trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not pursuing
    a meritless “Franks” motion.
    Finally, [Whitehead] cannot establish actual prejudice from
    trial counsel’s failure to litigate a “Franks” motion given the
    overwhelming evidence that supports the suppression court’s
    denial [of] his [M]otion to suppress including, (1) police initially
    had reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited warrantless search
    of defendant’s vehicle for weapons[;] (2) the arrest memo that
    supported the search warrant was not a verbatim recitation of
    Officer McMonagle’s observations[;] (3) Officer McMonagle’s
    observation of the firearm was made while legally recovering the
    narcotics packaging from the floor mat of the vehicle[;] and (4)
    the suppression court credited the observations of Officer
    McMonagle based upon the suppression court’s observation of his
    demeanor, manner of testifying[,] and corroborating evidence.
    Even if [Whitehead’s] trial counsel introduced photos of the
    interior of [Whitehead]’s vehicle, the outcome of the suppression
    hearing would not have changed. Indeed, police waited to
    obtain a search warrant before retrieving the firearm even
    though they could have conducted a warrantless search of
    [Whitehead]’s vehicle. For all of these reasons, [Whitehead]’s
    claim of ineffectiveness is without merit.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 6/12/20, at 6-8 (emphasis added; some citations and
    capitalization omitted).
    Our review of the record confirms the PCRA court’s analysis and
    conclusion.   See N.T. (Suppression Hearing), 12/7/12, at 19-20 (wherein
    Officer McMonagle testified that the gear shifter was altered and he could see
    the barrel of a firearm hidden underneath).     Moreover, as the PCRA court
    concluded, the photographs attached to Whitehead’s Amended PCRA Petition
    and appellate brief depict an altered gear-shifter, which supports Officer
    McMonagle’s testimony at the suppression hearing. See PCRA Court Opinion,
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    6/12/20, at 7-8; see also Amended PCRA Petition, 1/11/19, at 5-7
    (unnumbered); Brief for Appellant, Appendix C.     Thus, Whitehead’s trial
    counsel had a reasonable basis in not filing a Franks motion; Whitehead has
    not demonstrated that he suffered prejudice as a result; and his claim is
    without arguable merit. See Holt, supra; see also Watley, supra.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/13/2021
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 254 EDA 2020

Filed Date: 4/13/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/13/2021