Com. v. Miranda, L. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LUIS MIRANDA :
:
Appellant : No. 1614 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0000949-2021
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2023
Luis Miranda (Appellant) appeals the judgment of sentence entered
following his conviction at a bench trial of persons not to possess a firearm,
carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on a public street
in Philadelphia.1 We affirm.
Appellant challenges the denial of his pre-trial suppression motion.
Relevant to this appeal, the trial court summarized the evidence presented at
the suppression hearing:
The Commonwealth offered credible evidence of probable
cause at the suppression hearing on March 22, 2022, through
testimony from Police Officer Mouzon. Mouzon is a 25[-]year
veteran of the Philadelphia Police Department. He has been
involved in hundreds of narcotics investigations. N.T. at 26.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 6106, 6108.
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The Philadelphia Police Narcotics Field Unit to which Mouzon
was assigned made five controlled buys of crack cocaine from a
drug house at 2116 East Cambria Street, Philadelphia, in January
and February 2020. Id. at 12-[1]5, 17-[1]8, 20. Mouzon and his
fellow Narcotics Field Unit officers used a confidential informant
(CI) to make the buys. Id. at 14, 16-[1]7, 19[.] They searched
the CI before each controlled purchase, gave the CI pre-recorded
buy money, watched the CI approach, enter, and leave the drug
house, searched the CI upon his/her return, and recovered from
the CI crack from the drug house. Id.
Officer Mouzon served as “the eyes” on the buys. Id. at 26.
On two of the five buys, Mouzon saw [Appellant] arrive at the drug
house minutes after the CI knocked on the door. Id. at 15-[1]8.
On both days, February 4th and 7th, the CI purchased two tubes
of crack cocaine and left the house minutes after [Appellant] had
appeared. Id.
[Appellant] did not, at first, appear at the drug house during
the … controlled buys on February 12th. Id. at 23-[2]4. The
police executed a search warrant as soon as the CI emerged from
the house that day after buying more crack. Id. [Appellant],
however, appeared on the 2100 block of Cambria Street a few
doors away from the drug house shortly after the search began.
Id. at 24-[2]5, 38. The police noticed him in the street and
arrested him. [Appellant] volunteered he had a firearm. Id. at
25. The police recovered a black .32 caliber Colt handgun with
ivory grips from the front of his pants. Id.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/22, at 2-3.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the firearms offenses and
related charges. On July 21, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the
firearm recovered by police, asserting:
4. … [L]aw enforcement stopped, frisked and/or searched
[Appellant] on the public streets and as a result recovered
contraband which – on information and belief – the
Commonwealth intends to offer against [Appellant] at trial.
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5. It is most respectfully submitted that law enforcement lacked
reasonable suspicion/probable cause to stop, frisk, seize, search
and or detain [Appellant].
Suppression Motion, 7/21/21, ¶¶ 4-5. On March 22, 2022, following a
hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion. N.T., 3/22/22,
at 48-51.
A bench trial immediately followed, based on the suppression hearing
record and several evidentiary stipulations.2 Id. at 56-59. The trial court
thereafter found Appellant guilty of all charges. Id. at 59-60. On June 17,
2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 1½ - 3 years’
incarceration, followed by two years of reporting probation. Appellant timely
filed a notice of appeal. Appellant and the trial court have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue:
Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
suppress under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution[,] where Philadelphia Police arrested
and searched [Appellant] in the absence of probable cause to
believe that he was or had been involved in criminal activity?
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
Appellant argues he was arrested and searched based on “supposition
and conjecture.” Id. at 14. Appellant argues the evidence established only
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2The parties stipulated that the firearm was tested and found to be operable.
Id. at 55. The parties additionally stipulated to Appellant’s status as a person
not to possess firearms under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
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his mere presence at the house; “there was nothing to connect [him] to the
drug sales or illegal activity aside from his presence at the property.” Id. at
15.
Appellant argues law enforcement “did not have the requisite probable
cause to believe that [he] was committing (or had committed) a crime.” Id.
at 14. Appellant asserts:
From the testimony adduced during the suppression hearing,
[Appellant] arrived at and was admitted to a house where a
confidential informant purchased narcotics on two separate days.
No evidence was offered to explain why [Appellant] was at the
house and what if anything [he] did while inside….
Id. at 14-15. Appellant claims the only witness “did not testify he was able
to see what occurred inside of the house, and did not know what conversations
the CI had while inside of the house.” Id. at 15. Appellant maintains there
was no probable cause he was involved in illegal activity. Id. He argues, “To
conclude that he was involved in the drug transactions at issue was pure
speculation on the part of the suppression court.” Id.
Our review of the denial of a suppression motion
is limited to determining whether the factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression
court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the
record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo.
Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
evidence elicited at trial.
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Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations
omitted).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. Int. of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 416 (Pa. 2021). The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
paper, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularity describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Similarly, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizure, and no
warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall
issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by
the affiant.
PA. Const. art. I, § 8.
Our Supreme Court explained:
“Probable cause” is a practical, non-technical concept.
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 574 Pa. 261, 830 A.2d 554, 560
(Pa. 2003). To establish probable cause, the Commonwealth must
demonstrate that a search meets the requirements of the totality-
of-the-circumstances” test. Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa.
188, 988 A.2d 649, 655-56 (Pa. 2010)….
Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 40 (Pa. 2021).
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“[P]olice have probable cause where the facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person
of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
being committed.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 594 Pa.
319, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Rogers, 578 Pa. 127, 849 A.2d 1185, 1192 (Pa. 2004)).
Whether police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search also is evaluated under a traditional totality-of-the-
circumstances test. Id.Id. This Court further expounded:
Probable cause does not involve certainties, but rather the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men act. It is only the probability and not a prima
facie showing of criminal activity that is a standard of probable
cause. To this point on the quanta of evidence necessary to
establish probable cause, … finely tuned standards such as proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence,
useful in formal trials, have no place in the probable-cause
decision.
Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to
establish probable cause for an arrest. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 631 A.2d
1356, 1359 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Reece, 263 A.2d 463,
466 (Pa. 1970). However,
[w]hen executing a warrant to search a residence, the police have
authority to detain individuals who happen to be present.
However, in order to search or arrest them, the police must
establish independent probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 631 A.2d 1356, 1359 (Pa. Super. 1993).
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Viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence in
established more than Appellant’s “mere presence” at the scene. See
Wilson, 361 A.2d at 1359. As the trial court explained:
Here, police had probable cause to arrest and search [Appellant].
The totality of the circumstances indicated a probability that
[Appellant] had illegally distributed drugs. Over five days of
investigation, police saw [Appellant] at 2116 Cambria Street — a
known drug house — three times. N.T.[, 3/22/22,] at 16-20. On
two of those days, [Appellant] arrived at the drug house minutes
after a confidential informant knocked on the door to buy drugs.
Id. at 16-8. The CI left with crack cocaine a few minutes after
[Appellant] arrived. Id. [Appellant’s] arrival within minutes of
the informant, and the informant’s departure with crack cocaine a
few minutes later, support a reasonable inference that [Appellant]
supplied — or at least controlled — the crack cocaine. [Appellant]
appeared at the drug house for a third time while the police were
executing a search warrant immediately following the last
controlled buy. The police saw [Appellant] standing in the street
outside the house as the police processed evidence. [Appellant’s]
appearance immediately after the final drug purchase while the
police executed a search warrant supports an inference that he
controlled the drugs.
The police had ample probable cause to arrest [Appellant]. The
recovery of the firearm from his person incident to his arrest did
not violate either the federal or state constitution.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/22, at 4. Discerning no error or abuse of discretion,
we adopt the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis and conclusion.3 See id.
Appellant’s claim merits no relief. See Singleton, 169 A.3d at 82.
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3 As the trial court observed to Appellant at the suppression hearing:
I find that it’s either you’re the unluckiest person in the world to
just show up at a drug house at precisely the wrong time twice,
or there is something there. And I think that your arrival at the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/29/2023
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drug house so shortly after the [CI] arrived twice is more than
coincidence, and it supports a reasonable inference by the police
officer that you were engaged in a drug trafficking conspiracy with
[co-defendant]….
N.T., 3/22/22, at 49-50.
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