Com. v. Garcia, J. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S40007-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JEFFREY REYNOLDO GARCIA,
    Appellant               No. 1522 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 7, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000703-2017
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JEFFREY REYNOLDO GARCIA,
    Appellant               No. 1523 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 7, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000651-2017
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MCLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                   FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019
    Appellant, Jeffrey Reynoldo Garcia, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence of an aggregate term of 4½ to 15 years’ incarceration, imposed after
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S40007-19
    he pled guilty in two separate cases1 to possessing an instrument of crime
    (PIC), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a); providing false identification to law enforcement,
    35 Pa.C.S. § 4914(a); forgery, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4104(a)(2); and identity theft, 18
    Pa.C.S. § 4120(a). On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s calculation
    of his prior record score (PRS) in fashioning his sentence. After careful review,
    we affirm.
    The facts of Appellant’s underlying offenses are not pertinent to the
    issue he raises on appeal.        On May 17, 2018, Appellant pled guilty to the
    above-stated offenses. After a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report was
    prepared, the court calculated Appellant’s PRS as being a seven. That PRS
    included four points for a 1st degree felony robbery that Appellant had
    committed as a juvenile in New York. On August 7, 2018, the court sentenced
    Appellant in the present case to the aggregate term set forth above. Appellant
    filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied on September 27,
    2018.2
    ____________________________________________
    1 This Court sua sponte consolidated Appellant’s appeals in his two cases by
    order entered November 15, 2018.
    2 Despite that Appellant filed a post-sentence motion in both of his two cases,
    the court’s order denying the motion was only docketed and included in the
    certified record of the case docketed at CP-61-CR-0000703-2017 (“703-
    2017”).
    -2-
    J-S40007-19
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he also timely complied
    with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 3 The court
    subsequently filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion. Herein, Appellant states one issue
    for our review: “Did the … trial court err in calculating [Appellant’s PRS,]
    thereby resulting in a sentence outside the range of the standard guidelines?”
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
    We begin by recognizing that Appellant’s claim constitutes a challenge
    to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.         See Commonwealth v.
    Spenny, 
    128 A.3d 234
    , 241 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
    [S]uch challenges are not subject to our review as a matter of
    right. “An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this
    Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of
    a sentence,” by (1) preserving the issue in the court below, (2)
    filing a timely notice of appeal, (3) including a statement pursuant
    to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (“Rule 2119(f) statement”) in his brief on
    appeal, and (4) raising a substantial question for our review.
    Commonwealth v. Tejada, 
    107 A.3d 788
    , 797 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (citation omitted).
    
    Id.
    Here, Appellant preserved his PRS issue before the trial court in a post-
    sentence motion, he filed a timely notice of appeal, and he includes a Rule
    2119(f) statement in his brief. Additionally, his issue constitutes a substantial
    ____________________________________________
    3 Appellant only filed a Rule 1925(b) statement in the case docketed at CP-
    61-CR-0000651-2017 (“651-2017”), in which he pled guilty to PIC and
    providing false identification to law enforcement. In the case at 703-2017,
    the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion concluding that Appellant had waived
    his issues by not filing a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Trial Court Opinion in
    703-2017, 1/29/19, at 1. Thus, we only review Appellant’s challenge to the
    calculation of his PRS in regard to the sentence imposed in 651-2017.
    -3-
    J-S40007-19
    question   for   our   review.      See    
    id.
       (citation    omitted);   see     also
    Commonwealth v. Provenzano, 
    50 A.3d 148
    , 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Janda, 
    14 A.3d 147
    , 165 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Thus, we
    will address his sentencing claim herein, applying the following standard of
    review:
    [T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to
    affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of
    discretion. [A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
    judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
    discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised
    was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
    bias, or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court recently
    offered: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because
    an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
    requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
    prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
    erroneous.
    Provenzano, 50 A.3d at 154 (quoting Commonwealth v. Walls, 
    926 A.2d 957
    , 961 (Pa. 2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
    Appellant contends that the trial court erred by factoring his New York
    robbery offense into the calculation of his PRS.         He explains that he was
    adjudicated and sentenced for that crime as a ‘youthful offender,’ which does
    not constitute a conviction under New York law.              See 
    N.Y. Crim. Pro. § 720.35
    (1) (“A youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction
    for a crime or any other offense….”). Appellant concedes that “Pennsylvania
    law allows for juvenile adjudications to be counted toward the [PRS]….”
    Appellant’s Brief at 14. He insists, however, that “the New York law applicable
    to [y]outhful [o]ffenders is not equivalent nor is it similar to a Pennsylvania
    -4-
    J-S40007-19
    juvenile adjudication.” 
    Id.
     In support, Appellant claims only that, “[a]s a
    youthful offender, [he] is not deemed to have been convicted of the charge[,]”
    and that “Pennsylvania law differs.” 
    Id.
     (citing N.Y. Crim.P. 720.35(1)).
    Appellant’s    argument      is   unconvincing.   “It   is   axiomatic    that
    adjudications of juvenile delinquency are not criminal convictions.”            In re
    C.A.G., 
    89 A.3d 704
    , 713 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). As Appellant
    does not identify any way in which his New York adjudication as a youthful
    offender differs from a juvenile adjudication of delinquency in Pennsylvania,
    he has not convinced us that the trial court erred in calculating his PRS. 4
    Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.5
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    4 We note that Appellant suggests, in a single sentence, that his New York
    adjudication should not have been counted in his PRS because the court failed
    to make an “express finding … that the adjudication was for a felony or one of
    the Misdemeanor 1 offenses.” Appellant’s Brief at 15 (quoting 204 Pa.Code §
    303.7(a)(4)). However, Appellant did not raise this issue at sentencing, or in
    his post-sentence motion; thus, it is waived. See Commonwealth v.
    Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[I]ssues challenging the
    discretionary aspects of a sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion
    or by presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings.
    Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is
    waived.”) (citation omitted).
    5  To the extent that the trial court rejected Appellant’s PRS argument on
    slightly different grounds, we observe that this Court is permitted to affirm
    the trial court “on any valid basis, as long as the court came to the correct
    result….” Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 
    889 A.2d 563
    , 577 n.4 (Pa. Super.
    2005) (citations omitted).
    -5-
    J-S40007-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/24/2019
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1522 WDA 2018

Filed Date: 9/24/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024