In the Int. of: S.C., Appeal of: J.L.C. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.L.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 2373 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0003393-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.M.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.L.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 2374 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000600-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: G.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.L.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 2375 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000848-2021
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IN THE INTEREST OF: G.A.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.L.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 2376 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000450-2022
BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 5, 2023
J.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the August 18, 2022 decrees involuntarily
terminating her parental rights to her sons, S.C., a/k/a S.M.C. (born in
December 2017), and G.C., a/k/a G.A.C. (born in August 2021) (collectively,
“Children”).1 Mother also appeals from the August 18, 2022 orders changing
Children’s permanency goals from reunification to adoption. In addition,
Mother’s appointed counsel, James W. Martin, Esquire (“Counsel”), has filed a
petition to withdraw and accompanying brief, pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 By separate decrees the same date, the trial court terminated the parental
rights to the putative father of S.C., D.C., the putative father of G.C., A.Y.,
and any unknown fathers to both Children. Neither D.C., A.Y., nor any
unknown father filed notices of appeal, and none have participated in this
appeal.
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A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful review, we grant Counsel’s petition to
withdraw, affirm the termination decrees, and dismiss the appeals from the
goal change orders as moot.
The following relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed.2 The
Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) first became involved
with this family in 2008 and then again in 2013 and 2014, with respect to her
four children, none of whom are subjects of these appeals. DHS Petition,
8/5/2021, at ¶ a, e, m. On March 17, 2017, the trial court terminated Mother’s
parental rights to three of those children.3 Id. at ¶ ff.
Thereafter, in December 2017, DHS received a general protective
services (“GPS”) report alleging that Mother gave birth to S.C. Id. at ¶ gg.
The report further alleged that Mother did not appear prepared to care for
S.C., and she had a history of using phencyclidine (PCP) and marijuana. Id.On December 27, 2017, DHS obtained an order of protective custody (“OPC”)
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2 During the August 18, 2022 termination hearing, counsel for Mother
stipulated to the facts as alleged in the petitions filed by DHS. Notes of
testimony, 8/18/22 at 30-35.
3In July 2016, one of Mother’s children died of natural causes. DHS Petition,
8/5/2021, at ¶ dd.
On June 25, 2018, this Court affirmed the decrees involuntarily terminating
Mother’s parental rights to two of the children. In the Interest of A.M.,
2018 WL 1979123 (Pa.Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum). This Court
vacated the order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the
third child. Id.-3-
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for S.C. and placed him in the kinship care of his maternal great-cousin, J.S.,
where he currently remains.
At a shelter care hearing on December 28, 2017, the trial court lifted
the OPC, ordered legal custody to DHS, and ordered the temporary
commitment to stand. Subsequently, on January 10, 2018, after a hearing,
the trial court adjudicated S.C. dependent. On April 4, 2018, the trial court
issued an order finding that aggravated circumstances exist as to Mother due
to the termination of her parental rights to other children.
Nevertheless, the court maintained a permanency plan of reunification.
In furtherance of this goal, Mother was required to comply with the following
objectives: (1) comply with mental health services, sign releases, and comply
with all recommendations; (2) attend visitation; (3) report for random drug
screens; (4) attend family school; (5) maintain stable employment; (6) obtain
appropriate housing; (7) complete a parenting capacity evaluation and comply
with the recommendations; and (8) attend Achieving Reunification Center
(“ARC”) for anger management, housing, and employment services. DHS
petition, 8/5/2021, at ¶ pp; DHS petition, 7/25/2022, at ¶ q; Notes of
testimony, 8/18/22 at 26-27.
In August 2021, DHS received another GPS report alleging that Mother
gave birth to G.C.; she was homeless; she did not have infant supplies; and
S.C. and one other child were in placement. On August 16, 2021, DHS
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obtained an OPC for G.C., and placed him in the kinship care of a family friend,
S.M., where he currently remains.
At a shelter care hearing on August 18, 2021, the trial court lifted the
OPC, ordered legal custody to DHS, and ordered the temporary commitment
to stand. On September 21, 2021, after a hearing, the trial court adjudicated
G.C. dependent. On the same date, the trial court issued an order finding that
aggravated circumstances exist as to Mother due to the termination of her
parental rights to other children. The trial court established a permanency
plan of reunification and provided Mother with largely the same objectives.
The record does not contain significant detail, but provides that over the
course of the dependencies, Mother failed to consistently attend mental health
services. In February 2022, JFK Behavioral Health discharged Mother due to
lack of attendance. Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 20. Mother has also failed
to consistently visit with and care for Children. DHS petition, 8/5/2021, ¶ nnn;
DHS petition, 7/25/2022 ¶ u; Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 38-40, 44-47.
Mother also failed to obtain suitable housing and maintain stable employment.
8/5/2021, ¶ nnn; DHS petition, 7/25/2022 ¶ u. Furthermore, as best we can
discern from the record, Mother did not complete her ARC objective. DHS
petition, 8/5/2021, ¶ uu.
On August 5, 2021, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination
of Mother’s parental rights to S.C. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b), along with a petition to change S.C.’s permanency goal from
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reunification to adoption.4 Thereafter, on July 25, 2022, DHS filed a petition
for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to G.C., then almost
a year old, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), along
with a petition to change G.C.’s permanency goal from reunification to
adoption.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 18, 2022, at
which time Children were ages four and one, respectively. Children were
represented by Faryl Bernstein, Esquire, as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and
legal counsel.5
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4 S.C.’s case was continued numerous times for various reasons
including (1) the assigned judge was not available, (2) to obtain a contested
time slot, (3) Mother’s counsel was recently appointed, and (4) for reasons
undisclosed in the record.
5 Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to verify sua sponte that the
court appointed counsel to represent a child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2313(a), and if counsel served in a dual role, that the court determined
before appointment that there was no conflict between a child’s best and legal
interests. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020). If a
child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the outcome of
the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best interests,
and a child’s subsection 2313(a) right to counsel is satisfied by an attorney-
GAL who represents the attorney-GAL’s view of the child’s best interests. See
In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-1093 (Pa. 2018).
Regarding S.C., the trial court confirmed on the record that there was no
conflict between his best and legal interests. Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at
8-10. Concerning G.C., inasmuch as he was merely one year old at the time
of the hearing, he was unable to express a preference. Accordingly, we
conclude that Children’s statutory right to counsel was satisfied by Attorney
Bernstein.
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DHS presented the testimony of Michaela Finley, outpatient therapist at
JFK Behavioral Health, and Jacqueline Tillman, Community Umbrella Agency
(“CUA”) case manager. Mother was represented by Counsel and did not
appear. Counsel stated on the record to the trial court that Mother texted him
immediately prior to the hearing that “her health is more important than this
hearing.” Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 11-12.
By decrees dated and entered August 18, 2022, the trial court
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In addition, by orders dated
and entered the same date, the court changed Children’s permanency goals
to adoption. Mother, through Counsel, filed timely notices of appeal and
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The trial
court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 25, 2022.
Counsel filed his petition to withdraw and Anders brief in this Court on
December 1, 2022, which we address first. This Court has explained:
When counsel files an Anders brief, this Court may
not review the merits without first addressing
counsel’s request to withdraw. [T]his Court [has]
extended the Anders principles to appeals involving
the termination of parental rights. . . .
In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations omitted).
To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that,
after making a conscientious examination of the
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record, counsel has determined that the appeal would
be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief
to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that
he or she has the right to retain private counsel or
raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems
worthy of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citation omitted).
In Santiago, our Supreme Court held:
[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-
appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel
must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural
history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts
of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on
point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal
is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.3d at 361.
Additionally, this Court has stated that,
[P]ursuant to Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873
A.2d 748 (Pa.Super. 2005) and its progeny, [c]ounsel
also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his
client[, along with] a letter that advises the client of
his right to: (1) retain new counsel to pursue the
appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any
points that the appellant deems worthy of the
court[‘]s attention in addition to the points raised by
counsel in the Anders brief.
In re X.J., 105 A.3d at 4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform
the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court
has held counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter
sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Millisock, 873 A.2d
at 752. Finally, “[o]nce counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is
then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the court’s proceedings and
render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly
frivolous.” In re X.J., 105 A.3d at 4 (citation omitted).
Instantly, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw. Counsel also filed an
Anders brief which includes a summary of the procedural history and facts of
the case with citations to the record, issues that could arguably support
Mother’s appeal, and Counsel’s assessment regarding why the appeal is
frivolous with citations to relevant legal authority. Finally, Counsel attached
to his petition the letter that he sent to Mother advising of her right to retain
new counsel or proceed pro se to pursue her appeal. Accordingly, Counsel
complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.
We next “conduct a review of the record to ascertain if on its face, there
are non-frivolous issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or
misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa.Super.
2018) (en banc).
We note the standard of review in termination of parental rights cases:
[A]ppellate courts . . . accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
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supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the
trial court made an error of law or abused its
discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be
reversed merely because the record would support a
different result. We have previously emphasized our
deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 941-942 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of
parental rights and requires a bifurcated analysis. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and
welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs
and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status
of the emotional bond between parent and child, with
close attention paid to the effect on the child of
permanently severing any such bond.
In re J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 942 (citation omitted). In order to affirm a
termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to
any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).
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In the matter at bar, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Here, we analyze
the court’s termination decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration
to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall
not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental
factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any
petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent
to remedy the conditions described therein which are
first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we have indicated:
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In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements
must be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and
(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting In re
Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015)) (internal
citation omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of
Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
As such, “A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of
uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may
properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re S.C., supra at 1105
(citation omitted).
A careful review of the record supports termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2). Primarily, Children have never resided with Mother and she has
never provided for their needs. Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 24-26, 42-46.
Ms. Tillman, CUA case manager, testified that Mother actually delayed various,
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unspecified services and assessments for S.C. because she refused to sign
consents. Id. at 42.
In 2018, during S.C.’s first year of life, Ms. Tillman testified that Mother
regularly attended supervised visits with S.C. Id. at 39. In December 2018,
the trial court granted Mother twice weekly unsupervised community visits
with him. Id. at 40-42; Order, 12/5/2018. Mother continued to visit S.C.
regularly during 2019. Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 39. However, Ms.
Tillman testified that “[Mother’s] visits [] became an issue because [she]
started not attending or being late to visits.” Id. at 42. On January 6, 2020,
the trial court returned Mother to supervised visits. Id. at 43; Order,
1/6/2020.
Thereafter, Mother gave birth to G.C. in August 2021. Ms. Tillman
testified that “[d]uring the visits, [Mother] just has him in his stroller, and
she’s just sitting there looking at him. She’s not holding him.” Notes of
testimony, 8/18/22 at 46. According to DHS’s petition, Mother last saw G.C.
in March 2022. DHS Petition, 7/25/2022, at ¶ s. In addition, with respect to
Mother’s visits with S.C., Ms. Tillman stated that “[h]e plays with [Mother].
[Mother] does not have -- [Mother] is not nurturing. She sits there. She
argues with him. She yells at him.” Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 39. It is
unclear from the record when Mother last saw S.C. After returning to
supervised visits, Mother never again achieved unsupervised community
visits. Id. at 43.
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Ms. Finley, outpatient therapist at JFK Behavioral Health, testified that
Mother participated in therapy from December 2019 to December 10, 2021,
for a total of twenty-six sessions over two years. Id. at 20. She further
testified that Mother was discharged on February 4, 2022, due to Mother’s
lack of attendance. Id.
Finally, despite notice, Mother did not appear for the termination of
parental rights hearing. Id. at 10-12. Mother contacted her counsel right
before the hearing to tell him that she was not attending, stating her “health
is more important than this hearing.” Id. at 11-12. Accordingly, Counsel
could not state Mother’s position on the record. Id. at 30.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in concluding that Mother’s conduct warrants termination pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2). The record demonstrates that Mother’s repeated and
continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal to comply with her permanency goals,
resolve her mental health issues, and provide any type of love or care to
Children, has caused Children to be without essential parental care, control,
or subsistence necessary for their physical and mental well-being. Further,
the conditions and cause of Mother’s incapacity, neglect, or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied.
We turn now to Section 2511(b), which requires the court to “give
primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and
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welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such
as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d
251, 267 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court
has made clear that Section 2511(b) requires the trial court to consider the
nature and status of bond between a parent and child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d
481, 484-485 (Pa. 1993). It is reasonable to infer that no bond exists when
there is no evidence suggesting the existence of one. See In re K.Z.S., 946
A.2d 753, 762–763 (Pa.Super. 2008). To the extent there is a bond, the trial
court must examine whether termination of parental rights will destroy a
“necessary and beneficial relationship,” thereby causing a child to suffer
“extreme emotional consequences.” In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 484-485.
“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect
of the [s]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one
of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the
best interest of the child.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa.Super. 2014).
“In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as
the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent.” Id. In determining needs and welfare, the court may properly
consider the effect of the parent’s conduct upon the child and consider
“whether a parent is capable of providing for a child’s safety and security or
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whether such needs can be better met by terminating a parent’s parental
rights.” L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 (Pa.Super. 2021).
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates
that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children
are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing the
bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the
ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court
observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an
obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . .
the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
As related supra, Mother has never cared for Children. Ms. Tillman
testified that Mother does not have a parental bond with Children. Regarding
S.C., she testified that Mother merely “argues with him” and “yells at him.”
Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 39. Ms. Tillman further testified that when
Mother visited G.C., she did not hold him and merely looked at him as he sat
in the stroller. Id. at 46. Ms. Tillman testified that Children would not suffer
irreparable harm if Mother’s rights are terminated, and it is in their best
interest to terminate her rights. Id. at 39-41, 46.
Ms. Tillman also stated that Children are bonded to their respective
kinship foster parents, with whom Children have resided from the outset of
their cases and are pre-adoptive resources. Id. at 37-48. Ms. Tillman testified
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that S.C.’s kinship foster parent, J.S., provides for his daily needs and attends
his doctors’ appointments. Id. at 40. Ms. Tillman further testified that S.C.
requires unspecified services because he “has some delays.” Id. She stated
that J.S. ensures that S.C. gets the services he needs and has been teaching
him sign language. Id. at 40-41. Regarding G.C., Ms. Tillman testified that
G.C. considers his kinship foster parent, S.M., to be his “mom.” Id. at 45.
Ms. Tillman stated that S.M. provides for G.C.’s daily needs, attends his
doctors’ appointments, and brings him to play dates. Id. Finally, Ms. Tillman
testified that the kinship foster parents know each other, and CUA can
organize sibling visits in the community to encourage a sibling relationship
between Children. Id. at 48. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
terminating Mother’s parental rights because termination was consistent with
Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant
to Section 2511(b).
Our independent review of the certified record reveals no preserved
non-frivolous issue that would arguably support these appeals from the
decrees.
We decline to review Mother’s appeals from the orders changing
Children’s permanency goals in light of our disposition with respect to Mother’s
appeals from the termination decrees. By affirming the termination decrees,
Mother’s appeals from the goal change orders are moot. See In the Interest
of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is
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moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any
legal force or effect.”) (citation omitted).
Therefore, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation,
affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), and dismiss as moot the appeals from the
orders changing Children’s permanency goals to adoption.
Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed. Appeals from
goal change orders dismissed as moot.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/05/2023
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