Com. v. Winn, F. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S09040-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    FRANK WINN,
    Appellant                 No. 417 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order January 4, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-51-CR-0511411-2004
    CP-51-CR-0600011-2004
    CP-51-CR-0904141-2004
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                             FILED MARCH 28, 2017
    Appellant, Frank Winn, appeals from the January 4, 2016 order
    dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, as untimely. We affirm.
    We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our
    review of the certified record and the trial court’s September 21, 2016
    opinion. On May 16, 2005, Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted murder,
    robbery, person not to possess a firearm, and criminal conspiracy.1 On the
    same date, the trial court sentenced Appellant to not less than fifteen nor
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501, 901, 3701(a), 6105(a), and 903, respectively.
    J-S09040-17
    more than thirty years of incarceration. (See Trial Court Opinion, 9/21/16,
    at 1).
    On April 24, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The court
    appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on November 10,
    2014. On November 19, 2015, the court gave notice of its intent to dismiss
    the petition because it was untimely filed and did not invoke an exception to
    the PCRA timeliness requirements. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). On January 4,
    2016, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. This timely
    appeal followed.2
    Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: “May an illegal sentence
    be challenged at any time under the PCRA?” (Appellant’s Brief, at 7).
    We begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s instant PCRA
    petition.
    Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness
    of the underlying petition.      Thus, we must first determine
    whether the instant PCRA petition was timely filed.            The
    timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and
    jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order
    to reach the merits of the petition. The question of whether a
    petition is timely raises a question of law. Where the petitioner
    raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and
    our scope of review plenary.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Pursuant to the court’s order, Appellant filed a statement of errors
    complained of on appeal on February 17, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    The court entered its opinion on September 21, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a).
    -2-
    J-S09040-17
    A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the
    date the judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the
    conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
    Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
    review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). . . .
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    141 A.3d 491
    , 499 (Pa. Super. 2016) (case
    citations and some quotation marks omitted).
    Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 15,
    2005, thirty days after the trial court imposed sentence, and Appellant did
    not appeal to this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
    Appellant therefore had until June 15, 2006, to file a timely PCRA petition.
    See Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). He filed the instant petition on April 24, 2014.
    Thus, it is patently untimely.
    An untimely PCRA petition may be considered if one of the following
    three exceptions applies:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
    of interference by government officials with the presentation of
    the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
    unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained
    by the exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to apply
    retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii); see Brown, supra at 500.                   If an
    exception applies, a petitioner must file the PCRA petition “within [sixty]
    -3-
    J-S09040-17
    days of the date the claim could have been presented.”          42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9545(b)(2).     “[Our Supreme] Court has repeatedly stated it is the
    appellant’s burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions
    applies.”   Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 
    953 A.2d 1248
    , 1253 (Pa. 2008)
    (citation omitted).
    Here, Appellant has failed to invoke the applicability of any of the
    timeliness exceptions to the PCRA time bar. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-
    12). He attempts to argue that the petition is timely because a challenge to
    the legality of a “sentence can be raised at any time[.]”          (Id. at 10).
    However, “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within
    the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the
    exceptions thereto.”    Commonwealth v. Fahy, 
    737 A.2d 214
    , 223 (Pa.
    1999) (citation omitted). Accordingly, because Appellant failed to meet his
    burden to prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies, we conclude
    that his petition is untimely and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
    his claim. See Hawkins, supra at 1253; (Trial Ct. Op., at 4). Thus, we
    affirm the order of the PCRA court.
    Order affirmed.
    -4-
    J-S09040-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/28/2017
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Winn, F. No. 417 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 3/28/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024