Kepner, Jr., F. v. Kepner, T. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
FRANKLIN E. KEPNER, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
TINE KEPNER A/K/A ANNE KEPNER
Appellee No. 603 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree March 17, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 603 MDA 2014
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JUNE 03, 2015
Appellant, Franklin E. Kepner, Jr., (Husband) appeals from the March
17, 2014 final decree in divorce from his bonds of matrimony with Appellee,
Tine Kepner (Wife). Husband raises various challenges to the trial court’s
economic awards for equitable distribution, alimony, and alimony pendent
lite (APL). After careful review, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
A review of the certified record discloses the following pertinent
procedural history of this protracted divorce case. On February 22, 2008,
Husband filed a complaint in divorce including counts for no-fault divorce
and equitable distribution of marital property. Wife filed an answer and
counterclaim on March 17, 2008, including, inter alia, additional counts for
alimony, APL, costs and expenses, and counsel fees. On June 28, 2010,
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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upon agreement of the parties, the trial court appointed Michael Dennehy,
Esquire as special master (the master) to address the divorce, equitable
distribution, alimony, APL, counsel fees, and costs and expenses issues.
Hearings before the master were conducted on December 14, 2010 and
February 3, 2011. On November 10, 2011, the master filed a notice of filing
a master’s report. Wife filed exceptions on November 30, 2011, and
Husband filed exceptions on December 22, 2011.1
Specifically, Husband took exception to the master’s report for its
exclusion of Wife’s personal injury award from marital property in light of the
new Supreme Court case of Focht v. Focht, 32 A.3d 668 (Pa. 2011)
(holding that settlement proceeds received post-separation by spouse in
personal injury tort action, were marital property because cause of action
accrued prior to separation, overruling Pudlish v. Pudlish, 796 A.2d 346(Pa. Super. 2002)). Husband also took exception to the master’s report for
its failure to provide a final date for payment of APL, for awarding Wife
alimony and counsel fees in light of her substantial non-marital assets, and
for its alleged failure to properly account for certain rental value and asset
dissipation in determining the equitable distribution award. See Husband’s
Exceptions to the Report and Recommendations of Special Master Filed on
November 10, 2011, 12/22/11, at ¶¶ 1-7.
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1
On February 27, 2012, Husband filed a petition to bifurcate the divorce
counts from the economic counts, to which Wife filed an answer opposing.
The trial court never acted on the petition.
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On October 25, 2012, the trial court issued an order remanding the
matter to the master for recalculation of equitable distribution, alimony, and
APL in light of Focht. Trial Court Order, 10/25/12, at 1 ¶¶ 1-4. The trial
court also sustained in part Husband’s exception to the master’s
consideration of the factors pertaining to potential offsets and/or credits
relative to the sale value of the marital residence, directing the master to
consider its November 17, 2011 order on the subject. Id. at 5. The trial
court overruled Husband’s remaining exceptions. Id. at 4.
On September 9, 2013, the master filed a notice of filing master’s
report on remand.2 Husband filed exceptions to the master’s report on
remand on September 26, 2013. Therein, Husband alleged various errors
connected with the master’s new APL recommendation. Husband’s
Exceptions to the Master’s Report on Remand, 9/26/13, at ¶ 7. Wife filed
exceptions to the report on September 30, 2013. Thereafter, Husband filed
“counter exceptions” on October 22, 2013, reiterating, inter alia, most of his
exceptions to the master’s original report. Husband’s Counter Exceptions to
the Master’s Report on Remand, 10/22/13, at ¶¶ 1-9. The trial court denied
all exceptions of both parties by order filed March 7, 2014. On March 13,
2014, Wife filed a praecipe for entry of a final divorce decree. The decree
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2
The master’s reports and recommendations of November 10, 2011 and
September 9, 2013, do not contain numbered pages. For purposes of
reference, we have assigned sequential pagination, beginning after the
respective title pages.
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was filed on March 17, 2014. Husband filed a timely notice of appeal on
April 4, 2014.3
Subsequent to the filing of the instant appeal, Wife filed a motion to
quash, asserting the order appealed from was not a final order. On June 20,
2014, this Court issued a per curiam order denying Wife’s motion without
prejudice to present the issue before this Panel. Both parties have
addressed the issue in their appellate briefs.
On appeal, Husband raises the following issues for our review.
I. Whether this appeal should be quashed in light
of the [trial] court’s order of March 5, 2014[,] which
stated that the report and recommendation of the
[m]aster are adopted as a final order of court[, i.e.,
“]the parties are advised of their right to file a
motion for reconsideration pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
1930.2 (b) or a notice of appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 903[”?]
II. Whether the [trial] court erred in awarding
[Wife] alimony in light of her substantial non-marital
assets, in light of the ages of the parties and in light
of the fact that the [m]aster’s recommendation of
November 2011 recommended alimony of one
year[,] which was to terminate in November 2012[?]
III. Whether the [trial] court erred in substantially
increasing []Husband’s [APL] obligation retroactive
to December 9, 2010 in light of Wife’s substantial
assets, in light of the parties ages and in light of the
fact that Husband has been paying [APL] for a period
of in excess of five years[?]
IV. Whether the [trial] court erred in awarding
[Wife] payment toward her counsel fees given the
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3
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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fact that she has substantial assets and given the
fact that []Husband has been paying [APL] for in
excess of five years together with medical insurance
and given the further fact that the master originally
ordered that [APL] was to terminate in February
2012[?]
V. Whether the [trial] court erred in regard to its
order concerning non[-]marital property because its
subsequent order contradicts an order of the [trial]
court after [m]aster’s hearing on or about November
17, 2011[?]
VI. Whether the [trial] court erred in not
permitting a hearing and/or a conference on the
petition to modify [APL]/support[?]
VII. Whether the [trial] court erred in not allowing
the []Husband to take discovery including the
deposition of the []Wife[?]
Husband’s Brief at 2-3.
We initially address Wife’s motion to quash. In his notice of appeal,
Husband purports to appeal from the trial court’s March 7, 2014 order
denying the parties’ exceptions to the amended master’s report and
finalizing the trial court’s disposition of the parties’ economic claims. Wife
notes as follows.
An appeal to the economic claims raised in a divorce
action can only be filed to the divorce decree, which
is the final order. In the instant matter, Husband
filed an appeal to the order disposing of the
exceptions filed to the divorce master’s report. For
that reason alone, the instant appeal should be
quashed.
Wife’s Brief at 8. We agree that the March 7, 2014 order is not a final order.
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Unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule, an
appeal will lie only from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341.
A final order has been defined as one which ends the
litigation or disposes of the entire case. [Id.]
Therefore, a pre-divorce decree distributing marital
property is interlocutory. It cannot be reviewed until
it has been rendered final by the entry of a decree in
divorce.
Wilson v. Wilson, 828 A.2d 376, 378 (Pa. Super. 2003) (some citations
omitted). However, Wife filed a praecipe for the entry of a final divorce
decree on March 13, 2014, and the trial court entered the final decree on
March 17, 2014. Thus, Husband’s April 4, 2014 notice of appeal was filed
after the entry of a final decree but merely referenced the wrong order.
Accordingly, this court’s jurisdiction is not implicated, and we will correct the
caption to reflect an appeal from the final decree. See also Pa.R.A.P.
905(a)(5) (providing, “[a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as
filed after such entry and on the day thereof). For these reasons, we decline
to quash the appeal.
Husband’s second issue asserts it was error for the trial court to award
any alimony to Wife under the circumstances of the case. Husband’s Brief at
16. Instantly, the trial court adopted the master’s recommendation that
Wife receive $1,500.00 per month in alimony from Husband for 12 months.4
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4
The suggested alimony award in the master’s amended recommendations
remained unchanged from the suggested award contained in his November
10, 2011 recommendations.
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See Master’s Recommendations to the Court, 11/10/11, at 1, ¶ 2; Master’s
Amended Recommendations to the Court, 9/9/13, 1, ¶ 2. The trial court
rejected Husband’s exceptions to this award. Trial Court Order, 10/25/12,
at 4.
Our review of a challenge to a trial court’s alimony award is subject to
the following standard.
The role of an appellate court in reviewing alimony
orders is limited; we review only to determine
whether there has been an error of law or abuse of
discretion by the trial court. Absent an abuse of
discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the
support order, this Court will not interfere with the
broad discretion afforded the trial court.
Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
“Proper exercise of discretion requires the [trial] court to apply the Divorce
Code in a compassionate and reasonable manner so that the overriding goal
of effectuating justice between the parties may be achieved.” Edelstein v.
Edelstein, 582 A.2d 1074, 1078 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citation omitted),
appeal denied, 596 A.2d 157 (Pa. 1991).
We previously have explained that ‘the purpose of
alimony is not to reward one party and to punish the
other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable
needs of the person who is unable to support himself
or herself through appropriate employment, are
met.’ Alimony ‘is based upon reasonable needs in
accordance with the lifestyle and standard of living
established by the parties during the marriage, as
well as the payor’s ability to pay.’ Moreover,
‘alimony following a divorce is a secondary remedy
and is available only where economic justice and the
reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved
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by way of an equitable distribution award and
development of an appropriate employable skill.’
Gates v. Gates, 933 A.2d 102, 106 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted,
emphasis in original), quoting Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200
(Pa. Super. 2004). “The Divorce Code dictates that in determining the
nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, the court must
consider all relevant factors, including those statutorily prescribed for at 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3701, Alimony, (b) Relevant Factors (1)-(17).” Smith, supra(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he totality of the assets
and income actually available to the dependent spouse must be fairly
evaluated, regardless of the source from which they derive.” Nemoto v.
Nemoto, 620 A.2d 1216, 1221 n. 6 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted).
Husband identifies “[two] key factors which [he] believes the [m]aster
and the [trial] [c]ourt ignored when setting out the [r]ecommendation and
ultimate decision [] concerning alimony[.]” Husband’s Brief at 16.
Specifically, Husband references Wife’s non-marital assets, including a
$770,000.00 inheritance, and his payment of APL since February 26, 2008.
Id. at 16, 17-18.
Contrary to Husband’s assertion that these factors were “ignored,” the
master in fact considered these facts and weighed them against other
circumstances in this case to reach his recommendation of the alimony
award. The master explained his recommendation as follows.
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Considering the various factors under § 3701 of the
Divorce Code pertaining to alimony, particularly the
substantial earnings and earnings capacity of
Husband compared to that of Wife, the [m]aster
believes an award of alimony is appropriate.
Tempering the award of alimony, however, is the
substantial separate estate of Wife, Wife’s choice not
to seek to improve her income position since
separation, and the period of substantial spousal
support paid by Husband. The [m]aster specifically
finds that the large separate estate of Wife
significantly reduces her need for alimony to meet
her reasonable needs.
Master’s Report to the Court, 11/10/11, at 20, ¶ N.
Husband’s true complaint seems to be how the master and the trial
court gauged Wife’s non-marital property and her extended receipt of APL as
factors “tempering” her need for alimony, against the parties disparate
earning potential as justifying an alimony award. Husband’s Brief at 18-19.
Our review of the record indicates the master’s finding, as accepted by the
trial court, are amply supported. Husband’s annual income in excess of
$200,000.00 compared to Wife’s annual income of $11,000.00 was certainly
one such consideration. Master’s Report to the Court, 11/10/11, at 5-6, ¶¶
7, 10. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
including an alimony award to Wife as part of its overall resolution of
achieving economic justice between Husband and Wife. See Edelstein,
supra.
In his third issue, Husband faults the trial court for imposing a
retroactive increase in his APL obligation to Wife. Husband’s Brief at 19.
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Husband advances the same arguments he made relative to the trial court’s
alimony award discussed above, i.e., that due to Wife’s substantial non-
marital property and her past receipt of APL, no need for the additional APL
was shown. Id. at 20. Husband also claims the trial court erred because
the master’s recommendation after remand left him in a financially worse
position than before the remand. Id. at 21.
The [m]aster awarded Husband []$37,920.00[] from
the personal injury eye proceeds but then increased
his [APL] payments []$43,266,63[]. Thus, Husband
received marital property under the dictates … in
Focht[] in the amount of []$37,920.00[]. Husband
then lost []$43,266.63[] under the [m]aster’s
calculations cornering [sic] [APL]. This was clearly in
error.
Id.
Our review of this issue is guided by the following.
We review APL awards under an abuse of discretion
standard. APL is “an order for temporary support
granted to a spouse during the pendency of a
divorce or annulment proceeding.” 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3103. APL is designed to help the dependent
spouse maintain the standard of living enjoyed while
living with the independent spouse. Also, and
perhaps more importantly, APL is based on the need
of one party to have equal financial resources to
pursue a divorce proceeding when, in theory, the
other party has major assets which are the financial
sinews of domestic warfare. … [T]he purpose of APL
is to provide the dependent spouse equal standing
during the course of the divorce proceeding…. APL
focuses on the ability of the individual who receives
the APL during the course of the litigation to defend
her/himself, and the only issue is whether the
amount is reasonable for the purpose, which turns
on the economic resources available to the spouse.
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Additionally, [i]n ruling on a claim for [APL], the
court should consider the following factors: the
ability of the other party to pay; the separate estate
and income of the petitioning party; and the
character, situation, and surroundings of the parties.
An award of [APL] may be modified or vacated by a
change in circumstances…. It is the burden of the
party seeking to modify an order of support to show
by competent evidence that a change of
circumstances justifies a modification.
Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 463 (Pa. Super. 2011) (some internal
quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).
To the extent, with this issue, Husband also faults the trial court’s
division of the personal injury award as marital property, our review is
guided by the following.
Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of
a marital property distribution is whether the trial
court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the
law or failure to follow proper legal procedure. An
abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but only upon
a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court
to weigh the evidence and decide credibility and this
Court will not reverse those determinations so long
as they are supported by the evidence.
Yuhas v. Yuhas, 79 A.3d 700, 704 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (citations
omitted), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 464 (Pa. 2014). “Our scope of review
requires us to measure the circumstances of the case against the objective
of effectuating economic justice between the parties in discerning whether
the trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedure.”
Gates, supra at 105 (citation omitted). “In determining the propriety of an
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equitable distribution award, courts must consider the distribution scheme as
a whole.” Beise v. Beise, 979 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
omitted).
The weight to be given to [] statutory factors
depends on the facts of each case and is within the
court’s discretion. We will not reweigh them. We
look at the distribution as a whole, in light of a trial
court’s overall application of the factors enumerated
at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a). In addition we note, the
trial court has the authority to divide the award as
the equities presented in the particular case may
require.
Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1259-1260 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 1275 (Pa.
2007).
In its initial report and recommendations to the trial court, the master,
following then prevailing precedent, did not treat Wife’s settlement proceeds
from her personal injury claim as marital property. Master’s Report to the
Court, 11/10/11, at 14-15, ¶ J. Wife’s claim accrued during the marriage
but settlement occurred after the date of separation, and pursuant to this
Court’s decision in Pudlish, the master treated the settlement proceeds as
her non-marital property. Id. As noted, in response to the parties’
exceptions, the trial court directed the master to re-evaluate his
recommendations of alimony, APL, and equitable distribution in light of our
Supreme Court’s decision in Focht. The Court in Focht overruled Pudlish
and held that an award for personal injury, the cause of action for which
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accrues during the marriage, is marital property irrespective of when a
settlement or judgment is obtained. Focht, supra at 674.
On remand, the master noted that the settlement from Wife’s personal
injury claim for injury to her eye included $114,000.00 received by Wife and
$12,800.00 received by Husband for his loss of consortium claim. Master’s
Report to the Court on Remand, 9/9/13, at 8, ¶ H. The master recognized
that a portion of Wife’s settlement would have accounted for possible future
expenses and medical issues concerning Wife’s eye. Id. The master,
therefore, concluded a 60%/40% division of this $126,800.00 marital asset
in favor of Wife was equitable even though the remainder of the equitable
division of marital property remained 50%/50%. Id. The master also noted
that the portion of the settlement received by Wife had been considered
income to Wife for the purposes of the master’s calculations in determining
the prior APL award. Id. at 6, ¶ F. Therefore, the master recalculated the
parties’ income relative to the APL guidelines at Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(a)
PART IV. Id. at 9-10, ¶ I. The master described the results of that
recalculation as follows.
This results in [Wife’s] income being reduced by
$3,377.78 per month. That decrease results in an
increase in Husband’s [APL] obligation from
$2,217.25 per month to $3,528.36 per month,
retroactive to December 9, 2010. The change of
$1,311.11 per month equates to 40% of the
decrease in the income utilized for Wife, per the
formula set forth at Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(a), Part IV.”
Id.
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Our review discloses the master and the trial court considered the
requisite statutory factors in determining the amended APL and equitable
distribution award, and we will not reweigh those factors. See Busse,
supra. We note there was nothing in the trial court’s remand order
directing the master, in applying Focht, to achieve an economically neutral
result vis-à-vis his original recommendations. See Trial Court Order,
10/25/12. The master’s consideration of Wife’s potential future medical
needs justified the percentage distribution attached to the personal injury
claim proceeds, and the master’s recalculation of the APL award with the
adjusted income figures comports with support guidelines. Accordingly, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the master’s
amended recommendations, increasing retroactively Wife’s APL award and
dividing the personal injury claim proceeds 60% to Wife and 40% to
Husband. See Gates, supra at 105.
In his fourth issue, Husband challenges the trial court’s acceptance
and adoption of the master’s recommendation directing him to pay
$7,000.00 toward Wife’s counsel fees. Husband’s Brief at 22. Husband
cursorily advances similar arguments to those he raised in his first issue
objecting to the trial court’s alimony award to Wife, i.e., that the value of
Wife’s separate property and the long period she has received APL payments
from Husband undermine the trial court’s conclusion that an award of
counsel fees is warranted. Id. at. 24. Husband also contends that Wife
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submitted evidence of past counsel fees, for which she did not seek
contribution. Id. at 23. We review this issue in accordance with the
following standard.
We will reverse a determination of counsel fees
and costs only for an abuse of discretion. The
purpose of an award of counsel fees is to promote
fair administration of justice by enabling the
dependent spouse to maintain or defend the divorce
action without being placed at a financial
disadvantage; the parties must be “on par” with one
another.
Counsel fees are awarded based on the facts of
each case after a review of all the relevant factors.
These factors include the payor’s ability to pay, the
requesting party’s financial resources, the value of
the services rendered, and the property received in
equitable distribution.
Counsel fees are awarded only upon a showing of
need. In most cases, each party’s financial
considerations will ultimately dictate whether an
award of counsel fees is appropriate. Also pertinent
to our review is that, in determining whether the
court has abused its discretion, we do not usurp the
court’s duty as fact finder.
Busse, supra at 1258 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
At the time of the final hearing date before the master, Wife had
incurred in excess of $16,000.00 in counsel fees from her current counsel,
Michael Beltrami, Esquire, from the time of his appearance in the case on
February 13, 2009. See N.T., 2/3/11, at 239, Exhibits D-15 and D-15A. In
her pretrial statement, Wife sought an award for Husband to pay Attorney
Beltrami’s counsel fees. Wife’s Pre-Trial Statement, 12/8/10, at 5. She did
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not seek Husband’s contribution for fees she incurred from prior counsel
Martin Meyer, Esquire. Id. Nevertheless, Wife testified that she had been
billed more than $40,000.00 in fees from her former counsel. Master’s
Report to the Court, 11/10/11, at 7, ¶ 17.
Husband claims it was error for the master and the trial court to
consider Attorney Meyer’s bills in awarding counsel fees. Husband’s Brief at
23. We note that the trial court only gave partial relief for Wife’s claim for
counsel fees, awarding less than half of the fee charges incurred from her
current counsel. Master’s Amended Recommendations, 9/9/13, at 2, ¶ 3.
Thus, the trial court did not direct Husband to pay Wife’s counsel fees
incurred from her original attorney. Neither was it improper for the trial
court to consider the bills from Wife’s former counsel as part of its review of
“each party’s financial considerations.” Busse, supra at 1258. Further, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its overall assessment of
the relevant factors in this case, and we decline to reweigh those factors in
isolation as urged by Husband. See id. at 1259-1260.
Appellant next alleges it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to adopt and incorporate the master’s findings on remand relative to the
status of the parties’ non-marital property. Husband’s Brief at 24. In its
original report to the trial court, the master found that various items of
Husband’s non-marital personal property were in Wife’s possession at the
marital residence and needed to be returned to him within 30 days.
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Master’s Recommendations, 11/10/11, at 2, ¶ e, Schedule “C”. The trial
court, in its October 25, 2012 order remanding for reconsideration and
recalculation of alimony, APL, and equitable distribution in light of Focht,
specifically stated, “THIS IS NOT AN ORDER RE-OPENING THE
RECORD.” Trial Court Order, 10/25/12, at 1, ¶ 3 (emphasis in original).
The trial court’s directive that the “evidence which had been submitted is the
evidence which will form the basis of the MASTER’s FINDINGS in his report.”
Id. (emphasis in original). The trial court also directed the master to
consider its order of November 17, 2011, in preparing his report. Id. at 5.
That order directed, inter alia, that “the Master’s Report filed November 10,
2011 shall determine the distribution of all marital property.” Trial Court
Order, 11/17/11, at 1, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
On remand, the master did not take any further testimony.
Notwithstanding the foregoing admonitions, however, the master included
the following “supplemental” finding of fact. “When [W]ife vacated the
residence, she left most of Husband’s personal property at the residence,
with the notable exception of an antique blue and white blanket ….”
Master’s Report to the Court on Remand, 9/9/13, at 2, ¶ 32.
We conclude this finding is clearly without support in the record and
contradicts the trial court’s directions on remand. Accordingly, we agree
with Husband that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting this
finding. Therefore, to the extent the trial court’s March 7, 2014 order can be
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construed as adopting a finding of fact that the parties’ non-marital property
has been returned or is in the possession of the appropriate party, the same
is hereby reversed as not being supported by any record evidence. See
Yuhas, supra. Any dispute between the parties relative to compliance with
the November 10, 2011 master’s recommendation as adopted by the trial
court’s November 17, 2011 and October 25, 2012 orders, relative to the
disposition of the parties’ non-marital property, is the proper subject of an
enforcement action upon full development of a record.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts adoption of the master’s
finding on remand relative to the parties’ compliance with the proper return
of their respective non-marital property. Our reversal does not affect the
overall scheme of the trial court’s resolution of the economic issues, so no
remand to the trial court is required.
In Husband’s final two issues, he faults the trial court for not
conducting a hearing on his petition for modification of APL and for not
permitting certain discovery. We note, however that neither of these issues
were included in Husband’s Rule 1925(b) statement or are reasonably
inferable from any of the issues included therein. See Husband’s Concise
Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 5/12/14. Hence, we deem
the issues waived. “Any issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will
be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011).
Our Supreme Court intended the holding in
[Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa.
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1998)] to operate as a bright-line rule, such that
“failure to comply with the minimal requirements of
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of
the issues raised.” Commonwealth v. Schofield,
585 Pa. 389, 888 A.2d 771, 774 (2005) (emphasis
added); see also [Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888
A.2d 775, 780 (2005)]. Given the automatic nature
of this type of waiver, we are required to address the
issue once it comes to our attention.
Greater Erie Indus. Development Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc.,
88 A.3d 222, 223-224 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).
In sum, we affirm the decree of divorce and the trial court’s resolution
of the economic issues between the parties. Specifically, we affirm the trial
court’s alimony, APL, and equitable distribution orders. However, we
reverse the trial court’s finding, contained in the master’s report on remand,
relative to status of the parties’ return of their respective non-marital
property. Any dispute arising on that issue may be addressed in an
appropriate enforcement action.
Decree affirmed in part and reversed in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/3/2015
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