Com. v. Brodie, N. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S44004-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    NOLAN NATHANIEL BRODIE, JR.                :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 718 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 23, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001744-2018
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    NOLAN NATHANIEL BRODIE                     :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 719 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 23, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001497-2018
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                            FILED MARCH 30, 2023
    Nolan Nathaniel Brodie appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the judgment of
    sentence entered following his convictions, at two trial court dockets, of
    dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities, criminal use of a communication
    facility, possession of a controlled substance (THC), possession of drug
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S44004-22
    paraphernalia, and possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal
    use.1 On appeal, Brodie raises suppression claims relative to the warrantless
    search of his vehicle and the validity of search warrants obtained for his car
    and cell phones. Brodie also challenges the admission of text messages from
    his phones on the basis that they were not properly authenticated. We
    conclude Brodie’s claims do not merit relief and therefore affirm.
    On September 11, 2018, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Eric
    Dreisbach was on routine patrol in Lebanon County when he observed a black
    Ford Taurus with heavily tinted windows and significant damage to the hood.
    Trooper Dreisbach followed the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. When
    Trooper Dreisbach contacted Brodie, he noticed the odor of marijuana. Brodie
    indicated that he had smoked marijuana in the vehicle the previous day. Based
    on the odor of marijuana, Trooper Dreisbach asked Brodie to exit the vehicle.
    Trooper Dreisbach then performed a pat-down search of Brodie and
    found a significant sum of U.S. currency. In response to Trooper Dreisbach’s
    questions, Brodie explained the damage to his vehicle had been caused by a
    recent accident, and he stated there was more money in the car. Brodie also
    admitted he was on state parole and did not have a driver’s license.
    Trooper Dreisbach requested the assistance of a K-9 unit, and after a
    sweep, the K-9 alerted to the vehicle. Thereafter, Trooper Dreisbach
    ____________________________________________
    1See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5111(a)(1), 7512; 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (31), and
    (32).
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    performed a search of the vehicle. The search revealed a vial of marijuana, a
    bag containing nearly $39,000.00 in cash, two cell phones, a computer, a
    tablet, and a duffle bag containing a piece of a vacuum-sealed bag and dryer
    sheets. Brodie was arrested and transported to the police station. The vehicle
    was later impounded.
    During an interview, Brodie indicated he would not consent to a search
    of the two cell phones. Trooper Dreisbach obtained search warrants for both
    cell phones as well as the vehicle. During the second vehicle search, police
    found several ampules of THC.
    While executing the search warrant on the cell phones, police obtained
    extraction reports referencing user accounts on the phones, as well as text
    messages, photographs, and videos. Police also monitored Brodie’s recorded
    phone calls from prison and compared those conversations with text message
    conversations recovered from the cell phones.
    At trial court docket number 1497-2018 (“No. 1497-2018”), Brodie was
    charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
    paraphernalia, and possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal
    use, as well as the summary offenses of driving without a license, obstruction
    of front windshield, and improper sunscreening. At trial court docket number
    1744-2018 (“1744-2018”), Brodie was charged with dealing in the proceeds
    of unlawful activities and criminal use of a communication facility. The cases
    were consolidated for trial.
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    On January 15, 2019, Brodie filed a motion to suppress evidence
    recovered from the search of his vehicle and cell phones. Brodie argued
    Trooper Dreisbach lacked probable cause to conduct the initial traffic stop or
    perform the first vehicle search. He also claimed the search warrants for the
    second vehicle search and the cell phones were not supported by probable
    cause.
    The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine requesting an evidentiary
    hearing to address authentication and admissibility of the text message
    evidence.
    The trial court conducted joint hearings on the motion to suppress and
    the motion in limine. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the trial court
    indicated it was clear on the issue of suppression and authentication of the
    cell phone ending in 7817 (“Cell Phone 1”). However, the trial court directed
    the parties to file briefs concerning the authentication of the cell phone ending
    in 5031 (“Cell Phone 2”).2 On June 4, 2019, the trial court entered an order
    ____________________________________________
    2In its memorandum of law, the Commonwealth referenced statements Brodie
    made during the recorded prison calls about owning Cell Phone 2, text
    message conversations about a car accident, and similar conversations and
    contact names included in both phones. The Commonwealth stated Cell Phone
    2 contained 106 videos, some of which were of a sexual nature, and 35,695
    photographs, including “thousands of photos of Brodie both clothed and
    unclothed.” Memorandum of Law, 5/28/19, at 4 (unnumbered). The
    Commonwealth attached several enlarged photographs depicting Brodie’s face
    and multiple pages of thumbnail photographs depicting Brodie in various
    stages of undress.
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    J-S44004-22
    denying Brodie’s motion to suppress and granting the Commonwealth’s
    motion in limine.
    The matter proceeded to a jury trial on August 21, 2019. At No. 1497-
    2018, the jury convicted Brodie of possession of a controlled substance,
    possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a small amount of
    marijuana for personal use. At No. 1744-2018, the jury found Brodie guilty of
    dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities and criminal use of a communication
    facility. Additionally, the improper sunscreening charge was withdrawn, and
    Brodie was found not guilty of driving without a license and obstruction of
    front windshield.
    Following preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report and a
    hearing, the trial court sentenced Brodie to an aggregate term of 64 months
    to 17 years in prison, plus fines and the costs of prosecution. Brodie filed a
    timely post-sentence motion. The trial court denied relief, and Brodie filed an
    untimely appeal. This Court quashed the appeal after Brodie failed to respond
    to the rule to show cause on the issues of the appeal’s untimeliness and failure
    to comply with Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
    , 976 (Pa. 2018)
    (requiring separate notices of appeal when the order appealed from arises
    from more than one docket or relates to more than one judgment).
    While Brodie’s first appeal was pending, trial counsel sought and was
    granted leave to withdraw from representation. The trial court appointed new
    counsel, who filed a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act
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    (“PCRA”),3 requesting reinstatement of Brodie’s direct appeal rights, nunc pro
    tunc. After a hearing, the trial court reinstated Brodie’s direct appeal rights.
    The instant nunc pro tunc appeal followed.4
    On appeal, Brodie raises the following claims for our review:
    1. Did the trial court err in denying [Brodie’s] pretrial motion to
    suppress the search of his vehicle, the propriety of subsequent
    search warrants and the search of phones found in [Brodie’s]
    possession[?]
    2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting the
    Commonwealth’s motion to authenticate all text messages found
    in the cell phones in [Brodie’s] possession[?]
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    In his first issue, Brodie raises several challenges to the trial court’s
    denial of his motion to suppress. Our Court’s standard of review for a
    suppression issue is deferential to the suppression court’s findings of fact, but
    not its conclusions of law:
    An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
    to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
    whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
    the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
    facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
    suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
    Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
    remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
    a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
    supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
    findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
    ____________________________________________
    3   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    4 Brodie filed a notice of appeal at each trial court docket. This Court sua
    sponte consolidated the cases for review.
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    erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the
    suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
    suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
    appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
    court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
    of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    121 A.3d 524
    , 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation,
    brackets and ellipses omitted).
    We will address Brodie’s distinct suppression challenges in turn. First,
    Brodie challenges the warrantless search of his vehicle.5 Police may conduct a
    warrantless vehicle search so long as the search is supported by probable
    cause. See Commonwealth v. Gary, 
    91 A.3d 102
    , 137-38 (Pa. 2014).6
    ____________________________________________
    5  Brodie does not explicitly challenge the vehicle stop on appeal. We
    nevertheless note Trooper Dreisbach’s testimony that he stopped Brodie’s
    vehicle after observing heavily tinted windows and significant damage to the
    hood of the car. See N.T., Pre-Trial Vol. I, 4/10/19, at 6. This Court has held
    that an officer’s observation of heavily tinted windows in violation of 75
    Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e) provides probable cause to support a vehicle stop. See
    Commonwealth v. Harris, 
    176 A.3d 1009
    , 1020 (Pa. Super. 2017). Further,
    the Motor Vehicle Code prohibits operation of a vehicle which violates
    Department of Transportation regulations or the vehicle is otherwise in an
    unsafe condition. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2). An officer’s belief that the
    hood of a motor vehicle is not properly held together with a double latch
    system, see 
    67 Pa. Code § 175.77
    , provides reasonable suspicion for a vehicle
    stop with an investigative purpose. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    125 A.3d 425
    , 433 (Pa. Super. 2015) (concluding that officer had reasonable
    suspicion to support a traffic stop after observing appellant driving with the
    trunk of his car “bouncing up and down,” based on Department of
    Transportation regulations and Section 4107(b)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Code).
    6 We acknowledge that Gary has recently been overruled by our Supreme
    Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander, 
    243 A.3d 177
    , 181, 207
    (Pa. 2020) (holding that warrantless vehicle searches require both probable
    cause and exigent circumstances). Brodie cites to Alexander in his appellate
    brief and challenges the lack of exigent circumstances. However, “while the
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Probable cause requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. See
    Commonwealth v. Scott, 
    210 A.3d 359
    , 363 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    Probable cause is made out when the facts and circumstances
    which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the
    arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information,
    are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
    that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. The
    question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was correct or
    more likely true than false. Rather, we require only a probability,
    and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. …
    Commonwealth v. Grooms, 
    247 A.3d 31
    , 38 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation and
    emphasis omitted); see also Scott, 
    210 A.3d at 363
     (“The evidence required
    to establish probable cause for a warrantless search must be more than a
    mere suspicion or a good faith belief on the part of the police officer.” (citation
    and brackets omitted)).
    During the suppression hearing, Trooper Dreisbach described Brodie’s
    demeanor during the interaction as “extremely nervous.” N.T., Pre-Trial Vol.
    ____________________________________________
    Supreme Court in Alexander announced a new rule of criminal law,
    defendants are not automatically entitled to the retroactive application of the
    Alexander decision.” Commonwealth v. Arias, 
    286 A.3d 341
    , 347 (Pa.
    Super. 2022) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant
    must still preserve the underlying issue. Here, the Alexander decision was
    issued after Brodie’s trial but before he filed the instant nunc pro tunc appeal,
    and Brodie did not raise this claim before the trial court or in his Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) concise statement. Therefore, any challenge based on Alexander is
    waived. See id. at 348 (concluding appellant failed to preserve a challenge
    under Alexander where he never raised the issue of exigent circumstances
    with the trial court or in his Rule1925(b) concise statement); see also
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that “[i]ssues not included in the
    Statement … are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial
    court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
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    J-S44004-22
    I, 4/10/19, at 17; see also id. at 18 (opining that Brodie was “looking for an
    escape route”). According to Trooper Dreisbach, after he removed Brodie from
    the vehicle and asked whether it contained anything illegal, Brodie looked back
    toward the car and had difficulty maintaining eye contact. See id. at 17-18.
    Trooper Dreisbach also reviewed Brodie’s criminal history and discovered
    multiple prior offenses. See id. at 19. The K-9 then alerted to Brodie’s vehicle.
    See id. at 23. Ultimately, Trooper Dreisbach testified that he conducted the
    warrantless vehicle search based on the odor of marijuana,7 Brodie’s
    nervousness, Brodie’s criminal history and status as a parolee, and the K-9’s
    positive alert. See id. at 23-24.
    The trial court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances,
    Trooper Dreisbach had probable cause to perform a warrantless vehicle
    search. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/20, at 5-7. Upon review, we conclude
    that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record and its legal
    conclusions are sound. To be sure, the K-9 alert was itself sufficient to provide
    ____________________________________________
    7 In his brief, Brodie relies in part on Commonwealth v. Barr, 
    266 A.3d 25
    ,
    41 (Pa. 2021) (holding that marijuana is no longer per se illegal following the
    enactment of the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”)), and argues the smell of
    marijuana was insufficient to justify the search. The Barr decision was also
    issued during the pendency of this appeal, and Brodie did not raise this issue
    in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement. Nevertheless, Brodie’s reliance on Barr
    is misplaced. The Barr Court held that “the odor of marijuana may be a factor,
    but not a stand-alone one, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances for
    purposes of determining whether police had probable cause to conduct a
    warrantless search.” 
    Id.
     Trooper Dreisbach did not exclusively rely on the odor
    of marijuana to support the search. Moreover, Brodie admitted to smoking
    marijuana in the vehicle, conduct which is not permitted under the MMA. See
    35 P.S. § 10231.304(b).
    -9-
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    probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Green, 
    168 A.3d 180
    , 187 (Pa.
    Super. 2017). The K-9 alert, in combination with the additional circumstances,
    provided probable cause to search Brodie’s vehicle. See Commonwealth v.
    Moore, 
    263 A.3d 1193
    , 1203 (Pa. Super. 2021) (concluding that vehicle
    search based on the smell of marijuana was not improper where there were
    indicia the marijuana was not consumed in accordance with the MMA,
    including appellant’s admission to smoking in the vehicle). Accordingly, Brodie
    is not entitled to relief on this claim.
    Next, Brodie contends the search warrants for a second search of his
    vehicle and his cell phone were not supported by probable cause. Search
    warrants must be supported by probable cause. See Commonwealth v.
    Leed, 
    186 A.3d 405
    , 413 (Pa. 2018).
    [T]he issuing authority, in determining whether probable cause
    has been established, may not consider any evidence outside the
    affidavits. Probable cause exists where the facts and
    circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has
    reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to
    warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search
    should be conducted. The affidavit of probable cause must provide
    the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the
    existence of probable cause.
    
    Id.
     (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    In support of his claim, Brodie simply restates his argument that the
    vehicle search was illegal and adds that the warrants obtained as a result of
    the first search must also be invalid. Brodie does not otherwise develop this
    claim for review. He fails to identify relevant case law beyond general citations
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    to the most general warrant requirements, nor does he point to any language
    in the affidavits of probable cause supporting the warrants. See Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(a) (providing an appellant’s argument must be developed with
    discussion and citation of relevant authorities); see also Commonwealth v.
    McMullen, 
    745 A.2d 683
    , 689 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that “[w]hen the
    appellant fails to adequately develop his argument, meaningful appellate
    review is not possible.” (citation omitted)).
    Moreover, as we have already concluded, the circumstances of this case
    justified the trial court’s finding that Trooper Dreisbach had probable cause to
    conduct a warrantless search of Brodie’s vehicle. It therefore follows that
    Brodie’s challenge to the search warrant, based on the same argument, must
    also fail.
    In his second claim, Brodie argues the trial court abused its discretion
    by granting the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to authenticate text
    messages on the phones recovered from Brodie. See Appellant’s Brief at 19-
    26. Brodie acknowledges that some text messages in Cell Phone 1 were
    properly authenticated, but argues those messages were not related to drug
    activity. See id. at 21. He also states none of the messages in Cell Phone 2
    were authenticated. See id. Additionally, Brodie asserts many text messages
    have not been connected to him as the author-sender. See id. Brodie
    acknowledges the authenticated text messages relate to his ownership of the
    vehicle, but he argues the messages did not specifically point to his
    involvement in the possession or sale of drugs. See id. at 25.
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    Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the trial court’s
    discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. See
    Commonwealth v. Orr, 
    255 A.3d 589
    , 594 (Pa. Super. 2021). “An abuse of
    discretion occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
    exercised was either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality,
    prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. at 594-95 (citation omitted).
    To authenticate evidence, “the proponent must produce evidence
    sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
    Pa.R.E. 901(a). This burden of proof is relatively low. See Commonwealth
    v. Bowens, 
    265 A.3d 730
    , 759 (Pa. Super. 2021). “Proof of any circumstances
    which will support a finding that the writing is genuine will suffice to
    authenticate the writing.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth
    v. Koch, 
    39 A.3d 996
    , 1003 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided
    court, 
    106 A.3d 705
     (Pa. 2014) (“Circumstantial evidence may suffice where
    the circumstances support a finding that the writing is genuine.”).8
    Rule 901(b) provides examples of evidence tending to support
    authentication of evidence. Such evidence can include testimony by a witness
    with personal knowledge that the item is what the proponent claims it to be.
    See Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1). Evidence may also be authenticated through its
    “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
    ____________________________________________
    8Because the Supreme Court’s opinion in Koch did not garner a majority, the
    Koch decision is not binding on us, and this Court has since continued to apply
    our 2011 decision. See Orr, 255 A.3d at 598.
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    characteristics … taken together with all the circumstances.” Pa.R.E.
    901(b)(4); see also Orr, 255 A.3d at 595 (applying subsection (b)(4) and
    considering     circumstantial     evidence).9     As   this   Court   has   explained,
    “authentication of electronic communications … requires more than mere
    confirmation that the number or address belonged to a particular person.
    Circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender,
    is required.” Koch, 
    39 A.3d at 1005
    .
    After a pre-trial hearing on the issue of identification, the trial court
    determined that the Commonwealth had presented adequate evidence to
    establish the authenticity of text messages recovered from both cell phones.
    See Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/20, at 7-15. We summarize some of the relevant
    evidence.
    Significantly, Brodie made statements to Trooper Dreisbach indicating
    his ownership of the phones. Trooper Dreisbach testified that during an
    interview with Brodie after the vehicle search, Trooper Dreisbach asked for
    permission to search the phones. See N.T., Pre-Trial Vol. I, 4/10/19, at 26.
    Brodie replied that “he didn’t want anyone touching his phones.” 
    Id.
    Intercepted prison phone calls also contained statements by Brodie indicating
    ____________________________________________
    9We recognize that Rule 901 has since been revised to include an additional
    subsection governing the authentication or identification of digital evidence.
    See Pa.R.E. 901(b)(11). Because Brodie’s trial took place before the October
    1, 2020 effective date of subsection (b)(11), we will not apply it here. We
    have recognized in recent decisions that the new rule is consistent with Koch.
    See Orr, 255 A.3d at 601 n.3; Bowens, 265 A.3d at 760 n.18.
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    he was aware the police had his cell phones. See id. at 55-57; see also Trial
    Court Opinion, 3/9/20, at 9.
    Upon executing the search warrant, police obtained extraction reports
    for the phones. Trooper Dreisbach testified the extraction report for Cell Phone
    1 included user account information identifying several email addresses and
    usernames, many of which included some variation of Brodie’s name. See
    N.T., Pre-Trial Vol. II, 4/26/19, at 59-61. Trooper Dreisbach also found a text
    message from Cell Phone 1 referencing a car accident that occurred on the
    day prior to the stop. See id. at 66; see also id. at 83 (admitting as Exhibit
    21-H a picture sent by Cell Phone 1 depicting the black Ford Taurus Brodie
    was stopped in).
    Cell Phone 1 and Cell Phone 2 both contained photographs and videos
    of Brodie, some of which were sexual in nature.
    Further, at some time during the vehicle stop, Brodie indicated that he
    was planning to meet someone at the nearby Hardee’s in Myerstown. See
    N.T., Pre-Trial Vol. I, 4/10/19, at 20. Cell Phone 1 contained text messages
    with the Hardee’s address, an outgoing message instructing someone to come
    to Hardee’s, and an incoming message stating “I’ll just meet you at Hardee’s.”
    See N.T., Pre-Trial Vol. II, 4/26/19, at 63-65, 67.
    The parties do not appear to dispute that Cell Phone 1 was more
    frequently used. However, an outgoing text message from Cell Phone 2
    identified it as a new phone number. See id. at 71; see also id. at 77-78
    (discussing a text exchange between both cell phones and another individual,
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    with all outgoing messages before August 26, 2018, coming from Cell Phone
    1, and all outgoing messages after that date transmitting from Cell Phone 2).
    Both phones included overlapping contact names and numbers. See id. at 79.
    Upon review, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion under
    these circumstances. The Commonwealth offered sufficient circumstantial
    evidence to identify Brodie as the sender of text messages recovered from
    both phones. Cf. Koch, 
    39 A.3d at 1005
    . The phones were found in Brodie’s
    vehicle after the traffic stop, and Brodie made statements to Trooper
    Dreisbach and during recorded prison phone calls indicating his ownership.
    The two phones contained some identical contacts; conversations across both
    phones used similar jargon and referred to collecting large sums of money;
    and pictures and videos of Brodie were recovered from both phones. There is
    no evidence, nor does Brodie allege, that any other individual used or had
    access to the cell phone. See Orr, 255 A.3d at 601 (concluding text messages
    were sufficiently authenticated where the cell phone was recovered with
    appellant’s belongings; many of the messages referenced an ongoing custody
    dispute between appellant and the victim; threatening messages seemingly
    referred to their children; and appellant was the only person who used the
    phone); Bowens, 265 A.3d at 763 (stating “the Commonwealth proffered a
    quantum and quality of evidence sufficient to meet the relatively low burden”
    for authentication, where the phone was found on appellant’s person;
    messages referenced contraband that was seized in the vehicle; and
    appellant’s nickname was confirmed through his social media account, which
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    he displayed to the officers).10 Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by admitting the text messages into evidence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 03/30/2023
    ____________________________________________
    10Moreover, contrary to Brodie’s assertion that a trial court must authenticate
    each proffered text message individually, we do not interpret Koch as
    requiring such a time-consuming and grueling analysis, absent at least some
    evidence another person had access to the phone.
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