Kodenkandeth, J. v. Kodenkandeth, M. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A32009-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    JOHN F. KODENKANDETH,                           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    MARY F. KODENKANDETH,
    Appellee                  No. 2050 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Orders Dated November 19, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Family Court at No(s): FD 07-1796-004
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                       FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2016
    Appellant, John F. Kodenkandeth (“Husband”), appeals pro se from the
    orders dated November 19, 2014, in this equitable distribution action
    involving Appellee, Mary F. Kodenkandeth (“Wife”). We quash in part and
    affirm in part.
    We summarize the protracted history of this case as follows. In 1966,
    Wife came to the United States from India as a Fulbright Scholar and
    received a graduate degree in Periodontics from the University of Pittsburgh.
    While in Pittsburgh, Wife met Husband. Wife returned to India in 1970. In
    1971, Husband visited India, and the couple was married in India on July 11,
    1971.     The parties eventually returned to the United States.      Due to
    domestic abuse, Husband and Wife initially separated in November of 2007.
    J-A32009-15
    Husband and Wife then permanently separated in April of 2010. Husband
    filed a complaint in divorce in June of 2010.
    With regard to equitable distribution, the trial court held a one-day
    hearing in December of 2012 and entered an equitable distribution order on
    January 22, 2013. The final divorce decree was entered on June 11, 2013.
    Once the divorce decree was entered, Husband and Wife each filed cross-
    appeals with this Court.     On September 5, 2014, a panel of this Court
    affirmed the trial court’s decision relating to the equitable distribution of the
    marital estate. Kodenkandeth v. Kodenkandeth, 1082 WDA 2013, 1092
    WDA 2013, 
    107 A.3d 219
    (Pa. Super. filed September 5, 2014) (unpublished
    memorandum).        Neither party sought allowance of appeal with the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    After this Court rendered its decision on September 5, 2014, both
    Husband and Wife filed motions in the trial court.      Wife filed a motion for
    clarification of the trial court’s affirmed January 22, 2013 equitable
    distribution order, and Husband filed an answer and motion seeking interest,
    costs, and sanctions from Wife. The trial court entered multiple orders dated
    October 8, 2014, which denied relief to the parties.      However, one of the
    trial court’s orders did correct a roughly $6,000 mathematical error that it
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    had previously calculated in relation to Husband’s interest in the marital
    home.1
    On November 12, 2014, Husband filed with the trial court two notices
    of presentation, indicating that he would be filing motions with the trial court
    on November 19, 2014.            Then on November 19, 2014, Husband filed a
    motion seeking reconsideration of the October 8, 2014 order and a motion
    seeking imposition of a constructive trust on assets allegedly concealed by
    Wife.       In orders dated November 19, 2014, the trial court denied both of
    Husband’s motions. On December 16, 2014, Husband filed the instant pro
    ____________________________________________
    1
    In the main order dated October 8, 2014, the trial court stated the
    following:
    This Court noted in its [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)] Opinion of September
    13, 2013 that there was a mathematical error in the calculation
    as referenced by this Court in its Opinion, dated September 13,
    2013, on page 6. Husband’s monetary interest in the marital
    home is actually $80,054. It is not, as erroneously indicated in
    paragraph 1 of the January 22, 2013 [order], $86,080.
    Therefore, with respect to the marital residence, Wife owes
    Husband $80,054.00.
    Order, 10/8/14, at 1 ¶3. Thus, the trial court’s mathematical error was
    $6,026.00. In our previous memorandum affirming the trial court’s decree,
    we acknowledged the trial court’s mathematical error and included the
    following language:
    2
    In affirming the trial court’s decree, we recognize the [trial]
    court’s correction of the math error involving the sum of $6,026.
    Kodenkandeth v. Kodenkandeth, 1082 WDA 2013, 1092 WDA 2013, 
    107 A.3d 219
    (Pa. Super. filed September 5, 2014) (unpublished memorandum
    at 4 n.2).
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    se appeal challenging the denial of his motion for reconsideration and the
    denial of his motion seeking a constructive trust. Wife is also pro se. Both
    Husband and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Husband presents six issues for our review, the first three of which
    contain multiple subparts. Husband’s main issues are as follows:
    A.   IN THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 19, 2014, THE COURT
    ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT INTEREST AND COST TO
    [HUSBAND] FOR THE FAILURE OF [WIFE] TO PAY INTEREST
    FROM JANUARY 22, 2013 TO OCTOBER 17, 2014, FOR AMOUNTS
    THAT WERE DUE TO [HUSBAND] BASED ON THE COURT ORDER
    OF JANUARY 22, 2013.
    B.   TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING WIFE A CREDIT FOR
    $6026 FOR MARITAL RESIDENCE TOWARDS THE REAL ESTATE
    COMMISSION AND REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX. ON AN EX
    PARTE BASIS WITHOUT A HEARING. FURTHER WIFE PAID
    NO REAL ESTATE TAX NOR REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FOR THE
    TRANSFER OF THE HUSBAND’S INTEREST IN THE MARITAL
    RESIDENCE. ON OR ABOUT OCTOBER 17, 2014. AND THIS
    RESULTED IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT BY [WIFE] BY $6026 AND
    ACCRUED INTEREST.
    C.   TRIAL COURT ERRED, WHEN IT DENIED [HUSBAND’S]
    PETITION   DATED  NOVEMBER    19,  2014  TO   IMPOSE
    CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, FOR THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT BY THE
    WIFE DUE TO ERRORS OF LAW, ERRORS OF OMISSION, AND
    ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
    D.   COURT ERRED BY DENYING [HUSBAND’S] PETITION
    DATED NOV 19, 2014, TO ALLOW DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO 23
    Pa CSA §3305(C) FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST A & R.
    E.  COURT ERRED BY DENYING [HUSBAND’S] PETITION
    DATED NOV 19, 2014, TO IMPOSE A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
    ON THE WIFE TO PREVENT DISSIPATION OF THE FUNDS THAT
    BELONG TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST A & R.
    F.   TRIAL COURT ERRED, IN CLAIMING IN THE TRIAL COURT
    OPINION, DATED FEBRUARY 17, 2015, THAT [HUSBAND]
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    SHOULD HAVE APPEALED THE TRIAL COURT ORDER OF
    OCTOBER 8, 2014, AND CONCLUDES THAT [HUSBAND’S]
    MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF NOVEMBER 19, 2014, IS
    UNTIMELY, AND HENCE [HUSBAND’S] APPEAL FROM THAT
    ORDER FOR THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE
    QUASHED.
    Appellant’s Brief at 4-8 (verbatim).
    Before we review the issues presented by Husband, we must address
    the timeliness of a portion of this appeal, as it appears that Husband filed his
    notice of appeal concerning the orders dated October 8, 2014, beyond the
    time period permitted by law. Specifically, Husband’s issues A and B pertain
    to the order of the trial court dated October 8, 2014. In issue F, Husband
    lambasts the trial court for concluding that an appeal from the trial court’s
    orders dated October 8, 2014, is untimely.      Because the timeliness of an
    appeal implicates our jurisdiction, we cannot address the merits of these
    issues raised by Husband before determining whether such an appeal was
    timely filed. Krankowski v. O’Neil, 
    928 A.2d 284
    , 285 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    It is undisputed that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days
    of the disputed order.     Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).     In addition, Pa.R.A.P. 1701
    addresses the effect that an application for reconsideration has on the
    appeal process. This rule tolls the time for taking an appeal only when the
    court files “an order expressly granting reconsideration . . . within the time
    prescribed by these rules for the filing of a notice of appeal.”     Schoff v.
    Richter, 
    562 A.2d 912
    , 913 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1701).
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    Phrased differently the trial court is permitted to grant
    reconsideration only if such action is taken during the applicable
    appeal period. An order granting reconsideration will only be
    effective if it is made and entered on the docket before
    expiration of the applicable appeal period, 30 days from the
    entry of the order which is the subject of the reconsideration
    motion, and if it states that it is expressly granting
    reconsideration. It should be emphasized that the Rule requires
    reconsideration to be expressly granted. It is insufficient for the
    trial court to merely set a hearing date on the reconsideration
    motion or issue a Rule to Show Cause. Failure to “expressly”
    grant reconsideration within the time set by the rules for filing
    an appeal will cause the trial court to lose its power to act on the
    application for reconsideration. See: Note following Pa.R.A.P.
    1701.
    
    Id. (emphasis original).
         See also Cheathem v. Temple University
    Hospital, 
    743 A.2d 518
    , 519-520 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding that a trial
    court’s   order   granting    reconsideration    must    state   expressly   that
    reconsideration is granted and entry of a hearing date on the motion is
    inadequate to satisfy the mandate of the Rules).
    Therefore, as the comment to Pa.R.A.P. 1701 explains, although
    a party may petition the court for reconsideration, the
    simultaneous filing of a notice of appeal is necessary to preserve
    appellate rights in the event that either the trial court fails to
    grant the petition expressly within 30 days, or it denies the
    petition.
    Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs. v. Rib-It/K.P., Inc., 
    693 A.2d 242
    , 245 (Pa.
    Super. 1999).
    Our review of the certified record reflects that in September of 2014,
    Wife filed a motion for clarification of the trial court’s order of January 22,
    2013. On September 24, 2014, Husband filed an answer to Wife’s motion for
    clarification and included therein a petition for costs.      In an order dated
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    October 8, 2014, and entered upon the docket on October 10, 2014, the trial
    court disposed of both Wife’s and Husband’s requests. Thus, assuming for the
    sake of argument that the appeal period did not begin until the October 8,
    2014 order was docketed on October 10, 2014, Husband had until November
    10, 2014, to file a timely appeal from that order or a timely motion for
    reconsideration.2
    Notwithstanding the fact that the appeal period expired November 10,
    2014, on November 12, 2014, Husband filed with the trial court a notice of
    presentation indicating that on November 19, 2014, Husband would be filing a
    motion for reconsideration with the trial court titled, “[Husband’s] Motion for
    reconsideration of the order of October 8, 2014.” Husband’s untimely motion
    for reconsideration did not toll the appeal period, which expired on November
    10, 2014. Cheathem, Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs. Moreover, the trial court
    did   not   enter    an    order    “expressly   granting”   Husband’s   motion   for
    reconsideration within the appeal period.         Although the trial court accepted
    Husband’s motion for reconsideration for filing and ultimately denied it in an
    order dated November 19, 2014, the trial court failed to “expressly grant”
    Husband’s motion for reconsideration within the thirty-day appeal period.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    We note that Husband needed to file his appeal by Monday, November 10,
    2014, because November 9, 2014, was a Sunday. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908
    (stating that, for computations of time, whenever the last day of any such
    period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be
    omitted from the computation). See also Pa.R.A.P. 107; Pa.R.A.P. 903,
    note.
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    Husband then filed this appeal on December 16, 2014, thirty-six days after the
    time for filing a timely appeal had elapsed.
    Accordingly, because the trial court did not enter a timely order expressly
    granting Husband’s motion for reconsideration, the thirty-day appeal period
    was not tolled. Rule 903(a), requiring the notice of appeal to be filed within
    thirty days of the order dated October 8, 2014, and entered on the docket on
    October 10, 2014, remained in effect.            Therefore, this Court is without
    jurisdiction to hear the untimely portion of this appeal related to Husband’s
    challenge to the underlying order dated October 8, 2014.          Hence, we are
    constrained to quash the portion of Husband’s appeal pertaining to the order
    dated October 8, 2014, and docketed on October 10, 2014.3
    ____________________________________________
    3
    In an effort to avoid the untimely nature of his appeal from the trial court’s
    order dated October 8, 2014, Husband has alleged that the order was
    actually docketed on October 22, 2014, and he references an item with the
    docket number of 184. Appellant’s Brief at 9, 10, 36, 37. We have
    thoroughly reviewed the certified record before us, and we observe that item
    number 184 in the record is not an order docketed on October 22, 2014. In
    actuality, item number 184 is Wife’s unrelated pro se “Answer to
    [Husband’s] Petition to Unfreeze Kodenkandeth Foundation And Liquidate
    [Wife’s] interest in the Kodenkandeth Trust” that was docketed on December
    4, 2014.
    Furthermore, our review has revealed that the only item docketed in
    the certified record on October 22, 2014, is a copy of Wife’s “Motion For
    Clarification of Hon. Judge Hens Greco’s Order of Jan. 22, 2013,” which had
    been presented to the trial court in September of 2014, and it bears the
    docket number 176. However, we observe that appended to Wife’s motion
    at docket number 176 is a proposed order prepared by Wife. Notably, the
    trial judge crossed out the language of Wife’s proposed order and hand
    wrote the words: “Denied. See order of October 8th 2014.” Therefore, even
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    In his issues C, D, and E, Husband argues that the trial court erred with
    regard to his request for the imposition of a constructive trust.        Husband
    contends that the trial court erred in failing to create a constructive trust on
    assets that he alleges unjustly enriched Wife and he believes that discovery
    should have ensued. Further, Husband claims that the trial court should have
    granted an injunction to prevent Wife from allegedly dissipating marital assets
    that belong in the constructive trust.
    Section 3505 of the Divorce Code presents proper procedures to prevent
    parties from disposing, removing, encumbering, or alienating property to
    defeat equitable distribution. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505. Specifically, section 3505(d)
    addresses the imposition of constructive trusts for a party’s failure to disclose
    assets and provides as follows:
    If a party fails to disclose information required by general rule of
    the Supreme Court and in consequence thereof an asset or
    assets with a fair market value of $1,000 or more is omitted
    from the final distribution of property, the party aggrieved by the
    nondisclosure may at any time petition the court granting the
    award to declare the creation of a constructive trust as to all
    undisclosed assets for the benefit of the parties and their minor
    or dependent children, if any. The party in whose name the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    assuming for the sake of argument that the October 8, 2014 order was not
    final until this document at docket number 176 was docketed on October 22,
    2014, we still conclude that Husband’s appeal challenging the content of the
    October 8, 2014 order was untimely because Husband should have filed his
    notice of appeal on or before November 21, 2014. As stated above,
    Husband did not file his appeal until December 16, 2014. In addition,
    Husband’s motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied, did not
    toll the appeal period. Thus, Husband’s efforts to extend the appeal period
    do not provide him relief.
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    assets are held shall be declared the constructive trustee unless
    the court designates a different trustee, and the trust may
    include any terms and conditions the court may determine. The
    court shall grant the petition upon a finding of a failure to
    disclose the assets as required by general rule of the Supreme
    Court.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(d) (emphasis added).
    We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, the certified
    record before us and the opinion of the trial court dated February 17, 2015.
    We conclude that the trial court’s opinion adequately addresses Husband’s
    issues concerning the trial court’s refusal to impose a constructive trust in this
    matter. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s opinion as our own and affirm
    the November 19, 2014 order that denied Husband’s petition for a constructive
    trust on its basis.4
    Appeal quashed in part.            Order of November 19, 2014 affirmed.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The parties are directed to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of
    further proceedings in this matter.
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    J-A32009-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/19/2016
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2050 WDA 2014

Filed Date: 2/19/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024