Wilson, A. v. Autozone Stores ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ANTHONY WILSON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
AUTOZONE STORES, LLC., :
AUTOZONE, AUTOZONE II., AND :
AUTOZONE INC. : No. 140 EDA 2020
:
:
APPEAL OF: AUTOZONE STORES, :
LLC
Appeal from the Order Entered November 19, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): No. 141000329
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2020
AutoZone Stores, LLC (AutoZone) appeals from the judgment entered
following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial
court) in favor of Anthony Wilson (Wilson). The jury found that AutoZone’s
negligence caused Wilson to sustain injuries during a fall in oil spilled outside
of an AutoZone store and awarded Wilson $432,000 in damages. We affirm.
I.
We glean the following facts from the certified record. On May 10, 2013,
Wilson went to a local AutoZone store to purchase anti-freeze. As he was
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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entering the store, he noticed a “gooey, slippery” substance on his new shoes,
which he assumed that he must have stepped in while walking through the
parking lot. N.T., 8/27/19, at 60, 78-79. He told an AutoZone employee that
there was a spill in front of the store and that they should clean it up. The
employee responded, “I just work at AutoZone.” Id.
Wilson continued shopping in the store for 15 to 30 minutes and then
left through the same door he had entered. He was no longer thinking about
the substance he had stepped in and he did not notice it on the ground as he
exited the store. However, as he walked toward his car, he slipped on oil and
sustained serious injuries. There were no cones or tape in the area to alert
passers-by to a spill. Wilson testified that there was oil covering a one-to-two
foot area on the curb directly in front of AutoZone where he fell. While he
acknowledged that he noticed the substance on his shoe when he entered the
store earlier, he testified that he did not see the oil outside and did not know
where the spill was located until after he fell. Id. at 82, 90.
As a result of the fall, he sustained a patellar tendon rupture and medial
meniscal tear in his left knee. He later underwent surgery to repair the injury
and physical therapy thereafter. By the time of trial over six years later,
Wilson testified that he had not recovered the full range of motion in his left
knee and was no longer able to perform certain physical activities such as
running, playing sports or cleaning. He walks with a limp, is unable to stand
for long periods and has difficulty using the stairs. He testified that he still
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experiences severe pain in his knee on a daily basis. Wilson said that he had
gout and other problems with his right leg prior to the accident but the issues
he now experiences with his left leg only began after his fall at AutoZone.
Wilson introduced testimony from Thomas Balchak, an AutoZone district
manager for the store where Wilson was injured, and Steven Cooper, the store
manager on the day in question. Balchak testified that AutoZone’s store
managers are responsible for ensuring that the interior and exterior of the
stores are clean, and that AutoZone has procedures for employees to follow if
a spill is brought to their attention. Balchak noted that AutoZone’s landlord
was responsible under the terms of the lease for maintaining the sidewalks
and parking lot, but said that AutoZone nevertheless takes responsibility for
making sure the exterior of the store is safe and clean for customers. Cooper
testified that as the store manager, he ensured that there was no trash or
anything that could cause injury in front of the store, but that he was not
responsible for the parking lot, curb or outside areas. He said that there was
no policy in place related to cleaning the parking lot, but he did instruct his
employees to clean any spills that they noticed. Cooper was not working on
the day of Wilson’s fall. Balchak and Cooper testified that customers could
bring oil to AutoZone in their own containers for the store to dispose of
properly.
Dr. Norman Stempler testified as an expert on behalf of Wilson through
a video deposition and detailed Wilson’s injuries resulting from the accident,
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his treatment history, and his prognosis for recovery. Dr. Stempler examined
Wilson twice for the purposes of his lawsuit. He first examined Wilson
approximately three years after his accident and at that time, Wilson was still
experiencing pain, loss of motion and difficulty with walking and other
movements. He testified that Wilson also had fluid in his knee and it was
chronically inflamed. Dr. Stempler testified that Wilson’s condition had
worsened by 2019, as he had lost more motion in his knee and was continuing
to experience pain. Based on this history and Wilson’s age, Dr. Stempler
opined that his prognosis for a full recovery was poor. He did not believe that
Wilson’s knee would fully recover and said that Wilson would experience the
pain and loss of function for the rest of his life. Dr. Stempler confirmed that
Wilson had a history of degenerative joint disease, but said that before the
fall, Wilson did not have problems with his left knee to the extent that he did
after. He testified that Wilson had been showing signs of recovery in the
months immediately after his surgery, but that it was not uncommon for
injuries of this type to decline over time.
In its case-in-chief, AutoZone presented a video deposition of Dr. Craig
Israelite, who testified as an expert regarding the cause and extent of Wilson’s
injuries. Dr. Israelite rendered his opinion based on his review of Wilson’s
medical records. He agreed that Wilson had suffered a left patellar tendon
rupture but opined that he had recovered from that injury following surgery.
He opined that due to his age and weight, Wilson had some degenerative and
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chronic changes to his knees prior to sustaining his injury. Wilson also had a
gout condition prior to the accident that could have contributed to his injury.
However, Dr. Israelite found that based on the treating physician’s notes,
Wilson had recovered to full motion, strength and range of activities by
approximately six months after his surgery. He noted that Wilson was
discharged from physical therapy after the surgery for noncompliance. He did
not believe that any ongoing issues Wilson suffered with his left knee were
the result of his fall at AutoZone.
Following reception of the evidence, the jury deliberated and returned a
verdict. In its initial verdict sheet, the jury determined that AutoZone was
negligent and the factual cause of Wilson’s injury. The jury also determined
that Wilson was negligent but found that he was not the factual cause of his
injury. Because it found that Wilson was not the factual cause of the injury,
the verdict form instructed the jury to skip the following question, which asked
it to apportion the percentage of negligence between the parties. When the
jury initially read its verdict in open court, however, the clerk asked the jury
about the apportioned negligence, and the jury responded that AutoZone bore
80% of the negligence and Wilson bore 20%. At that juncture, the trial court
realized that the jury had not followed the instructions on the form and sent
it back to the deliberation room to correct the form. When the jury reentered
the courtroom, it again stated that Wilson was not the factual cause of his own
injury and followed the instruction to skip the question regarding apportioning
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negligence. Finally, the jury awarded Wilson $432,000 in non-economic
damages for his injury.
AutoZone filed a timely post-trial motion and brief in support and Wilson
filed a response. The trial court denied the motion and AutoZone timely
appealed. The trial court and AutoZone have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
II.
AutoZone first argues that it is entitled to judgment non obstante
veredicto (JNOV)1, 2 because the danger presented by the oil spill in the
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1 We have set forth our scope and standard of review as follows:
[a] JNOV can be entered upon two bases: (1) where the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and/or, (2) the
evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree
that the verdict should have been rendered for the movant. When
reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV, we must
consider all of the evidence admitted to decide if there was
sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict. In so doing,
we must also view this evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, giving the victorious party the benefit of every
reasonable inference arising from the evidence and rejecting all
unfavorable testimony and inference. Concerning any questions
of law, our [standard] of review is [de novo]. Concerning
questions of credibility and weight accorded the evidence at trial,
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact.
If any basis exists upon which the [fact finder] could have properly
made its award, then we must affirm the trial court’s denial of the
motion for JNOV. A JNOV should be entered only in a clear case.
Linde v. Linde, 220 A.3d 1119, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2019) (alterations in
original).
2AutoZone also raises a challenge to the trial court’s denial of its motion for
nonsuit. However, “a defendant’s presentation of evidence following the
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parking lot was known and obvious to Wilson before he entered the store, and
he voluntarily chose to encounter the known risk once again as he left.
AutoZone cites Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120 (Pa. 1983), for the
proposition that when a business invitee voluntarily encounters an obvious
and avoidable dangerous condition, the possessor of the land is not liable for
injuries resulting from that obvious danger and has no duty to warn the invitee
of the danger. AutoZone, thus, contends that Wilson assumed the risk of
falling in the oil outside of AutoZone because he was aware of the spill and
chose to walk through the area when exiting the store.
Wilson and the trial court contend that Carrender is inapposite because
Wilson did not see the oil spill in the parking lot on the way into the AutoZone,
but rather only noticed an oily substance on his shoe after he entered the
store. Wilson also contends that he did not see the oil spill on the curb after
he left the store until he had already fallen. Because he was not aware of the
exact location of the spill prior to his fall, Wilson and the trial court conclude
that AutoZone breached its duty to warn or protect Wilson from the spill.
To prove a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must establish “a duty or
obligation recognized by law; breach of that duty by the defendant; causal
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denial of a defendant’s motion for nonsuit renders the correctness of that
denial a moot issue,” and “the denial of a motion for compulsory nonsuit is
not appealable.” Williams v. A-Treat Bottling Co., Inc., 551 A.2d 297, 299
(Pa. Super. 1988) (citing Burns v. City of Philadelphia, 504 A.2d 1321 (Pa.
Super. 1986)). Thus, we do not address this issue.
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connection between the defendant’s breach of that duty and the resulting
injury; and actual loss or damage suffered by the complainant.” Reilly v.
Tiergarten, Inc., 633 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa. Super. 1993). A business such as
AutoZone owes the highest duty of care to its business invitees, and it “must
protect an invitee not only against known dangers, but also against those
which might be discovered with reasonable care.” Gutteridge v. A.P. Green
Servs., Inc., 804 A.2d 643, 656 (Pa. Super. 2002). AutoZone contends that
it is entitled to JNOV because Wilson failed to establish the first element of his
claim: that AutoZone had a duty to warn or protect him from the danger
presented by the known and obvious oil spill.
Our disposition of this issue depends on a detailed review of Wilson’s
testimony. Wilson first testified that on the day of his fall, he parked in the
parking lot in front of AutoZone and walked into the store. He testified: “As
I entered AutoZone, as I walked—as I walked into AutoZone, I walked into
the store. I noticed that there was a gooey, slippery substance on my new
sneakers.” N.T., 8/27/19, at 60. He testified that he immediately told an
employee that there was a spill “out there” before continuing to his shopping.
Id. When Counsel later asked him if he noticed the spill when he was exiting
the store, Wilson responded that he did not and that he was no longer thinking
about the spill. Id. at 63. Describing the fall, he stated “[a]s I was exiting
the store, as I was walking from the store, the next thing I know, as I went
to step down, I was on the ground.” Id. at 64. There were no cones or tape
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to mark the spill. Wilson confirmed that a photo exhibit of the area outside of
AutoZone depicted the portion of the sidewalk where he fell. Id. at 65. Later,
when asked where he was looking at the time of the fall, Wilson said that he
was “looking forward” and “[w]alking directly out of the door to my car.” Id.
at 74.
On cross-examination, AutoZone questioned Wilson regarding whether
he saw the oil spill before entering the store:
Q: On the day of the accident you did see an oil spill. Correct?
A: I walked in to enter the store.
Q: So on your way in to the store you saw an oil spill?
A: I walked and entered into the store. I noticed when I got in
the oily substance was on my sneaker.
Id. at 78-79. He then testified that the spill was on the curb right in front of
the store and covered one to two feet in area. Id. at 80-81. The following
exchange then occurred:
Q: Can you indicate where it is you saw that oil spot on your way
in to the store that day?
A: I see nothing. I walked right there. I walked in the AutoZone.
As I walked in to the AutoZone, I walked in the door.
Q: Where was the spot that you saw on the curb?
A: As I walked into AutoZone—as I walked into AutoZone, the oily
substance was in that zone area, all right there.
Q: So where the split in the concrete is; somewhere around either
side of that?
A: Yes, I walked into there.
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Id. at 82. Later, AutoZone again asked Wilson if he slipped where he saw the
oil spill on his way into the store, and Wilson responded, “[i]n front of the
AutoZone. I didn’t know nothing was in there. As I walked in, like I said
before, I noticed a gooey substance was on my sneaker.” Id. at 90.
AutoZone then attempted to impeach Wilson with his prior deposition
testimony:
Q: Reading that, does it refresh your recollection that where you
fell on the way out is the same place where you had noticed
something on your way in?
A: The way I walked in is the way I walked the same way out.
The court: Does that mean yes?
A: Yes.
Id. at 91. AutoZone then reiterated Wilson’s prior deposition testimony: “You
were asked, ‘[w]here you fell, is this the same place where you had noticed
something on your way in?’ And your answer was—” Wilson responded,
“Yes.” Id. at 91-92. Wilson then said he did not know whether the spill had
been cleaned while he was shopping or whether the spill was still on the
ground when he left. Id. at 92. The only testimony about the appearance of
the oil spill was Wilson’s description of the one-to-two foot size of the spill; no
evidence was admitted as to the color or visibility of the oil spill.
Our review of Wilson’s testimony reveals that he repeatedly testified
that he did not see the spill on his way into the store and only became aware
of the spill when he noticed the oily substance on his shoe. The exchange
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related to Wilson’s deposition testimony is the only portion of the testimony
where he does not specifically state that he only saw the substance on his
shoe after entering the store, and as Wilson argues in his brief, the testimony
is far from clear. See Wilson’s Brief at 11-12 (“[Wilson] may have been
merely affirming his testimony that he used the same general path when he
exited from the store as he used to walk from his car to AutoZone.”). In
contrast, whenever he was asked directly whether he saw the spill on his way
into the store, Wilson testified that he did not. N.T., 8/27/19, at 78-79, 82,
90. The more oblique statements in Wilson’s prior deposition do not establish
“beyond peradventure” that Wilson saw the oil spill before he entered the
store.
AutoZone relies on Stewart v. Ray, 76 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1950), to argue
that because cross-examination on Wilson’s deposition testimony was the last
word regarding when he saw the spill, that version of events should control
for the purposes of its JNOV claim. In Stewart, our Supreme Court
recognized the “settled principle that where a witness has testified to two
different versions or has made inconsistent and contradictory statements and
is confronted with that contradiction, his final statement is the one which
controls.” Id. at 632. There, the witness provided manifestly contradictory
testimony on direct and cross-examination and was subject to lengthy
questioning as to which of his statements was correct. Id. The Stewart court
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held that the witness’s final statement, which he adhered to through more
rigorous examination, would control over his earlier inconsistent one. Id.
However, in Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Philadelphia
Trans. Co., 190 A.2d 293, 296 (Pa. 1963), the Supreme Court held that the
principle in Stewart only applies in cases where the witness is directly
confronted with his contradictions. Where a witness offers inconsistent
testimony but is not subject to examination regarding the contradictions, “the
case must go to the jury, whose province it is to reconcile conflicting
statements, whether of the same or different witnesses, or to draw the line
between them and say which shall prevail.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Flannery,
119 A.2d 224, 226 (Pa. 1956)); see also Wolansky v. Lawson, 133 A.2d
843, 844 (Pa. 1957) (holding that the witness’s final statement controls if
witness gives contradictory testimony and “the conflicts therein are called to
his attention and he is asked and answers which of them is correct” (emphasis
added)).
Here, Wilson was not asked on direct examination whether he saw the
oil spill before entering the store, but in his narrative of events testified that
he only noticed the substance on his sneaker after entering the store. N.T.,
8/27/19, at 60. He then reiterated that version of events multiple times on
cross-examination. Id. at 78-79, 82, 90. The question in Wilson’s deposition
did not directly ask whether he saw the oil spill on the way into the store. The
question could also be interpreted as asking whether Wilson fell in front of the
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store in the same area where he noticed the substance on his shoe, prompting
Wilson’s response that “[t]he way I walked in is the way I walked the same
way out.” Id. at 91. Based on the ambiguities in both the question and
response, this exchange did not reveal a contradictory “final statement” that
should have controlled for the purposes of JNOV. The trial court correctly
concluded that any ambiguities in Wilson’s testimony should be left for the
jury to resolve and the jury was entitled to conclude that Wilson did not know
the exact location of the spill until after his fall.
Viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to Wilson as the
verdict winner, Linde, supra, we must determine whether Wilson’s general
knowledge that there was an oil spill in the parking lot obviated AutoZone’s
duty to him as a business invitee to warn of or protect from that hazard. There
was no testimony at trial as to the size of the AutoZone parking lot or the area
in front of the store. Wilson was not asked and did not testify regarding how
far away he had parked from the entrance to the store. There was also no
testimony regarding the color or visibility of the oil spill in relation to the curb
or pavement. While we have determined that Wilson only noticed the
substance on his shoe after entering AutoZone, the record does not reveal
how much area Wilson crossed before entering the store.
AutoZone argues that this case is analogous to Carrender, where the
plaintiff observed a hazard and chose to encounter it in the defendants’
parking lot. In Carrender, the plaintiff parked in the defendants’ parking lot
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in an area that was covered with a thin sheet of ice. Carrender, supra, at
121. The plaintiff noticed the ice as soon as she opened her car door and
testified that she was immediately concerned about the slippery conditions.
Id. at 121-22. Even though other parking spaces were available and free
from ice, the plaintiff chose to walk over the ice to enter the defendants’
business. Id. When she returned to her vehicle, she slipped on the ice and
fractured her hip. Id. The plaintiff brought suit claiming that the defendants
had been negligent in maintaining their parking lot and won a judgment
against the defendants after a jury trial.
Our Supreme Court concluded that the defendants were entitled to
JNOV, holding that “[a] possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose
danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate
the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Id. at 123 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A). The court went on to note:
A danger is deemed to be “obvious” when “both the condition and
the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable
man, in the position of the visitor, exercising normal perception,
intelligence, and judgment.” For a danger to be “known,” it must
“not only be known to exist, but ... also be recognized that it is
dangerous and the probability and gravity of the threatened harm
must be appreciated.” Although the question of whether a danger
was known or obvious is usually a question of fact for the jury,
the question may be decided by the court where reasonable minds
could not differ as to the conclusion.
Id. at 123-24 (cleaned up). Because the plaintiff testified that she observed
the ice, recognized the risk it presented, and chose to walk on it regardless,
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the defendants owed no duty to warn or protect her from the hazard and were
entitled to JNOV.
Here, Wilson’s general knowledge that there had been an oil spill
somewhere outside of the store 15 to 30 minutes prior to his fall does not
establish that the spill was “known and obvious” under the definitions set forth
in Carrender. Importantly, the result in Carrender flowed from the plaintiff’s
“uncontradicted testimony” that she directly observed the hazardous ice and
consciously chose to encounter it. Id. at 124. The plaintiff chose to park her
car in an area where walking over ice was unavoidable, despite the availability
of other clear parking spaces. There was no question for the jury as to when
the plaintiff first became aware of the hazard. As discussed supra, no such
testimony was offered here to establish that the oil spill was “obvious” as
defined in Carrender. No cones or tape demarcated the area where the spill
was located, and there is no evidence of record to establish that the spill was
clearly visible to passersby. To the contrary, the only evidence regarding the
oil spill was Wilson’s testimony that he did not see the spill on his way into the
store, apparently stepping into the oil without noticing it. He also did not see
the spill as he exited the store, as he was looking forward and walking toward
his car.
The evidence also does not demonstrate that the possibility of harm
arising from the oil spill was “known” to Wilson in the same manner as the
danger was known to the plaintiff in Carrender. There, the plaintiff testified
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that she was immediately aware of the risks posed by walking on the ice, as
she had a prosthetic leg and knew that she would be unable to balance well
on the ice. Carrender, supra, at 121-22. Knowing this, she chose to park
on the sheet of ice and walk over it to enter the defendants’ business. Here,
Wilson did not know the precise location of the hazard, other than to tell an
employee that there was a spill somewhere outside of the store. Wilson
walked through the spill once without noticing it or falling, and there was no
testimony at trial that Wilson had any subjective reason to believe that he
would not be able to navigate safely back to his vehicle. As a result, it is not
clear that “the probability and gravity of the threatened harm [was]
appreciated” by Wilson before his fall. Id. at 123-24 (citation omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Wilson, the evidence and the
inferences fairly flowing therefrom established that Wilson did not know the
precise location of the oil spill before his fall and did not consciously choose to
encounter it when he left the store. Wilson was questioned regarding whether
the oil spill was known and obvious to him before his fall, and the evidence
did not establish as a matter of law that AutoZone did not owe him a duty of
care. Moreover, Wilson’s various responses to questioning at trial and at his
deposition did not establish beyond peradventure that he knew of the exact
location of the oil spill prior to his fall. On these facts, the trial court correctly
held that JNOV was not warranted and that the jury should weigh the evidence
and determine liability. No relief is due.
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III.
Next, AutoZone asserts that it is entitled to a new trial on the basis that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.3 AutoZone reiterates its
argument that Wilson’s testimony established that he saw the oil spill on his
way into the store, well before he fell and sustained his injuries. AutoZone
also argues that the jury’s responses to the interrogatories on the verdict slip,
finding Wilson negligent but not the factual cause of his injuries, are illogical
and demonstrate that the jury was confused about the applicable law.4 It
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3 Our scope and standard of review is as follows:
[A]ppellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial
court’s] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because
the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the
evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of
the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
of justice.
Corvin v. Tihansky, 184 A.3d 986, 992-93 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted; alterations in original). “On issues of credibility and weight of the
evidence, an appellate court defers to the findings of the trial judge, who has
had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and the demeanor of the
witnesses.” L.F.F. v. P.R.F., 828 A.2d 1148, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2003).
4 AutoZone initially raised its challenge to the revised verdict slip as an
independent claim of error, but clarified in its reply brief that the
inconsistencies in the verdict slip were further support for its challenge to the
weight of the evidence. AutoZone’s Brief at 65-66; Reply Brief at 17-20. A
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argues that this confusion is further evident from the jury’s initial verdict slip
that apportioned 20% of the negligence to Wilson despite finding that he was
not the factual cause of his injuries.
“An appellant is not entitled to a new trial where the evidence presented
was conflicting and the fact-finder could have decided in favor of either party.”
Winschel v. Jain, 925 A.2d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. 2007).
A new trial based on weight of the evidence issues will not be
granted unless the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one’s sense of justice; a mere conflict in testimony will not
suffice as grounds for a new trial. Upon review, the test is not
whether this Court would have reached the same result on the
evidence presented, but, rather, after due consideration of the
evidence found credible by the jury, and viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, whether the court
could reasonably have reached its conclusion.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). As long as the record supports the
trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying a motion for a new trial based on
the weight of the evidence, we must affirm. Corvin v. Tihansky, 184 A.3d
986, 992-93 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
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claim that the jury’s verdict should not have been entered because it is
inconsistent must be raised before the jury is discharged, while a claim that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence may be preserved in a post-
trial motion. See Avery v. Cercone, 225 A.3d 873, 877-78 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(distinguishing between evidentiary weight claims and claims based solely on
inconsistency in the verdict). AutoZone did not preserve a claim of error based
on inconsistencies in the jury’s responses to the interrogatories, but merely
relies on these inconsistencies to support its argument that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence.
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AutoZone cites Bostanic v. Barker-Barto, 936 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Super.
2007), to argue that inconsistencies in a verdict form that render the verdict
illogical can render a verdict against the weight of the evidence.5 There, the
jury returned a verdict that the defendant was negligent for her role in a
vehicle accident, but that her negligence was not a factual cause of the
plaintiff’s harm. Id. at 1086. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for
a new trial on the basis that the jury’s conclusion was against the weight of
the evidence because both parties’ medical experts agreed that the accident
caused the plaintiff’s injury. We affirmed, finding that even though the jury
could have concluded that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in causing
the accident, it could not conclude based on the uncontradicted evidence that
the defendant did not also bear some causal responsibility for the plaintiff’s
injury. Id. at 1088. This court has similarly held that a verdict awarding no
damages for pain and suffering is against the weight of the evidence when
medical experts for both parties agreed that the plaintiff sustained injuries in
the accident at issue. See, e.g., Burnhauser v. Bumberger, 745 A.2d 1256,
1261 (Pa. Super. 2000).
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5 AutoZone also cites Chiaverini v. Sewickley Valley Hosp., 598 A.2d 1021(Pa. Super. 1991), in support of this proposition. However, a new trial was
granted in Chiaverini on the basis that the trial court abused its discretion in
molding the verdict in an attempt to cure inconsistencies, not on the basis
that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 1023-24. Thus,
it is inapplicable here. See note 4, supra.
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We concluded in these cases that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding a new trial when the jury’s verdict was plainly in
opposition to the evidence that both parties had presented at trial. In
Bostanic and Burnhauser, for example, the jury verdicts disregarded key
facts that the parties’ medical experts had agreed upon. Thus, the verdicts
were against the weight of the evidence because the juries’ conclusions
directly contradicted all evidence presented at trial. While a successful weight
claim does not require that all evidence support a conclusion contradictory to
the jury’s verdict, the evidence must be so clearly weighted toward the
opposite conclusion that to allow the verdict to stand would “shock one’s sense
of justice.” Winschel, supra. Mere disagreements between witnesses or
inconsistencies in testimony are factual issues for the jury to decide and will
not support a claim for a new trial. Id.The jury is entitled to resolve all conflicts in the evidence and make all
credibility determinations when the parties are not in agreement as to the
relevant facts and neither party’s evidence clearly outweighs the other, as was
the case here. Id. Wilson and AutoZone disputed several relevant facts:
whether Wilson saw the oil spill before entering the store, whether Wilson saw
the oil spill before his fall, and whether the injuries Wilson suffered were solely
caused by the fall or were the result of other health conditions. AutoZone
argues, as it did at trial, that a new trial is warranted because the evidence
established that Wilson saw the oil spill before he entered the store and should
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have been able to avoid the spill while walking to his car. However, as
discussed in Section II, supra, our review of the trial evidence reveals that
Wilson repeatedly denied seeing the oil spill before his fall. AutoZone cross-
examined Wilson on this point based on his responses to questions at his
earlier deposition.
The jury, as the sole arbiter of the facts, weighed the evidence
presented to reach its verdict. To the extent that Wilson’s deposition
responses differed from his trial testimony, the jury was entitled to resolve all
conflicts in the evidence and pass on Wilson’s credibility as a witness. In its
verdict, the jury credited Wilson’s testimony by finding that both Wilson and
AutoZone were negligent, but that only AutoZone’s negligence was the cause
of Wilson’s fall. In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this
court is not permitted to second-guess the jury’s credibility and factual
determinations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion for a new trial because the evidence presented was not so clearly
weighted in favor of AutoZone that the verdict was shocking to the conscience.
AutoZone also argues that the jury’s initial responses to the verdict slip
indicate that it was confused by the facts or law. When the jury initially
returned its verdict, it found that AutoZone was negligent and the factual
cause of Wilson’s injury. It also found that Wilson was negligent, but
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determined that he was not the factual cause of his injury.6 The next question
on the verdict slip asked the jury to apportion fault between the parties only
if the jury had already determined that both parties were negligent and the
factual cause of the injuries. Even though the verdict slip directed the jury to
skip this question because it did not find that Wilson was a factual cause of
the injuries, the jury initially responded to the question by apportioning 20%
of the negligence to Wilson.
When the jury read this question aloud in open court, the trial court
stopped the proceedings and recessed the jury to correct the verdict sheet.7
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6 A jury is permitted to render a verdict that a party was negligent but that
the negligence was not a factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury. See, e.g.,
Kozier v. Rayner, 200 A.3d 513, 520-21 (Pa. Super. 2018). This is
particularly true when the jury is presented with multiple accounts of the event
in question and is required to weigh all of the evidence to determine which
version is most credible. Id. As long as the jury’s verdict is supported by the
evidence and “not inherently improbable nor at a variance with admitted or
proven fact or with ordinary experience,” a new trial is not warranted. Id. at
521 (quoting S.N.T. Industries, Inc. v. Geanopulos, 525 A.2d 736, 740
(Pa. Super. 1987)). Here, for example, the jury could have concluded that
Wilson was negligent in walking through the oil spill on his way into the store,
but not negligent when he left the store 15 to 30 minutes later because he
had already alerted an employee that there was a spill to be cleaned outside.
7 As noted supra, AutoZone did not object to this procedure at the time.
Wilson also did not object to any inconsistency in the verdict sheet initially
read by the jury. As a result, no claim for a new trial based on the
inconsistency of the verdict was presented to the trial court and none was
raised on appeal. However, we note that when a verdict is “inconsistent,
irrational, or problematic” and the inconsistency is evident from the “four
corners of the verdict slip,” the proper remedy is for the trial court, upon
objection from a party, to “return that jury to the deliberation room and
instruct it to clarify (not reconsider) the verdict.” Avery, supra, at 877.
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When the jury returned, it had completed the verdict sheet in accordance with
the instructions and had skipped the question about apportioning negligence.
The final verdict form entered on the record stated that AutoZone’s negligence
alone caused the fall, and there were no inconsistencies in the responses to
the questions regarding causation or apportioning negligence. There is no
indication in the record that this procedure confused the jury or that it
submitted any questions to the trial court after it was instructed to correct the
verdict slip. N.T., 8/28/19, at 70-75. We conclude that this claim is meritless
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new
trial.
IV.
Finally, AutoZone argues that it is entitled to remittitur or a new trial to
address liability and damages because the jury’s award of $432,000 in non-
economic damages is excessive, arbitrary, speculative, punitive and
unreasonable.8 AutoZone argues that Wilson’s initial treating physician
determined that he had responded well to surgery and had recovered almost
entirely within a year following the procedure. It also points out that Wilson
had a history of gout, was morbidly obese and had suffered injuries to his
right knee and tendons in the past. AutoZone argues that Wilson’s medical
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8 This court will reverse an order denying remittitur only if the trial court
abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Paliometros v. Loyola,
932 A.2d 128, 134-135 (Pa. Super. 2007); Smalls v. Pittsburgh-Corning
Corp., 843 A.2d 410, 414 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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expert only examined him for the purposes of litigation and did not adequately
consider Wilson’s medical history and the notes from his treating physician
when he formed his opinion.
Much like a claim challenging the weight of the evidence, when
reviewing an order denying remittitur, we must determine whether the
damages award “so shocks the sense of justice such that the trial court should
have granted remittitur as a matter of law.” Smalls v. Pittsburgh-Corning
Corp., 843 A.2d 410, 414 (Pa. Super. 2004). “Remittitur is justified only in
limited instances [] where the verdict plainly is excessive, exorbitant, and
beyond what the evidence warrants . . . or where the verdict resulted from
partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corruption.” Id. (cleaned up). This court
must afford deference to the jury’s factual determinations and review a
request for remittitur “in light of the evidence accepted by the jury.” Id.(quotations omitted).
“A jury is given wide latitude to fashion a verdict on damages. . . . The
large size of a verdict by itself is not evidence of excessiveness.” Farese v.
Robinson, 222 A.3d 1173, 1189-90 (Pa. Super. 2019). In a case involving
non-economic damages, the trial court must advise the jury to consider the
following factors when fashioning a damages award:
(1) the age of the plaintiff; (2) the severity of the injuries; (3)
whether the injuries are temporary or permanent; (4) the extent
to which the injuries affect the ability of the plaintiff to perform
basic activities of daily living and other activities in which the
plaintiff previously engaged; (5) the duration and nature of
medical treatment; (6) the duration and extent of the physical
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pain and mental anguish which the plaintiff has experienced in the
past and will experience in the future; (7) the health and physical
condition of the plaintiff prior to the injuries; and (8) in case of
disfigurement, the nature of the disfigurement and the
consequences for the plaintiff.
Id. at 1190 (quoting Pa.R.C.P. 223.3). Here, the trial court properly
instructed the jury to consider these factors when assessing Wilson’s non-
economic damages. N.T., 8/28/19, at 58-59. The trial court additionally
advised the jury that Wilson’s life expectancy at the time of his accident was
36 years. Id. at 59. Based on all of the evidence admitted at trial, the jury
returned a damages award of $432,000.
The jury’s award is supported by the record and not excessive, arbitrary
or unreasonable in relation to the evidence adduced at trial. It is undisputed
that Wilson sustained a patellar tendon rupture and medial meniscal tear in
his left knee as a result of the fall at AutoZone. While he underwent surgery
and physical therapy to treat the injury, he had not recovered his full range
of motion by the time of trial. In addition, he was no longer able to participate
in hobbies or physical activities such as running, playing sports or cleaning,
and he experiences pain when walking or standing for long periods. He
continues to walk with a limp, has difficulty using the stairs, and sometimes
has to use the stairs sideways because of the pain in his left knee. He testified
that he still experiences severe pain in his knee on a daily basis.
Wilson also presented testimony from Dr. Stempler regarding his
prognosis for long-term recovery. At the examination in 2016, Wilson was
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still experiencing pain, loss of motion, difficulty with walking and other
movements and chronic inflammation in his knee. By the second examination
in 2019, Wilson had lost more motion in his knee and still had daily pain in his
knee. Dr. Stempler believed that all of Wilson’s problems with his left knee
stemmed from the fall at AutoZone, as Wilson had never reported any pain or
lack of function in that knee prior to the accident. Based on Wilson’s history
and age, Dr. Stempler did not believe that Wilson would ever fully recover.
He opined that the pain and loss of function was likely to persist throughout
the rest of Wilson’s life. Even though Wilson had been showing signs of
recovery after his surgery, Dr. Stempler explained that it was not uncommon
for injuries of this type of decline over time.
AutoZone presented expert testimony to the contrary. While Dr.
Israelite agreed that Wilson sustained an injury and would have initially
experienced pain as a result, he opined that Wilson had recovered fully
following his surgery and that any continuing problems Wilson experienced
with his knee were the result of unrelated health conditions. Dr. Israelite
formed his opinion based on a review of Wilson’s medical records, particularly
those generated by his treating physician within six months following the
surgery, but did not examine Wilson personally. His testimony contradicted
the opinion proffered by Dr. Stempler. The jury, as the sole arbiter of the
facts, was entitled to resolve the differences in the two experts’ testimony and
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credit Dr. Stempler’s opinion over Dr. Israelite’s. We do not disturb this
finding on appeal.
In light of the testimony proffered by Wilson and Dr. Stempler, as well
as Wilson’s life expectancy of 36 years at the time of the accident, the jury
concluded that Wilson was entitled to damages to compensate him for the
likely permanent loss of function in his knee and the daily pain he continued
to experience as a result of AutoZone’s negligence. Under these
circumstances, the award of $432,000 in compensatory damages was not so
clearly excessive as to shock one’s sense of justice. Neither remittitur nor a
new trial is warranted, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying relief.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/20
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