Com. v. Stokes, T. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S45008-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    TYON STOKES                              :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 306 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 4, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0006083-2009
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 02, 2020
    Tyon Stokes appeals from the order that dismissed without a hearing
    his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).    We
    vacate the order and remand for the appointment of counsel and a hearing.
    Given our disposition, we offer only a brief recitation of the history of
    the case. In 2012, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury
    convicted him of the 2003 murder of Phillip “Diesel” Sheridan in a dispute over
    drug territory. Neither his direct appeal nor his first PCRA petition afforded
    him any relief. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 
    100 A.3d 296
     (Pa.Super.
    2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 
    99 A.3d 925
     (Pa. 2014).
    See also Commonwealth v. Stokes, 
    175 A.3d 1062
     (Pa.Super. 2017)
    (unpublished memorandum).
    J-S45008-20
    Appellant filed the facially-untimely1 pro se PCRA petition at issue in the
    instant appeal on March 18, 2019. Therein, he claimed that on December 28,
    2018, he learned through a mutual acquaintance that Darrian Deans had
    witnessed the killing of Diesel and was certain that Appellant was not the
    murderer. See PCRA Petition, 3/18/19, at 8. He attached the affidavit of Mr.
    Deans, as well as that of the mutual acquaintance, and asserted that his
    testimony supported an after-discovered evidence claim.          Id. at 3, 7, 12
    (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)). See also id. at Exhibits A and B. Appellant
    further alleged that the petition was subject to the newly-discovered-facts
    timeliness exception because the existence of Mr. Deans and his knowledge
    of the incident was previously unknown to Appellant and could not have been
    discovered earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Id. at 2-3, 7-8 (citing
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)).
    The Commonwealth filed a response to the petition indicating that it did
    not object to the PCRA court granting a hearing on the issue. Commonwealth’s
    Letter Response, 10/2/19.         However, the PCRA court on October 4, 2019,
    issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing
    pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 because it was untimely and no timeliness
    exception applied. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 10/4/19, at 1. Appellant
    ____________________________________________
    1 Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
    subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
    of sentence is final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
    -2-
    J-S45008-20
    filed a timely response reiterating that he had invoked § 9545(b)(1)(ii), and,
    noting that the PCRA court had not explained the reason for its conclusion that
    the timeliness exception had not been satisfied, renewed his request for an
    evidentiary hearing. See Objection to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 10/16/19,
    at 2-3. Nonetheless, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition without a
    hearing by order of November 4, 2019.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the
    PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In particular, Appellant maintained
    that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing given
    his allegations concerning his discovery of the new evidence provided by Mr.
    Deans.      See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 1/17/20.         He reiterates his
    arguments in his brief, contending that he sufficiently pled and offered to
    prove the newly-discovered facts timeliness exception.2 See Appellant’s brief
    at 18-19.
    The PCRA court, in its Rule 1925 opinion, agreed with Appellant. The
    court explained that it had errantly applied a prior version of the § 9545(b)
    which required that a claim based upon a newly-discovered fact be filed within
    ____________________________________________
    2 Appellant also argues the merits of his substantive after-discovered evidence
    claim. See Appellant’s brief at 20-26. However, the substantive claim is
    distinct from the timeliness exception. Appellant must first satisfy his burden
    of proving that he has satisfied all the requirements of the timeliness exception
    before this Court or any court has jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the
    substantive claim. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    111 A.3d 171
    , 176 (Pa.
    Super. 2015) (discussing the distinct requirements of the timeliness exception
    and the substantive after-discovered evidence claim).
    -3-
    J-S45008-20
    sixty days of the date that the claim could have been presented, rather than
    the version applicable beginning on December 24, 2018, which changed the
    deadline from sixty days to one year.          See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/28/20, at
    5. Accordingly, the PCRA court acknowledged that it improperly dismissed the
    petition, and requests that we remand for Mr. Deans to testify at a hearing. 3
    
    Id.
    We agree with Appellant and the PCRA court that Appellant has pled and
    offered to prove sufficient facts to warrant a hearing to determine whether the
    facts upon which his claim was based were previously unknown to him and
    could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence,
    ____________________________________________
    3   For its part, the Commonwealth does not go so far as to concede that a
    hearing is necessary, although its response to the petition affirmatively
    indicated its lack of objection to a hearing. Rather, it merely expresses a lack
    of opposition to a remand, and opines that:
    on remand, the lower court should determine whether defendant’s
    proffered evidence otherwise satisfied all the requirements to
    establish the exception for discovery of new facts that could not
    have been discovered earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
    It will simply need to make that determination while applying the
    applicable one-year rather than the superseded sixty-day period.
    Commonwealth’s brief at 8 n.1. Since Appellant has pled that neither he nor
    the Commonwealth had any knowledge of the fact that Mr. Deans witnessed
    the shooting, let alone that he could describe the murderer’s appearance and
    affirmatively represent that it was not Appellant, we agree with the PCRA court
    that a hearing is warranted to ascertain the truth of Appellant’s assertions. If
    the PCRA court concludes after hearing from the witnesses that Appellant has
    satisfied the timeliness exception, it may then proceed to take evidence upon
    substantive after-discovered evidence claim and decide whether it merits
    relief.
    -4-
    J-S45008-20
    and whether Appellant filed his petition within one year of when he could have
    presented the claim. Accord Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 
    170 A.3d 553
    , 560
    (Pa.Super. 2017) (remanding for a hearing to determine the veracity of the
    allegations concerning the petitioner’s discovery of new facts and whether the
    petitioner could have discovered them sooner with the exercise of due
    diligence). Therefore, we vacate the order dismissing Appellant’s petition as
    untimely without a hearing, and remand for the PCRA court for a hearing on
    the timeliness of Appellant’s petition and, if warranted by the PCRA court’s
    timeliness findings, on the substance of Appellant’s after-discovered evidence
    claim.
    Moreover, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that
    when an unrepresented, indigent establishes entitlement to a hearing, “the
    judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(D).
    Upon remand, the PCRA court shall ascertain whether Appellant’s financial
    circumstances entitle him to appointed counsel to represent him at the hearing
    and related proceedings.
    Order vacated.       Case remanded with instructions.       Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
    -5-
    J-S45008-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/2/20
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 306 EDA 2020

Filed Date: 12/2/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/2/2020