In Re: Adoption of C.E.-M.J. Appeal of: S.A.J. ( 2014 )

J-S54016-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.E.-M.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.A.J., FATHER
No. 748 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree March 31, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 61-ADOPT-2013
IN RE: ADOPTION OF F.N.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.A.J., FATHER
No. 749 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree March 31, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 62-ADOPT-2013
IN RE: ADOPTION OF J.M.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.A.J., FATHER
No. 750 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree March 31, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 63-ADOPT-2013
J-S54016-14
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 05, 2014
S.A.J. (Father) appeals from the March 31, 2014 decrees involuntarily
terminating his parental rights to his three daughters, C.E.M.-J., born in July
2005, and, F.N.J. and J.M.J., who are twins born in November 2006 (the
Children).1 Upon careful review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows.
The Children were born in York County, Pennsylvania, during the marriage of
Father and J.M.D. (Mother). Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 5. In May
2008, when C.E.-M.J. was nearly three years old, and F.N.J. and J.M.J. were
eighteen months old, Father placed the Children in the temporary custody of
his sister, J.L.H. (Aunt), and her husband, D.P.H. (Uncle). N.T., 3/25/14, at
11, 56, 110. At the time, Father and the Children were living in the State of
Georgia, with Father acting as the primary caretaker of the Children because
Mother was in the military. Id. at 56, 133. Uncle and Aunt offered to take
the Children for “a little while,” so Father could make arrangements to
relocate to Pennsylvania. Id. at 56. Father and Mother subsequently
divorced, and Father relocated to Pennsylvania at a time not specified in the
certified record before this Court. Id. at 161, 177-178.
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1
By the same decrees, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of the Children’s mother, J.M.D., but she did not file notices
of appeal.
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Aunt and Uncle filed a custody action in Franklin County, Pennsylvania,
against Father, and, by order dated August 6, 2010, Father, then living in
the York or Lancaster area of Pennsylvania, was granted supervised
visitation for three and one-half hours on an alternating weekly basis.2 Id.
at 20-21, 134, 161. In October 2011, Father re-married, and thereafter he
and his wife, L.J. (Stepmother), resided in Elkland, Tioga County,
Pennsylvania, which is a driving distance of approximately four to four and
one-half hours from the home of Aunt, Uncle, and the Children in
Shippensburg, Franklin County, Pennsylvania. Id. at 132, 159, 161.
On December 20, 2013, Aunt and Uncle filed petitions for the
involuntary termination of parental rights of Father and Mother pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). The orphans’ court held a hearing on
March 25, 2014, during which Uncle, Aunt, Stepmother, and Father testified.
By decrees dated March 31, 2014, the orphans’ court granted the petitions
for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights.3 On April 30,
2014, Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors
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2
Father appeared pro se in the custody action. N.T., 3/25/14, at 134. The
custody order is not included in the certified record, and the record does not
disclose the basis for the custody court’s decision limiting Father’s custody to
supervised visitation.
3
On April 10, 2014, the orphans’ court issued two amended decrees at Nos.
61 ADOPT 2013 and 62 ADOPT 2013, respectively, to correct typographical
errors. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 1, n.2.
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complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), (b). On May
14, 2014, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P.
513 (permitting consolidation of appeals where the same question is
involved).
On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review.
I. Did the [orphans’] court err in determining
[that Aunt and Uncle] presented clear and convincing
evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights under
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?
II. Did the [orphans’] court err in finding there
was sufficient evidence that termination of Father’s
parental rights after analysis pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(b) was in the best interest of the [C]hildren?
Father’s Brief at 4.
We review the decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s parental
rights according to the following standard.
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of
discretion standard when considering a trial court’s
determination of a petition for termination of
parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. As
has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does
not result merely because the reviewing court might
have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.
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[T]here are clear reasons for applying an
abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts,
appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-
specific determinations on a cold record, where the
trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous
other hearings regarding the child and parents.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency
and termination cases, an appellate court must resist
the urge to second guess the trial court and impose
its own credibility determinations and judgment;
instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as
the factual findings are supported by the record and
the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (citations
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section
2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process
prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the
focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights
are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows.
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a
period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition either has
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
…
(b) Other considerations.―The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A §§ 2511(a)(1), 2511(b).
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With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce
clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six
months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled
intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform
parental duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008), citing
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental rights, the court must engage in three lines
of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect
of termination of parental rights on the child
pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Id., quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa.
1998).
This Court has emphasized that a parent does not perform his or her
parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development
of the child.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, In Re Adoption of N.M.B., 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa.
2005). We have explained this principle as follows.
A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional,
cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the
development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has
held that the parental obligation is a positive duty
which requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a
financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in
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the child and a genuine effort to maintain
communication and association with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor,
parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to
take and maintain a place of importance in the
child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act
affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and
not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the
parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent
must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more
suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with his
or her physical and emotional needs.
Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted)
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite
analysis as follows.
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination
of parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d
1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs
and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where
there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect
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analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In his first issue on appeal, Father argues that his conduct does not
warrant termination of his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)
because Aunt and Uncle “discouraged, obstructed and ultimately thwarted
[his] efforts to remain a significant figure in his daughter[s’] lives.” Father’s
Brief at 12. Father argues that the efforts he made to perform his parental
duties were reasonable under the circumstances. Upon careful review, we
disagree.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court articulated its factual
findings as follows.
Father offered evidence that he had made
repeated attempts to have telephone contact with
the [C]hildren, often calling multiple times a day and
leaving messages; however, his calls were not
returned by [Aunt and Uncle]. [Aunt and Uncle]
acknowledged not answering the telephone if the
[C]hildren were not able to speak with Father for
some reason (meals[sic] time, not all children home,
etc.). Father admitted that [Aunt and Uncle] asked
that he call ahead to schedule a time to speak with
the [C]hildren when all of the [C]hildren would be
available to speak with him. Father refused to do as
[Aunt and Uncle] asked and call ahead since the
Custody Order did not require him to do so and his
work as an over-the-road truck driver prevented him
from being able to establish a set time for phone
calls. Father’s last telephone contact with the
[C]hildren was in December of 2013 when he spoke
with them for about 30 minutes.
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The Custody Order required Father’s time with
the [C]hildren to be supervised. Specifically, the
Custody Order awarded Father supervised visits on
alternate Saturdays from 9:00 a.m. until 1:30 p.m.
at the home of Paternal Grandparents. [Aunt]
testified that Father maintained regular visits under
the Custody Order for a year. After that he visited
with the [C]hildren about on[c]e a month, and then
less frequently until he completely stopped
contacting [Aunt and Uncle] to schedule visits.
According to [Aunt], Father’s last visit occurred on
June 23, 2012.
Initially, [Uncle] was willing to serve as the
supervisor [of the visits] and did so. Father and
[Uncle] set up times for visits via email. [Uncle]
provided transportation to Paternal Grandparents’
home in the York, Pennsylvania area where the visits
took place. However, after July 2012, [Uncle] was
unable to continue as the supervisor because of a
change in his employment. By that time, Paternal
Grandparents were also not willing to provide
supervision for Father’s visits. [Uncle] advised
Father of his inability to continue to supervise visits
and encouraged Father to find another supervisor.
Father testified that he felt that he had done his
share with respect to locating a suitable supervisor,
and that it was up to [Uncle] to locate one by, for
example, asking his church members. Father’s last
visit with the [C]hildren was supervised by a family
acquainted with Father and approved by [Aunt and
Uncle]; unfortunately, the family sold their home and
embarked on a mission trip to Africa. Thereafter,
[Aunt and Uncle] refused Father’s request to permit
Father’s then fiancée (now wife) to supervise the
visits.
Father also informally requested additional
time with the [C]hildren after completing the four-
hour program for separated and divorcing parents
required of individuals prior to being granted a
divorce decree in this judicial district. Father took
the course in December, 2010, because completion
of a parenting class was a prerequisite under the
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Custody Order for Father to be awarded more time
with the [C]hildren. He believed the course would
satisfy the requirement; [Aunt and Uncle] did not
believe the four-hour class satisfied the [custody
c]ourt’s directive and therefore refused Father’s
requests to expand his time. Father claims to have
taken another course through his church, as well.
The [custody c]ourt was never asked to examine and
decide the issue.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 9-11. Upon review of the record, we
conclude the testimonial evidence supports the orphans’ court’s findings.
Indeed, Father testified that, after completing the parenting class on
December 9, 2010, Uncle and Aunt denied him increased visitation with the
Children. Nevertheless, he did not request more visitation from the custody
court because he could not financially afford a lawyer. N.T., 3/25/14, at
136-137. He further testified, “I could have done it on my own, but given
my past experience in the [custody c]ourt, without a lawyer, I didn’t want to
go into [the custody c]ourt and lose more time with my kids….” Id. at 137.
On cross-examination by counsel for Aunt and Uncle, Father testified with
respect to the performance of his parental duties as follows.
Q. So is it your belief and your testimony
today that you have been a parent to your children
in the six months prior to the [involuntary
termination] petition being filed in December, 2013?
A. As best as I was allowed to be.
Q. When you say you were allowed to be,
what did you do to try to parent your children?
A. I made phone calls to make contact with
them and they were not returned or answered.
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Q. And it is your belief that phone calls are
enough to parent children?
A. No.
Q. Did you contact a lawyer about changing
the Custody Order?
A. I haven’t had the financial means to do
so.
Q. Did you attempt contacting legal services
to see if they could help you at a reduced or a free
rate?
A. Other than my lawyer standing present,
no.
Q. And that would have been you applied
for her after you received the Petition?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you attempt to do the paperwork and
file with the [custody c]ourt to be able to do things
on your own to get this in front of a judge?
A. I downloaded … many of the documents
to do that, but because of my inexperience in law, I
didn’t know how to go about all of it, and I was
afraid that if I tried – and I was given advice not to
by some of my friends that I trusted, because they
knew of friends of theirs that had done the same
thing and went into [custody c]ourt and lost more.
Q. But in 2013 you’re essentially saying you
had nothing with your children, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So how could you lose more than
nothing?
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A. That’s a good point.
Id. at 164-165. In addition, Father testified that since his last visit with the
Children in June of 2012, he has not written any letters to the Children. Id.
at 182. According to Father’s own testimony, since the beginning of 2013,
while he purchased gifts, he did not provide the gifts to the Children. Id. at
153.
On cross-examination by the guardian ad litem (GAL), Father testified
with respect to his share of responsibility for his lack of contact with the
Children:
A. I understand that basically that I need to
do my part, and I think I’ve learned even through
this part where we are right now, that legally I had
more options, that I didn’t really know . . . that were
available to me, apart from knocking on their door,
which has already been told to me I’m not allowed
near their home. So I didn’t know if I was even
allowed in their church, places that I could have
gone to make myself known, to make my presence
known in my daughters’ lives, I didn’t think were an
option to me, because I’m not even allowed in their
home.
So I found out since this proceeding has
started that I’m incorrect in that, that I should have
been doing those things, and I wish I had.
Id. at 184.
With respect to the Children’s best interests, Aunt and Uncle testified
that they intend to adopt the Children if Father’s and Mother’s parental
rights are terminated. Id. at 36-37, 98. Aunt testified that it is neither her
nor Uncle’s intent to wholly exclude Father as a part of the Children’s lives.
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Id. at 98. Aunt explained, “[w]e hope that some day we can all be at family
events together.” Id.
Father acknowledged that it would be detrimental to remove the
Children from Aunt and Uncle. Id. at 177. Father testified on cross-
examination by counsel for Aunt and Uncle with respect to the Children’s
best interests, as follows.
Q. [L]ooking at it from your kids’
perspective, who have been … mom and dad to
them?
A. [Aunt and Uncle] have.
Q. And is it your position that making that
permanent by allowing them to be adopted is not in
their best interest?
A. They have been mom and dad. If the
Court could give me what I have always wanted, the
least of which I’ve always wanted, is that if [Aunt]
and [Uncle] were in the place of mom, quote-
unquote, mom in the normal type of divorced
situation, that I would get what a normal dad would
get. That would make me happy. I think that
moving to that would have to be slow, because of
the fact that I haven’t had a lot of access to my kids,
but that I think it would be best -- whether they
adopted them or whether or not I don’t lose my
rights, and I get that -- I think what would be best is
that I stay involved in their life, and I think it would
be detrimental to remove [Aunt] and [Uncle] from
their life, as well.
Id. at 176-177.
Based on our review, and the foregoing testimonial evidence, we
conclude the orphans’ court did not commit an error of law or abuse its
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discretion in determining that “Father’s efforts to overcome the difficulty he
experienced spending time with and talking to his children and to engage in
a meaningful father-child relationship were insufficient.” Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 5/19/14, at 11. We conclude the record demonstrates that Father
displayed “merely a passive interest in the development” of the Children,
which does not satisfy his parental obligation. See In re B.,N.M., supra.
Father acknowledged yielding to the obstacles posed by Aunt and Uncle in
maintaining communication and association with the Children. Orphans’
Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 11. Father has allowed Aunt and Uncle to satisfy
the Children’s physical and emotional needs since May of 2008, and he has
failed to exercise reasonable firmness in maintaining a parent-child
relationship with them. Id. Therefore, upon our thorough review, we
conclude the record supports termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).
Father’s first issue on appeal fails.
In his second issue, Father argues the orphans’ court abused its
discretion in terminating his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b)
because there was insufficient evidence with regard to “the current bond
between him and the Children to determine the extent of the bond and the
effect on the [C]hildren if the bond were to be severed.” Father’s Brief at
20. We disagree.
With respect to the bond analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), our
Supreme Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment
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of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination
petition.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). The Court further
stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination
must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and
whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268 (citation
omitted). Moreover, the Court directed that, in weighing the bond
considerations pursuant to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking
clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The Court observed that,
“[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an
obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail, …
the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court noted that the GAL,
who interviewed the Children and visited them in the home of Aunt and
Uncle, “did not specifically interview the [C]hildren about their Father, so as
not to cause the [C]hildren to become upset.” Orphans’ Court Opinion,
5/19/14, at 18. Nevertheless, the court stated that the GAL “described all
three children as energetic and happy. He observed the Children to show
affection toward [Aunt and Uncle]. The GAL’s report also indicated that the
girls are doing well in school.” Id. The GAL recommended to the orphans’
court that Father’s parental rights be involuntarily terminated.4
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4
Likewise, the GAL filed an appellee brief with this Court in support of the
subject decrees.
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To the extent Father argues that a bonding evaluation was necessary
in this case, we disagree. We have long recognized that, “[i]n analyzing the
parent-child bond, the orphans’ court is not required by statute or precedent
to order a formal bonding evaluation be performed by an expert.” In re
K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
Similarly, we have stated that, “when conducting a bonding analysis, the
court is not required to use expert testimony.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,
1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court found as follows.
[T]he [C]hildren do not see Father in a
parental role. [Aunt and Uncle] have filled the roles
of parents in the [C]hildren’s lives since May 2008.
By way of example, the girls refer to Father as
“Daddy Steve” by their own choice. The [C]hildren
refer to [Uncle] as “Daddy.” …
…
Despite not having seen their Father since July
2012 and not having spoken with him on the
telephone since December 2013 (and only
sporadically prior to that), the [C]hildren are doing
well. They have, for the most part, overcome the
developmental delays that necessitated Early
Childhood Intervention services. The twins have
largely addressed the issues that necessitated
counseling services, and C.E.-M.J.’s counseling
sessions are held on [a] less frequent schedule now
than they had been in the past, indicating progress.
With the exception of some stealing behavior
exhibited by C.E.-M.J., the [orphans’ c]ourt heard no
evidence regarding behavior issues, educational
issues, or emotional issues leading the [orphans’
c]ourt to believe that their Father’s near two-year
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absence has caused the [C]hildren to suffer in any
significant or measurable way.[5]
According to the credible testimony of [Aunt],
the [C]hildren have started to combine their last
name with [Uncle’s and Aunt’s] last name and have
asked why their last name cannot be the same as
[Uncle and Aunt]. C.E.-M.J. has formed the
impression that her parents have walked out of her
life.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 16-17. Based on our review, we
conclude the testimonial evidence supports the orphans’ court’s findings.
Significantly, Aunt testified on cross-examination by the GAL about
why she decided to seek counseling for the Children in March of 2012.
Q. [W]hy did you think that the [C]hildren
needed counseling as of March 2012, rather than in
the time period before that, when they were in your
care? What changed?
A. What changed was that I saw more and
more things cropping up that concerned me. I saw
[F.N.J.]’s confusion. I saw her frustration with
herself as a very bright, little girl when she couldn’t
make things do exactly what she wanted them to do.
I saw some of [J.M.J.]’s insecurity
around other people. She has a tremendous fear of
dogs, period.
And I saw [C.E.-M.J.]’s struggles
reflected in some of her behavior and in some of the
things that she would say – I saw her struggles with
I have all these people but what do they mean to my
life. And I know she struggled with the thought that
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5
Uncle testified that he and Aunt are seeking a second opinion from a
psychologist with respect to whether C.E.-M.J. suffers from Asperger’s
Syndrome. N.T., 3/25/14, at 79.
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her … biological mom and her biological dad – had
essentially all but walked away. That was … the
impression that she was forming.
And we wanted to do things to help all
three of the girls get past some of these obstacles in
their lives.
N.T., 3/25/14, at 115-116.
Finally, Aunt testified about the effect on the Children of terminating
Father’s parental rights.
Q. And what about the termination[] of
[Father]’s parental rights, how do you think that will
affect [the Children]?
A. [] I will say this: I do not believe it will
as adversely affect them as [Father] may think it
will. They love him. And I think that’s wonderful.
They don’t see him often enough or hear from him or
get cards or letters or anything from him with any
consistency that it would cause them damage to
have him no longer be their biological father.
Id. at 98.
In light of the foregoing testimonial evidence, and after thorough
review of the certified record, we discern no error of law or abuse of
discretion by the orphans’ court in concluding that,
[T]he [C]hildren certainly love their father.
However, Father’s sporadic and minimal contact with
the [C]hildren cannot be a sound basis to maintain
that the [C]hildren would suffer harm if Father’s
parental rights were terminated. There is no
evidence to suggest that a permanent severance of
the bond between Father and the [C]hildren would
cause the [C]hildren harm. In fact, based on the
evidence presented, the [C]hildren’s best interests
would be served by terminating Father’s parental
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rights and freeing the [C]hildren for adoption by
[Aunt and Uncle].
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 18-19; See In re K.K.R.-S., supra at
535 (clarifying that, “concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent
simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound”). Therefore, contrary to Father’s
assertion, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the orphans’
court termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Accordingly, Father’s final issue on appeal fails.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decrees involuntarily
terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Sections
2511(a)(1) and (b).
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/5/2014
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