Odell, D. v. Weingartner, E. ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • J-A09015-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    DREAMA ODELL,                                  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    ELLEN WEINGARTNER AND SUN
    AMERICA ANNUITY LIFE,
    Appellee                   No. 1433 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 13, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
    Civil Division at No(s): 12-01300
    BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, AND STABILE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                               FILED MAY 27, 2015
    Dreama Odell appeals pro se the June 13, 2014 judgment entered on
    the verdict in favor of Edward Weingartner, III and Suzanne Law-Ticknor
    after a bench trial. We affirm.
    The trial court succinctly stated the underlying facts and procedural
    history as follows: properly
    On or about November 11, 1961, Edward Weingartner, Jr.
    was issued a life insurance policy by Mutual Benefits Life
    Insurance Company under policy #4175670A. The primary
    beneficiary of the policy was his wife, Ellen Weingartner, and the
    contingent beneficiaries were "children born of marriage of
    insured and primary beneficiary or legally adopted by insured."
    Mr. and Mrs. Weingartner had two children, Edward Weingartner,
    III and Susan Law-Ticknor. Mr. and Mrs. Weingartner were
    divorced in 1994.
    J-A09015-15
    Mr. Weingartner passed away on December 17, 2011. On
    December 20, 2011, Plaintiff faxed a letter, dated December 19,
    2011 and signed by her, to Sun America seeking payment of the
    proceeds of this life insurance policy. Attached to this letter was
    a Financial Transaction Request Form-Loan, dated December 14,
    2011. This document, which appears to have been signed by Mr.
    Weingartner, seeks a loan to the benefit of Mr. Weingartner in
    the amount of $15,000.00. A handwritten note on the form,
    written by Plaintiff, requests a form to change the beneficiary of
    the policy and further states: "In the interim, this statement will
    serve as the official and authorized change identifying the
    beneficiary as Dreama Odell." Following this note is a signature
    which appears to be that of Mr. Weingartner, and the date,
    December 14, 2011. A second copy of the loan document with
    Plaintiffs handwritten note was received by Sun America through
    the mail on December 21, 2011.
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/14, at 1-2 (select quotation marks omitted)
    (citations and footnotes omitted).
    On February 6, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se complaint against Sun
    America Annuity and Life Assurance Company (incorrectly identified as Sun
    America Annuity and Life) (“Sun America”) and Ellen Weingartner. Appellant
    asserted that she was entitled to the proceeds of Mr. Weingartner, Jr.’s life
    insurance policy because the decedent effectually named her has the
    primary beneficiary of that policy before he died.    Sun America countered
    with, inter alia, a counterclaim for interpleader that sought to add the
    contingent beneficiaries, Edward Weingartner, III and Ms. Law-Ticknor, as
    interpleader claimants.     Thereafter, the parties stipulated that upon
    interpleading the $27,979.66 insurance proceeds into the trial court, Sun
    -2-
    J-A09015-15
    America would be discharged from any liability and dismissed from the case.
    Sun America deposited the funds and was dismissed.
    Following a non-jury trial,1 the trial court entered the above referenced
    order finding, “Plaintiff is not a beneficiary of the life insurance policy in
    question.” Trial Court Order, 12/12/13, at 1 n.1. Essentially, the trial court
    determined that, pursuant to the terms of life-insurance policy, a request to
    change a beneficiary is deemed effective if received prior to the insured’s
    death, that Appellant failed to establish that Sun America received the
    document in time, and that she adduced insufficient evidence to establish
    that Mr. Weingartner Jr. achieved substantial compliance with the policy’s
    change-of-beneficiary requirements by utilizing every reasonable effort to
    satisfy the insurer’s prerequisites. This pro se appeal followed the denial of
    Appellant’s timely motion for post-trial relief.2
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Appellant was represented by counsel during the non-jury trial; however,
    counsel was granted leave to withdraw on March 20, 2014.
    2
    As judgment had not been entered on the record pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 301
    when Appellant filed her notice of appeal, this appeal was premature. See
    Vance v. 46 and 2, Inc., 
    920 A.2d 202
     (Pa. Super. 2007) (appeal to
    Superior Court can only lie from judgment entered subsequent to trial
    court’s disposition of post-verdict motions, not from order denying post-trial
    motions). Accordingly, on May 29, 2014, we issued a per curiam order
    directing Appellant to file in the trial court a praecipe to enter judgment on
    the verdict. We further advised that upon compliance with the per curiam
    order, this Court would regard the premature notice of appeal as being filed
    after the entry of judgment. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict
    on June 13, 2014. Accordingly, the appeal is properly before this Court.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -3-
    J-A09015-15
    Appellant presents ten fundamentally redundant questions for our
    review, which we reduce to the following succinct issue: Whether the trial
    court erred in finding that Appellant failed to prove that she was entitled to
    the proceeds of Mr. Weingartner, Jr.’s life insurance policy.
    The following legal principles are relevant to our disposition. First, we
    observe that, absent an error of law, our review the trial court’s verdict is
    highly deferential. In Kennedy v. Consol Energy Inc. __A.3d __, 
    2015 PA Super 93
    , *12 (filed April 22, 2015) (quoting Stephan v. Waldron Elec.
    Heating & Cooling LLC, 
    100 A.3d 660
    , 665 (Pa.Super. 2014)), we recently
    reiterated our standard of review as follows:
    Our review in a non-jury case is limited to “whether the findings
    of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and
    whether the trial court committed error in the application of
    law.” We must grant the court's findings of fact the same weight
    and effect as the verdict of a jury and, accordingly, may disturb
    the non-jury verdict only if the court's findings are unsupported
    by competent evidence or the court committed legal error that
    affected the outcome of the trial. It is not the role of an
    appellate court to pass on the credibility of witnesses; hence we
    will not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Thus,
    the test we apply is “not whether we would have reached the
    same result on the evidence presented, but rather, after due
    consideration of the evidence which the trial court found
    credible, whether the trial court could have reasonably reached
    its conclusion.”
    Next, as it relates to the questions posed in this appeal, we note that,
    in order to make a valid change to the beneficiary of an insurance policy, the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    -4-
    J-A09015-15
    insured must comply with requirements specified by the policy.            See
    Carruthers v. $21,000, 
    434 A.2d 125
     (Pa.Super. 1981).               However,
    Pennsylvania jurisprudence has carved an exception to this doctrine when it
    is determined that the insured has done everything that he reasonably could
    do to comply with the policy.   
    Id. at 127
    .      In Carruthers, we observed,
    “The intent of the insured will be given effect in our Commonwealth if he
    does all that he reasonably can under the circumstances to comply with the
    terms of the policy which permit a change of beneficiary.” 
    Id.
    Instantly, Appellant’s claim is two-fold.    First, relying upon case law
    that addressed the contract principles of offer and acceptance, Appellant
    contends that the beneficiary designation was deemed received by Sun
    America on the date that she placed it in the mail on Mr. Weingartner, Jr.’s
    behalf. See Falconer v. Mazess, 
    168 A.2d 558
     (Pa. 1961) (offer of stock
    purchase was accepted by posting in mail); Chanoff v. Fiala, 
    271 A.2d 285
    ,
    287 (Pa. 1970) (option on real estate accepted by posting check in mail the
    day before offer was due to expire); Russock v. AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins.
    Co., 
    898 A.2d 636
     (Pa.Super. 2006) (automobile insurance renewal payment
    deemed received on date check was mailed because policy required
    premiums to be submitted by mail).        Second, Appellant argues that Mr.
    Weingartner, Jr. achieved substantial compliance with the terms of the policy
    on December 15, 2011, by having Appellant note his intention to change the
    beneficiary on the Sun America loan transaction form, signing the form near
    -5-
    J-A09015-15
    the hand-written notation, and directing Appellant to mail the form to Sun
    America.     The crux of the latter argument challenges the weight of trial
    court’s determination that Mr. Weingartner, Jr. did not effectuate a change
    of beneficiary on his insurance policy before he died.
    In rejecting Appellant’s initial position, the trial court concluded that
    the mail-box exception that Appellant attempted to invoke was inapplicable
    in this case because the insurance policy required that it receive changes to
    the designation of beneficiaries and alterations of payment options for
    beneficiaries prior to the death of the insured. Specifically, the life insurance
    policy provided,
    Upon request, the owner may change the beneficiary. The
    owner may also request that all or part of the proceeds be
    placed under a payment option for a beneficiary who is a natural
    person and who id to receive payment in his or her own behalf.
    We must receive any such request before the death
    of the insured. When we approve the request, any prior
    designation of beneficiary and any prior agreement to
    place the proceeds under a payment option will cease to
    be in effect.
    See Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Policy, ¶ 21.3 (emphasis added).            As
    Appellant did not assert that Sun America received the change-of-benefit
    designation prior to Mr. Weingartner, Jr.’s death, the trial court concluded
    that the request was not effective.
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Sun America is the successor to Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company.
    -6-
    J-A09015-15
    As it relates to Appellant’s remaining assertions, the trial court found
    that Appellant failed to adduce any credible evidence that Mr. Weingartner,
    Jr. utilized every reasonable effort to comply with the policy requirements.
    Specifically, the trial court determined that Appellant’s testimony regarding
    Mr. Weingartner, Jr.’s efforts to change the beneficiary lacked credibility and
    conflicted with other evidence in the certified record.        The court doubted
    Appellant’s    testimony   concerning   both   whether   Mr.    Weingartner,   Jr.
    requested a change of beneficiary form from Sun America and whether he
    used reasonable efforts to tender the self-styled request that Appellant
    eventually submitted to the insurance company after his death. Additionally,
    trial court found Appellant’s characterization of her relationship with Mr.
    Weingartner, Jr. as “life partners” was suspect in light of the fact that she
    sued him on at least one occasion over sales commission that she believed
    she was owed. N.T. 12/12/13, at 24-25. While the testimony regarding the
    prior lawsuits was only tangentially related to Mr. Weingartner, Jr.’s efforts
    to change his beneficiary, the trial court considered the dichotomy between
    Appellant’s representations and actions revealing as to her general lack of
    credibility.
    After a thorough review of the parties’ briefs, pertinent law, and the
    certified record, we conclude that the Honorable Jacqueline C. Cody cogently
    addressed Appellant’s arguments in her well-reasoned opinion entered on
    August 4, 2014, and we affirm on the bases contained therein.
    -7-
    J-A09015-15
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/27/2015
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1433 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 5/27/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021