In Re: A.J.N. , 2016 Pa. Super. 165 ( 2016 )

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2016 PA Super 165IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
IN RE: A.J.N. PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.J.N.
No. 653 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order March 25, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Civil Division at No(s): 70071 of 2014 M.D.
BEFORE: BOWES, MUNDY AND JENKINS, JJ.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 22, 2016
A.J.N. appeals the March 25, 2015 order denying his petition to
expunge two involuntary commitment proceedings instituted against him.
Since the record establishes that the procedural requirements of the Mental
Health Procedures Act (“the MHPA”), 50 P.S. §§ 7101, et seq. were not
followed at either proceeding, we reverse. We remand and direct that all
records of the involuntary commitment proceedings in question be expunged
and destroyed.
Appellant instituted this action against the Lawrence County Office of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation and the Pennsylvania State Police,
Appellee, by filing a petition for expungement of two three-day involuntary
commitments that he had undergone pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302 (“§ 302”)
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of the MHPA. Appellant thereafter filed an amended petition, wherein the
following averments were made. He was born in October, 1982, in New
Castle, Pennsylvania. After attending high school, he briefly went to college,
transferred to a technical school, and then dropped out of school altogether.
Appellant thereafter worked at various part-time jobs for two years.
As a young man, Appellant had a drug-addiction problem. In 2004, he
was involuntarily committed twice under § 302 of the MHPA for three days.
The first commitment occurred on May 27, 2004, after Appellant’s
grandmother indicated that he was a danger to himself. The second one
transpired on November 6, 2004, and was based on a report to police by
Appellant’s father that Appellant was a danger to himself. On both
occasions, Appellant was undergoing withdrawal from drugs and
experiencing physical distress.
By 2005, Appellant was free from his addiction. That year, he enlisted
in the United States Army and, after nine years, progressed to the rank of
Sergeant First Class. During his tenure with the Army, Appellant was twice
deployed to Afghanistan and successfully completed the following: 1) the
United States Army Airborne, Air Assault, and Pathfinder Schools; 2) the
Warrior Leader Course; 3) the Combat Life Saver Course; 4) the United
States Army Combatives School, and 5) the Advanced Leader Court.
Appellant also was awarded four commendation medals, two achievement
medals, two good-conduct medals for honorable and faithful service, the
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Afghanistan Campaign metal, and the NATO medal. Additionally, Appellant
earned the Army service and global war on terrorism ribbon, non-
commissioned officer developmental ribbons, two overseas ribbons, the
parachutist badge, the air assault badge, the driver badge, the expert and
combat infantryman’s badges, and the pathfinder badge.
When he instituted this case, Appellant was serving as an airborne
instructor at the United States Army Airborne School at Fort Benning,
Georgia, and held a secret security clearance. His supervisors considered
him to be an outstanding and competent leader, both in combat and training
environments.
In this action, Appellant sought relief from the prohibition against
carrying firearms applicable to him due to his § 302 commitments. See 18
Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(4).1 He premised this right upon 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1),
which states: “Upon application to the court of common pleas under this
subsection by an applicant subject to the prohibitions under subsection
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1
Section 6105 of the Crimes Code prohibits certain persons from possessing
firearms and states in pertinent part: “ A person . . . whose conduct meets
the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or
manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or
manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
Persons meeting the criteria of subsection (c) include someone who “has
been . . . involuntarily committed to a mental institution for inpatient care
and treatment under section 302, . . . [of the] Mental Health Procedures
Act.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(4).
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(c)(4), the court may grant such relief as it deems appropriate if the court
determines that the applicant may possess a firearm without risk to the
applicant or any other person.”
In addition, Appellant sought expungement and destruction of all
records from the two involuntary commitments pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §
6111.1(g),2 challenging the sufficiency of the evidence upon which each
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2
That provision states:
(1) Upon receipt of a copy of the order of a court of competent
jurisdiction which vacates a final order or an involuntary
certification issued by a mental health review officer, the
Pennsylvania State Police shall, after disclosing relevant records
under subsection (f)(3), expunge all records of the involuntary
treatment received under subsection (f).
(2) A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant to section
302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act may petition the court
to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
commitment was based. If the court determines that the
evidence upon which the involuntary commitment was based
was insufficient, the court shall order that the record of the
commitment submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police be
expunged. A petition filed under this subsection shall toll the
60-day period set forth under section 6105(a)(2).
(3) The Pennsylvania State Police, after disclosing relevant
records under subsection (f)(3), shall expunge all records of an
involuntary commitment of an individual who is discharged from
a mental health facility based upon the initial review by the
physician occurring within two hours of arrival under section
302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act2 and the physician's
determination that no severe mental disability existed pursuant
to section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act. The
physician shall provide signed confirmation of the determination
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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commitment was based. As an alternative basis for expungement, Appellant
asserted that the commitments in question “failed to comply with the
requirements of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act.” Amended
Petition for Expungement of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 9/30/14, at ¶¶
30, 48. Based upon violations of procedural mandates of that Act, Appellant
claimed that the commitments were “invalid, and illegal” as well as “a
violation of his right to due process of law.” Id. Appellant demanded that
the commitments “be declared null and void and . . . vacated and the
records thereof” expunged and destroyed. Id.
At a hearing, these issues were fully addressed. Appellant claimed
that, pursuant to § 6111.1(g), there was not sufficient evidence to support
either commitment since he expressed only suicidal ideation due to drug
withdrawal. Appellant additionally asked the trial court to expunge both of
the records since “the procedure protections and mandates delineated in the
Mental Health Procedures Act were not followed.” N.T. Hearing, 10/20/14,
at 2-3.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
of the lack of severe mental disability following the initial
examination under section 302(b) of the Mental Health
Procedures Act to the Pennsylvania State Police.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g).
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At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court determined that
Appellant’s right to possess a firearm could be restored under § 6105(f)(1)
in that Appellant’s actions after his 2005 enlistment demonstrated
unequivocally that he could possess a firearm without any risk to himself or
others. The court, however, refused to expunge the two proceedings either
under § 6111.1(g) or due to violations of the procedures outlined in the
MHPA. Since the records of the § 302 commitments were not expunged,
Appellant remained subject to a federal prohibition against possessing a
firearm.3
Appellant thereafter filed this appeal. He raises three allegations:
ISSUE I.
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3
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) prohibits anyone who was ever
committed to a mental institution from possessing a firearm. We note that a
federal district court recently concluded that this provision violated the
Second Amendment constitutional right to bear arms as applied to an
individual whose circumstances were similar to those at issue herein. Keyes
v. Lynch, 2016 WL 3670852 (M.D.Pa. 2016). In Keyes, there were two
plaintiffs, one of whom was Johnathan Yox. The federal district court ruled
that Yox was entitled to privately own a gun as the federal prohibition was
infirm as applied to him. Yox was involuntarily committed as a juvenile after
taking steps to commit suicide while experiencing a very stressful life event,
his parents’ divorce. After that institutionalization, Vox went on to serve in
the United States Army and then became a state correctional officer. Like
Vox, Appellant herein was undergoing a stressful life event, drug withdrawal,
when he made threats to harm himself. Additionally, Appellant thereafter
ceased using drugs and led an exemplary life in service to his country, as
had Yox. Appellant herein has not raised a Second Amendment challenge to
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4) as applied to him.
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EXAMINING PHYSICIANS' FINDINGS INSUFFICIENT
Did the trial court make an error of fact and law when it
failed to hold that both of the involuntary commitments must be
expunged because the findings that the examining physicians
made in both the 302 proceeding of May 27, 2004 and that of
November 6, 2004 were insufficient as a matter of fact and of
law to support emergency impatient treatment under Section
302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (50 P.S.
§ 7302) (hereinafter "MHPA ") thus requiring expungement of
the records thereof?
ISSUE II.
VIOLATIONS OF THE MHPA'S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS
Did the trial court make an error of law when it failed to
hold that both of the involuntary commitments must be
expunged because the procedural due process protections and
mandates delineated in the MHPA were violated in both the 302
proceeding of May 27, 2004 and November 6, 2004 resulting in
both the commitments being improper, invalid, and illegal and
requiring expungement of the records thereof?
ISSUE III.
WRONGFUL ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF HEARSAY
MEDICAL OPINIONS
Did the trial court make an error of law when it failed to
sustain A.J.N.'s counsel's hearsay objections to the admission
into evidence of the medical opinions and conclusions contained
within those portions of the 302 application forms that
contained the examining physicians' statements of the results of
the examinations of both the May 27, 2004 and November 6,
2004 commitments?
Appellant’s brief at 3.
Initially, we note: “Our well-settled standard of review in cases
involving a motion for expunction is whether the trial court abused its
discretion.” In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016, 1022 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citing
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Commonwealth v. A.M.R., 887 A.2d 1266, 1268 (Pa.Super. 2005)).
Herein, we agree with Appellant’s second position, wherein he avers that he
is entitled to expungement of both civil commitments due to a violation of
the due process/procedure mandates of the MHPA. We therefore do not
address either the evidentiary sufficiency of the commitments or the hearsay
issue.
Appellant’s specific position in this appeal is that he was detained and
driven by police to the mental health facilities for his involuntary
commitments in violation of the procedural provisions of § 302(a) of the
MHPA. The MHPA permits a person to be taken into custody and transported
to a mental health facility in accordance with the following procedures:
(a) Application for Examination.--Emergency
examination may be undertaken at a treatment facility upon the
certification of a physician stating the need for such examination;
or upon a warrant issued by the county administrator authorizing
such examination; or without a warrant upon application by a
physician or other authorized person who has personally
observed conduct showing the need for such examination.
(1) Warrant for Emergency Examination.--Upon
written application by a physician or other
responsible party setting forth facts constituting
reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely
mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment, the county administrator may issue a
warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any
peace officer, to take such person to the facility
specified in the warrant.
(2) Emergency Examination Without a Warrant.--
Upon personal observation of the conduct of a
person constituting reasonable grounds to believe
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that he is severely mentally disabled and in need of
immediate treatment, [a] physician or peace officer,
or anyone authorized by the county administrator
may take such person to an approved facility for an
emergency examination. Upon arrival, he shall make
a written statement setting forth the grounds for
believing the person to be in need of such
examination.
50 P.S. § 7302 (a).
Herein, the record establishes that the requirements of § 302(a) were
violated in that police, when they assumed custody of Appellant and drove
him to the mental health facilities, had neither personally viewed behavior
supporting a belief that Appellant was in need of involuntary treatment nor
had a warrant been issued. Appellant, his grandmother, and his grandfather
all testified that, in both cases, police were called. Thereafter, police
immediately detained Appellant and transported him to a mental health
facility to await examination by a physician. This procedure was followed
during both commitment proceedings, N.T. Hearing, 10/20/14, at 14, 16,
23, 24-25, 33, 34, and Appellee did not present any proof to the contrary.
The applications for involuntary emergency examination and treatment
from both proceedings, which were admitted into evidence, indicated that
police purportedly took Appellant into custody and to the mental health
facilities pursuant to a warrant issued by the county administrator.
Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination and Treatment, 5/27/04
at 3 (where Appellant’s grandmother, based upon information provided in
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the application, asked that “The County Administrator issue a warrant
authorizing a policeman or someone representing the County Administrator
[to] take the patient to a facility for examination and treatment.”);
Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination and Treatment, 11/6/04,
at 3 (where Appellant’s father, based upon information provided in the
application, asked that “The County Administrator issue a warrant
authorizing a policeman or someone representing the County Administrator
[to] take the patient to a facility for examination and treatment.”).
With respect to the first commitment, the county administrator issued
a warrant allowing Appellant to “be taken to and examined” at the mental
health facility “[b]ased upon representations made to” him by Appellant’s
grandmother. Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination and
Treatment, 5/27/04, at 5. As to the second commitment, the county
administrator issued a warrant allowing Appellant to “be taken to and
examined” at the mental health facility “[b]ased upon representations made
to” him by Appellant’s father. Application for Involuntary Emergency
Examination and Treatment, 11/6/04, at 5.
The default occurred because the warrants were not issued until after
Appellant had arrived at the facilities, and Appellant was not take into
custody pursuant to the warrants, as represented by Appellee. Scott
Baldwin, the county administrator who executed both warrants, admitted at
the hearing that the warrants in question were issued upon written
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representations of Appellant’s grandmother and father, respectively. Id. at
58. Mr. Baldwin also conceded that the written applications for him to issue
the warrants were “completed at the hospital after the patient had already
been transported to the hospital.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it is not
subject to dispute that, for purposes of both commitments, police detained
Appellant and drove him to the mental health facility. They did not view
behavior allowing them to perform these actions, otherwise issuance of the
warrants would not have been necessary. Moreover, police did not possess
warrants when they assumed custody of Appellant and transported him to
the facility, as Mr. Baldwin admitted that he signed the warrants after these
actions were taken.
The language of § 302(a) is clear and unequivocal. It permits
transportation to and an emergency examination at a mental health facility
“upon the certification of a physician stating the need for such examination,”
or “upon a warrant issued by the county administrator authorizing such
examination,” or “without a warrant upon application by a physician or other
authorized person who has personally observed conduct showing the need
for such examination.” 50 P.S. § 7302(a). Herein, there was no physician’s
certification, Appellant was taken by police to the facility before the warrant
was issued, and the police failed to personally observe conduct
demonstrating the need for such an examination.
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The subsections of § 302(a) reiterate these mandates. Under §
302(a)(1), after a responsible party or physician indicates the need to do so,
the county administrator can issue a warrant permitting a person authorized
by him or any police officer “to take such person to the facility specified in
the warrant.” In this case, Appellant already had been transported to the
facility specified in the warrant when that document was issued. Section
302(a)(2) states that a physician, police officer or someone authorized by
the county administrator is permitted to transport a person to an approved
facility for an emergency examination without a warrant only upon the
personal observation of conducting authorizing emergency involuntary
treatment. Herein, Appellant was taken into custody by police. At the time,
police did not have a warrant and had not personally observed any conduct
on the part of Appellant providing grounds for an involuntary commitment,
otherwise the county administrator would not have needed to issue a
warrant based upon the representations of the responsible parties in
question. Hence, § 302(a) was violated.
The government’s authority to involuntarily commit persons who are a
danger to themselves or others arises from the state’s inherent police
powers. In re Hutchinson, 454 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Pa. 1982). The person
so confined has a countervailing liberty interest protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Id. As our Supreme Court clearly delineated in
In re Hutchinson, “involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill persons
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constitutes deprivation of liberty and may be accomplished only in
accordance with due process protections.” Id. at 1010. The MHPA is “an
enlightened legislative endeavor to strike a balance between the state's valid
interest in imposing and providing mental health treatment and the
individual patient's rights.” Id. (citation omitted). The MHPA specifically
embodies these principles by stating that its provisions must “be interpreted
in conformity with the principles of due process[.]” 50 P.S. § 7102. As we
noted in In re Ryan, 784 A.2d 803, 807 (Pa.Super. 2001), “The legislative
policy reflected in the Mental Health Procedures Act is to require that strict
conditions be satisfied before a court order for commitment shall be issued.
Such a policy is in accord with the recognition that commitment entails a
massive deprivation of liberty.”
In this case, police, without Appellant’s consent, took him into their
custody and transported him to a mental health facility to await a medical
examination. There are significant liberty interests at stake when a person
is detained by police, transported to a mental health facility, and confined
therein until an examination by a physician is conducted. Section 302(a)
outlines the procedure by which those actions can be exercised in conformity
with due process safeguards so as to protect these liberty interests. In this
case, the strictures of § 302(a) were ignored. Without personally viewing
any behavior on Appellant’s part that would support the belief that he was a
danger to himself or others, police assumed control over Appellant’s person
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and forcibly conveyed him to the mental health facility without a warrant.
The warrant was only issued after Appellant was already at the facility
awaiting an examination.4
Even before enactment of the MHPA, our case law provided that, if a
person is involuntarily committed in violation of his due process rights, he is
entitled to expungement of the proceedings and the destruction of all
records relating thereto. In Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1978), the
appellant was involuntarily committed to a mental health facility for ten days
without a hearing. The then-applicable act, the Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966, permitted emergency involuntary detentions
without a hearing for ten days. The court of common pleas was then
required to hold a hearing and find that the involuntarily committed patient
was in need of continued care. In Wolfe, the hearing occurred, the court
found appellant to be mentally ill and in need of care and treatment, and
committed her to the mental health facility until such time as the director
determined he did not need further treatment.
After her release, the appellant petitioned the court of common pleas
for a declaration that her commitment was improper due to the fact that the
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4
Appellee maintains that Appellant was taken into custody with a warrant.
The record contradicts this representation since the county administrator
admitted that, during both involuntary commitments, he did not approve of
the warrant until after police had brought Appellant to the mental health
facility.
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commitment procedures violated her due process rights. Specifically, the
appellant “was committed after hearings of which she was not apprised and
at which she neither appeared nor had representation.” Id. at 1190, n. 1.
Appellant also requested an order expunging the proceedings, and a
directive that any hospital records arising from the commitment be
destroyed. The court of common pleas determined that the proceeding in
question had violated the appellant’s due process rights and concluded that
it was void and had to be expunged. Despite this finding, the court declined
to order destruction of the hospital records.
The Commonwealth Court affirmed, but our Supreme Court reversed.
It concluded that, since an exonerated criminal defendant had the right to
the expungement of the criminal records, a person subjected to an illegal
involuntary commitment procedure should enjoy the same right. The Wolfe
Court ruled that a person who is committed to a mental health facility in
violation of his or her due process rights is entitled to destruction of the
records of that commitment.
In re Ryan, supra, is instructive. At issue therein were § 302 and 50
P.S. § 7303 (“§ 303”) of the MHPA. Under § 302, a person may be
involuntarily committed for up to five days, but a physician must examine
the patient within two hours of his arrival at the facility to confirm the need
for involuntary treatment. If extended treatment is required, a physician
may apply for such involuntary treatment for an additional twenty days
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pursuant to § 303. The application for extended involuntary treatment must
be served on the patient and filed in the trial court, and an informal hearing
must be held before a judge or mental health review officer within twenty-
four hours of the filing of the application for extended involuntary treatment.
After the informal hearing, if the judge or mental health review officer
certifies the patient is severely mentally disabled, he or she may authorize
up to an additional twenty days of treatment. When the certification is made
by the mental health review officer instead of a judge, the patient may
petition the trial court to review the certification, and a hearing must be held
on that petition within seventy-two hours.
In In re Ryan, the § 303 review hearing by the mental health review
officer was not conducted within twenty-four hours of the application for
extended involuntary treatment, and the application was not filed with the
court of common pleas before that hearing. Additionally, the patient had
petitioned for review by the trial court after the mental health review officer
conducted the hearing. The trial court did not examine the case within the
seventy-two-hour time limit required by the MHPA. We concluded that the
time and filing requirements of §§ 302 and 303 were designed to protect a
patient’s due process rights and that their violation required the grant of
relief to the patient. We vacated the certification for extended involuntary
treatment and directed that all records pertaining to the matter be
expunged.
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Our decision in In re Chiumento, 688 A.2d 217 (Pa.Super. 1997),
likewise addressed the scenario where the specific due process protections
provided to a person under MHPA were ignored. We stated, “Because the
specific procedural protections and mandates delineated in the MHPA were
not followed,” the involuntary commitment in question was improper, the
appellant had to be discharged, and the record of the involuntary
commitment had to expunged. Id. at 218. We concluded that a mental
health patient's need for treatment cannot trump compliance with the due
process requirements outlined in the MHPA, even when the due process
violation appears to be minimal. See Commonwealth v. C.B., 452 A.2d
1372 (Pa.Super. 1982) (C.B. was not given a copy of a petition three days in
advance of hearing held pursuant to § 7304 (relating to court-ordered
involuntary treatment not to exceed ninety days), as required by MHPA; C.B.
was entitled to expungement of all records of commitment). See also In
re Condry, 450 A.2d 136, 137 (1982) (vacating an order that upheld an
involuntary commitment because “the statutory requirements [of the MHPA]
were not strictly adhered to[.]”); Cf. In re J.M., 726 A.2d 1041 (Pa. 1999)
(holding proceedings valid where county administrator issued warrant before
person was taken to facility for involuntary treatment and where warrant
supported the finding that there was a reasonable probability that patient
was in need of emergency involuntary commitment under § 302). Thus, the
case law uniformly mandates expungement and destruction of records when
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the procedural, due process requirements of the MHPA are violated during a
commitment proceeding.
In this case, the record establishes unequivocally that § 302(a) of the
MHPA was violated. This provision protects critical liberty interests and
establishes the procedures by which a person may be involuntarily detained
by police, transported to and placed in a mental health treatment facility,
and await and undergo an examination by a physician. The violation of its
strictures in the present case mandates, under the applicable legal authority,
that the records of the two civil commitments at issue herein be expunged
and that all records of those commitments be destroyed.
Order reversed. The involuntary commitment of J.N. conducted on
May 27, 2004 is ordered to be expunged and all records of that commitment
are to be destroyed. The involuntary commitment of J.N. conducted on
November 16, 2004 is ordered to be expunged and all records of that
commitment are to be destroyed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Mundy joins the opinion.
Judge Jenkins notes dissent.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/22/2016
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