Zamsky, B. v. David Dodge ( 2015 )

J-A09020-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
BARBARA ZAMSKY AND DODGE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PREMIER, INC. AND PREMIER : PENNSYLVANIA
PLATFORM TENNIS, INC., :
:
Appellants :
:
v. :
DAVID DODGE AND CHRISTINE :
ANTHONY AND JEFFERY SHERMAN, :
ESQUIRE AND PREMIER PLATFORM :
TENNIS, LLC, :
:
Appellees : No. 2107 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order June 30, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County,
Civil Division at No. 11-2637
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2015
Barbara Zamsky (“Zamsky”), Dodge Premier, Inc., and Premier
Platform Tennis, Inc. (collectively, “Appellants”), appeal from the order
entered on June 30, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County,
granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth
herein, we affirm.
A summary of the relevant facts and procedural history is as follows.
Zamsky and David Dodge (“Dodge”) were married from May 1998 until May
2008. During the marriage, Zamsky and Dodge formed Premier Platform
Tennis, Inc. (“Premier Corporation”). Premier Corporation operated a
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business that involved building and maintaining platform tennis courts.1
Zamksy retained control of Premier Corporation following her separation
from Dodge.
In late 2008, Dodge and Christine Anthony (“Anthony”) formed
Premier Platform Tennis, LLC (“Premier LLC”). Premier LLC, like Premier
Corporation, built and maintained platform tennis courts. Dodge and
Anthony held themselves out as president and vice president respectively.
Dodge and Anthony retained Attorney Jeffrey Sherman (“Attorney
Sherman”) to form and register Premier LLC. In the course of forming and
registering Premier LLC in Pennsylvania, Attorney Sherman’s business
address was listed in the formation papers for initial tax purposes, and was
also listed at one time as the “President” of Premier LLC on the Corporation
Bureau’s records.
On April 5, 2011, Appellants filed a complaint against Premier LLC,
Dodge, Anthony, and Attorney Sherman.2 With respect to Attorney Sherman
1
“Platform tennis is an outdoor court game played with paddles and a
rubber ball on a raised and fenced wooden floor that is smaller than a tennis
court.” See Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 6 n.1 (citing THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1387 (3d ed. 1996)).
2
At oral argument, this Court determined that outstanding claims remained
undecided in the trial court concerning Premier LLC, rendering this appeal
interlocutory. See Pa.R.A.P. 341 (“any order or other form of decision that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a final
order.”). On March 23, 2015, this Court issued an Order providing
Appellants with ten days to dismiss the action against Premier LLC. See
Order of Court, 3/23/15, at 1-2. The Order further provided that failure to
comply would result in our quashing of the appeal. Appellants complied with
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in particular, Appellants alleged that he was the president and sole officer of
Premier LLC and lodged the following claims against him: conspiracy,
conversion by agent, unfair competition, tortious interference with business
relations, unjust enrichment, accounting, and violation of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act.
On August 30, 2013, Attorney Sherman filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that he only acted as an attorney for Premier LLC, and
that since all claims against him arose solely from Appellants’ erroneous
belief that he had a personal interest in Premier LLC, they should be
dismissed. The trial court granted Attorney Sherman’s motion for summary
judgment on June 30, 2014.3 Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration
on July 9, 2014 and a notice of appeal on July 23, 2014. The trial court
denied Appellants’ motion for reconsideration on July 30, 2014.
On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review:4
1. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment stated at
page 11 "Dodge and Anthony retained the service of
[Attorney] Sherman, to act as their attorney and
assist with the formation of Premier, LLC. Complaint
¶ 24, without considering the allegations of various
our Order by filing a Praecipe to Discontinue/Dismiss Action as to Premier
LLC on March 30, 2015. Accordingly, we will address the merits of
Appellants’ claims.
3
The trial court also granted Dodge and Anthony’s motion for summary
judgment on June 30, 2014, but that decision is not the subject of this
appeal.
4
We have rearranged Appellants’ issues on appeal for ease of disposition.
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wrongful acts by [Attorney] Sherman and the two
named Defendants?
2. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment only
considered the argument of [Attorney] Sherman that
his services were as a facilitator only, omitting the
information that Defendant [Attorney] Sherman was
paid $1500.00 by check dated 1/13/09 with Dodge
Corp on the memo line, a usual and customary fee
for the formation of an LLC in this area. There were
subsequent payments long after formation of the LLC
was completed totaling in excess of $8000, that is
$8654.23?
3. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment omitted
informing the Court that Defendant [Attorney]
Sherman was listed on the records of the
Department of State of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Business Entity Filing History, as
President of [Premier] LLC, on the date of the
formation of the LLC, December 24, 2008 and
continued being shown on the Business Entity Filing
History as President of [Premier] LLC, on the records
of Department of State of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, until at least March 10, 2011?
4. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment admits at
Paragraph 26[,] "Appellants can conceivably
maintain a claim of conspiracy against [Attorney]
Sherman only if his alleged conduct was other than
as a lawyer for his clients?"
5. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count I CONSPIRACY, when the
various paragraphs of Count I specifically allege the
Defendants including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman
conspired to acquire the business of Plaintiff Premier
[Corp.], took confidential and proprietary information
as to customers, collected accounts receivable,
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withdrew funds from the bank account of plaintiff
DPI, took equipment and other assets without
permission or consent of any authorized party?
6. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count I CONSPIRACY as the movants
counsel for Defendant [Attorney] Sherman advised
the Court, because there was a release of two co-
defendants; Dodge and Anthony, there could not be
a conspiracy of one, that is Defendant [Attorney]
Sherman alone, when there was an additional
Defendant Premier [] LLC still in the case?
7. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count II CONVERSION BY AGENT,
when the facts in the various paragraphs of Count II
specifically allege Dodge while still an officer and an
employee of Plaintiff [Premier Corp.] and DPI with
the assistance of Anthony and [Attorney] Sherman
formed Defendant [Premier] LLC; further acting, in
concert with Defendants misappropriated assets of
the Plaintiff’s herein?
8. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count III UNFAIR COMPETITION. The
facts in the various paragraphs of Count III
specifically allege all of the Defendants including
Defendant [Attorney] Sherman, conspired to acquire
the business of the Plaintiffs [Premier Corp.] and DPI
took and used business and proprietary information
of Plaintiffs [Premier Corp.] and DPI, engaged in
deceptive selling practices using the name of Plaintiff
Premier [Corp.] and used forms, cards and other
material similar to that used by [Premier Corp.]
9. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count IV DEFENDANT [] DODGE
VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES. The facts in the
various paragraphs of Count IV specifically allege
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that from and after May 1, 2008, Defendant []
Dodge --- in concert with the other named
Defendants (Anthony and [Attorney] Sherman)
converted took and misappropriated assets of the
Plaintiffs herein.
10. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count VI DEFENDANTS TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE PLAINTIFFS BUSINESS RELATIONS.
The facts in the various paragraphs of Count IV
specifically allege that the engagement/employment
of Defendant Dodge by Plaintiffs was never
terminated and that he, in concert with the other
Defendants, including Defendant [Attorney]
Sherman, willfully solicited customers and suppliers
of Plaintiffs for his and their own purposes.
11. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count VII UNJUST REINRICHMENT
[sic]. The facts in the various paragraphs of Count
VII specifically allege that Defendant Dodge in
concert with the other named Defendants including
Defendant [Attorney] Sherman took and
misappropriated assets of the Plaintiffs.
12. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count VIII. The facts in the various
paragraphs of Count VIII specifically allege that the
paragraphs 1 through 58 of the Complaint were
incorporated in Count VIII by reference and
Defendant Dodge, in concert with the other named
Defendants, including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman
took including [sic] and misappropriated assets of
the Plaintiffs.
13. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted as to Count IX. The facts in the various
paragraphs of Count IX specifically allege Defendant
Dodge in concert with the other named Defendants
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including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman took and
misappropriated assets of the Plaintiffs.
14. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment did not
address that discovery had not yet been completed?
15. Was the Court in error in not considering that the
aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment omitted
informing the Court that despite Defendant
[Attorney] Sherman's assertion that all electronic
records were lost, one e-mail from Defendant
[Attorney] Sherman came into Plaintiffs’ possession
by reason of being transmitted on Plaintiffs'
computer, stating that [Attorney] Sherman was
recovering the business of Premier Platform Tennis
for Defendant Dodge?
Appellants’ Brief at 4-6.5
Appellants also raise in their Statement of Errors Complained of on
Appeal the following: “the trial court ‘was in error as to not giving full impact
to the following issues of fact’:”
5
Attorney Sherman argues that Appellants’ appeal should be dismissed for
failing to conform to the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Attorney Sherman’s Brief at 17-18. Attorney Sherman specifically argues
that Appellants deviated from the briefing requirements in Rules 2172, 2174,
2117, and 2116(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, by
failing to “include a cover page, alphabetically arranged table of citations,
statement of case with no arguments, name of judge whose determinations
are to be reviewed, concise questions and answers after the questions.” Id.
Attorney Sherman further argues that Appellants’ argument section in its
brief “was not divided into as many parts as there are questions to be
argued (fifteen), and there was no particular point treated in parts of the
argument, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).” Id. at 18. We agree that the
brief is defective. However, while this Court has authority to dismiss an
appeal for defects in the brief, we conclude that the defects in this instance
do not impede our ability to conduct meaningful review of the issues on
appeal, and therefore, we will address the merits of Appellants’ claims.
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1[.] Defendant [Attorney] Sherman was President of
[Premier] LLC for a period of almost three (3) years.
2. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman has not presented
facts of proof that he is still not the President of
[Premier] LLC.
3. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman was the
Responsible Party In the Docketing Statement of the
Department of Revenue.
4. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman has not presented
facts of proof that he is still not the Responsible
Party in the Docketing Statement of the Department
of Revenue.
5. The release of Defendants Dodge and Anthony has
not been finalized by an agreement as required by
the Divorce Court.
6. Such agreement prepared in accordance with the
directions of the Court is required to that [sic]
provide the case shall continue against Defendant
[Attorney] Sherman and Defendant [Premier] LLC.
7. The discovery of Defendant [Attorney] Sherman
has not been completed.
8. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman [sic] refusal to
produce electronic and hard copy records claiming all
such records were “lost” subjects [Attorney]
Sherman to all adverse inferences under the
Doctrine of Spoilation. See, Transportation Law
Update, Rawle and Henderson, LLP, vol. 13; and
Spoilation of Evidence, Georgia Bar Journal, Lee
Wallace, 2002.
9. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman cannot assert
there can be no conspiracy, if Defendants Dodge and
Anthony are released, based on the concept that
there can be no conspiracy of one, where Defendant
[Premier] LLC is not released and remains as one (1)
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of two (2) defendants, along with Defendant
[Attorney] Sherman.
10. Defendant [Premier] LLC was included in the
notes of testimony attached to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment as being a party to the case
going forward.
Id. at 6.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for
summary judgment is well settled:
A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial
court only where it is established that the court
committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.
In evaluating the trial court's decision to enter
summary judgment, we focus on the legal standard
articulated in the summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P.
1035.2. The rule states that where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary
judgment may be entered. Where the non-moving
party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may
not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order
to survive summary judgment. Failure of a non[-
]moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an
issue essential to his case and on which it bears the
burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the
moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Lastly,
we will view the record in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be
resolved against the moving party.
Thompson v. Ginkel, 95 A.3d 900, 904 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261-62 (Pa. Super.
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2013)). This standard of review implicates a three-step process, which
requires the appellate court to determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. If so, the second step
is to determine whether there is any discrepancy as
to any facts material to the case. Finally, it must be
determined whether, in granting summary judgment,
the trial court has usurped improperly the role of the
jury by resolving any material issues of fact.
Reilly v. Tiergarten, Inc., 633 A.2d 208, 209-210 (Pa. Super. 1993)
(citing Dudley v. USX Corp., 606 A.2d 916, 920 (Pa. Super. 1992)).
On appeal, Appellants direct the first three of their fifteen issues to
their claim that the trial court erred in its determination that Attorney
Sherman did not act other than as a lawyer. Appellants assert that the trial
court failed to consider that Attorney Sherman was listed as the President of
Premier LLC for nearly three years and that Attorney Sherman received
payments after the formation of Premier LLC.
With regard to Appellants’ claim that Attorney Sherman acted as more
than a lawyer, the trial court held:
There is no issue of fact that [Attorney] Sherman
benefited personally in any way from the formation
and registration of Premier LLC or participated in any
way in the business of Premier LLC. The record
before this court revealed that Anthony, at all times,
was the sole member and held all interests in
Premier LLC. The listing with the Pennsylvania
Department of State, Corporations Bureau
identifying Sherman as the president of Premier LLC
was a technical error caused by the Pennsylvania
Department of State not by [Attorney] Sherman. It
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was ultimately corrected by the Pennsylvania
Department of State. There is no basis for
Appellants’ contention [Attorney] Sherman was the
president of Premier LLC or was acting other than as
a lawyer.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 10.
Appellants state, “At trial, [Appellees] may be able to establish by the
relevant evidence that [Attorney] Sherman was not the President. But that
remains a matter for trial, not the basis for an award of summary
judgment.” Appellants’ Brief at 17. Appellants fail to acknowledge,
however, that “[i]n response to a summary judgment motion, the
nonmoving party cannot rest upon the pleadings, but rather must set forth
specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.” Bank of
America, N.A. v. Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 464 (Pa. Super. 2014); Pa.R.C.P.
1035.3. Our review of the record reveals that Appellants have not set forth
specific facts establishing that Attorney Sherman was the President of
Premier LLC or that Attorney Sherman acted other than as a lawyer to
satisfy their burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.
To the contrary, at her deposition, Zamsky testified that she was not
aware of whether Premier LLC employed Attorney Sherman other than as a
lawyer, and was not “aware of any relationship between [Attorney] Sherman
and Dodge which would compel Premier [] LLC, to pay Sherman other than
legal fees for work services he provided[.]” N.T., 3/14/13, at 29-30, 48-49.
When questioned as to the basis for her belief that Attorney Sherman had an
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ownership interest in Premier LLC, Zamsky responded, “Because he was
listed as president on the state documents, and when he – it was brought to
his attention, he never changed it for several years.” N.T., 1/25/13, at 155.
Zamsky was also questioned whether she had “any support for a contention
that [Attorney] Sherman was president or is president of Premier [] LLC
other than the printout which [she] referenced from the Pennsylvania
Department of State Corporation Bureau website[.]” N.T., 1/25/13, at 187.
Zamsky responded, “No.” Id.
Attorney Sherman presented a letter sent by the Pennsylvania
Corporation Bureau that explained the Department of State’s process for
obtaining information and transmitting information regarding corporate
entities into its records. The letter explained,
As indicated in your letter, the Department of State
and the Department of Revenue provide information
to each other as required by statute. Title 15
Pa.C.S. § 134(b) requires the Department of State to
transmit the information contained in the Docketing
Statement to the Department of Revenue. The
information contained in the docketing statement
consists of the entity name, the tax responsible
party, the entity purpose and the effective date, if
any. This information is transmitted electronically to
the Department of Revenue on a daily basis.
Section 403 of the Tax Reform Code provides that a
corporate tax report shall include such other
information as the Department of Revenue may
require. Upon receipt of the report, the Department
of Revenue shall promptly forward to the
Department of State, the names of the president,
vice-president, secretary and treasurer of the
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corporation and the complete street address of the
principal office of the corporation for inclusion in the
records of the Department of State relating to
corporation. 72 P.S. § 7403(a)(3).
Section 1110 of the Associations Code provides that
the names of the officers and the address of
“corporations for profit” as annually forwarded to the
Department of State by the Department of Revenue
are public information. The phrase “corporations for
profit” as used in the Associations Code does not
include limited liability companies, partnerships and
other associations that are classified as corporations
for Federal income tax purposes. Furthermore,
limited liability companies do not have the
statutory officers of president, secretary and
treasurer and may only have members,
managing members and partners.
In February 2010 a review of the above procedures
discovered that when the Department of State
provided the tax responsible party information
contained in the docketing statement, the
Department of Revenue inadvertently transmitted
officer information on the limited liability companies,
when in fact this was incorrect. Upon this
realization, the Corporation Bureau had all officer
information for limited liability companies deleted
from the database on March 14, 2010. The
Department of Revenue also made provisions so that
this incorrect information was no longer forwarded to
the Department of State. You indicated in your
letter of August 8, 2011 that you were initially
identified as the tax responsible party. However a
search of the Corporation Bureau’s website prior to
March 14, 2010 incorrectly identified you as the
president of Premier Platform Tennis, LLC. Our
records now have been updated and you are no
longer identified as the president.
Department of State Corporation Bureau Letter, 8/15/11, at 1-2 (emphasis
in original).
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Appellants argue that the trial court misread the letter sent by the
Corporation Bureau:
The Court omits that the technical error in the view
of the Corporation Bureau was a listing of any
officer, and that the Corporation Bureau’s [sic]
ceased listing any and all officers. The Corporation
Bureau did not state that Defendant Sherman was
not the President of Premier LLC. Only that it would
not list him or any other officer of any LLC.
Appellants’ Brief at 17.
Although Appellants contend that the letter does not establish that
Attorney Sherman was not the president, Appellants disregard their burden
of providing some basis that Attorney Sherman was the president or had
any other role in the company. Appellants failed to present any evidence
that Attorney Sherman acted other than as a lawyer aside from the negative
inference they drew from the letter issued by the Corporation Bureau.
Moreover, Zamsky admitted at her deposition that she was unaware of
any documents submitted to the Department of State that reflected Attorney
Sherman’s involvement with Premier LLC. N.T., 1/25/13, at 195. The
interest certificate of Premier LLC reflects that Anthony retained a 100%
interest in Premier LLC. See Attorney Sherman’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, 8/30/13, Exhibit L (Interest Certificate). Moreover, in Premier
LLC’s Articles of Dissolution, Anthony is solely listed as a director and officer.
Id. at Exhibit Q (Articles of Dissolution). Thus, based upon our review of the
record, we conclude that Appellants have not presented any evidence to
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establish a genuine issue of material fact that Attorney Sherman acted other
than as a lawyer.
In their next nine issues on appeal, Appellants assert that “[t]here are
numerous allegations set forth in the Complaint that do not relate to
whether [Attorney Sherman] was president or not.” Appellants’ Brief at 12.
Specifically, Appellants claim that Attorney Sherman acted in concert with
Anthony and Dodge to commit several business torts including, conversion,
unfair competition, tortious interference with business relations, unjust
enrichment, accounting, and violating the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The
trial court addressed the Appellants’ assertions, stating:
These claims may best be described as torts which
are contingent upon (1) the involvement of
[Attorney] Sherman in the business operations of
Premier LLC and/or (2) a personal stake or interest
by [Attorney] Sherman in Premier LLC. The record
before this court revealed no such personal interest
in Premier LLC and was devoid of any evidence
[Attorney] Sherman was involved in the actual
business of Premier LLC. Rather, it is apparent that
[Attorney] Sherman simply provided legal services to
Anthony and Dodge, specifically regarding the
formation and registration of Premier LLC.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 11.
We agree with the trial court’s assessment. As we previously
discussed, there is no evidence establishing that Attorney Sherman acted as
anything other than a lawyer. The evidence presented establishes that
Attorney Sherman provided legal services to Anthony and Dodge to form and
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register Premier LLC. There is no evidence, however, that Attorney
Sherman played any other role in the business activities of Premier LLC
related to Appellants or otherwise after he assisted Anthony and Dodge with
forming and registering the company. Thus, Appellants are unable to
establish that Attorney Sherman participated in any activity or conspired
with Anthony and Dodge to participate in any activity that would be
detrimental to Appellants. Accordingly, Appellants failed to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact and are not entitled to relief on
these nine issues.
Finally, in their last two issues on appeal, Appellants claim that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because discovery had not
yet been completed. Our review of the record reveals, however, that
discovery had been completed. The record reflects that the discovery
deadline was set for July 2, 2013. See Attorney Sherman’s Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion for Sanctions and for Dismissal of Claims Against
Sherman, 8/30/13, Exhibit H, at 1 (Letter to Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas). On July 2, 2013, counsel for Attorney Sherman requested
that the trial court approve a stipulation between Attorney Sherman and
Appellants to permit specific discovery to occur and to extend the deadline
for filing dispositive motions from August 1, 2013 to August 30, 2013. Id.
The parties requested the trial court allow document review to occur on
August 8, 2013 at Zamsky’s home, a deposition of Richard K. House, the
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individual who wrote the letter regarding the Pennsylvania Department of
State records, and to permit the deposition of Zamsky, if needed following
the document review. Id. at 2-3. On July 10, 2013, the trial court entered
an order approving the stipulation. Order, 7/10/13. Attorney Sherman filed
his motion for summary judgment on August 30, 2013, in accordance with
the stipulation. There is nothing in the record to support Appellants’
assertion that discovery had yet to be completed.
Moreover, Appellants fail to assert what more they could have gained
from additional discovery that would be essential to its case. Appellants
baldly assert that additional discovery would have permitted them to
determine why Attorney Sherman received two payments from Dodge and
Anthony, one for $1,500 and one in excess of $8,000. Appellants’ Brief at
18, 20. Appellants do not identify any other evidence they sought to
discover that would be essential to their case. Appellants argue, however,
that the doctrine of spoilation applies to this case because Attorney Sherman
claims that he “lost” all electronic files. See Appellants’ Brief at 12, 20.
Appellants specifically argue that “The grant of summary judgment permits
[Attorney] Sherman to contend that all documents and records were ‘lost’
without consequence. A result that should not be permitted to stand under
the Doctrine of Spoilation.” Id. at 12. Appellants fail, however, to provide
any discussion or citation to legal authority. It is well settled that
“arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived.” Lackner v.
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Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing Jones v. Jones, 878
A.2d 86, 90-91 (Pa. Super. 2005)). “Arguments not appropriately developed
include those where the party has failed to city any authority in support of a
contention.” Lackner, 892 A.2d at 29-30 (citing Korn v. Epstein, 727 A.2d
1130, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1999)). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants
waived any argument regarding the doctrine of spoliation.
As Appellants failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact, we
conclude that the trial court did not commit an error of law or abuse its
discretion when it granted Attorney Sherman’s motion for summary
judgment.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/23/2015
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