In Re: M.L.G., a Minor, Appeal of: P.S. ( 2017 )

J-S24045-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: M.L.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: P.S. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 39 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered December 8, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 6 Adoption 2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 27, 2017
Appellant, P.S. (“Father”), files this appeal from the order entered
December 8, 2016, in the Somerset County Court of Common Pleas by the
Honorable Scott P. Bittner, granting the petition of G.L.G. and L.R.G.
(“Maternal Grandparents”) and involuntarily terminating Father’s parental
rights to his son, M.L.G. (“Child”), born in June of 2009, pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).1 After careful review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Child has
resided with Maternal Grandparents since birth. Notes of Testimony
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
By the separate order entered the same date, the trial court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of L.G. (“Mother”) with respect to Child.
Mother did not file an appeal, nor is Mother a party to the instant appeal.
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(“N.T.”), 12/8/16, at 8. Initially, Mother and Father moved in with Maternal
Grandparents upon relocation from Pittsburgh prior to Child’s birth. Id. at 9,
39. After about nine months to one year, in approximately April or May of
2010, Father entered a rehabilitation facility.2 Id. at 9, 24, 30, 39. Mother
moved out a couple of weeks later; she was in and out of Maternal
Grandparents’ residence over the next several years until finally moving out
in 2013. Id. at 9-11. Child, however, remained with Maternal
Grandparents. Id. at 9. Of significance, both Mother and Father had
substance abuse issues. Id. at 25-26, 32, 48.
In 2010, Maternal Grandparents filed for custody of Child and were
subsequently granted primary physical custody.3 Id. at 9-10, 40-41. Father
did not participate in these proceedings.4 Id. at 42-43. In 2013, Maternal
Grandparents sought and were granted a name change as to Child’s last
name.5 Id. at 11. Mother filed for divorce from Father. Id. at 15.
____________________________________________
2
Maternal Grandfather requested Father leave the home. Id. at 21. Father
received treatment at Twin Lakes Residential Treatment Center and from
there was transferred to Eagleville. Id. at 39-40.
3
Father admitted that, pursuant to the custody order, he and Mother were
entitled to custodial time and contact with Child if drug-free. Id. at 40, 42.
4
Father indicated he was in Philadelphia when the proceedings took place;
however, he did not receive a copy of an order until sometime in 2011 while
incarcerated. Id. at 42-43. While Mother informed Father of and, therefore,
had knowledge of these proceedings, it is unclear if she, in fact, participated.
5
Child’s last name was changed to the maternal last name. Id. at 11.
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After rehabilitation, Father, unable to return to Maternal Grandparents’
home, attempted to establish himself in Philadelphia until he was
incarcerated in May 2011.6 Id. at 40-43. Upon release in May 2013, Father
resided in Lawrence County, approximately two hours from Somerset County
where Child and Maternal Grandparents reside, until his re-incarceration in
August 2016. Id. at 47, 52. At the time of the termination hearing, Father
was incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill awaiting classification for State
Intermediate Punishment, a program focusing on rehabilitation and
community reintegration with a two-year sentence. Id. at 38-39, 49. If
sentenced to State Intermediate Punishment, Father indicated his sentence
would conclude on October 17, 2018, although he expected to be released to
a halfway house in the summer of 2017.7 Id. at 48-49.
Father has not seen Child since he entered rehabilitation in 2010 and
acknowledged a lack of financial support of Child. Id. at 24, 48.
Subsequent to rehabilitation, he maintained contact with Mother for a period
of time. Id. at 20, 40. During his incarceration, Father sent correspondence
to Child in 2012 and 2013. Id. at 42-43. He additionally called and spoke
with Mother, but was unable to speak with Child. Id. at 42, 44.
____________________________________________
6
Father testified that just prior to completion of his treatment program, he
contacted Maternal Grandparents, who advised Father that he was not
welcome back in their home. Id. at 40.
7
Father was unsure as to his sentence if he was approved for State
Intermediate Punishment. Id. at 49.
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Over the approximate three-year period from May 2013 to August
2016, during which Father was not incarcerated, Father neither visited with
Child, nor exercised his custodial rights, nor sought to modify the custody
order to request time with Child.8 Id. at 24-25, 47, 51. While Father
referenced a lack of finances to obtain legal representation, he made no
inquiries of Legal Aid or the court. Id. at 47, 52. After attempted telephone
calls to Maternal Grandfather and the involvement of Father’s uncle, Father
sent Child birthday and holiday cards.9 Father claims the cards were
returned in 2014 and 2015. Id. at 45-47. Maternal Grandfather, however,
testified that no correspondence was received from Father in the last two to
three years and claimed he did not refuse mail from Father. Id. at 20-21.
On April 26, 2016, Maternal Grandparents filed a petition to
involuntarily terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights to Child. The trial
court conducted a termination hearing on December 8, 2016. In support
thereof, Maternal Grandfather and Grandmother each testified. Father, who
was represented by counsel, testified via telephone from SCI-Camp Hill.
Mother was not present, but was represented by counsel.10
____________________________________________
8
Father testified to contacting the police with regard to his custody order.
Id. at 45.
9
Maternal Grandfather acknowledged not taking Father’s calls. Id. at 20.
10
The guardian ad litem argued in favor of termination of Father’s parental
rights to Child. Id. at 59-60. He additionally submitted a brief in favor of
this position on appeal.
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Following the hearing, on December 8, 2016, the trial court entered an
order involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).11 On December 30, 2016, Father filed a
notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).12
On appeal, Father raises one issue for our review:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting the
petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights under
23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1) and (2) when the evidence did not
establish a “settled purpose to relinquish parental rights” or a
“refusal to parent” because he maintained efforts to contact the
child[] even while incarcerated despite significant obstacles
created by [Maternal Grandparents]?
Father’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47
A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
____________________________________________
11
This order memorialized the decision placed by the court on the record at
the conclusion of the hearing.
12
We note that the trial court’s Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion, dated January 9,
2017 and entered January 11, 2017, referred to the Notes of Testimony of
the December 8, 2016 hearing for the rationale for its decision and declined
further supplementation. Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/17, at 1 (unpaginated).
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manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”
Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different result. Id.at [325-26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In
re R.J.T., [608 Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise
free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s
findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite
result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of
the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). Clear
and convincing evidence is defined as that which is so “clear, direct, weighty
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761
A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of Adoption
of Charles E.D.M. II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (2), as well as (b). We have
long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need
only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a),
well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super.
2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination order pursuant
to subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
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beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
We first examine the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights
under Section 2511(a)(1). We have explained this Court’s review of a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the involuntary
termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1), the moving
party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct,
sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the
termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish
parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be
terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent
either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental
duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of
inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of
termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
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As it relates to the crucial six-month period prior to the filing of the
petition, this Court has instructed:
[I]t is the six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition that is most critical to our analysis. However, the trial
court must consider the whole history of a given case and not
mechanically apply the six-month statutory provisions, but
instead consider the individual circumstances of each case.
In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citations omitted). This
requires the Court to “examine the individual circumstances of each case
and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his
or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.” In re B.,
N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872
A.2d 1200 (2005) (citation omitted).
Further, we have stated:
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must
be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the
psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a
serious intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-
child relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and
capacity to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to
reestablish his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof
on this question.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). See
In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).
Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A
child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
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passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this
Court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty
which requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional
needs.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (internal citations omitted).
In In re Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court discussed In re
Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 331 A.2d 652 (1975), and stated:
Applying in McCray the provision for termination of parental
rights based upon abandonment, now codified as § 2511(a)(1),
we noted that a parent “has an affirmative duty to love, protect
and support his child and to make an effort to maintain
communication and association with that child.” Id. at 655. We
observed that the father’s incarceration made his performance of
this duty “more difficult.” Id.
In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 327, 47 A.3d at 828. The Supreme
Court continued:
[A] parent’s absence and/or failure to support due to
incarceration is not conclusive on the issue of
abandonment. Nevertheless, we are not willing to
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completely toll a parent’s responsibilities during his or her
incarceration. Rather, we must inquire whether the
parent has utilized those resources at his or her
command while in prison in continuing a close
relationship with the child. Where the parent does not
exercise reasonable firmness in declining to yield to
obstacles, his other rights may be forfeited.
[McCray] at 655 (footnotes and internal quotation marks
omitted). . . .
In re Adoption of S.P., supra.In the instant matter, in finding grounds for termination, the trial court
concluded:
Moving on with regard to the natural father, the [c]ourt
finds, based on the evidence presented today, that there is clear
and convincing evidence that natural father had been living in
the home of maternal grandparents with natural mother and the
child until May of 2010, when he vacated the maternal
grandparents’ home to enter drug rehabilitation.
Since that time, the [c]ourt finds that there has not been
significant contact between natural father and the child.
The [c]ourt further finds that natural father has not
provided any financial support for the child since at least May of
2010.
There is evidence in the record that for a period from 2012
to early 2013, natural father did send letters to the child. Then
there is conflicting testimony where natural father indicates he
continued sending letters and cards, but that those letters and
cards were returned to him.
Conversely, both petitioners testified this morning that
after 2013 they did not receive any type of correspondence, be it
letters or cards, from natural father from 2013 to the present.
I find the testimony of the petitioners on that subject more
credible than the testimony of natural father.
I further find by clear and convincing evidence that for
approximately the last one-and-a-half to two years, that there
has not been any contact between natural father and child; and
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the [c]ourt further finds that in May – specifically, May 17, 2013
– natural father was released from jail and was residing in
Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.
From May[] of 2013 to August of 2016, despite being only
two hours away from the child, the father, by his own testimony,
did not make any attempts to come to Somerset County to see
the child. He didn’t visit with the child or attempt to visit with
the child.
He didn’t attempt to exercise his custody rights under the
existing custody order, and he did not in any way petition the
[c]ourt to expand those custody rights or to enforce the custody
order.
Natural father specifically testified that he understood the
custody order to allow him to see the child.
Although there was some conflicting testimony from
natural father that he had a conversation with the Conemaugh
Township Police, and was told that he could not see the child, I
don’t find that testimony to be credible; and even if natural
father didn’t have the assistance of an attorney, he certainly
could have participated in the custody proceedings in this court
by acting pro se and the [c]ourt certainly would have entertained
his appearance in the matter and allowed him to participate in
those proceedings.
So, I do find that the natural father had avenues available
to him to have contact with the child, but yet he failed to
exercise those custody rights.
I realize that the natural father was incarcerated for a
period of time and that incarceration presents certain obstacles
to a parent, that in some ways prevents them from seeing the
child; however, an incarcerated parent, under the law, must
exercise reasonable efforts to overcome those obstacles to have
contact with their child, and I don’t find under the testimony
presented today that natural father made reasonable efforts to
overcome those obstacles or to see his child when he could have
done that.
Therefore, I find that there is clear and convincing
evidence under [S]ection[] 2511(a)(1) and 2511(a)(2)], and I
find that the petitioners have met their burden of proving the
requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1) and 2511(a)(2)],
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presenting grounds for involuntary termination of natural
father’s parental rights in this matter.
N.T. at 67-69.
In arguing that the trial court erred in finding grounds for the
termination of his parental rights Father recognizes his substance abuse and
incarceration impeded him from performing parental duties. Id. at 14.
Father, however, asserts that not only did he maintain contact with Child in
2012 and 2013 while incarcerated, but he attempted to contact Child after
his release in 2013 “by making telephone calls to Mother and [Maternal]
Grandfather, trying to go through the police to exercise visitation with the
Child, and trying to establish contact with the Child through his own uncle.”
Id. at 13-14. Father points to obstacles which thwarted his efforts to
maintain contact with Child, such as incarceration, lack of transportation,
lack of finances for legal assistance, denial of telephone access, and returned
correspondence. Id. at 14. Father posits, “[a]ll of these obstacles were
reasonably resisted by Father, but he was unable to maintain contact with
the Child despite his best efforts and desire to do so.” Id. at 14-15. Such
efforts were, according to Father, contrary to a deliberate purpose of
relinquishing parental rights or refusal to parent. Id. at 15.
Upon review, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s conclusion
and discern no abuse of discretion. Beyond Father’s substance abuse and
incarceration, the record reveals a lack of support and significant contact
between Father and Child from the time Father left Maternal Grandparents’
home. N.T. at 24, 48. While Father sent correspondence in 2012 and 2013,
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id. at 42-43, Maternal Grandfather denied refusing Father’s mail and
testified that Father has sent no recent correspondence. Id. at 20-21.
Moreover, and more critically, from 2013 to 2016, between
incarceration periods, Father resided a mere two hours from Child yet failed
to visit with and/or exercise any custodial rights to Child, despite
acknowledging an order providing such rights. Id. at 24-25, 51-52.
Likewise, Father failed to file any paperwork to enforce and/or extend these
custodial rights. Id. at 24-25, 47, 51. Father additionally failed to make
any inquiries of Legal Aid or the court. Id. at 52. Thus, as the trial court’s
determinations regarding section 2511(a)(1) are supported by competent,
clear and convincing evidence in the record, we find no abuse of discretion.
See In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628, 71 A.3d at 267; In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d at 394. As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of
parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one
subsection of Section 2511(a) before assessing the determination under
Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384. We, therefore, need not
address Section 2511(a)(2).
As noted above, after the trial court finds sufficient grounds to warrant
termination of the parental rights, it must conduct an analysis under Section
2511(b) to analyze the needs and welfare of the child. In re L.M., 923 A.2d
at 511. However, Father did not preserve a challenge related to Section
2511(b) as he failed to raise the issue in the statement of questions involved
section of his brief and failed to present argument related thereto in his
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brief. As such, we find Father has waived any claim regarding Section
2511(b) and Child’s needs and welfare. See Krebs v. United Refining Co.
of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that a
failure to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion
of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues); In re W.H., 25
A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011)
(quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010)) (“[W]here an
appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to
relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”). See also In re
Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 679 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
76 A.3d 540 (Pa. 2013) (declining to address Section 2511(b) where not
challenged on appeal). Nevertheless, in light of the requisite bifurcated
analysis, we review this issue.
In determining whether termination was proper under Section
2511(b), [o]ur Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M.
a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 123, 620 A.2d 481, 485
(1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
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bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791. However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds
is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-29, 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is
no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re
Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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In the case sub judice, in reasoning that termination of Father’s
parental rights favors Child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b) of
the Adoption Act, the trial court stated:
However, . . . we must move on to an analysis under
section 2511 (b), which we must give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of
the child.
An analysis under section 2511 (b) is clear to the [c]ourt
that there is no bond existing between the natural father and the
child.
The natural father has not seen the child or had any
contact with the child since the child was approximately ten
months old, less than one year; and I find that even if there may
have been a bond formed in the first year of the child’s life
between the child and the natural father, that, given the
significant passage of time since natural father had any contact
with the child, that that bond would have deteriorated.
I also find that the child has clearly formed a bond with the
child’s maternal grandparents, the petitioners in this matter.
As I indicated earlier, the petitioners have essentially
raised the child in their home since he was born. They have
provided everything that the child needs to develop both
physically and emotionally; and they have met the needs and
welfare of the child in every respect.
The child has formed a bond with the petitioners and refers
to them as Mom and Poppy; and I further find that the child has
formed a bond with his two natural cousins, who in fact live with
him in maternal grandparents’ home, and based on the
testimony, the child views them more as siblings or brothers
than he would as first cousins.
I believe it is appropriate to allow the child to continue to
foster the relationship that he has formed with his cousins while
living in the maternal grandparents’ home; and I find that by
allowing the child to continue living with his maternal
grandparents, that it will promote his best interests and will
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provide him with the stability and permanency that he very
much needs at the young, tender age of seven years old.
Therefore, based on the clear and convincing evidence
before the [c]ourt today, I find it appropriate to enter a decree
involuntarily terminating the parental rights of the natural father,
and I will execute the proposed order of [c]ourt that has been
prepared for that purpose.
N.T. at 69-71.
Here, the record likewise corroborates the trial court’s termination
order pursuant to Section 2511(b). Despite any potential correspondence,
Father has not seen Child since Child was less than one year old. N.T. at 24.
Father acknowledged he has not provided any financial support for Child.
Id. at 48. Moreover, Maternal Grandfather testified that Child does not
know who Father is or ask about him. Id. at 14-15. Maternal Grandmother
likewise indicated that Child does not ask about Father. Id. at 28. There is
no evidence of the existence of any bond between Father and Child.
Further, Maternal Grandfather testified that Child is doing well both
educationally and socially. Id. at 14. Evidence was presented of a positive
and nurturing relationship between Child and Maternal Grandparents, with
whom he has resided his entire life and who are able to provide for his
needs. Id. at 15-16. Significantly, Child views Maternal Grandparents as
his mother and father. Id. at 15. Child calls Maternal Grandfather “Mom”
and Maternal Grandfather “Poppy.” Id. at 28. Maternal Grandfather
referred to Child as his “sidekick.” Id. at 23. Additionally, Child has also
formed a close bond with his cousins who also reside in Maternal
Grandparents’ home. Id. at 23. Child views his cousins as siblings.
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Father admits that it is in Child’s best interest for Child to remain with
Maternal Grandparents. Id. at 47-48. Father stated, “[Child]’s best interest
is to be raised by [Maternal Grandparents], at least for the immediate
future. I, I can no way provide for him right now, and I am aware of that.
Ultimately, I just don’t want to be eliminated from his life.” Id. at 48. Thus,
as confirmed by the record, termination of Father’s parental rights serves
Child’s needs and welfare. While Father may profess to love Child, a
parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not
preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. As
we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a
parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”
Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and
rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental
duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or
her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M.,
856 A.2d at 856.
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). We, therefore, affirm
the order of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/27/2017
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