K.T. & M.T. v. L.S. f/k/a L.R. ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • J-A10001-15
    
    2015 Pa. Super. 141
    K.T. AND M.R.T.                               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellants
    v.
    L.S. F/K/A L.R.
    Appellee                   No. 2072 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 6, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2013-FC-001604-03
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
    OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                            FILED JUNE 17, 2015
    Appellants, K.T. (“Paternal Grandmother”) and M.R.T. (“Paternal
    Grandfather”) (collectively, “Paternal Grandparents”), appeal from the order
    entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, which denied their
    request for partial physical custody of their minor grandchildren, K.A.T.
    (born in September 2007) and K.W.R. (born in March 2009) (“Children”), in
    this custody action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    The certified record indicates the relevant facts and procedural history
    of this case as follows.    Appellee, L.S. f/k/a L.R. (“Mother”), and D.T.
    (“Father”) are the natural parents of Children. Mother gave birth to K.A.T.
    while she was in high school and living with her mother (“Maternal
    Grandmother”). Maternal Grandmother would not permit Father to live with
    Mother because they were unmarried, so Mother moved in with Father in
    J-A10001-15
    Paternal Grandmother’s home              in December 2007, when K.A.T. was
    approximately two months old.1 Mother and Father did not marry, but they
    maintained a relationship until early 2009. In January 2009, when Mother
    was pregnant with their second child, K.W.R., Mother and Father separated
    and Mother moved with K.A.T. out of Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s
    home.2 At that time, Mother moved in with a co-worker for several months.
    Beginning in January or February 2009, Mother and Father split
    custody of K.A.T.       During Father’s periods of physical custody, Children
    resided with Father in Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s home. Mother gave
    birth to K.W.R. in March 2009.                 Mother and Father subsequently split
    custody of K.W.R. as well. In April 2009, Mother met D.S. In May 2010,
    Mother married D.S. (“Mother’s Husband”) in Hawaii; Father and Mother
    agreed Father would take custody of Children while Mother was in Hawaii to
    marry. In the summer of 2010, Father anticipated imminent deployment to
    Iraq. Based on his expected deployment, Father agreed Mother could take
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Paternal Grandparents were divorced in 1998. When Mother and K.A.T.
    moved in with Paternal Grandmother, Paternal Grandmother was living in
    Erie County with her long-term significant other, W.B., with whom she still
    resides. Paternal Grandfather also lives in Erie County with his significant
    other, D.D.
    2
    The parties dispute whether Mother moved out of Paternal Grandmother
    and W.B.’s home in December 2008 or January 2009. When Mother moved
    out, Father was away in basic training for the United States Army since
    September 2008.
    -2-
    J-A10001-15
    Children to live in Hawaii with Mother’s Husband.3 Mother and Father agreed
    Father would have custody of Children during the summer months and
    holidays, and that Father could communicate with Children via phone calls
    and social media.        Around August 2010, Mother and Mother’s Husband
    moved with Children to Hawaii. Mother obtained a new telephone number,
    but she did not disclose her new phone number to any of Father’s family
    members, including Paternal Grandparents, and limited Children’s telephone
    communication only to Father. After Mother had already moved to Hawaii
    with Children, Father learned his anticipated deployment would not occur,
    but he continued to permit Mother to live with Children in Hawaii. Mother
    and Father agreed that if Mother moved back to Erie County, they would
    again split physical custody of Children on an equal basis.
    In November 2011, Mother and Mother’s Husband returned from
    Hawaii with Children and moved to Clymer, New York.4 The parties dispute
    whether Mother told Father she had moved back from Hawaii with Children.
    In August 2012, Mother and Children moved with Mother’s Husband to
    Wisconsin. Mother obtained a new phone number upon moving, which she
    did not give to Father or Paternal Grandparents.      On February 17, 2013,
    while Mother and Children were still living in Wisconsin with Mother’s
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Mother’s Husband was in the Army and stationed in Hawaii at that time.
    4
    Clymer, New York is approximately eight miles away from Corry,
    Pennsylvania (where Paternal Grandmother and W.B. live in Erie County).
    -3-
    J-A10001-15
    Husband, Father died in an automobile accident.       Mother and Children did
    not attend Father’s funeral.          Around March 2013, Mother and Mother’s
    Husband moved with Children to York County, Pennsylvania, where they
    currently reside.
    On September 6, 2013, Paternal Grandparents filed a joint petition in
    York County seeking partial physical custody of Children.5         At the time
    Paternal Grandparents filed their petition, Mother had denied them any
    access whatsoever to Children. By order dated October 4, 2013 and entered
    October 7, 2013, the court issued an interim custody order granting sole
    legal and primary physical custody of Children to Mother. The court awarded
    Paternal Grandparents the following periods of partial physical custody,
    beginning with a “phase-in” schedule:6 (1) Friday, September 27, 2013,
    from 5:30-7:30 p.m., in York County, with Mother present; (2) Saturday,
    September 28, 2013, from 9:30 a.m. until 12:00 p.m., in York County, with
    Mother present; (3) December 27-29, 2013, at Paternal Grandmother’s
    home in Erie County, phasing out Mother’s presence during the scheduled
    visits; and (4) two weekends between January 1, 2014 and June 1, 2014, in
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Paternal Grandparents previously filed a joint petition for partial custody in
    Erie County but withdrew that petition to refile in York County. Paternal
    Grandparents have standing to seek partial custody pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 5325(1) (stating where parent of child is deceased, parent or grandparent
    of deceased parent may file action of partial physical custody or supervised
    physical custody).
    6
    The parties live approximately 5½ hours away.
    -4-
    J-A10001-15
    York County.       The interim custody order provided the following regular
    schedule of partial physical custody thereafter: (1) three weeks over the
    summer (one week in June, July, and August) in the summer of 2014 and
    each following summer; (2) two weekends each in the fall and spring to
    occur in York County; (3) four overnight periods during Children’s Christmas
    break, between December 27th through December 31st each year; and (4)
    any other times agreed to by the parties.          The interim custody order also
    included a provision for Skype communication between Children and
    Paternal Grandparents to occur each Sunday at 7:00 p.m., beginning on
    October 6, 2013.
    After Paternal Grandparents commenced their custody action, Mother’s
    Husband started proceedings to adopt Children. The court initially granted
    the adoption, but Paternal Grandparents intervened on or around November
    4, 2013, when they learned of the proceedings.              Because Mother and
    Mother’s Husband failed to notify Paternal Grandparents about the adoption
    proceedings, the court vacated the adoption decree.7
    The court held a custody trial on February 10, 2014. At the start of
    trial, the court announced it was the first custody trial the court had presided
    over in approximately five years.         The court expressed dissatisfaction with
    ____________________________________________
    7
    At the time of trial, Mother’s Husband testified he planned to re-commence
    the adoption proceedings once the custody proceedings were resolved.
    -5-
    J-A10001-15
    the legislature’s enactment of the Custody Act since the court had last
    presided over a custody trial. The court stated:
    Frankly, I’m not sure how I want to do this. But since this
    is the first custody trial that I have to sit on—fortunately,
    the other cases assigned to me have been resolved by
    agreements.
    That being so, I think it fair to counsel to advise them that
    I did sit and try and figure out when the last custody trial I
    had and I think it was about five years ago having other
    assignments in the interim.
    And during that period of time, the legislature enacted a
    big comprehensive custody act, bunch of stuff that they
    did. They determined that they needed to help the courts
    in deciding these cases by telling them what factors they
    have to consider in determining what the best interest of
    the child or children is.
    Honestly, I’ve taken a look at the statute. I have personal
    reservations as to whether the legislature can tell me how
    to make a decision. But I’m told that’s the way we do it.
    So counsel should be on the         alert that I haven’t studied
    these things. I haven’t gone        and looked and figured out
    whatever. So touch base on          those things that you think
    are important to decide what        is in the best interest[s] of
    these children.
    (N.T. Trial, 2/10/14, at 11-12; R.R. at 9a).
    Paternal Grandmother testified, inter alia, as follows.8 Mother moved
    into her home when K.A.T. was approximately two months old.                    Paternal
    Grandmother and Mother had a nice relationship while Mother lived with her
    and W.B. During this time, Mother wrote Paternal Grandmother and W.B. a
    ____________________________________________
    8
    (See 
    id. at 14-74;
    R.R. at 10a-40a.)
    -6-
    J-A10001-15
    “thank you” card expressing gratitude for their kindness and generosity, as
    well as a Valentine’s Day card.9 Mother also wrote Paternal Grandmother a
    “get well” card after Paternal Grandmother had surgery.        On February 7,
    2008, Mother executed an “authorization for treatment of a minor” form,
    which gave Paternal Grandmother and W.B. authority to accompany K.A.T.
    to doctor’s appointments and to consent to K.A.T.’s medical examinations
    and/or treatment.
    Mother moved out in January 2009.        When Mother and Father split
    custody of Children, Father was living with Paternal Grandmother, so
    ____________________________________________
    9
    The “thank you” card states:
    I wanted to find a thank you card filled with all the words
    that I feel. But then I found this card & knew it was
    perfect [because] it’s in this card that I can write down my
    own feelings with all of my own words.
    [Paternal Grandmother and W.B.,]
    Everything you guys do and have done for me (& [K.A.T.])
    is so appreciated. I hope that eventually I can help you
    the way that you’ve helped me. You’ve dealt with my
    bullshit and helped me on my feet—and for that I’m truly
    grateful. I’ve never met two other people who are so
    willing to help others. You’ve given me so much & much of
    that isn’t what money can buy. You’ve taught me lessons
    that I won’t forget & shown me love that I will always
    remember. I thank you both for all that you do. Thank
    you for everything.
    [Mother].
    (Paternal Grandparents’ Exhibit 3).
    -7-
    J-A10001-15
    Children stayed at Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s home during Father’s
    periods of physical custody. Paternal Grandmother testified Mother refused
    to let Paternal Grandparents communicate with Children when they lived in
    Hawaii. Paternal Grandmother explained Mother threatened Father while in
    Hawaii that if Father disclosed Mother’s phone number to Paternal
    Grandparents, or allowed anyone else on the phone line during Father’s
    phone calls with Children, that Mother would disconnect the call.            Mother
    also “un-friended” Paternal Grandmother on Facebook.
    Paternal Grandmother testified that Mother failed to tell Father when
    she moved from Hawaii to Clymer, New York.               In February 2012, Father
    learned that Mother was in Clymer, and when Father confronted Mother
    about moving from Hawaii, Mother claimed she was back in town for a short
    time on vacation.      Paternal Grandmother explained Mother agreed Father
    could    visit   Children   once   during    this   “vacation”   period.    Paternal
    Grandmother testified that Father visited Children again in July 2012, when
    Father discovered through Maternal Grandmother that Mother was still living
    with Children in Clymer. In August 2012, Father returned to Clymer to visit
    Children again, but Mother had already moved away.
    Following   Father’s   sudden       death   in   February   2013,   Paternal
    Grandmother hired a private investigator to locate Mother and Children.
    When the private investigator discovered Mother had an address in
    Wisconsin, Paternal Grandmother hired a second private investigator in
    -8-
    J-A10001-15
    Wisconsin. Ultimately, Paternal Grandmother located Mother and Children in
    York County, Pennsylvania.      Upon finding Mother and Children, Paternal
    Grandparents served Mother with the custody complaint.
    Paternal Grandmother testified that Mother was uncooperative with the
    terms of the interim custody order. With respect to the court-ordered Skype
    conversations, Paternal Grandmother said Mother claimed her camera was
    broken, so Paternal Grandparents could not actually see Children during the
    calls. Paternal Grandmother’s son, S.T. (“Children’s Uncle”), offered to fix
    Mother’s camera free-of-charge, but Mother refused the offer.        Paternal
    Grandmother testified that if she called Mother to speak with Children
    outside of the court-ordered Skype timeframe, Mother would not answer the
    phone or she would state it was not a good time or tell Paternal
    Grandmother to wait until the court-ordered timeframe to speak with
    Children.
    Paternal Grandmother testified that Paternal Grandparents’ first visit
    with Children under the interim custody order was a success. The visit took
    place at an arcade, and Children recognized Paternal Grandparents right
    away.     Paternal Grandmother also spoke highly of Paternal Grandparents’
    visit with Children over the Christmas holiday. Paternal Grandmother had a
    Christmas party at her home with Children’s extended family.         Paternal
    Grandparents, their significant others, and Children’s paternal aunts, uncles,
    cousins, and other relatives attended. Children made glow bugs, balloons,
    -9-
    J-A10001-15
    made a Christmas gift for Mother, and played with their cousins. Children
    also participated in a balloon launch to honor Father’s memory. Children’s
    great-aunt gave Children a memory box containing a small toy soldier and
    Father’s dog tags.        Mother later discarded the toy soldier, claiming it
    promoted violence.
    While the interim custody order was in place, Paternal Grandmother
    sent Children Captain America and Superman action figures.           Paternal
    Grandmother testified Mother also discarded these action figures as “too
    violent,” even though Mother permitted Children to dress-up as Superman
    and Batman for Halloween.
    Paternal Grandmother admits she has rheumatoid arthritis.     Paternal
    Grandmother denied having any health issues which would impede her
    ability to care for Children.       Paternal Grandmother and W.B. both smoke
    cigarettes but do not smoke around Children.            Paternal Grandmother
    admitted she was charged with passing a bad check in 2012 and with theft
    of services in 2009.10 Paternal Grandmother did not explain the details of
    these charges.
    Paternal Grandmother is currently employed with Interim Health Care
    for the past four years. Prior to her employment with Interim Health Care,
    ____________________________________________
    10
    Counsel for Paternal Grandparents objected to the admission of testimony
    concerning these criminal charges. The court overruled the objection as
    relevant to Children’s best interests. Paternal Grandparents challenge this
    evidentiary ruling in their third issue on appeal.
    - 10 -
    J-A10001-15
    Paternal Grandmother owned a daycare which she operated out of her
    home.     Children were enrolled in the daycare when Father was at work
    during his periods of physical custody (when Father and Mother had split
    custody).     Father paid Paternal Grandmother approximately $14.00 or
    $15.00 each week as his “co-pay” for the daycare services.                      Paternal
    Grandmother said Father paid her to babysit K.A.T. even when Mother had
    been living with Paternal Grandmother and W.B.
    Paternal Grandmother intervened with the adoption proceedings
    because she does not want Mother’s Husband to adopt Children.                   Paternal
    Grandmother said Mother’s Husband uses military-style discipline with
    Children.     Paternal Grandmother also expressed concerns that Mother’s
    Husband is racist, based on his Facebook posts related to “racial stuff and
    Nazi stuff.”11
    Paternal    Grandmother       requested     the   court   to   enlarge   Paternal
    Grandparents’ periods of partial physical custody under the interim custody
    order.   Paternal Grandmother sought three weekends each in the fall and
    spring to occur in Erie County so that Children’s extended family can see
    Children. Paternal Grandmother suggested the parties could meet at a half-
    way point to exchange custody.             Paternal Grandmother also sought two
    weeks’ custody in June, July, and August. Paternal Grandmother explained
    ____________________________________________
    11
    The Facebook rants were keenly distressing to Paternal Grandmother
    because W.B. is African-American.
    - 11 -
    J-A10001-15
    that she has an amicable relationship with Paternal Grandfather, and they
    agreed that during Paternal Grandparents’ periods of partial physical
    custody, Children will stay overnight at Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s
    home; Paternal Grandfather will see Children during the daytime.
    Paternal Grandfather testified, inter alia, as follows.12     Paternal
    Grandfather has a good relationship with Paternal Grandmother.        Paternal
    Grandfather goes to Paternal Grandmother’s house during the court-ordered
    timeframe for Skype calls with Children.           Paternal Grandfather echoed
    Paternal Grandmother’s testimony regarding the successful first visit with
    Children under the interim custody order.            Paternal Grandfather said
    Children remembered him when Paternal Grandfather first saw them at the
    arcade.    Paternal Grandfather had a great interaction with Children at the
    Christmas visit as well. Children asked Paternal Grandfather to teach them
    guitar. Paternal Grandfather admitted he had a problem with alcohol abuse
    in the past that worsened after Father’s death.           Paternal Grandfather
    currently attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings twice each week and does
    not consume alcohol.           Paternal Grandfather last consumed alcohol on
    December 21, 2013.          When confronted with a recent picture of himself
    holding a beverage can, Paternal Grandfather described the beverage
    ____________________________________________
    12
    (See N.T., 2/10/14, at 75-93; R.R. at 41a-50a.)
    - 12 -
    J-A10001-15
    pictured as a “Genny NA”; the “NA” stands for non-alcoholic.13         Paternal
    Grandfather smokes cigarettes, but he does not do so in front of or around
    Children.
    Paternal Grandfather is unemployed due to a 1996 work-related oil
    field injury that required multiple surgeries. Paternal Grandfather currently
    collects social security disability and has no residual effects from the injury
    which would impair his ability to care for Children.     Paternal Grandfather
    discussed a custody schedule with Paternal Grandmother and echoed
    Paternal Grandmother’s request for additional time with Children. Paternal
    Grandfather confirmed Paternal Grandmother’s statement that Children
    would sleep at Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s home during Paternal
    Grandparents’ periods of partial physical custody.       Paternal Grandfather
    indicated that he will travel with Paternal Grandmother to York County to
    visit Children if the court permits Paternal Grandparents to exercise partial
    physical custody; they will obtain separate rooms in the same hotel.
    Paternal Grandfather indicated he did not call Mother to speak with
    Children while they were in Hawaii because Mother threatened to disconnect
    her phone and disappear with Children if anyone from Father’s family
    contacted her.      Paternal Grandfather said Father did not disclose Mother’s
    phone number to his family members in fear of losing Children.         Paternal
    ____________________________________________
    13
    The Genesee Brewing Company website confirms that “Genny NA” is a
    non-alcoholic beer. See http://www.geneseebeer.com/beer/genesee-na/.
    - 13 -
    J-A10001-15
    Grandfather asked Maternal Grandmother for Mother’s address, but Maternal
    Grandmother would not disclose it.             Maternal Grandmother gave Paternal
    Grandfather a ride home once. Maternal Grandmother asked where Father
    was and told Paternal Grandfather that she knew where Children were
    residing.    Father happened to be at Paternal Grandfather’s home at that
    moment. Father then had a discussion with Maternal Grandmother outside
    of Paternal Grandfather’s presence, after             which Father   left Paternal
    Grandfather’s home with Maternal Grandmother to see Children.14
    Laurie Rogan, the first private investigator Paternal Grandmother
    hired, testified via telephone, inter alia, as follows.15 Paternal Grandmother
    hired her in March 2013 to locate Mother and Children. Ms. Rogan’s initial
    investigation led her to believe Mother and Children were residing in
    Wisconsin. Paternal Grandmother subsequently hired a private investigator
    in Wisconsin, who determined that Mother and Children had lived there but
    moved.      Ms. Rogan subsequently sent a United States Postal Service
    ancillary service request to obtain Mother’s forwarding address, which
    provided Mother’s current location in York County, Pennsylvania.
    ____________________________________________
    14
    Paternal Grandfather did not elaborate on the details of this event, but
    additional testimony at trial indicated that Father’s interaction with Maternal
    Grandmother took place while Mother was living with Children in Clymer,
    New York, shortly before she moved to Wisconsin in August 2012.
    15
    (See N.T., 2/10/14, at 94-105; R.R. at 51a-56a.)
    - 14 -
    J-A10001-15
    Children’s Uncle testified, inter alia, as follows.16    Children’s Uncle
    offered to fix Mother’s computer for no charge so the Skype visual
    technology would work. During Children’s visit over the Christmas holiday,
    Children recognized Children’s Uncle and jumped into his arms. Children’s
    Uncle played guitar with Children, and they built toys.          Children’s Uncle
    observed that Children seemed very happy during their visit with Father’s
    family over Christmas.        Children’s Uncle did not contact Mother when she
    lived in Hawaii with Children because Father told him that if anyone from his
    family were to call Mother, she would hang up the phone. Children’s Uncle
    has attempted to contact Mother on Facebook in the past, but he cannot find
    her name; so Children’s Uncle believes Mother “blocked” him.
    W.B. testified, inter alia, as follows.17 W.B. is Paternal Grandmother’s
    significant other. W.B. has known Children since they were babies; Children
    call W.B. “poppy.”         W.B. loves Children as if they are his biological
    grandchildren; W.B. gets along very well with Children.         Mother lived with
    K.A.T. in Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s home.         W.B. and Mother were
    mostly friendly during that timeframe.
    In June 2010, the Commonwealth charged W.B. with harassment due
    ____________________________________________
    16
    (See 
    id. at 105-116;
    R.R. at 56a-61a.)
    17
    (Id. at 116-135; R.R. at 61a-71a.)
    - 15 -
    J-A10001-15
    to a physical altercation with a neighbor;18 the neighbor had pulled into
    W.B.’s driveway, continually revved his engine, and refused to exit W.B.’s
    property. The Commonwealth also charged the neighbor in relation to the
    incident. The neighbor no longer lives in W.B.’s neighborhood. W.B. did not
    recall a charge against him for trespass by a motor vehicle.
    W.B. is currently disabled due to multiple degenerative discs.         W.B.
    receives social security disability. W.B. does not drink alcohol.
    W.B. attended the first visit between Paternal Grandparents and
    Children under the interim custody order. Children remembered W.B. and
    called him “poppy.”         The second visit with Children under the interim
    custody order took place on September 28, 2013, at a park.               W.B. also
    attended that visit and played tag with Children, at great physical cost. At
    the Christmas visit at Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s home, Children were
    excited and appeared to have lots of fun. Children made Mother pictures of
    reindeer as a Christmas gift.
    W.B. denied he smoked marijuana in his home when Mother lived
    there.    W.B. also denied driving by Mother’s place of employment after
    Mother had moved out of his home.              Following W.B.’s testimony, Paternal
    Grandparents rested their case.
    ____________________________________________
    18
    Counsel for Paternal Grandparents objected to testimony concerning this
    harassment charge, but the court overruled the objection as relevant to
    Children’s best interests.
    - 16 -
    J-A10001-15
    Mother testified, inter alia, as follows.19 Mother moved out of Maternal
    Grandmother’s       home     in   December     2007      and   moved    into   Paternal
    Grandmother and W.B.’s home at that time.                 Mother lived with Paternal
    Grandmother and W.B. with K.A.T. until December 2008.                          Mother’s
    relationship with Paternal Grandmother was good at first. Over the course
    of Mother’s stay at Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s home, Mother’s
    relationship with Paternal Grandmother worsened. Mother felt like nothing
    she did was good enough while living in Paternal Grandmother’s home.
    Mother said Paternal Grandmother had strict rules.             For example, Paternal
    Grandmother would not allow Mother to talk on the phone or go to the
    grocery store without Paternal Grandmother’s permission.               Mother claimed
    Paternal Grandmother told Mother that if she wanted to move out, Mother
    would have to leave K.A.T. with Paternal Grandmother and W.B.
    Mother conceded that she let Paternal Grandmother watch K.A.T. while
    Mother worked; Mother enrolled K.A.T. in Paternal Grandmother’s home
    daycare.     Mother said she paid Paternal Grandmother for her daycare
    services using government assistance.              Mother paid Paternal Grandmother
    every other week; Father paid Paternal Grandmother on the alternating
    ____________________________________________
    19
    (Id. at 136-209; R.R. at 71a-108a.)
    - 17 -
    J-A10001-15
    weeks.20       Mother claimed Paternal Grandmother forced her to commit
    welfare fraud; Mother alleged she ultimately had to repay the government as
    a result.21
    Mother claimed she also had difficulties with W.B. while living in his
    home.      Mother said she initially liked W.B. but is now “terrified” of him.
    Mother observed W.B. smoke marijuana in the home. Mother claimed she
    once overheard W.B. talking about a drug deal, and W.B. threatened to kill
    Mother if she told anyone what she had heard. Mother said she could not
    escape from Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s home because they allegedly
    had video surveillance around the home and trained guard dogs.
    When    confronted      with   the     letters   Mother   wrote   to   Paternal
    Grandmother and W.B. while living in their home, Mother claimed she was
    grateful to have a roof over her head.             Mother testified: “I know how to
    count my blessings regardless of how bad something can be, and I did not
    want to make [Paternal Grandmother and W.B.] mad.” (N.T., 2/10/14, at
    182; R.R. at 94a).
    Mother said she had an okay relationship with Paternal Grandfather.
    According to Mother, Paternal Grandfather drank a lot.
    ____________________________________________
    20
    Mother claimed she had receipts for each payment she made to Paternal
    Grandmother, but she did not present those receipts at trial.
    21
    Mother presented no evidence at trial to substantiate these allegations.
    - 18 -
    J-A10001-15
    Mother testified that she attempted to contact Father at basic training
    to inform him she planned to move out of Paternal Grandmother and W.B.’s
    home with K.A.T. Mother’s attempts to reach Father at basic training were
    unsuccessful. Mother left in the middle of the night in December 2008 and
    moved in with a co-worker with K.A.T.; Mother was pregnant with K.W.R. at
    that time.     Father returned home from basic training for a break around
    January 2009. Mother met with Father at that time and brought K.A.T. to
    their meeting.    Mother claimed Father “kidnapped” K.A.T. for a week and
    refused to return K.A.T. to Mother’s care until Mother’s relative threatened
    Father that he would lose his military career if he did not return K.A.T.
    Mother admitted she did not report the alleged kidnapping to any
    authorities.
    In early 2009, Mother and Father split physical custody of K.A.T. on a
    50/50 basis.     Mother gave birth to K.W.R. in March 2009.     Once K.W.R.
    reached six months’ old, Mother and Father split physical custody of K.W.R.
    on a 50/50 basis as well.      Mother said Father did not utilize all of his
    custodial time with Children under the shared custody arrangement. Mother
    conceded that Paternal Grandparents might have spent time with Children
    during Father’s periods of physical custody, though she was uncertain where
    Father lived at this time.
    Mother began a relationship with D.S. in April 2009, and they married
    in May 2010. Mother admitted that Father took custody of Children for two
    - 19 -
    J-A10001-15
    weeks while she was in Hawaii to marry.22 Mother and Father agreed that
    Mother could take Children to live in Hawaii with Mother and Mother’s
    Husband if Mother agreed to release Father from his child support obligation.
    The agreement provided that Father would get custody of Children during
    the summertime, holidays, and have unlimited communication with Children
    through phone calls and social media.              Mother also agreed the custody
    arrangement would revert to 50/50 custody if Mother moved back to Erie
    County.
    Mother moved with Children and Mother’s Husband to Hawaii in
    September 2010.         Mother said Father called only once every four to six
    months while she lived in Hawaii with Children. Father did not send Children
    cards while they lived in Hawaii.          Mother admitted she told Father not to
    disclose her phone number to others, but she did not recall threatening to
    run away with Children if Father gave out her number. Mother said Father
    did not utilize all of his custody time with Children in the summer because
    Father anticipated deployment overseas.
    Mother, Children, and Mother’s Husband relocated from Hawaii to
    Clymer, New York in November 2011.                 Mother stayed in New York until
    August 2012, when she moved with Children and Mother’s Husband to
    ____________________________________________
    22
    Counsel for Paternal Grandparents suggested that Father took custody of
    Children for six weeks while Mother was in Hawaii to marry; Mother denied
    this proposition.
    - 20 -
    J-A10001-15
    Wisconsin.23 Mother claimed she told Father about her return to New York,
    and she permitted Father to see Children. Mother said her stay in New York
    was only temporary, to use up Mother’s Husband’s vacation time from the
    Army.    Mother admitted she told Husband she was only in New York on
    vacation. Mother conceded she did not immediately tell Father she was back
    from Hawaii for good.        Mother denied that she was hiding from Father or
    Father’s family while she moved around the country.
    Mother, Children, and Mother’s Husband moved to Wisconsin in August
    2012, when Mother’s Husband started school. After the move to Wisconsin,
    Mother claimed she had problems with her phone which necessitated a new
    phone number. Mother did not tell Father her new phone number. Mother
    ____________________________________________
    23
    Mother admitted she was angry with Maternal Grandmother for bringing
    Father to see Children in New York the night before Mother and Children
    moved to Wisconsin. Counsel for Paternal Grandparents had the following
    exchange with Mother regarding this incident:
    [Counsel]:     [I]f I ask [Maternal Grandmother] whether
    she brought [Father] to Clymer, New York, because she
    thought it was wrong for you to be hiding these kids from
    him, she’s going to tell me that I’m full of crap and that
    didn’t happen?
    [Mother]:         Good luck. My mom is a pistol. Good luck.
    [Counsel]:    You were angry with your mother, weren’t
    you, because of what she did?
    [Mother]:         Yeah.
    (N.T., 2/10/14, at 192; R.R. at 99a).
    - 21 -
    J-A10001-15
    claimed Father still could have contacted Mother through Facebook, if he
    wanted to reach her.      When Father died in the automobile accident in
    February 2013, Mother was living with Children and Mother’s Husband in
    Wisconsin. Mother did not attend the funeral because of the cost of travel.
    Additionally, Mother claimed Children did not really know Father and
    regarded Father as the “guy with the cool tattoo.”       After Father’s death,
    some of his family reached out to Mother’s Husband through Facebook,
    asking to see Children. Mother denied their request, stating Father’s family
    had not previously made any effort to see Children. Paternal Grandmother
    tried to contact Mother to discuss Father’s life insurance policy, but Mother
    did not want to work with Paternal Grandmother.
    Mother testified that Children’s behavior has changed since entry of
    the interim custody order.    Mother claimed Children now need counseling
    because they are wetting the bed and having nightmares. Mother insisted
    Children’s emotional issues did not begin until after entry of the interim
    custody order. Mother said Children hate the Skype calls, and the calls are
    terrible. Mother contended Children have nightmares because of the Skype
    calls. Mother tried to fix her phone to allow use of the visual technology, but
    her efforts were unsuccessful. Mother testified that Children’s first visit with
    Paternal Grandparents under the interim custody order was terrible.
    Children did not recognize Paternal Grandparents and Children hid behind
    - 22 -
    J-A10001-15
    Mother’s leg when they saw Paternal Grandparents. Mother claimed she had
    bruises on her leg from Children squeezing her so tight.
    Mother would not permit Children to play with the action figure toys
    Paternal Grandparents sent Children because Mother said that the toys
    promote violence.       Mother threw away candy Paternal Grandparents sent
    Children because Mother thinks candy is bad for Children.                     Mother
    complained Children returned home, from the Christmas visit with Paternal
    Grandparents, smelling like cigarettes and were sick and exhausted after
    this visit.
    Mother denied Paternal Grandmother’s request to speak with Children
    on the phone outside of the court-ordered Skype timeframe because Mother
    said Children are too busy. Children participate in martial arts classes two to
    four days each week. Mother does not want Paternal Grandparents to have
    any     custody   of    Children    whatsoever      because   she   thinks   Paternal
    Grandparents are horrible people. Mother admitted that she once filed an
    abuse report against Paternal Grandmother, which Children and Youth
    Services ruled “unfounded.”
    Mother’s Husband testified, inter alia, as follows.24 Mother’s Husband
    has a good relationship with Children.             Prior to Father’s death, Mother’s
    Husband was on good terms with Father. Mother’s Husband gave his phone
    ____________________________________________
    24
    (Id. at 210-229; R.R. at 108a-118a.)
    - 23 -
    J-A10001-15
    number to Father in case Father was unable to reach Mother.               Mother’s
    Husband said Father did not exercise his holiday time with Children while
    they lived in Hawaii. Father called Children only five or six times while they
    were in Hawaii.
    Mother’s Husband said that during Children’s first visit with Paternal
    Grandparents      under   the   interim     custody   order,   Children    seemed
    uncomfortable.     Mother’s Husband denied that Children ran into Paternal
    Grandparents’ arms at the first visit. Children called Paternal Grandmother
    “nana” only after she repeated that word to Children multiple times.
    Children are not excited to participate in the Skype calls. Mother’s Husband
    has tried to fix the visual technology for the Skype calls but to no avail.
    Mother’s    Husband   initially   denied   posting   racist   and   Nazi-type
    comments on Facebook. Mother’s Husband said he is not a racist or a Nazi.
    Upon further questioning, Mother’s Husband admitted he posted a response
    to a friend’s comment on Facebook on August 11, 2011, stating: “We need
    to start a fucking chapter of the KKK or Nazi or something. I refuse to live
    in a town with anything but whites.” (Id. at 227; R.R. at 117a.) Mother’s
    Husband said this post “was a joke because [my friend was talking] about all
    of the niggers moving here because there is lots of them.” (Id. at 227-28;
    R.R. at 117a.)      Mother’s Husband said he was not serious.             Mother’s
    Husband admitted he had a conversation with a friend on Facebook on
    February 15, 2013, in which Mother’s Husband said: “I want to go nigger
    - 24 -
    J-A10001-15
    hunting.”     (Id. at 224; R.R. at 115a.)     Mother’s Husband defended this
    comment as follows: “…I was angry. But nigger by definition is an ignorant
    person. It does not mean anybody of color.” (Id. at 228; R.R. at 117a.)
    Mother’s Husband said he has African-American friends.           Mother’s
    Husband could not recall posting a picture of Hitler to his Facebook page,
    stating: “Hail to Hitler. We should all be like him.” (Id.) Mother’s Husband
    explained that when he was in the Army he would shave his head and people
    would call him Hitler because his last name is German, so if Mother’s
    Husband did post a picture of Hitler, it was meant as a joke.          Mother’s
    Husband conceded that on October 18, 2013, he posted: “…I won’t stop until
    they get nothing because that’s what they deserve[,]” in reference to
    Paternal Grandparents and the current custody action. (Id. at 226; R.R. at
    116a.)        Mother’s   Husband’s   Facebook     post   referencing   Paternal
    Grandparents continued that during Paternal Grandparents’ last visit with
    Children, Mother’s Husband believed Paternal Grandparents were high on
    pain pills.
    Mother’s Husband said he disciplines Children using exercise. Mother’s
    Husband makes Children do squats, leg lifts, and other forms of exercise as
    punishment. Children learn a similar discipline in their Hapkido marital arts
    classes. Mother’s Husband said Mother did not throw away the action figure
    toys Paternal Grandparents sent Children; Mother stored the action figures
    in the laundry room because Mother and Mother’s Husband do not allow
    - 25 -
    J-A10001-15
    Children to play with toys that promote violence.             Mother’s Husband said
    Children’s behavior has changed since the start of the custody proceedings.
    Children sleep in Mother and Mother’s Husband bed more frequently and
    have nightmares. Children are currently in counseling.
    Mother’s Husband tried to adopt Children.             Paternal Grandparents
    intervened, which caused the court to vacate the adoption decree. Mother’s
    Husband still plans to adopt Children after these custody proceedings are
    resolved.
    Mr. Dennis Lagan is a private investigator whom Mother hired for
    purposes of the custody proceedings.               Mr. Lagan testified, inter alia, as
    follows.25 Mother hired Mr. Lagan to conduct background investigations on
    Paternal Grandparents, W.B., and any other relatives with whom Children
    might have contact.26 Mr. Lagan discovered the following criminal records.
    In October 2009, the Commonwealth charged Paternal Grandmother with
    theft of services; Paternal Grandmother pled guilty in November 2009, paid
    a fine, $250.00 in restitution, and costs.           In 2012, Paternal Grandmother
    pled guilty to a traffic violation. Later in 2012, the Commonwealth charged
    ____________________________________________
    25
    (Id. at 229-241; R.R. at 118a-124a.)
    26
    Counsel for Paternal Grandparents objected to testimony/evidence
    concerning criminal records, but the court overruled the objection as
    relevant to Children’s best interests.
    - 26 -
    J-A10001-15
    Paternal Grandmother with bad checks; the disposition was guilty.27 Also in
    2012, the Commonwealth charged Paternal Grandmother with operating a
    vehicle without required financial responsibility; that charge was dismissed.
    In 2013, Paternal Grandmother pled guilty to speeding (71 mph in a 55 mph
    zone).
    Mr. Lagan did not discover any criminal history, bankruptcies, tax
    liens, or judgments against Paternal Grandfather. Mr. Lagan found one child
    support action against Paternal Grandfather from 1998.
    Mr. Lagan discovered that the Commonwealth charged W.B. with
    trespass by a motor vehicle in 2008; W.B. pled guilty to this offense and
    paid a fine and costs.         In 2010, the Commonwealth charged W.B. with
    harassment due to a physical altercation; W.B. pled guilty to this offense in
    July 2010 and paid a fine and costs.
    ____________________________________________
    27
    Mr. Lagan shared no factual basis for the theft of services, traffic violation,
    and bad checks convictions. Mr. Lagan also could not determine whether
    the convictions were summary offenses or misdemeanor offenses.
    Additionally, counsel for Paternal Grandparents confronted Mr. Lagan with a
    print-out from the Pennsylvania State Police dated May 15, 2012, which
    showed that Paternal Grandmother had no criminal record. Mr. Lagan
    explained that the Pennsylvania State Police records are generally based on
    fingerprinting; Mr. Lagan suggested Paternal Grandmother might not have
    been fingerprinted for her crimes. Mr. Lagan indicated that the Pennsylvania
    State Police records might be different than the records accessed through
    the Unified Judicial System Portal. Neither the Pennsylvania State Police
    record nor the Unified Judicial System Portal record pertaining to Paternal
    Grandmother’s convictions is part of the certified record on appeal.
    - 27 -
    J-A10001-15
    Maternal Grandmother testified, inter alia, as follows.28          Maternal
    Grandmother’s relationship with Mother is currently fine, though they have
    had their “ups and downs” over the years. Maternal Grandmother would not
    permit Mother and Father to live together when Mother gave birth to K.A.T.
    because they were unmarried, so Mother moved in with Father at Paternal
    Grandmother and W.B.’s home.                   Mother became distraught living with
    Paternal Grandmother and W.B., so Mother moved out.
    When Mother and Father shared custody of Children, Maternal
    Grandmother described the custodial arrangement as “horrible.”             Maternal
    Grandmother said Children had no set routine because they were always
    back and forth between homes. Maternal Grandmother said Father did not
    always show up for his periods of physical custody.
    Maternal Grandmother said she drove Father to see Children in New
    York on March 20, 2012, but Father did not get out of the car.             Maternal
    Grandmother indicated Father already knew Mother was living with Children
    in New York when this incident took place. Maternal Grandmother admitted
    Mother was upset that Maternal Grandmother brought him to see Children
    on this date.      Maternal Grandmother said she spoke to Father again on
    August 18, 2012 and informed Father that Mother and Mother’s Husband
    planned to move to Wisconsin with Children.               Maternal Grandmother told
    ____________________________________________
    28
    (Id. at 241-257; R.R. at 124a-132a.)
    - 28 -
    J-A10001-15
    Father it might be the last opportunity to see Children for a while, but Father
    said he did not want to see Children.29 Maternal Grandmother denied that
    anyone from Father’s family had ever contacted her, asking for Mother’s
    phone number or address.               Maternal Grandmother believes Mother’s
    Husband is a great man who is good with Children and is giving Children a
    good life.
    Mr. Wilson L. Richardson teaches Children Hapkido,30 a martial arts
    class, two to three days each week. Mr. Richardson testified, inter alia, as
    follows.31    Mr. Richardson said Mother and Mother’s Husband attend the
    classes and watch Children more frequently than most parents do. Children
    are doing well in the class.
    Keiton Lyle Westfall testified, inter alia, as follows.32   Mr. Westfall is
    Father’s second cousin.       Mr. Westfall and Father did not spend much time
    together, but they always conversed when they saw each other. In speaking
    ____________________________________________
    29
    There is some inconsistency in the testimony as to whether Maternal
    Grandmother drove Father to see Children on March 20, 2012, or on August
    18, 2012, shortly before Mother and Children moved to Wisconsin with
    Mother’s Husband.
    30
    Hapkido is a self-defense based curriculum that also teaches Children the
    discipline of exercise.
    31
    (Id. at 257-261; R.R. at 132a-134a.)
    32
    (Id. at 262-265; R.R. at 134a-136a.)
    - 29 -
    J-A10001-15
    with Father, Mr. Westfall did not recall Father ever being distraught about
    Children or discussing a search for Children.
    After Mr. Westfall’s testimony, Mother rested her case.        The court
    instructed counsel to address in closing arguments the statutory factors
    relating to grandparent custodial rights as well as the two or three year
    period in which Paternal Grandparents had no contact with Children.
    Regarding the lack of contact, the court stated: “And, of course, the effect
    of—assuming parent withholds the children from grandparents, and frankly it
    makes no difference whether it is hiding them or just simply saying you can’t
    see them, it is the time lag that I’m concerned about.” (Id. at 267; R.R. at
    137a.) The court explained that it planned to make a decision immediately
    following closing arguments so that the parties could leave the courtroom
    informed of the result.
    Following closing argument, the court explained its custody decision as
    follows:
    Now, before we had this most recent legislation, the test
    was actually pretty direct and somewhat simple. Upon the
    death of a child, the parents of the deceased child may
    seek reasonable partial custody to an unmarried child upon
    a finding that partial custody would be in the best interest
    of the child and would not interfere with the parent-child
    relationship.
    Court decisions instruct that the court must consider the
    amount of personal contact between the parents, the
    grandparents, and the child or children.
    The purpose of allowing partial custody under this is not to
    replace a parent with a grandparent as a primary
    - 30 -
    J-A10001-15
    caregiver. And essentially what the cases were saying is
    natural biological parent trumps grandparent for primary
    physical custody, period.
    But as it relates to partial physical custody, that was to
    continue a healthy relationship with grandparents if that
    was in the child’s best interest and would not interfere with
    the parent’s relationship.      And the statute was then
    apparently replaced by this new one with these factors.
    And I’m sorry. I have to say this. When I started
    reviewing the code when I got this assignment, my first
    reaction was the legislature has embarked upon an
    unconstitutional encroachment of the court’s authority.
    They are telling us what we must consider to make a
    decision.
    I’m not sure—the example came to mind is for example if
    the legislature said we’re going to control fat people. So
    anybody who makes a personal injury claim in an
    automobile accident case, you’ve got to consider whether
    they are fat or not. Now what the heck does that have to
    do with somebody’s injuries? And some of the factors, I’m
    sorry, that I have reviewed I’m shaking my head saying
    what the heck does this have to do with the best interest
    of the children? Oh, it controls the conduct of the adults
    because the adults can’t act like adults. So we’ll dictate
    how the adults will act and call it in the best interest of the
    children.
    I’m tempted to just rule, [Paternal Grandparents’ counsel],
    because I know you are a competent, qualified, good
    practitioner in the area of family law that this is all
    unconstitutional because it infringes upon my authority to
    make a decision. Any I may find the case that I will do
    that.
    But nevertheless, the legislature has enacted these factors.
    You addressed them. Now, as [Mother’s counsel] pointed
    out, there is no testimony on some of the stuff because it
    doesn’t exist. All right. So we pass over those and we
    look at the factors and we do so with the understanding
    that grandparents have the burden of proof in these areas.
    - 31 -
    J-A10001-15
    There is a curious circumstance that comes to mind. If a
    biological parent—I’m not saying that’s the case here. But
    if a biological parent intentionally creates conflict and
    estrangement with that biological parent’s former in-laws,
    do they get punished for what they did by saying we’re
    going to ignore the conflict because biological parent
    created it and we’re still going to give partial physical
    custody to grandparents knowing there is an irreconcilable
    conflict and then say you live with it? I don’t think that is
    in the best interest of the children.
    Which brings me back to finally all well and good, here are
    the factors you[,] that you consider. How do you consider
    them? Who caused what? That is part of the equation.
    That is part of the discussion. I guess as I get more
    educated in this area, I’ll answer that question for myself.
    But the facts are that I would find from the testimony
    there is contact between [Paternal Grandmother] and
    there has been literally no contact with [Paternal
    Grandfather]. And he’s—I don’t mean to be disrespectful
    to you. You’re sort of the passenger sitting in the car and
    your former wife is driving it. And in whichever direction
    she ends, that’s where you’re going.        That’s another
    circumstance.
    We have divorced grandparents involved with significant
    others living in separate households, both of them are
    Plaintiffs. And yet they solved the apparent problem of
    splitting time with them by their own agreement that if
    they get partial physical custody, the kids are going to stay
    overnight with [P]aternal [G]randmother and [P]aternal
    [G]randfather will come and pick them up and be with
    them during the day while [Paternal Grandmother] works.
    That doesn’t sound like it has…much court supervision at
    all, but nobody is asking me to get involved in that
    because they’ve agreed. So I don’t have the dilemma of
    saying let me figure out…how to split time with
    grandfather, grandmother, Skype calls. He goes over to
    her place, and they participate in these Skype calls.
    That’s another thing. I’m sorry. This micromanaging
    contacts over the phone and Skype and all that stuff, you
    just can’t be all things to all people.   And from the
    - 32 -
    J-A10001-15
    evidence, I do accept [M]other’s testimony that these
    Skype calls are upsetting. They are an interruption of their
    routine. And I can appreciate that.
    How do you have a conversation with a 4-year-old? Hi.
    How are you? Tell me what you did today. What do you
    think of the Middle East situation? Four-year-olds don’t
    have conversations with people in most instances. They
    report. I played. I like the puzzle. I like my bat. I like
    the ball. I watched the Muppets. They are not on [TV]
    anymore or whatever, whoever.
    But 6-year-olds are starting to have conversations. They
    are going to school. They are in kindergarten, first grade.
    This Skype technology, I heard the evidence. And I heard,
    oh yeah, we’ll get you the right device and this will all
    work. Mom refused that. But then she doesn’t apparently
    know how to use her phone to make it work. But then I
    heard testimony that it doesn’t work for group calls with
    phones.
    And I will tell you what my concern was when I heard all of
    that testimony and there was I believe you said you could
    get up to ten people on a call if you’re on a computer.
    Ma’am, in my judgment, that is overload. You get ten
    people yammering at a 4-year-old, all visual, all seeing, all
    that. To me, I can’t comprehend how that would impact a
    4-year-old.[33]
    All right. Where am I? Well, I’m analyzing the evidence in
    front of me. There is no question there is a conflict
    between the two.      I’m calling them households even
    though I know [Paternal Grandparents have] two
    households. Conflict between the households.
    One thing that I will tell you struck me and was concerning
    to me, [M]other’s current husband has been described as a
    ____________________________________________
    33
    No testimony established that Paternal Grandparents placed or intended
    to place ten people on the Skype calls while the interim custody order was in
    effect. Rather, testimony explained that the “group call” function on Skype
    allows up to ten people to participate on a call.
    - 33 -
    J-A10001-15
    good father, doing a good job, accepting of these children.
    And he stepped up to adopt these children and apparently,
    according to evidence, had got an order allowing him to
    adopt the children. And [Paternal G]randparents couldn’t
    just let that go. They had to go in and undo that to get it
    vacated. To what end?
    And my reaction was real simple to that. They stuck their
    nose in that situation and probably they should have
    stayed the hell out of it. Their—I can’t say daughter-in-
    law but their son’s paramour and their grandchildren are in
    a stable family, legally married, doing the right thing to
    adopt these boys. And [Mother’s Husband] steps up and
    for whatever reasons, you undid it. I don’t believe that
    could possibly be considered a best interest for your
    grandchildren in any way, shape, or form.
    Yes, I read the section.      One notation.  I do agree
    [Mother’s     counsel]     referred  [to]    grandparent
    considerations under the 5328 subsection, but you said as
    well as the other general factors.
    If I am compelled to use the factors that the legislature set
    up, I’m not looking beyond what the statute says.
    And the statute says grandparents factors. Fine. If I’m
    told I have to use those factors, I’m not going back and
    looking at general factors because I don’t think I should
    anyway be compelled to.
    But the bottom line is this. There is a conflict between
    [Paternal G]randmother and [M]other. Who created it?
    Even if I say [M]other, still is a fact.      Now I don’t
    necessarily believe that [M]other created the conflict.
    And even if she did and her perception is wrong, what is
    the old saying[,] perception becomes reality[,] is reality.
    Now, what am I to do with that, say [M]other you have got
    to make it up with your former paramour’s mother? Gee,
    I’m sure that will work. Wait a minute, counseling. We’ll
    make you spend money for counseling to heal this rift.
    Well, [Paternal G]randmother is in Erie.        Excuse me.
    [Corry], close to Erie.—
    - 34 -
    J-A10001-15
    *       *       *
    Corry. And [Mother] is in Hanover. How is that going to
    work? Oh, let’s make everybody drive three hours to get
    at a middle point and find some counselor to talk to these
    people for an hour and send them back on their way. That
    will give them a lot of time to think while they are driving
    back and forth. That is not going to work.
    So bottom line is this. Right or wrongly, I don’t believe
    that the conflict between [M]other and [P]aternal
    [G]randmother can be fixed. And I don’t think, therefore,
    it is in the best interest to trump [M]other’s decision not to
    give access to grandparents simply because grandparents
    want to establish a relationship with their grandchildren. I
    don’t see any need. Mother needs no help. She has a new
    husband. He’s doing good by her. They are stable, adding
    to their family.[34] So I’m not going to interfere with her
    decision.
    She is [C]hildren’s mother. And I don’t see any reason,
    even considering all of these factors that I’m supposed to
    think about, to conclude that [C]hildren would be better or
    it would be in their best interest to be compelled to spend
    regulated time with grandparents, nor for that matter have
    dictated times for contact on the phone.
    So having said all of that, the bottom line order is this.
    ORDER
    AND NOW, to wit, this 10th day of February, 2014, the
    complaint for custody filed by [Paternal Grandparents] is
    dismissed. We will enter no order of partial physical
    custody.
    *   *   *
    ____________________________________________
    34
    Mother was pregnant at the time of the custody trial.
    - 35 -
    J-A10001-15
    (Id. at 289-298; R.R. at 148a-152a.)35
    On March 7, 2014, Paternal Grandparents timely filed a notice of
    appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).       Paternal Grandparents raised four issues in their
    concise statement challenging: (1) the court’s decision to sever all ties
    between Children and their Paternal Grandparents’ ancestry; (2) the court’s
    admission of evidence of criminal and motor vehicle offenses; (3) the court’s
    failure to consider the Custody Act’s statutory factors and to conduct a
    detailed analysis; and (4) the court’s exclusive focus on the conflict between
    Mother and Paternal Grandparents. On March 24, 2014, the court issued a
    responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. In its opinion, the court stated:
    We have reviewed our Decision and feel no need presently
    to elaborate further. As the issues are styled, we would
    take the opportunity to offer some generalized comments
    and observations. Simply put, this Judge believes that the
    legislature has unduly encroached upon the judiciary and
    the way Judges are to perform their responsibilities. To
    state the issues of error as failing to conduct a detailed
    child custody analysis as required misdirects the focus
    away from the sole question of what is in the best interests
    of children. …
    Since it is unlikely a litigant would directly challenge “the
    factors” (23 Pa.C.S. 5328), in the context of the issues
    ____________________________________________
    35
    Prior to trial, the parties had filed motions for contempt. Mother filed for
    contempt, alleging Paternal Grandparents had smoked in front of Children.
    Paternal Grandparents filed for contempt based on Mother’s alleged
    interference with the visual capabilities of the Skype calls. The court denied
    both petitions for contempt at the conclusion of trial, finding insufficient
    evidence to substantiate either claim.
    - 36 -
    J-A10001-15
    styled, it is hoped this appeal may address the threshold
    question[:] can the legislature do what this law purports to
    do? The development of custody law, as is so with the
    common-law, was unquestionably within the province of
    the judiciary. An absolute preclusion from primary custody
    when a parent moved in the paramour[,] evolved to a
    more precise consideration of what is the effect of such a
    meretricious relationship on children. While the judiciary
    may have struggled with shifting social [mores], the
    Courts never lost focus that the paramount question was
    and always will be[,] what is in the best interest of
    children.
    *     *      *
    This is not a new challenge for the Courts. When called
    upon, it has been decided by the Superior Court that
    legislation is not the end all be all. In considering a
    natural parent’s petition to resume custody of his or her
    children, the best interest of the child standard was
    applicable rather than the clear necessity standard as set
    out in the Juvenile Act (42 Pa.C.S.A. 6301 et seq.).
    Perhaps in hindsight, this Judge should have declared
    outright in this case that “the factors” would not be
    considered and thus pre[v]ented the precise question
    being asked now. What we did do is consider the evidence
    and arguments presented by the litigants and to the best
    of our human ability decide what was in the best interest
    of these two boys. We do not think we were wrong in the
    result or how we got there.
    (Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed March 24, 2014, at 2-5) (some internal citations
    omitted).
    On September 16, 2014, this Court vacated and remanded the matter,
    based on the trial court’s failure to utilize the requisite statutory factors in
    making its determination. Specifically, this Court instructed the trial court to
    consider upon remand the sixteen general statutory “best interest” factors
    - 37 -
    J-A10001-15
    applicable when making any order of custody (see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a))
    and the three statutory custody factors pertaining to grandparents and
    great-grandparents (see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(1)).             Based on its
    disposition, this Court declined to address the merits of any of Paternal
    Grandparents’ issues.
    On November 6, 2014, the trial court issued its remand decision. The
    trial court’s remand decision provides no facts or procedural history of the
    case.    The remand decision initially references the closing arguments of
    counsel and incorporates by reference the court’s on-the-record discussion
    at the conclusion of the custody trial.        The court’s remand decision
    continues, in its entirety and without any discussion of legal authority
    whatsoever, as follows:
    We then reference the grandparents’ factors in Section
    5328(c)(1) of the Child Custody Act. We consider the
    three subsections as follows: (i) none for approximately 3
    years; (ii) interference would result to the parent/child
    relationship as it did when grandparents intervened in a
    finalized adoption by Mother’s current husband resulting in
    the adoption being undone and still pending at the time of
    this custody trial; (iii) awarding custody to grandparents
    would not be in the best interest of the children. The
    analysis however, does not end there and we continue to
    consider the 16 factors set forth at pages 4-6 of the
    Superior Court Opinion. We will address each factor ad
    seriatum.
    Factor 1:     Neither party is more likely to encourage
    and promote frequent and continuing contact.
    Factor 2:      There exists no risk of physical harm to the
    children, though efforts to influence a child’s thinking may
    possibly create emotional stress.
    - 38 -
    J-A10001-15
    Factor 3:       Grandparents have performed no parental
    duties for at least three years, while Mother has.
    Factor 4:       Grandparents are unnecessary to provide
    stability and continuity in [Children’s] education, family life
    and community life as circumstances present at trial.
    Mother provides for those.
    Factor 5:     Grandparents (and others) are the extended
    family, 5½ travel hours away. Mother’s current husband
    completes the traditional family unit of husband and wife
    and children. There is no evidence they need help from
    any outside source.
    Factor 6:       There is no reason to believe [C]hildren’s
    relationship is anything but good and at the time of trial a
    third sibling was expected.        We fail to see how
    grandparents add anything to the sibling relationships.
    Factor 7:     There was no evidence presented as to the
    well-reasoned preference of [C]hildren.
    Factor 8:      Not applicable.
    Factor 9:       Mother is more likely to maintain a loving,
    stable, consistent and nurturing relationship “adequate” for
    [C]hildren’s emotional needs.
    Factor 10:    Mother is more likely to attend to the daily,
    physical, emotional, developmental, educational and
    special needs of [C]hildren.        Need it be stated,
    Grandparents are 5½ hours away.
    Factor 11:     The parties [live] at least 5½ travel hours
    apart.
    Factor 12:     While each party may have the ability to
    make appropriate child-care arrangements and be
    “available,” as written, we do not believe this subsection
    permits us to rewrite the statute to address quality of care.
    However, see factor 9.
    - 39 -
    J-A10001-15
    Factor 13:       There exists a high level of conflict between
    the parties, more so with [Paternal Grandmother] than
    with [Paternal Grandfather]. While the parties may state a
    willingness to cooperate, we are unpersuaded that there
    exists the ability to cooperate.
    Factor 14:    While there was evidence presented about
    past drug and alcohol use/abuse, adequate evidence of
    present circumstances is lacking.
    Factor 15:      While [Paternal G]randfather may have
    some difficulties getting around, there is no evidence that
    any party or household member is mentally impaired or
    physically incapable.
    Factor 16:      No   other     relevant   factors   exist   of
    significance.
    Following then the directive to properly consider
    [Children’s] best interest in light of the statutory factors,
    we have done so. To answer this question we have
    balanced each factor singularly and in toto in each to the
    other and as each may apply to the underlying
    circumstances presented. Considering then the evidence
    presented as to the subject matter of each factor and
    further considering the arguments of counsel, we do
    conclude that it is not in the best interests of these
    children to be compelled by court order to spend times of
    partial physical custody with [Paternal] Grandparents. An
    appropriate Order dismissing [Paternal G]randparents’
    complaint follows hereinafter.
    (Remand Decision, filed November 6, 2014, at 1-4). Paternal Grandparents
    timely filed a notice of appeal and Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statement on
    December 5, 2014.       On December 17, 2014, the trial court issued a
    supplemental opinion, commenting only on its evidentiary rulings concerning
    the criminal offenses of Paternal Grandmother and W.B. (See Supplemental
    Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed December 17, 2014, at 1-2.)
    - 40 -
    J-A10001-15
    Paternal Grandparents raise the following issues for our review:
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
    DISCRETION OR AN ERROR OF LAW BY FAILING TO
    PROPERLY ANALYZE THE CUSTODY FACTORS SET FORTH
    IN 23 PA.C.S. § 5328(a) AND (c) OF THE CUSTODY ACT,
    AS AMENDED, ON REMAND, AS DIRECTED BY THE
    SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WHEN THE TRIAL
    COURT MERELY ENGAGED IN A CURSORY AND
    PERFUNCTORY ANALYSIS RATHER THAN THOROUGHLY
    EXAMINING AND CONSIDERING ALL FACTORS AS SET
    FORTH IN § 5328(a) AND (c), AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
    THE STANDARD OF WHAT IS IN CHILDREN’S BEST
    INTERESTS?
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
    DISCRETION OR AN ERROR OF LAW IN FAILING TO GRANT
    PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS ANY RIGHTS OF PARTIAL
    PHYSICAL CUSTODY, WHICH, IN EFFECT, CUTS CHILDREN
    OFF FROM THEIR PATERNAL ANCESTRY AND IS CONTRARY
    TO THE BEST INTEREST[S] OF CHILDREN AND IS IN
    CONTRAVENTION OF WELL-SETTLED CASE LAW AND THE
    PURPOSE OF 23 PA.C.S. § 5325?
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
    DISCRETION OR AN ERROR OF LAW BY REPEATEDLY
    ALLOWING THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE (OVER
    OBJECTIONS) OF CRIMINAL AND MOTOR VEHICLE
    OFFENSES NOT ENUMERATED IN 23 PA.C.S. § 5329 AND
    WHICH WERE NOT OTHERWISE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE
    RULES OF EVIDENCE?
    (Paternal Grandparents’ Brief at 4).
    For purposes of disposition, we combine Paternal Grandparents’ first
    and second issues. Paternal Grandparents argue the legislature recognized
    a beneficial relationship between children and their grandparents when it
    gave grandparents standing under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325, in the event of a
    parent’s death. Paternal Grandparents assert the trial court wholly ignored
    - 41 -
    J-A10001-15
    the importance of their role in Children’s lives.       Paternal Grandparents
    contend the court’s custody decision effectively severed all ancestral ties
    between Children and Father’s family because Mother and Mother’s Husband
    have made clear they will not permit Paternal Grandparents to have any
    contact or communication with Children in the future.
    Paternal Grandparents also argue that the court’s decision following
    remand fails to set forth a detailed analysis to support the court’s decision to
    deny Paternal Grandparents any contact with Children. With respect to the
    trial court’s initial consideration of the grandparent factors (see 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 5328(c)(1)), under Section 5328(c)(1)(i) (amount of contact between child
    and grandparent prior to filing of custody action), Paternal Grandparents
    assert the court merely stated Paternal Grandparents have not had contact
    with Children for approximately three years. Paternal Grandparents aver the
    court ignored their substantial contact with Children prior to the custody
    action, where K.A.T. resided with Paternal Grandmother and W.B. for one
    year and Paternal Grandparents provided care for both Children when
    Mother and Father shared physical custody after their separation in 2009.
    Paternal Grandparents claim their lack of contact with Children in recent
    years stemmed from Mother’s repeated moves and refusal to inform Paternal
    Grandparents of her contact information and whereabouts.               Paternal
    Grandparents stress how they needed to hire a private investigator to locate
    Mother and Children after Father’s death.
    - 42 -
    J-A10001-15
    Under Section 5328(c)(1)(ii) (whether custody award interferes with
    parent-child relationship), Paternal Grandparents complain the trial court
    improperly focused on Paternal Grandparents’ intervention with the adoption
    proceedings by Mother’s Husband.       Paternal Grandparents insist the trial
    court blamed them for asserting their rights under the adoption statute to
    provide testimony regarding whether Mother’s Husband would be an
    appropriate adoptive parent. Paternal Grandparents maintain that Mother’s
    and Mother’s Husband’s failure to notify Paternal Grandparents about the
    adoption proceedings (which resulted in the court vacating the adoption
    decree) deprived Paternal Grandparents of an opportunity to participate in
    the determination of whether adoption by Mother’s Husband would serve
    Children’s best interests. Paternal Grandparents suggest their intervention
    in the adoption proceedings was especially necessary in light of Mother’s
    Husband’s inflammatory racist comments on Facebook.
    Regarding Section 5328(c)(1)(iii) (whether custody award is in best
    interest of child), Paternal Grandparents recite the court’s entire analysis of
    this factor as follows: “awarding custody to grandparents would not be in the
    best interest of children.” Paternal Grandparents contend the “best interest
    of the child” determination is the polestar criterion in custody cases, and the
    court’s bare assertion is woefully inadequate.
    Paternal Grandparents proclaim the court was also required to analyze
    all of the sixteen statutory custody factors under Section 5328(a). Paternal
    - 43 -
    J-A10001-15
    Grandparents highlight the trial court’s initial remarks on the record that it
    would not consider the sixteen custody factors and would consider only the
    three factors related to grandparents seeking custody. When compelled to
    do so by this Court, the trial court mentioned the sixteen factors in its
    remand decision but provided no detail or analysis of the factors, and no
    references to the record.           Paternal Grandparents maintain the court’s
    decision after remand falls far short of a thorough analysis.
    Paternal Grandparents further suggest the record does not support the
    court’s conclusory statements as to certain factors.36 For example, Paternal
    Grandparents suggest that factor one (which party is more likely to
    encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between child and
    another party) actually favors Paternal Grandparents, as Mother admitted
    she will not permit Paternal Grandparents to see Children; the court
    erroneously concluded this factor favored neither party.        Regarding factor
    three (parental duties performed by each party on behalf of child), the court
    concluded Paternal Grandparents performed no parental duties for three
    years, but Paternal Grandparents maintain the court ignored Mother’s
    ____________________________________________
    36
    The court determined there was no evidence presented relevant to the
    court’s analysis of factor 2 (present and past abuse committed by party or
    member of party’s household), factor 7 (well-reasoned preference of child),
    factor 14 (history of drug or alcohol abuse of party or member of party’s
    household), and factor 15 (mental and physical condition of party or
    member of party’s household). The court did not mention factor 2.1 (related
    to child abuse and involvement with protective services) in its decision
    following remand.
    - 44 -
    J-A10001-15
    repeated moves and efforts to             exclude     Paternal Grandparents from
    Children’s lives as well as Paternal Grandparents’ efforts to locate Mother
    and Children. As to factor four (need for stability and continuity in child’s
    education,    family   life   and   community      life),   the   court   said   Paternal
    Grandparents were “unnecessary” for Children’s stability and continuity.
    Paternal Grandparents aver the amount of custodial time awarded to
    Paternal Grandparents under the interim custody order does not disrupt
    Children’s lives, and the court failed to consider any benefit to Paternal
    Grandparents’ involvement in Children’s lives.
    Paternal Grandparents contend the court also ignored evidence of
    Children’s extended family on Father’s side, who reside in Erie County
    (relative to factor five), when the court simply concluded: “Mother’s current
    husband completes the traditional family unit of husband and wife and
    children.    There is no evidence they need help from any outside source.”
    Paternal     Grandparents      explain    the     court     indicated     that   Paternal
    Grandparents add nothing to Children’s sibling relationships (relative to
    factor six); Paternal Grandparents submit this factor is inapplicable in the
    context of a case where grandparents seek only partial physical custody.
    Regarding factor eight (attempts of parent to turn child against other
    parent), the court concluded this factor was inapplicable, but Paternal
    Grandparents suggest the record is replete with examples of Mother’s efforts
    to turn Children against them by excluding Paternal Grandparents from
    - 45 -
    J-A10001-15
    Children’s lives. With respect to factor nine (which party is more likely to
    maintain loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with child
    adequate for child’s emotional needs), Paternal Grandparents contend both
    parties demonstrated adequate parenting skills, but the court inexplicitly
    determined factor nine favored Mother, without consideration of Paternal
    Grandparents’ loving relationship with Children. In deliberation of factor ten
    (which party is more likely to attend to daily physical, emotional,
    developmental,       educational     and       special   needs   of   child),   Paternal
    Grandparents complain the court failed to consider Paternal Grandparents’
    ability to care for Children during their periods of partial physical custody.
    Instead, the court focused on the distance between the parties.                 Paternal
    Grandparents claim the trial court impermissibly relied primarily on the
    distance between the parties in its discussion of three of the sixteen
    factors,37 when distance is relevant only to factor eleven. Even as to factor
    eleven (proximity of residences of parties), Paternal Grandparents insist
    their request for partial physical custody as dictated under the interim
    custody order is reasonable in light of the distance between the parties.
    Concerning factor twelve (each party’s availability to care for child or
    ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements), Paternal Grandparents
    claim this factor is neutral because Paternal Grandparents will be available to
    ____________________________________________
    37
    The court mentioned the distance between the parties’ residences in its
    consideration of factors five, ten, and eleven.
    - 46 -
    J-A10001-15
    care for Children during their periods of partial physical custody and have
    already agreed to a joint schedule during those periods.38             Paternal
    Grandparents aver the court erroneously concluded that no party to this
    custody action has the ability to cooperate (relative to factor thirteen). To
    the contrary, Paternal Grandparents declare that they have been cooperative
    with Mother, but Mother remains uncooperative with Paternal Grandparents,
    in an effort to keep them away from Children.
    Regarding factor sixteen (any other relevant factor), the court said no
    other relevant factors of significance exist.      Paternal Grandparents submit
    the court ignored, inter alia, Mother’s unsubstantiated allegations that
    Paternal Grandparents’ conduct during the interim custody order caused
    Children to suffer emotional harm and behavioral issues, Mother’s and
    Mother’s Husband’s outright refusal to permit Paternal Grandparents any
    contact with Children whatsoever, Mother’s efforts to exclude Paternal
    Grandparents from Children’s lives over the years preceding the current
    custody action, and Mother’s Husband’s racially derogatory comments on
    Facebook. Paternal Grandparents conclude the trial court’s remand decision
    is severely deficient and unsupported by the record, and this Court must
    reverse the trial court’s custody decision and award Paternal Grandparents
    ____________________________________________
    38
    The trial court conceded that both parties might have the ability to make
    appropriate child-care arrangements and be “available,” but then the court
    referred back to its analysis of factor nine, favoring Mother. (See Remand
    Decision, filed November 6, 2014, at 3.)
    - 47 -
    J-A10001-15
    partial custody in accordance with the terms of the interim custody order. 39
    We agree.
    In custody cases, the relevant scope and standard of review are as
    follows:
    [T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or
    inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact,
    nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no
    competent evidence to support it…. However, this broad
    scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the
    duty or the privilege of making its own independent
    determination…. Thus, an appellate court is empowered to
    determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible factual
    findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not
    interfere with those conclusions unless they are
    unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings;
    and thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion.
    R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 
    986 A.2d 1234
    , 1237 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting
    Bovard v. Baker, 
    775 A.2d 835
    , 838 (Pa.Super. 2001)).             “On issues of
    credibility and weight of the evidence, we defer to the findings of the trial
    judge who has had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and
    demeanor of the witnesses.” R.M.G., 
    Jr., supra
    .
    The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial
    court places on the evidence. Rather, the paramount
    concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child.
    Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s
    consideration of the best interest of the child was careful
    and thorough, and we are unable to find any abuse of
    discretion.
    ____________________________________________
    39
    At the custody trial, Paternal Grandparents asked for additional custodial
    time with Children, but on appeal they seek only the custodial time awarded
    under the interim custody order. (See Paternal Grandparents’ Brief at 65.)
    - 48 -
    J-A10001-15
    
    Id. (quoting S.M.
    v. J.M., 
    811 A.2d 621
    , 623 (Pa.Super. 2002)). “Indeed,
    our admittedly circumscribed standard of review does not preclude this Court
    from finding that a trial court abused its discretion in fashioning a custody
    order. While prudence dictates that we exercise our authority sparingly, we
    are not powerless to rectify a manifestly unreasonable custody order.” V.B.
    v. J.E.B., 
    55 A.3d 1193
    , 1200 (Pa.Super. 2012).        “Ultimately, the test is
    ‘whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
    evidence of record.’”   Ketterer v. Seifert, 
    902 A.2d 533
    , 539 (Pa.Super.
    2006) (quoting Dranko v. Dranko, 
    824 A.2d 1215
    , 1219 (Pa.Super.
    2003)).
    The statutory presumption favoring an award of custody to parents
    over third-parties is not applicable to the current case because Paternal
    Grandparents seek only partial physical custody of Children.              See 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b) (setting forth presumption in cases concerning primary
    physical custody). The Child Custody Act (“Act”) provides:
    § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody
    (a) Factors.−In ordering any form of custody, the court
    shall determine the best interest of the child by
    considering     all  relevant   factors,  giving    weighted
    consideration to those factors which affect the safety of the
    child, including the following:
    (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and
    permit frequent and continuing contact between the
    child and another party.
    - 49 -
    J-A10001-15
    (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party
    or member of the party’s household, whether there is a
    continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party
    and which party can better provide adequate physical
    safeguards and supervision of the child.
    (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)
    (relating to consideration of child abuse and
    involvement with protective services).
    (3) The parental duties performed by each party on
    behalf of the child.
    (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
    education, family life and community life.
    (5)   The availability of extended family.
    (6)   The child’s sibling relationships.
    (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based
    on the child’s maturity and judgment.
    (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against
    the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence
    where reasonable safety measures are necessary to
    protect the child from harm.
    (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving,
    stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the
    child adequate for the child’s emotional needs.
    (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
    physical, emotional, developmental, educational and
    special needs of the child.
    (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
    (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or
    ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.
    (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
    willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with
    one another. A party’s effort to protect a child from
    - 50 -
    J-A10001-15
    abuse by another party is not evidence of unwillingness
    or inability to cooperate with that party.
    (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
    member of a party’s household.
    (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
    member of a party’s household.
    (16) Any other relevant factor.
    *     *      *
    (c) Grandparents and great-grandparents.—
    (1) In ordering partial physical custody or supervised
    physical custody to a party who has standing under
    section 5325(1) or (2) (relating to standing for partial
    physical custody and supervised physical custody), the
    court shall consider the following:
    (i)    the amount of personal contact between the
    child and the party prior to the filing of the action;
    (ii) whether the award interferes with any
    parent-child relationship; and
    (iii) whether the award is in the best interest of
    the child.
    *     *      *
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), (c)(1). Thus, when deciding an award of custody,
    the court must conduct a thorough analysis of the best interests of the child
    based on the factors set forth in the Act.         E.D. v. M.P., 
    33 A.3d 73
    (Pa.Super. 2011). “All of the factors listed in [S]ection 5328(a) are required
    to be considered by the trial court when entering a custody order.” J.R.M.
    v. J.E.A., 
    33 A.3d 647
    , 652 (Pa.Super. 2011) (emphasis in original).
    - 51 -
    J-A10001-15
    Nevertheless, “there is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s
    explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are
    considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.”
    M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 
    63 A.3d 331
    , 336 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 
    620 Pa. 710
    , 
    68 A.3d 909
    (2013).
    Further, “in the recent past, grandparents have assumed increased
    roles   in     their   grandchildren’s   lives    and   our   cumulative   experience
    demonstrates the many potential benefits of strong inter-generational ties.”
    Hiller v. Fausey, 
    588 Pa. 342
    , 360, 
    902 A.2d 875
    , 886 (2006), cert.
    denied, 
    549 U.S. 1304
    , 
    127 S. Ct. 1876
    , 
    167 L. Ed. 2d 363
    (2007). Thus:
    While acknowledging the general benefits of these
    relationships, we cannot conclude that such a benefit
    always accrues in cases where grandparents force their
    way into grandchildren’s lives through the courts, contrary
    to the decision of a fit parent. In contrast, however, we
    refuse to close our minds to the possibility that in
    some instances a court may overturn even the
    decision of a fit parent to exclude a grandparent
    from a grandchild’s life, especially where the
    grandparent’s child is deceased and the grandparent
    relationship is longstanding and significant to the
    grandchild.
    
    Id. at 360,
    904 A.2d at 886-87 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis
    added). See also Commonwealth ex. rel. Goodman v. Dratch, 
    159 A.2d 70
    , 71 (Pa.Super. 1960) (stating: “Unless there [is] some compelling
    reason, we do not believe that a grandchild should be denied visitation to his
    grandparents”).
    - 52 -
    J-A10001-15
    Additionally, in the context of custody proceedings, “[h]ostilities
    between the [parties] are relevant only insofar as they constitute a threat to
    the child or affect the child’s welfare.” Nancy E.M. v. Kenneth D.M., 
    462 A.2d 1386
    , 1388 (Pa.Super. 1983). Importantly:
    A custodial parent’s suspicion of or animosity towards
    another parent or third party seeking visitation should not
    alone warrant denial of visitation; otherwise the custodial
    parent could always effectively deny visitation simply by
    testifying to suspicion or animosity. Instead of deferring to
    suspicion or animosity, the hearing judge must try to
    determine whether there is any basis for these feelings.
    Stated more broadly, the judge must appraise whether
    the relationship between the disputing parties has
    an adverse effect on the child.
    *     *      *
    Except under unusual circumstances, no child should be
    cut off entirely from one side of [his or her] family.
    [V]isits with a grandparent are often a precious part of a
    child’s experience and there are benefits which devolve
    upon the grandchild from the relationship with his
    grandparents which he cannot derive from any other
    relationship. If animosities continue between the parties,
    and result in adverse [e]ffects on [the child]…, a
    visitation order may be revised, even to the extent of
    retracting visitation.
    Commonwealth ex. rel. Williams v. Miller, 
    385 A.2d 992
    , 995 (Pa.Super.
    1978) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) (reversing trial court
    order denying maternal grandmother visitation with grandchild following
    mother’s death; maternal grandmother offered sufficient reasons why
    visitation with child for one weekend each month would serve child’s best
    interests; record did not support trial court’s finding that maternal
    - 53 -
    J-A10001-15
    grandmother    abandoned     mother;    father’s   “mistrust”   of   maternal
    grandmother was not valid reason for denying her visitation; trial court
    failed to provide sufficient consideration to unusual facts of case; and if
    enforcing visitation away from child’s home presents harmful effects on
    child, then trial court may specify place and conditions of visitation).   See
    also Johnson v. Diesinger, 
    589 A.2d 1160
    (Pa.Super. 1991) (explaining
    how rivalry between parents and grandparents for child’s affection can be
    devastating; when animosity exists, appropriate inquiry is not where to place
    blame, but how does animosity affect best interests of children).
    Instantly, the court announced at the start of the custody trial that it
    had not presided over a custody trial in the past five years, and the court
    was dissatisfied with the legislature’s enactment of the Act since the court
    had last presided over a custody trial. (See N.T., 2/10/12, at 12; R.R. at
    9a) (stating: “I have personal reservations as to whether the legislature can
    tell me how to make a decision”).       Following the conclusion of closing
    arguments, the court again expressed disdain with the Act. (See 
    id. at 290-
    91; R.R. at 148a-149a) (stating: “I’m tempted to just rule…that this is all
    unconstitutional because it infringes upon my authority to make a decision”).
    During the court’s on-the-record remarks, the court acknowledged the
    existence of the statutory factors at Sections 5328(a) and 5328(c)(1), but
    went on to state that it would consider only the statutory factors pertaining
    to grandparents’ rights.   (Id. at 295; R.R. at 151a) (stating: “If I am
    - 54 -
    J-A10001-15
    compelled to use the factors that the legislature set up, I’m not looking
    beyond what the statute says. And the statute says grandparents factors.
    Fine. If I’m told I have to use those factors, I’m not going back and looking
    at general factors because I don’t think I should anyway be compelled to”).
    At the conclusion of trial, the court dismissed Paternal Grandparents’
    custody complaint, awarding them no periods of partial physical custody.
    After Paternal Grandparents filed their notice of appeal, the trial court
    issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, once again expressing contempt with the Act
    as “unduly encroach[ing] upon the judiciary and the way [j]udges are to
    perform their responsibilities.” (Rule 1925(a) Opinion at 2). In its opinion,
    the trial court declined to analyze any of the factors set forth in Section
    5328(a) or Section 5328(c)(1). Instead, the court simply concluded: “What
    we did do is consider the evidence and arguments presented by the litigants
    and to the best of our human ability decide what was in the best interest of
    these two boys. We do not think we were wrong in the result or how we got
    there.” (Id. at 5).
    On September 16, 2014, this Court vacated and remanded the matter,
    based on the trial court’s failure to utilize the requisite statutory factors in
    making its determination. Specifically, this Court instructed the trial court to
    consider upon remand the general statutory “best interest” custody factors
    set forth at Section 5328(a) and the three statutory custody factors
    pertaining to grandparents at Section 5328(c)(1).
    - 55 -
    J-A10001-15
    On November 6, 2014, the trial court issued its decision after remand.
    Significantly, the trial court’s remand decision provides no facts or
    procedural history of the case.         (See Remand Decision at 1-4.)   Similarly
    absent from the court’s decision after remand are any express credibility
    determinations.40 The court also supplies no law whatsoever. (See Remand
    Decision at 1-4.) Rather, the court issues mere conclusory statements as to
    each factor under Section 5328(a) and Section 5328(c)(1). (See id.) Our
    review of the court’s decision after remand leaves questionable whether the
    court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of, and gave due consideration to,
    each relevant factor, where the court offered no facts of record or analysis to
    support its conclusions. See 
    M.J.M., supra
    ; 
    J.R.M., supra
    ; 
    E.D., supra
    .
    The court’s decision after remand appears to pay mere lip service to this
    Court’s remand directive.          Under these circumstances, the trial court’s
    remand decision is deficient.         See 
    M.J.M., supra
    ; 
    J.R.M., supra
    ; 
    E.D., supra
    .
    More importantly, many of the trial court’s conclusory statements do
    not accurately reflect the evidence presented at trial.       For example, the
    court’s bald statement regarding Section 5328(c)(1)(i), that Paternal
    Grandparents have had no contact with Children for approximately three
    ____________________________________________
    40
    The sole reference to a party’s credibility determination appears in the
    midst of the court’s on-the-record remarks at the conclusion of trial, where
    the court accepted as true Mother’s testimony that the Skype calls were
    upsetting to Children. (See N.T., 2/10/14, at 293; R.R. at 150a.)
    - 56 -
    J-A10001-15
    years (see Remand Decision at 1), lacks necessary context. Specifically, the
    court ignores, inter alia, the following evidence: (1) Mother and K.A.T. lived
    with   Paternal   Grandmother   and   W.B.   for   one   year;   (2)   Paternal
    Grandparents spent substantial time with Children when Mother and Father
    shared physical custody; (3) Mother repeatedly moved around the country
    and refused to disclose (or to permit Father to disclose) her contact
    information to Paternal Grandparents; and (4) Paternal Grandparents had to
    hire a private investigator to locate Mother and Children in the aftermath of
    Father’s death.    The court similarly ignores this evidence concerning its
    finding at Section 5328(a)(3) (parental duties performed by each party on
    behalf of child), where the court simply states: “Grandparents have
    performed no parental duties for at least three years, while Mother has.”
    (Remand Decision at 2).
    Under Section 5328(a)(1) (which party is more likely to encourage and
    permit frequent and continuing contact between child and another party),
    the trial court found this factor favored neither party.         (See Remand
    Decision at 2.)   Nevertheless, the record discloses that this factor favors
    Paternal Grandparents, as the evidence presented at trial shows they have
    made efforts to cooperate with Mother during the pendency of the interim
    custody order.    Conversely, Mother and Mother’s Husband demonstrated
    their opinion that Paternal Grandparents are “horrible,” and testified that
    - 57 -
    J-A10001-15
    they will not permit Paternal Grandparents to have any contact with Children
    in the future (presumably, unless compelled to do so by court order).
    Regarding Section 5328(a)(9) (which party is more likely to maintain
    loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with child adequate for
    child’s emotional needs), Section 5328(a)(10) (which party is more likely to
    attend to daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
    needs of child), and Section 5328(a)(12) (each party’s availability to care for
    child or ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements), the trial court
    announced, with little or no explanation, that each of these factors favored
    Mother. (See Remand Decision at 3.) Significantly, the trial court made no
    factual findings concerning Paternal Grandparents’ ability to care for and
    support Children during their periods of partial physical custody. (See id.)
    Nothing in the record suggests Paternal Grandparents are unable to or would
    have difficulty providing care for Children.      Paternal Grandmother and
    Paternal Grandfather want to be part of Children’s lives and have amicably
    worked out a schedule regarding the care for Children during their periods of
    partial physical custody.
    Further, the court’s decision following remand focuses on certain
    factors, to the detriment of other relevant factors. For example, the court
    placed great emphasis on the distance between the parties, which the court
    mentioned in its consideration of factors five, ten, and eleven. (Id. at 2-3.)
    We fail to see how proximity is relevant to factor five (availability of
    - 58 -
    J-A10001-15
    extended family) and factor ten (which party is more likely to attend to daily
    physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of child),
    in the context of Paternal Grandparents’ request for limited partial physical
    custody of Children.41        Compare Durning v. Balent/Kurdilla, 
    19 A.3d 1125
    (Pa.Super. 2011) (explaining that award of shared physical custody of
    school-aged child of parents who do not live in geographical proximity to
    each other is contrary to child’s need for continuity at home and at school).
    As well, the court relied heavily on the conflict between the parties,
    determining the conflict could not be resolved. (See N.T., 2/10/14, at 295-
    97; R.R. at 151a-152a) (stating: “So bottom line is this. Right or wrongly, I
    don’t     believe   that    the   conflict     between   [M]other   and   [P]aternal
    [G]randmother can be fixed”); (see also Remand Decision at 3) (regarding
    analysis of Section 5328(a)(13), stating: “While the parties may state a
    willingness to cooperate, we are unpersuaded that there exists the ability to
    cooperate”). Absent from the court’s remarks, however, is an appropriate
    analysis of why the conflict exists and why it adversely affects Children. See
    
    Johnson, supra
    ; Nancy 
    E.M., supra
    ; 
    Miller, supra
    .
    The court also seemed to base its decision largely on Paternal
    Grandparents’ unwelcome intervention with the adoption proceedings. (See
    N.T., 2/10/14, at 294-95; R.R. at 150a-151a) (stating: “And my reaction
    ____________________________________________
    41
    Maternal Grandmother also lives in Erie County, Pennsylvania.
    - 59 -
    J-A10001-15
    was real simple to that. They stuck their nose in that situation and probably
    they should have stayed the hell out of it”); (see also Remand Decision at
    1) (regarding analysis of Section 5328(c)(1)(ii), stating: “interference would
    result to the parent/child relationship as it did when grandparents intervened
    in a finalized adoption by Mother’s current husband resulting in the adoption
    being undone and still pending at the time of this custody trial”). The court’s
    comments are shocking in light of some of the disturbing testimony about
    Mother’s Husband’s gravely inappropriate posts on Facebook (which he
    admitted writing), especially where W.B. is African-American.
    The court failed to consider, however, the important contribution
    Paternal Grandparents can make in Children’s lives, particularly since their
    Father’s death. With respect to Section 5328(a)(4) (need for stability and
    continuity in child’s education, family life and community life), the court
    coldly stated: “Grandparents are unnecessary to provide stability and
    continuity in the child’s education, family life and community life as
    circumstances present at trial.    Mother provides for those.”     (Id. at 2.)
    Concerning Section 5328(a)(5) (availability of extended family), the court
    explained: “Grandparents (and others) are the extended family, 5½ travel
    hours away. Mother’s current husband completes the traditional family unit
    of husband and wife and children. There is no evidence they need help from
    any outside source.” (Id.) The court’s conclusory statements discount the
    significant benefits Children can reap from Paternal Grandparents, who can
    - 60 -
    J-A10001-15
    provide Children ties to their deceased Father. See 
    Hiller, supra
    ; Nancy
    
    E.M., supra
    .       Additionally, the court disregarded evidence of Father’s
    extended family living near Paternal Grandparents; Children could interact
    with Father’s relatives during Paternal Grandparents’ periods of partial
    physical custody.
    Based on this record, we cannot agree that the court made a reasoned
    decision   based    on   the   evidence   presented,   particularly   in   light   of
    Pennsylvania’s strong public policy favoring grandparent involvement in a
    child’s life. See 
    Hiller, supra
    ; 
    Miller, supra
    ; 
    Dratch, supra
    . See also
    
    V.B., supra
    ; 
    Ketterer, supra
    . Therefore, we are compelled to reverse the
    trial court’s decision to deny Paternal Grandparents’ request for partial
    physical custody of Children, and remand for the court to enter the interim
    custody order dated October 4, 2013 and entered October 7, 2013, as a final
    order.
    In their third issue, Paternal Grandparents acknowledge that in making
    a custody determination, a court must consider whether a party seeking
    custody poses a threat of harm to the child based on certain enumerated
    prior criminal convictions. Paternal Grandparents explain that 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 5329(a) lists thirty-two enumerated offenses for the court to consider
    when making this assessment.        Paternal Grandparents emphasize that the
    statute enumerates only misdemeanor and felony offenses and does not list
    any summary offenses. Paternal Grandparents maintain that under Section
    - 61 -
    J-A10001-15
    5330, one party who has obtained information about a criminal charge filed
    against the other party may move for a temporary custody order or
    modification of an existing custody order (pending a hearing), but only
    where the other party has been charged with an offense under Section
    5329(a).      Read together, Paternal Grandparents contend the legislature
    limited the relevance of criminal convictions to only those offenses
    enumerated      in   Section   5329(a),    in   awarding   custody.    Paternal
    Grandparents argue that, even where a party seeking custody has a criminal
    conviction for an enumerated offense, the court is not precluded from
    granting that party custody; instead, the court shall consider the party’s
    conduct relative to the offense to determine whether the party poses a
    threat of harm to the child.     Only when a parent has been convicted of
    murder of the other parent can the court deny custody without considering
    threat of harm (see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329(b)).
    Paternal Grandparents stress that none of the offenses considered by
    the court are enumerated offenses under Section 5329(a).               Paternal
    Grandparents submit the court improperly allowed testimony (over their
    objections)    concerning   Paternal   Grandmother’s   and   W.B.’s   respective
    criminal histories, absent any prior convictions under Section 5329(a).
    Paternal Grandparents acknowledge that the court stated in its supplemental
    opinion that if it erred in admitting such testimony, the error was harmless.
    Paternal Grandparents suggest the court’s improper admission of prior
    - 62 -
    J-A10001-15
    offenses played a part in the court’s determination as to the high level of
    conflict between the parties, where the record shows Mother used Paternal
    Grandmother’s and W.B.’s respective criminal histories to bolster Mother’s
    position that the court should deny Paternal Grandparents any custodial time
    with Children. Paternal Grandparents conclude the court’s evidentiary ruling
    was erroneous. We agree.
    Generally, our standard of review concerning evidentiary rulings is as
    follows:
    The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound
    discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to
    the admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling
    by the trial court upon a showing that it abused its
    discretion or committed an error of law A trial court has
    wide discretion in ruling on the relevancy of evidence and
    its ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of
    discretion.
    B.K. v. J.K., 
    823 A.2d 987
    , 991-92 (Pa.Super. 2003) (internal citations
    omitted).
    Section 5329 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
    § 5329. Consideration of criminal conviction
    (a) Offenses.−Where a party seeks any form of custody,
    the court shall consider whether that party or member of
    that party’s household has been convicted of or has
    pleaded guilty or no contest to any of the offenses in this
    section or an offense in another jurisdiction substantially
    equivalent to any of the offenses in this section. The court
    shall consider such conduct and determine that the party
    does not pose a threat of harm to the child before making
    any order of custody to that parent when considering the
    following offenses:
    - 63 -
    J-A10001-15
    18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to criminal homicide).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2706 (relating to terroristic threats).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1 (relating to stalking).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2901 (relating to kidnapping).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2902 (relating to unlawful restraint).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2903 (relating to false imprisonment).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2910 (relating to luring a child into a motor
    vehicle or structure).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3121 (relating to rape).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual assault).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual
    intercourse).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1 (relating to sexual assault).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent
    assault).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (relating to indecent assault).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3127 (relating to indecent exposure).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3129 (relating to sexual intercourse with
    animal).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3130 (relating to conduct relating to sex
    offenders).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3301 (relating to arson and related offenses).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 4302 (relating to incest).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 4303 (relating to concealing death of child).
    - 64 -
    J-A10001-15
    18 Pa.C.S. § 4304 (relating to endangering welfare of
    children).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 4305 (relating to dealing in infant children).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 5902(b) (relating to prostitution and related
    offenses).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 5903(c) or (d) (relating to obscene and other
    sexual materials and performances).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6301 (relating to corruption of minors).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (relating to unlawful contact with
    minor).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6320 (relating to sexual exploitation of
    children).
    Section 6114 (relating to contempt for violation of order or
    agreement).
    The former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 (relating to driving under
    influence of alcohol or controlled substance).
    75 Pa.C.S. Ch. 38 (relating to driving after imbibing alcohol
    or utilizing drugs).
    Section 13(a)(1) of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No.
    64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
    Cosmetic Act, to the extent that it prohibits the
    manufacture, sale or delivery, holding, offering for sale or
    possession of any controlled substance or other drug or
    device.
    (b) Parent convicted of murder.—No court shall award
    custody, partial custody or supervised physical custody to
    a parent who has been convicted of murder under 18
    Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) (relating to murder) of the other parent
    of the child who is the subject of the order unless the child
    is of suitable age and consents to the order.
    - 65 -
    J-A10001-15
    (c) Initial evaluation.—At the initial in-person contact
    with the court, the judge, conference officer or other
    appointed individual shall perform an initial evaluation to
    determine whether the party or household member who
    committed an offense under subsection (a) poses a threat
    to the child and whether counseling is necessary. The
    initial evaluation shall not be conducted by a mental health
    professional. After the initial evaluation, the court may
    order further evaluation or counseling by a mental health
    professional if the court determines it is necessary.
    *     *      *
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329(a)-(c) (internal footnote omitted). Section 5330 of the
    Act states:
    § 5330. Consideration of criminal charge
    (a) Expedited hearing.—A party who has obtained
    information under 42 Pa.C.S. § 1904 (relating to
    availability of criminal charge information in child custody
    proceedings) or otherwise about a charge filed against the
    other party for an offense listed under section 5329(a)
    (relating to consideration of criminal conviction) may move
    for a temporary custody order or modification of an
    existing custody order. The court shall hold the hearing
    under this subsection in an expeditious manner.
    (b) Risk of harm.—In evaluating any request under
    subsection(a), the court shall consider whether the party
    who is or has been charged with an offense set forth in
    section 5329(a) poses a risk of physical, emotional or
    psychological harm to the child.
    (c) No     prejudice.—Failure  to  either  apply  for
    information under 42 Pa.C.S. § 1904 or act under this
    section shall not prejudice any party in a custody
    proceeding.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5330. “The plain language of the statute reveals the obvious
    intent of the Legislature to ensure that custody is not being provided to a
    - 66 -
    J-A10001-15
    [party] whose past criminal behavior presents a present threat of harm to
    the child.” Ramer v. Ramer, 
    914 A.2d 894
    , 900-01 (Pa.Super. 2006).42
    Instantly, during Paternal Grandmother’s cross-examination, Mother’s
    counsel sought to elicit testimony from Paternal Grandmother concerning a
    bad check charge in 2012 and a theft of services charge in 2009. Counsel
    for Paternal Grandparents objected. (See N.T., 2/10/14, at 69-70; R.R. at
    38a.) Mother’s counsel responded: “[W]e are looking at what is in the best
    interest of the children.      And [Paternal Grandmother] is up here basically
    indicating that she is a wonderful grandparent and we’re just showing her
    history.” (Id. at 70; R.R. at 38a.) Mother’s counsel further stated that the
    testimony was relevant under Section 5328(a)(16) (any other relevant
    factor). (Id.) The court overruled Paternal Grandparents’ objection on this
    basis. (Id.) During W.B.’s cross-examination, Mother’s counsel sought to
    elicit testimony from W.B. concerning a harassment charge in 2010. (Id. at
    129; R.R. at 68a.) Counsel for Paternal Grandparents objected, specifically
    stating that harassment is not an enumerated offense under Section 5329,
    ____________________________________________
    42
    This Court decided Ramer in the context of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5303(b)
    (repealed by 2010, Nov. 23, P.L. 1106, No. 112, § 1, effective January 24,
    2011; re-codified at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323, 5328-5330). Section 5303(b)
    provided similar language to the current Section 5329(a), stating: “If a
    parent has been convicted of or has pleaded guilty or no contest to an
    offense as set forth below, the court shall consider such criminal conduct and
    determine that the parent does not pose a threat of harm to the child before
    making an order of custody, partial custody or visitation to that parent[.]”
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5303(b) (repealed).         That statute listed only fourteen
    relevant convictions. See 
    id. - 67
    -
    J-A10001-15
    and is therefore irrelevant to the custody proceeding.      (Id.)   Mother’s
    counsel responded: “It is absolutely relevant. We’re talking about the best
    interest of these children.   These children will be in the home where this
    gentleman lives. Absolutely.” (Id.) Mother’s counsel conceded Mother was
    not seeking an evaluation under Section 5329, but “[w]e’re just talking
    about his character. It is about what is in the best interest of the children
    and the people around the children, Your Honor.” (Id. at 130; R.R. at 68a.)
    The court overruled Paternal Grandparents’ objection.
    During Mr. Lagan’s direct-examination, Mother’s counsel sought to
    elicit testimony concerning Mr. Lagan’s background investigations on
    Paternal Grandparents and W.B.     (Id. at 230; R.R. at 118a.) Counsel for
    Paternal Grandparents again objected, explaining that Sections 5329 and
    5330 specifically enumerate and discuss criminal convictions which are
    relevant in a custody proceeding; counsel also stated any criminal
    convictions pertaining to Paternal Grandparents or W.B., which are not
    enumerated under the statute, are irrelevant.      (Id.)   Mother’s counsel
    responded as follows: “This matter is what is in the best interest of the
    children which includes what each party has in their background, what they
    do every day, what type of person they are, and whether or not they should
    be around children. It is absolutely relevant.” (Id.) The court then had the
    following exchange with Mother’s counsel:
    - 68 -
    J-A10001-15
    [THE COURT]:            But isn’t it limited by the
    legislature moving into this area by defining certain
    specific offenses?
    [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]:        Your Honor, I believe the 5329
    section as well as 5330 is to determine who should have
    an evaluation to see if they are at risk of harm to the
    children to be able to have any custody at all. We’re
    certainly not representing that [Mr. Lagan’s] going to give
    us information to say that [Paternal Grandmother] has any
    5329 offenses.
    She has other offenses. We’re not saying that she should
    have—well, she should have no contact at all just based on
    these offenses.
    We’re not asking that she receive an evaluation. We’re
    just simply speaking to the type of person who [is] around
    the children.
    [THE COURT]:               Are you saying this to me, for
    example, if a criminal background check reveals a person
    who has retail thefts, bad checks, forgeries, that somehow
    may impact on their character?
    [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]:       Essentially, Your Honor, yes.
    However, not to prove they will…commit those offenses
    again but whether or not they should be around children.
    [THE COURT]:              The children.
    [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]:       Correct.
    [THE COURT]:              I’ll   allow   it.   Objection   is
    overruled.
    (Id. at 231-233; R.R. at 119a-120a.) Subsequently, Mr. Lagan testified that
    he discovered Paternal Grandmother pled guilty to theft of services in
    October 2009, a traffic violation in 2012, and speeding in 2013. Mr. Lagan
    said Paternal Grandmother had another conviction for bad checks in 2012
    - 69 -
    J-A10001-15
    with a disposition of guilty.43 Mr. Lagan also found that W.B. pled guilty to
    trespass by motor vehicle in 2008, and harassment in 2010. (Id. at 233-
    35; R.R. at 120a-121a.)         Mr. Lagan provided little to no detail concerning
    the factual bases for any of these offenses. Mr. Lagan also did not indicate
    the grading of any of the offenses.44 (Id.)
    Section 5329 makes clear the type of criminal convictions the
    legislature deemed relevant for purposes of making an award of custody, by
    specifically enumerating only those crimes which evidence a threat of harm
    to the child.     See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329(a); 
    Ramer, supra
    .             The parties
    agree that none of Paternal Grandmother’s or W.B.’s prior criminal
    convictions or motor vehicle offenses are listed in Section 5329(a).           The
    record is unclear whether any of the offenses at issue were graded higher
    than summary offenses. In an effort to circumvent Section 5329, Mother’s
    counsel attempted to obtain admission of the criminal offenses as relevant
    generally to Section 5328(a)(16), which permits the court to consider “any
    other relevant factor,” and the over-arching “best interests” analysis.         We
    cannot agree that the court’s admission of evidence concerning Paternal
    Grandmother’s        and    W.B.’s     criminal    histories   was   proper   under
    ____________________________________________
    43
    Mr. Lagan also indicated Paternal Grandmother was charged with
    operating a vehicle without required financial responsibility in 2012, but that
    charge was dismissed.
    44
    The investigatory report(s) on which Mr. Lagan relied at trial are not
    included in the certified record.
    - 70 -
    J-A10001-15
    subsection(a)(16), where the Act expressly delineates those criminal
    convictions which are relevant to a custody determination, and the offenses
    at issue are not among those listed.45         See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329(a).   See
    also Pa.R.E. 401 (explaining evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to
    make fact more or less probable than it would be without evidence; and fact
    is of consequence in determining action); Johns v. Cioci, 
    865 A.2d 931
    (Pa.Super. 2004) (explaining that unless it is shown that parent’s conduct
    has had harmful effect on child, that conduct should be given little weight in
    custody determinations); Vicki N. v. Josephine N., 
    649 A.2d 709
    (Pa.Super. 1994) (stating party’s past conduct is not relevant to custody
    proceeding unless it will produce ongoing negative effect on child’s welfare);
    Commonwealth ex rel. Gorto v. Gorto, 
    444 A.2d 1299
    (Pa.Super. 1982)
    (stating primary concern in custody matters lies not with past but with
    present and future; facts as of time of trial are foundation for court’s
    determination; past conduct is not relevant unless it will produce ongoing
    negative effect on child’s welfare).
    Moreover, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the court cannot
    ____________________________________________
    45
    On appeal, Mother argues only that testimony concerning Paternal
    Grandmother’s and W.B.’s respective criminal histories was relevant to
    determine, based on their character or reputation, whether it is in the best
    interest of Children for Paternal Grandmother and W.B. to be around
    Children. (See Mother’s Brief at 51-54.) Mother does not argue that she
    offered Paternal Grandmother’s or W.B.’s criminal histories for impeachment
    purposes.
    - 71 -
    J-A10001-15
    consider other criminal offenses under the general language of Section
    5328(a)(16), where the Act expressly delineates those criminal convictions
    which the legislature deemed relevant to a custody determination, and the
    offenses at issue are not among those listed. See generally McClellan v.
    Health Maintenance Organization of Pennsylvania, 
    546 Pa. 463
    , 473,
    
    686 A.2d 801
    , 806 (1996) (explaining: “[u]nder our statutory construction
    doctrine [of] ejusdem generis (“of the same kind or class”), where general
    words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the
    general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the
    same general nature or class as those enumerated.           When the opposite
    sequence is found, i.e., specific words follow general ones,…the doctrine is
    equally applicable, and restricts application of the general term to things
    that are similar to those enumerated”).            Mother cites no law to the
    contrary.46    Therefore, the court erred by admitting into evidence Paternal
    Grandmother and W.B.’s previous offenses, which fell outside of Section
    5329.47 See 
    B.K., supra
    .
    ____________________________________________
    46
    Instead, Mother relies on generic legal principles stating that criminal
    convictions are reasonably probative as to the reputation of an individual
    and have impact upon assessing a person’s character. (See Mother’s Brief
    at 51-54.)
    47
    In its supplemental trial court opinion, the court indicated that to the
    extent the court improperly admitted the evidence at issue, the error was
    harmless. (See Supplemental Rule 1925(a) Opinion at 1-2.) In the event
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    - 72 -
    J-A10001-15
    Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision to deny Paternal
    Grandparents’ request for partial physical custody and remand for the trial
    court to enter immediately as a final order, the interim custody order dated
    October 4, 2013 and entered October 7, 2013. Mother must fix the Skype
    feature on her cell phone or home computer to allow visual capabilities
    within thirty (30) days of this disposition.        Alternatively, the parties could
    consider using FaceTime to communicate.
    Order reversed; case remanded with instructions.               Jurisdiction is
    relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/17/2015
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    that this matter might proceed to a new custody trial at some point in the
    future, the trial court’s harmless error analysis would be immaterial.
    - 73 -
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
    CIVIL ACTION- LAW
    \(.T- _.:.                    and                                                                           r-,'}
    t-1\ .. i ..T ...             -                          No. 2013-FC-001604-03                    L.      =
    c..,_,
    M•:I
    c.:                           ;1.:':
    Plaintiffs                                                           {:··j
    ....,.      C:)
    ,, . - .          c
    ·<
    ...
    (
    .. ::,:.,
    )     ' ,
    ~,
    . ....             -I
    v.                                                        ,· "
    .,,
    --
    (   ..
    I
    ...._~
    ,..
    .,
    )
    "   .,
    -~              u
    . f/k/a                                                         ..
    >·       ::c.;:         -i
    L·    ft .• :                                   Action In Cu$tody
    Defendant                                                                     c;,           ·-··
    APPEARANCES:                           For Plaintiff:         David Schanbacher, Esquire
    For Defendant:         Joseph A. Kalasnik, Esquire
    This matter has been assigned to the Honorable                 Themas. v\. ~\\..ey ]l
    INTERIM ORDER FOR CUSTODY. PENDING TRIAL
    AND NOW, this                    4 th day of Q Lhll /o;/                    , 2013, this Order is
    being entered as a result of a pre-trial conciliation conference held on September 27,
    2013 before Leslie S. Arzt, Conciliator. The matter Is before the Court on paternal
    Grandparents' petition seeking partial physical custody. The parties were unable to
    reach an agreement to resolve these issues. Accordingly, this Order is being entered
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    on an interim basis, in the best interests of the children, and to .govern the relationship
    of the parties pending a trial in this matter.
    MEDIATION:
    Mediation has been waived due to the distance of the parties.
    CUSTODY WORKSHOP:
    The parties are hereby directed to participate in, and successfully complete the
    custody workshop, consisting of the Kids First custody workshop, which is provided at
    Family-Child Resources. Paternal Grandparents can attend a similar workshop in Erie,
    PA. Informational pamphlets have been given to the parties. The parties shall contact
    the appropriate agency within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. The parties shall
    obtain certificates of successful completion of the training, and shall file their certificates
    of completion with the Prothonotary within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order.
    MATTERS PRELIMINARY TO TRIAL:
    The trial of this case will be scheduled formally at a pre-trial conference which will
    be scheduled by separate Order. Requests for a continuance of the pre-trial conference
    shall be in writing and addressed to the Judge conducting the pre-trial conference, not
    later than two (2) weeks prior to the date of the pre-trial conference.
    The parties shall submit to the Court a proposed parenting plan pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. §5331 not later than one (1) week prior to the time scheduled for the pre-trial
    conference.
    The parties are directed to cooperate in obtaining psychological evaluations,
    home studies, and other investigations, which shall be requested within fifteen (15)
    2
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    days of the date of this Order.          If such services    are not requested    by a party
    within that time period, the party is deemed to have waived the right to obtain
    such services.      Each party shall pay the costs of all evaluations and studies which that
    party requests, except that if the parties agree on a single evaluator for any purpose,
    the cost of that evaluator shall be divided evenly between the parties.
    23 Pa. C.S.A. §5329:
    The parties represent       that none of them,       nor any member of his or her
    household, has been convicted of an offense enumerated in 23 Pa. C.S. §5329 or an
    equivalent offense in another jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:
    This matter involves the custody of:
    \(.. \l ., .·                YOB: 2009                  AGE: 4
    K T4
    p                        YOB: 2007                  AGE: 6
    MOTHER'S position is: Mother avers that the paternal grandparents should have
    no contact with the children.
    PATERNAL GRANDPARENT'S position is: Paternal Grandparents are seeking
    partial physical custody of the children.
    A previous court order concerning the children was entered on July 12, 2010
    between Mother and Father, prior to Father's death. There are no prior custody orders
    involving the Plaintiffs in this case.
    3
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    SOLE LEGAL CUSTODY:
    The Court hereby awards sole legal custody to Mother.            Sole legal custody
    means the right of a party to exercise parental control over and make major decisions
    for the benefit of the children, including, but not limited to, educational, medical and
    religious decisions, without the necessity of obtaining the agreement of any other party.
    PHYSICAL CUSTODY:
    Primary physical custody of the children, as that term is defined in the Custody
    Act, shall be with Mother.
    Partial physical custody is the right to take possession of the children away from
    the custodial party for a certain period of time. Paternal Grandparents shall have partial
    physical custody of the children as follows:
    SCHEDULE OF PARTIAL CUSTODY:
    PHASE-IN:
    Paternal Grandparents shall enjoy partial custody of the children as follows:
    -   On Friday, September 27, 2013 from 5:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. at Hickory Falls
    in Hanover. Mother shall be present for this visit.
    -   On September 28, 2013, from 9:30 a.m. until 12:00 noon at Wirt Park in
    Hanover Borough. Mother shall be present for this visit.
    -   During the children's Christmas break from school in December 2013, from
    Friday, December 2ih through December 29th . Mother shall travel to Corry,
    PA with the children and the visits shall occur at paternal grandmother's
    residence. On Friday, December 2ih the visit shall occur from 5:30p.m. until
    4
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    8:30p.m. and Mother shall be present.     She shall be responsible to transport
    the children to and from paternal grandmother's residence for said visit.       On
    Saturday, December 28th from 9:30a.m. until 7:30 p.m. with Mother present
    for the first half of the visit through 2:00 p.m. On Sunday, December 29th from
    9:30a.m.   until   12:30 p.m. without Mother being present.     Mother shall be
    responsible to transport the children to and from paternal grandmother's
    residence for said visits.
    -   Two (2) weekends between January 1, 2014 and June 1, 2014 so long as
    Paternal Grandparents travel to Hanover, PA. Said weekends shall begin on
    Friday evening at 5:30 p.m.     and end at 12:30 p.m. on Sunday.         Paternal
    grandparents shall provide Mother with at least thirty (30) days' notice of their
    requested weekends.
    REGULAR SCHEDULE OF PARTIAL PHYSICAL CUSTODY:
    Summer:
    In the Summer of 2014, and each summer thereafter, Paternal Grandparents
    shall enjoy a total of three (3) weeks with the children during the children's summer
    vacation from school. Paternal grandparents shall designate one (1) week in June, July
    and August to begin on a Sunday at 12:30 pm through the following Sunday at 12:30
    p.m. Paternal Grandparents shall advise Mother of their intended periods of custody at
    least thirty (30) days prior to their intended summer vacation periods.
    5
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    Throughout the School year:
    Paternal Grandparents shall be entitled to enjoy up to four weekends per school
    year, by designating two (2) weekends in the fall and two (2) weekends in the spring
    that they may travel to Hanover, Pennsylvania to spend time with the children from
    Friday at 5:30 p.m. through Sunday at 12:30 p.m. Paternal Grandparents shall provide
    Mother with at least thirty (30) days' notice of their requested weekends.
    Christmas:
    Paternal Grandparents shall enjoy up to four overnight periods during the
    children's Christmas break from school, to begin no earlier than December 2?1h through
    December 31st each year.
    OTHER TIMES:
    At any other times that the parties by mutual agreement can agree.
    TRANSPORTATION:
    Except as noted herein above with regard to the phase-in period, the
    transportation burden shall generally be shared by the parties, with the party who is to
    obtain custody at the time of exchange to provide for transportation from the residence
    of the other party, unless otherwise specified. At all times, the children shall be secured
    in appropriate passenger restraints. No person transporting the children shall consume
    alcoholic beverages prior to transporting the children.      No person transporting the
    children shall be under the influence of any alcoholic beverages while transporting the
    children.
    6
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    LATE FOR EXCHANGE:
    In the event any party is more than 20 minutes late for a scheduled custody
    exchange, in the absence of a telephone call or other communication from the party, the
    other party may assume that the party who is late has chosen not to exercise that
    period of custody, the period will be forfeited, and the other party will be free to make
    other plans with the children.
    TELEPHONE CALLS/SKYPE:
    The parties are urged to use common sense in scheduling telephone calls to talk
    to the children. The parties are hereby directed to refrain from preventing the party who
    may be calling from talking to the children, or preventing the children from calling the
    other parties, provided that the phone calls are not excessively frequent or too long in
    duration that they disrupt the children's schedule.
    Beginning on Sunday, October 6, 2013 at 7:00 p.m., and every Sunday
    thereafter, the children shall be available to communicate with Paternal Grandparents
    through Skype. The parties shall exchange their respective emails to set up the Skype
    communication within seven (7) days, or no later than Friday, October 4, 2013.
    DISPARAGING REMARKS:
    Each of the parties and any third party in the presence of the children shall take
    all measures deemed advisable to foster a feeling of affection between the children and
    the other parties. Neither party shall do nor shall either party permit any third person to
    do or say anything which may estrange a child from the other parties, their spouse or
    7
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    relatives, or injure a child's opinion of the other party or which may hamper the free and
    natural development of a child's love and respect for the other parties.
    The parties shall not use a child to convey verbal messages to the other party
    about the custody situation or changes in the custody schedule.
    FINANCIAL CARE OF CHILD:
    In the event that a significant matter arises with respect to the medical care,
    education, or financial care of the children, such as a change in occupation, health
    insurance, educational expenses, or residence of a party, those matters shall be
    discussed with the other party before any change is made by either party.
    MUTUAL CONSULTATION:
    Each party shall keep the other informed of his or her residence and telephone
    number to facilitate communication concerning the welfare of the children and visitation.
    WELFARE OF CHILDREN TO BE CONSIDERED:
    The welfare and convenience of the children shall be the prime consideration of
    the parties in any application of the provisions of this order. Both parties are directed to
    listen carefully and consider the wishes of the children in addressing the custodial
    schedule, any changes to the schedule, and any other parenting issues.
    SMOKE I DRINK/ ILLEGAL SUBSTANCES:
    No party shall smoke in a confined area, consume alcohol beverages to excess
    or use illicit drugs while exercising physical custody of the children.     Nor shall either
    party permit another person to smoke in a confined area, consume alcohol beverages to
    excess or use illicit drugs when the children are present. No party shall be under the
    8
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    influence of alcoholic beverages or illegal substances when in the presence of the
    children.
    RELOCATION OF A PARTY:
    A relocation is defined as a change in a residence of the children which
    significantly impairs the ability of a non-relocating party to exercise custodial rights. 23
    Pa.C.S. §5322. No relocation shall occur unless every individual who has custody rights
    to the children consents to the proposed relocation or the court approves the proposed
    relocation. If a party seeks to relocate, that party shall notify every other individual who
    has custody rights to the children. Both parties must follow the statutory requirements
    contained in 23 Pa.C.S. §5337. Specifically, the relocating party must notify every other
    individual who has custody rights to the children by certified mail, return receipt
    requested. The notice must then comply with the following requirements:
    Notice must be sent no later than:
    (1) the eoth day before the date of the proposed relocation; or
    (2) the 1 o" day after the date that the individual knows of the relocation if the
    individual did not know and could not reasonably know of the relocation in
    sufficient time to comply with the 60 day notice requirement and it is not
    reasonably possible to delay the date of relocation so as to comply with the
    60 day notice requirement.
    Unless otherwise excused by law, the following information must be included in
    the notice:
    ( 1) The address of the intended new residence.
    9
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    (2)     The mailing address, if not the same as the address of the intended new
    residence.
    (3)     Names     and ages of the     individuals   in the new residence,      including
    individuals who intend to live in the new residence.
    ( 4)    The home telephone number of the intended new residence, if applicable.
    (5)     The name of the new school district and school.
    (6)     The date of the proposed relocation.
    (7)     The reasons for the proposed relocation.
    (8)     A proposal for a revised custody schedule.
    (9)     Any other information which the party proposing the relocation deems
    appropriate.
    (10) A counter-affidavit as provided under subsection (d)(1) which can be used
    to object to the proposed relocation and modification of a custody order.
    (11) A warning to the non-relocating party that if the non-relocating party does
    not file with the court an objection to the proposed relocation within 30 days
    after receipt of notice, that party shall be foreclosed from objecting to the
    relocation.
    If any of the aforementioned information is not known when the notice is sent but
    is later made known to the party seeking the relocation, then that party shall promptly
    inform every individual who received notice.
    If the non-relocating party objects to the proposed move he/she must do so by
    filing the counter-affidavit with the court and the other party within 30 days. The notice
    of objection     to the opposing party must be sent by certified mail, return receipt
    requested.      If no objection is made in the manner set forth above then it shall be
    presumed that the non-relocating party has consented to the proposed relocation and
    10
    Circulated 06/09/2015 03:33 PM
    the court will not accept testimony challenging the relocation in any further review of the
    custodial arrangements.
    The court shall hold an expedited full hearing on the proposed relocation after a
    timely objection has been filed and before relocation occurs.        The Court may permit
    relocation before a full hearing if the court finds that exigent circumstances exist.
    MODIFICATION OF ORDER:
    The parties are free to modify the terms of this order but in order to do so the
    Court makes it clear that both parties must be in complete agreement to any new terms.
    That means both parties must consent on what the new terms of the custody
    arrangement or visitation schedule shall be.
    In the event that one or the other does not consent to a change, that does not
    mean each follows your own idea as to what you think the arrangements should be.
    The reason this Court Order is set out in detail is so both parties have it to refer to and
    to govern your relationship with the children and with each other in the event of a
    disagreement.
    Plaintiffs I Paternal Grandparents were both born in 1967. Defendant I Mother
    was born in 1990.
    Copies of this Order shall be sent to counsel for the parties.
    11