Crespo, A. v. Hughes, W. ( 2023 )

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2023 PA SUPER 52
ANTHONY CRESPO AND EDWARD : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
TORRALVO : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
WILLIAM B. HUGHES, HUGHES AND :
HENSELL ASSOCIATES, INC., :
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY ANDTEMPLE :
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, INC. :
:
APPEAL OF: ARCH INSURANCE :
COMPANY : No. 1313 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered April 14, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Civil Division at No(s): 1207003490.
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2023
Arch Insurance Company appeals from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing as moot its motion to compel
Dr. William B. Hughes, M.D. to comply with a charging order. Because the
trial court erroneously dismissed Arch’s motion to compel as moot, we vacate
and remand for further proceedings.
In 2016, a jury found Dr. Hughes liable to Edward Torralvo for medical
malpractice and awarded Mr. Torralvo $538,000. Dr. Hughes appealed, and
this Court affirmed. See Crespo v. Hughes, 167 A.3d 168 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Mr. Torralvo assigned the judgment to Arch Insurance Company.
On November 8, 2019, Arch moved to enforce the judgment against Dr.
Hughes by attaching the assets of Hughes Holdings, LLC to satisfy the 2016
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judgment. Dr. Hughes is the sole member of Hughes Holdings, LLC. He
opposed the motion to enforce on the grounds that the assignment to Arch
was invalid. On September 29, 2020, the trial court entered an order granting
Arch’s motion; the order charged 100% of the unsatisfied Torralvo Judgment
debt to Hughes Holdings, LLC. Specially, the Charging Order (1) charged Dr.
Hughes’ ownership interest with the obligation to pay the judgment, (2)
ordered an accounting of the financial operations of the LLC, (3) granted Arch
the right to inspect the books and records of the LLC, (4) ordered Dr. Hughes
to pay the LLC’s incoming rents to Arch, and (5) ordered the judicial sale of
the LLC through the Sheriff of Philadelphia County.
Dr. Hughes appealed. This Court unanimously affirmed. See Crespo
v. Hughes, 2184 EDA 2020, 2021 WL 5858464 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-
precedential decision). Nevertheless, Dr. Hughes still refused to follow the
Charging Order, and Arch filed a motion to compel his performance.
The trial court assigned The Honorable Edward C. Wright to hear Arch’s
motion to compel. On March 22, 2022, he recused without explanation.
The court reassigned the motion to The Honorable Linda A. Carpenter.
Three weeks later, Judge Carpenter, sua sponte, issued an order denying the
motion, because “the Court who issued the Order of September 29, 2020 has
recused itself and has refrained from entering sanctions, this Motion is MOOT.”
Trial Court Order, 4/14/22, at 1. This timely appeal followed.
I.
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After receiving Arch’s notice of appeal and docketing statement, this
Court issued a show-cause order. We questioned whether the appealed-from
order was a collateral order, as Arch had asserted in its docketing statement.
See Superior Court Order, 7/19/22, at 1. Arch filed a timely reply, and this
Court discharged the show-cause order and deferred the question of appellate
jurisdiction to us.
“The establishment of jurisdiction is of equal importance as the
establishment of a meritorious claim for relief.” Robinson v. Pennsylvania
Bd. of Probation & Parole, 582 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. 1990). This Court “may
always consider that question on our own motion.” Kapcsos v. Benshoff,
194 A.3d 139, 141 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).
A jurisdictional issue presents us with “a question of law; the appellate
standard of review is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary.” Id.This Court’s appellate jurisdiction extends to “(1) a final order or an
order certified by the trial court as a final order; (2) an interlocutory order as
of right; (3) an interlocutory order by permission; (4) or a collateral order.”
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Hodes, 784 A.2d 144, 144 (Pa.
Super. 2001).
Dr. Hughes spends a great deal of time in his brief arguing that the
appealed-from order is not the second, third, and fourth type of appealable
orders. See Hughes’ Brief at 17-28. However, he defines, but thereafter
ignores, the first and most common type of appealable order – i.e., the final
order. See id. at 17.
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The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure define a “final order” as
an order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
When Arch filed its motion to compel Dr. Hughes to comply with the
September 29, 2020 Charging Order, all other claims were no longer pending,
and all other parties were no longer participating in this matter. The only
claim before the trial court was Arch’s motion to compel. When the trial court
issued its order dismissing Arch’s motion as moot, the order therefore
disposed of “all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
Accordingly, we hold that the appealed-from order is a final order. “[A]n
appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a . . . trial court.”
Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction.
II.
Turning to the merits of the appeal, Arch raises eight issues as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Arch’s motion to
compel as moot.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Arch’s motion to
compel based upon the previous trial judge’s recusal from
the case.
3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to enforce the
judgment against [Dr.] Hughes, which was affirmed on
appeal.
4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to enforce the
Charging Order, which was affirmed on appeal.
5. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the previous
judge’s recusal rendered Arch’s pending motion moot,
where [Judge Wright] refrained from ruling on the motion .
..
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6. Whether the trial court erred in denying Arch’s motion to
compel on the basis that a judicial recusal renders all
pending motions before that judge moot, as opposed to
finding that a judicial recusal means that another judicial
officer of the same court shall be assigned to consider and
decide the merits of the pending motion.
7. Whether the trial court erred in denying Arch’s motion to
compel, because a manifest injustice will result in that [Dr.]
Hughes continues to violate the terms of the Charging
Order, which was affirmed on appeal and remains in effect.
8. Whether the trial court erred in denying Arch’s motion to
compel, because Arch will be left with no way to enforce its
judgment against [Dr.] Hughes or the Charging Order,
which was affirmed on appeal and remains in effect.
Arch’s Brief at 5-7. We address all of Arch’s issues simultaneously, because
they are all interrelated and meritorious.
Arch contends the trial court erroneously dismissed its motion to compel
as moot. According to the trial court it determined that the motion was moot,
because Judge Wright, “who issued the Order of September 29, 2020 has
recused [him]self and has refrained from entering sanctions . . . .” Trial Court
Order, 4/14/22, at 1.
“Mootness, like standing, is a question of law . . .” Estate of Crowder,
262 A.3d 549 (Pa. Super. 2021). “Therefore, our scope of review is plenary;
our standard is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Mauk, 185 A.3d 406, 409 (Pa.
Super. 2018).
“As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages
of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.” In re M.B., 101
A.3d 124, 127 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa.
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Super. 2002). “An issue before a court is moot when a determination is
sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect
on the existing controversy.” Printed Image of York, Inc. v. Mifflin Press,
Ltd., 133 A.3d 55, 59 (Pa. Super. 2016).
It is undeniably clear that Arch and Dr. Hughes are actively fighting over
who will own Hughes Holdings, LLC and control the profits from that business.
Thus, an actual controversy exists. Moreover, if the trial court enters an order
compelling Dr. Hughes to comply with the Charging Order on pain of civil
contempt, such an order will have a real effect on resolving the controversy.
Recusal by a trial judge does nothing to change these basic, underlying
facts. Indeed, if recusal by one member of the judiciary could render a party’s
claim moot, a miscarriage of justice would result, because the recusal would
deprive the aggrieved party of its constitutionally guaranteed judicial remedy.
The ancient maxim holds: “for every wrong, a remedy.” Guardians
Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 626,
(1983) (Marshall, J. dissenting). “An injury is a wrong; and for the redress
of every wrong there is a remedy: a wrong is a violation of one’s right; and
for the vindication of every right there is a remedy.” Speck v. Finegold, 439
A.2d 110, 116 (Pa. 1981). Once a cause of action accrues, it becomes “a
vested right, which under Article 1, § 11 [of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania], may not be eliminated by subsequent
legislation.” Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 919, 930 (Pa. 2004).
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According to our constitution, “every man for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law,
and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay.” Pa. Const.
art. I, § 11. So precious is one’s constitutional right to pursue a judicial
remedy that the right of access to the courts trumps the recusal doctrine when
necessary.
For example, in Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 929 (Pa.
2006), the legislature passed a bill raising the pay of the judiciary and other
state officials. When public opinion pressured the General Assembly to repeal
the pay raises, it passed another bill doing just that. A group of trial judges
sued the Commonwealth, the leaders of the General Assembly, and various
members of the Executive Branch. The trial judges sought to have the bill
repealing of their pay raise declared unconstitutional under Article V, § 16(a)
of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.1
Because the repealing bill also reduced the salaries of the Justices of
Pennsylvania, the Justices had identical interests in the outcome of a lawsuit
as the plaintiff judges. Normally, they would have had to recuse themselves.
However, had they done so, there would have been no other judicial officers
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1 “Justices, judges and justices of the peace [now magisterial district judges]
shall be compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law. Their
compensation shall not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by
law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth.” Pa.
Const. art. V, § 16(a).
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left in Pennsylvania to sit as temporary Justices, because every judge of the
inferior courts faced the same conflict of interest as the Justices.
Even where every Justice and judge in the Commonwealth would have
normally had to recuse themselves, the Supreme Court did not dismiss the
case as moot. Instead, “the long-recognized common law ‘rule of necessity’
require[d the Supreme] Court to proceed to discharge its constitutional duty,
notwithstanding any interest in the outcome.” Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905
A.2d 918, 929 (Pa. 2006).
“The true rule unquestionably is that wherever it becomes necessary for
a judge to sit, even where [the judge] has an interest — where no provision
is made for calling another in, or where no one else can take [the judge’s]
place — it is [the judge’s] duty to hear and decide, however disagreeable it
may be.” Id. (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214, (1980);
Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 185 (1870)).
Thus, even if every judge in Pennsylvania were conflicted and would
normally have to recuse from Arch’s case, the motion to compel would still
not be rendered moot. One judge would have to undertake the constitutional
duty to hear and to decide the motion to compel. Clearly, then, the nearly
100 unconflicted judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia are duty
bound to hear and to decide this case. One of them must rule upon the merits
of Arch’s motion to compel Dr. Hughes’ performance of the Charging Order,
in the first instance.
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Hence, Judge Wright’s recusal did not render this case moot. Arch’s
constitutional right to proceed and to collect on its judgment is too important
to countenance such a result. This matter remains ripe to decide the motion
to compel Dr. Hughes’ compliance with the Charging Order. We therefore
remand this case for the trial court to rule upon the merits of the motion to
compel.
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/31/2023
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