In the Interest of: S.Q.L., a Minor ( 2017 )


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  • J. S25032/17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: S.Q.L.,            :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    A MINOR                                :           PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER                :          No. 3238 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Decree, September 14, 2016,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000533-2016,
    CP-51-DP-0000744-2014
    IN THE INTEREST OF: A.L.,              :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    A MINOR                                :           PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER                :          No. 3240 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Decree, September 14, 2016,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000532-2016,
    CP-51-DP-0000746-2014
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                   FILED MAY 26, 2017
    M.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered September 14,
    2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting the
    petition of the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
    and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor, dependent
    children, S.Q.L., a male born in August of 2009, and A.L., a female born in
    October of 2007 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act,
    J. S25032/17
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1   2
    Mother further appeals
    the   orders     entered   September   14,   2016,   changing    the   Children’s
    permanency goal to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 6351. After review, we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history
    as follows:
    The family in this case has been known to DHS since
    2010.[3] Between 2010 and 2014, DHS received
    four General Protective Services (“GPS”) reports
    alleging problems in the home.[4] All four reports
    were substantiated, and DHS offered services. On
    February 6, 2014, DHS received another GPS report
    that the utilities in Mother’s home were turned off.
    DHS visited the home and found it was filled with
    trash, smelled of marijuana and had no heat.[5] The
    Children were truant. By family arrangement, DHS
    implemented a Safety Plan and the Children moved
    into the home of their maternal cousin.          On
    March 25, 2014, Mother met with DHS and the
    1
    By separate decrees entered June 27, 2016, the trial court involuntarily
    terminated the parental rights of the Children’s fathers and/or putative
    fathers, also pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Neither
    of the Children’s fathers and/or putative fathers has appealed, nor are they
    parties to this appeal.
    2
    Mother’s three older children, who are not the subject of this matter, were
    also adjudicated dependent and remained committed and in placement.
    3
    Upon review of the certified record, DHS’s involvement goes back even
    further, to May of 2008. (See DHS Exhibit 1.)
    4
    DHS received reports on September 7, 2010, May 28, 2011, February 6,
    2014, and February 9, 2014, with respect to conditions of the home and
    neglect of the Children. (See DHS Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5.)
    5
    DHS received a similar report as to the conditions of the home, among
    other things, on February 9, 2014. (See DHS Exhibit 5.)
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    Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) and stated she
    intended to take the Children back into her care.
    DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody
    (“OPC”) and formally placed the Children with the
    cousin. The following day the cousin stated she
    could not care for the Children, so DHS placed them
    in other foster homes. Following an adjudicatory
    hearing on April 9, 2014, the court adjudicated the
    Children dependent and fully committed them to
    DHS custody. CUA then developed a Single Case
    Plan (“SCP”) with objectives for Mother. Between
    2014 and 2016, Mother failed to complete her
    objectives. . . .
    Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 1-2 (citations to record omitted).
    The trial court held regular permanency review hearings in this matter.
    Throughout these     reviews, the trial court maintained the Children’s
    commitment and placement and permanency goal.
    On June 10, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
    parental rights and for a goal change. Thereafter, the trial court conducted
    combined termination and goal change hearings on June 27, 2016 and
    September 14, 2016.6       In support of its petitions, DHS presented the
    testimony of CUA caseworker, Lloyd Guyton.         Further, DHS offered DHS
    Exhibits 1 through 17, which were admitted into evidence on June 27, 2016.
    (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 86.)     Counsel stipulated to their content,
    6
    Mother agreed to sign voluntary relinquishments of her parental rights to
    the Children at the June 27 hearing.           Mother signed the necessary
    paperwork subsequent to the submission of evidence and testimony being
    taken on the termination/goal change petitions. The matter was, however,
    listed for September 14, 2016, for the court to issue its decision on the
    termination/goal change petitions should Mother revoke the voluntary
    relinquishments, which she in fact did, in the requisite 30 days.
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    but not their veracity. (Id. at 20-21, 37.) Mother additionally testified on
    her own behalf.   Children’s fathers were not present.     However, putative
    father for both Children, S.P.B., Jr., a/k/a S.B., a/k/a S.B., who is
    incarcerated and was represented by counsel, was contacted via telephone
    and chose not to participate.7
    By decree entered September 14, 2016, the trial court involuntarily
    terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children.8 On October 10, 2016,
    Mother, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal, along
    with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
    On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
    1.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
    granting [DHS]’s Petition to Change the Goal
    to Adoption?
    2.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
    finding that DHS proved by clear and
    convincing evidence that [M]other failed to
    rehabilitate herself pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    Section 2511[(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)]?
    3.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
    finding that DHS proved by clear and
    convincing evidence that it would not harm
    A.L. and/or S.Q.L. to be severed from their
    mother and that it was in the best interests of
    7
    A.L.’s father, D.F., was represented by counsel. S.Q.L.’s father, A.P., was
    not represented by counsel as an address was never obtained. (Notes of
    testimony, 6/27/16 at 19-20.)
    8
    The trial court announced its decision, memorialized by subsequent
    decrees and orders, on the record on September 14, 2016.
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    the children to be adopted         pursuant   to
    23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(b)?
    4.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
    failing to consider that [M]other completed all
    her family service plan goals in 2015, and that
    after the additional goal of “mental health” was
    added in 2015, [M]other had made substantial
    progress with this goal despite the fact that
    DHS made no referral and provided no
    assistance to her.
    Mother’s brief at 4.
    In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
    standard of review is as follows:
    The standard of review in termination of parental
    rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
    findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
    trial court if they are supported by the record.”
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826 (Pa.
    2012).     “If the factual findings are supported,
    appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
    made an error of law or abused its discretion.” 
    Id. “[A] decision
    may be reversed for an abuse of
    discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or
    ill-will.” 
    Id. The trial
    court’s decision, however,
    should not be reversed merely because the record
    would support a different result. 
    Id. at 827.
    We
    have previously emphasized our deference to trial
    courts that often have first-hand observations of the
    parties spanning multiple hearings.       See In re
    R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013).         “The trial court is free to
    believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
    make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
    In re M.G., 
    855 A.2d 68
    , 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
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    competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
    the record could also support the opposite result.”        In re Adoption of
    T.B.B., 
    835 A.2d 387
    , 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
    The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
    Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
    analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of
    the child.
    Our case law has made clear that under
    Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
    process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,
    the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and
    convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
    satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
    delineated in Section 2511(a).     Only if the court
    determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
    termination of his or her parental rights does the
    court engage in the second part of the analysis
    pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
    best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
    needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
    status of the emotional bond between parent and
    child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
    child of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).       We
    have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
    weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
    conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
    In re C.S., 
    761 A.2d 1197
    , 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
    Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 
    708 A.2d 88
    , 91 (Pa. 1998).
    -6-
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    With regard to Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues, which we
    address first, Mother essentially challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in
    terminating her parental rights. (Mother’s brief at 13-18.) In this case, the
    trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have long held that, in
    order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the
    trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
    Section 2511(b).    In re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa.Super. 2004)
    (en banc).     Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under
    Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
    (a)   General rule.--The rights of a parent in
    regard to a child may be terminated after a
    petition filed on any of the following grounds:
    ....
    (2)    The    repeated   and   continued
    incapacity,  abuse,   neglect  or
    refusal of the parent has caused
    the child to be without essential
    parental    care,    control   or
    subsistence necessary for his
    physical or mental well-being and
    the conditions and causes of the
    incapacity,  abuse,   neglect  or
    refusal cannot or will not be
    remedied by the parent.
    ....
    (b)   Other     considerations.--The    court    in
    terminating the rights of a parent shall give
    primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of
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    the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
    terminated     solely     on     the    basis     of
    environmental factors such as inadequate
    housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
    medical care if found to be beyond the control
    of the parent. With respect to any petition
    filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
    the court shall not consider any efforts by the
    parent to remedy the conditions described
    therein which are first initiated subsequent to
    the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
    We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
    terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
    In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three
    elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued
    incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
    incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
    child to be without essential parental care, control or
    subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
    well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
    abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
    remedied.
    In re Adoption of M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d 1266
    , 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
    omitted).   “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
    cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct.            To the
    contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
    perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    , 1216
    (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 
    797 A.2d 326
    , 337 (Pa.Super.
    2002).
    -8-
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    Instantly, in finding sufficient evidence supporting termination of
    Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the court stated as
    follows:
    The Children have been in care since April 9, 2014.
    Mother’s original objectives were to visit the
    Children, obtain housing and a job, complete
    parenting classes and a PCE [(“parenting capacity
    evaluation”)]. Mother obtained appropriate housing.
    Mother has never provided documentation of her
    income. While Mother completed parenting classes,
    she was completely unable to demonstrate that she
    learned anything from them. Even after the classes,
    she did not have the capacity to provide the Children
    with a safe and permanent home. During the PCE,
    Mother minimized and denied the issues that brought
    the Children into care.       The PCE recommended
    Mother engage in therapy, and this became an
    objective in her SCP and in court orders.         CUA
    referred Mother for mental health therapy in October
    2015. Mother has never attended therapy. Mother
    testified that therapy was never one of her
    objectives, though it had been discussed at SCP
    meetings and court hearings where Mother was
    present. Mother testified that she attended family
    therapy with the Children, but was actually referring
    to another child who is not the subject of this case.
    At the beginning of the case, Mother consistently
    attended visits, and was given unsupervised visits.
    She began coaching the Children to withhold
    information from the foster parents, and her visits
    were changed to supervised.        The Children had
    originally been placed with relatives, but had been
    removed and placed with unrelated foster parents at
    Mother’s request. Mother testified falsely about her
    request, originally testifying that the relatives had
    failed FBI clearances.       When asked about this
    contradictory testimony, Mother admitted that her
    original testimony had been untrue. The Children
    need permanency, which Mother cannot provide.
    Mother has demonstrated that she is unwilling to
    remedy the causes of her incapacity to parent in
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    order to provide the Children with essential parental
    care, control, or subsistence necessary for their
    physical and mental well-being. Termination under
    this section was also proper.
    Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 6-7.
    Mother, however, argues that the record “does not support the finding
    that she failed to take affirmative action to rectify the circumstances that led
    to the removal of the children.” (Mother’s brief at 16.) Mother argues the
    evidence was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard. (Id. at
    16-17.)    Specifically, she indicates the only evidence offered was the
    testimony of the caseworker as to a lack of documentation regarding
    individual therapy, income or results of a medication evaluation.          (Id. at
    16.)   Mother further challenges the court’s evidentiary rulings during her
    cross-examination of the caseworker, which she contends prevented her
    “from eliciting any further information that the witness should have gleaned
    from his review of the case documents. (Id. at 17.) We disagree.
    A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for
    termination under Section 2511(a)(2).           CUA caseworker Lloyd Guyton
    testified that Mother’s objectives were “to sustain housing, to maintain a
    source of income, to attend therapy and to attend parenting classes.”
    (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 43.) Mr. Guyton also verified a parenting
    capacity evaluation. (Id. at 43.) Critically, he indicated that Mother failed
    to   provide    documentation    as   to   mental   health   treatment,   although
    acknowledging that she stated she had completed therapy, or a psychiatric
    - 10 -
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    evaluation, as recommended by the parenting capacity evaluation, 9 as well
    as to income.       (Id. at 43-44.)   Further, as confirmed by Mr. Guyton, a
    parenting capacity evaluation conducted by William Russell, Ph.D., and
    Sheetal A. Duggal, Psy.D., dated December 2, 2014, opined that Mother
    lacked the “capacity to provide safety and permanency” for the Children.
    (Id. at 49.       See also DHS Exhibit 14 at 10.)      Notably, the evaluators
    highlighted Mother’s potential inability to provide for the Children financially,
    noting, “[Mother] presented no secure plan of how she intends to financially
    support her children with a limited income.”       (DHS Exhibit 14 at 9.)     In
    addition, the evaluators recognized Mother’s lack of insight as to issues for
    which the Children were brought into care and her inability to accept
    responsibility.
    Additional barriers include [Mother’s] continued
    denial and minimization of events that led to her
    children’s removal (including keeping them in unsafe
    housing, failure to meet their medical and dental
    needs, and concerns regarding substance use) and
    she continues to project blame and responsibility
    onto others for DHS involvement. [Mother] was
    unable to make any connection between her
    behavior and parenting and the fact that all of the
    children have emotional/behavioral problems.
    9
    Mr. Guyton testified that Mother was referred for therapy in October of
    2015. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 50.) Mother denied the inclusion of
    any additional objectives and disputed any meetings as to her objectives
    following completion of the parenting capacity evaluation. (Id. at 76, 82.)
    However, Mother testified to her presence in court on numerous occasions
    since that time where there was testimony presented regarding her
    objectives. (Id. at 84.)
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    Id. See also
    notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 49.        The evaluators also
    recognized concerns as to the Children’s putative father, who is a registered
    sex offender, which Mother minimized.        (Id. at 5, 7, 9.)    Similarly, the
    evaluators further observed that, despite completion of parenting classes,
    Mother, who admitted to the prior use of corporal punishment, “was unable
    to identify methods of appropriate discipline.” (Id. at 9. See also notes of
    testimony, 6/27/16 at 49.)    Therefore, as suggested above, among other
    things, the evaluators recommended Mother participate in individual therapy
    “with the focus to include identifying the role she played in her children’s
    removal and for DHS’s ongoing involvement with her family, [sic] monitoring
    possible substance use.” (Id. at 10.)
    Further, we note, the decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence
    is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.         Buchhalter v.
    Buchhalter, 
    959 A.2d 1260
    , 1263 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
    See also Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC, 
    34 A.3d 94
    , 100-101 (Pa.Super.
    2011); Jacobs v. Chatwani, 
    922 A.2d 950
    (Pa.Super. 2007).            This court
    may only reverse upon a finding of a clear abuse of discretion.      
    Id. After review
    of the record, we do not discern any abuse of discretion with respect
    to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Hence, the record substantiates the
    conclusion that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect,
    or refusal has caused the Children to be without essential parental control or
    subsistence necessary for their physical and mental well-being. See In re
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    Adoption of 
    M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272
    . Moreover, Mother cannot or will not
    remedy this situation.      See 
    id. As the
    trial court’s factual findings are
    supported by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result
    of an error of law or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s
    decrees with regard to Section 2511(a)(2). In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267
    (Pa. 2013).
    We      next   determine    whether       termination   was   proper   under
    Section 2511(b).       With regard to Section 2511(b), we have stated as
    follows:
    Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
    parental rights would best serve the developmental,
    physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the
    child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b)
    does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the
    term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case
    law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional
    bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to
    be considered as part of our analysis.        While a
    parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a
    major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest
    analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors
    to be considered by the court when determining
    what is in the best interest of the child.
    [I]n addition to a bond examination, the
    trial court can equally emphasize the
    safety needs of the child, and should also
    consider the intangibles, such as the
    love, comfort, security, and stability the
    child might have with the foster parent.
    Additionally, this Court stated that the
    trial   court    should    consider    the
    importance of continuity of relationships
    and whether any existing parent-child
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    bond can be severed without detrimental
    effects on the child.
    In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    , 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting
    In re N.A.M., 
    33 A.3d 95
    , 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and
    citations omitted).
    In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights favored
    Children’s needs and welfare, the court concluded:
    Mother has consistently visited with the Children
    over the life of this case, but has not maintained a
    bond with them.       She does not have a healthy
    maternal relationship with [A.L.]        Mother has
    coached the Children improperly, whereby visits
    were changed to supervised. Mother appeared to
    confuse these Children with her other Children.
    Mother planned to have the Children adopted by a
    sex offender who is currently in prison. Mother
    interfered with the Children’s placement and
    permanency to prevent them from being placed with
    relatives, in contravention of the purpose of the
    Juvenile Act. It is in the Children’s best interest to
    terminate Mother’s rights, as they will not suffer
    irreparable harm. Mother does not have a healthy
    parental relationship with [A.L.]         [S.Q.L.] is
    hospitalized at the time of trial. CUA is exploring
    potential family resources. Although Mother visits
    with [S.Q.L.], the trial court did not hear any
    evidence of a bond between Mother and [S.Q.L.]
    Consequently, the trial court properly inferred that
    no parental bond exists with Mother. The court did
    not abuse its discretion when it found that it was
    clearly and convincingly established that there was
    no parental bond, and that termination of Mother’s
    parental rights would not destroy an existing
    beneficial relationship.
    Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 10-11 (citations to record omitted).
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    Despite acknowledging Section 2511(b) in her brief, Mother fails to
    offer any discussion and/or analysis as to this subsection. Mother, therefore,
    waived any claim relating to Section 2511(b).              See In re W.H., 
    25 A.3d 330
    , 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 
    24 A.3d 364
    (Pa. 2011),
    quoting In re A.C., 
    991 A.2d 884
    , 897 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[W]here an
    appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to
    relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
    fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).                  See also In re
    Adoption of R.K.Y., 
    72 A.3d 669
    , 679 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
    denied, 
    76 A.3d 540
    (Pa. 2013) (declining to address Section 2511(b)
    where not challenged on appeal).
    Nevertheless, in light of the requisite bifurcated analysis, we observe
    that, had Mother preserved this issue, we would have found it lacked merit.
    There    was   sufficient    evidence   to   allow   the    trial   court   to   make   a
    determination of the Children’s needs and welfare, and as to the existence of
    a bond between Mother and Children that, if severed, would not have a
    detrimental impact on them.         Mother’s visitation with the Children, while
    unsupervised for a time, was modified to supervised.10 (Notes of testimony,
    6/27/16 at 73-75.)          Further, Mr. Guyton testified as to the unhealthy
    relationship between Mother and A.L. and no irreparable harm to either child
    10
    Although disputing the truth, Mother acknowledged being advised that the
    change in visitation was due to coaching the Children not to disclose certain
    information to their foster parents. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 82-83.)
    - 15 -
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    if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. (Id. at 44.) Of significance, we
    also again recognize the parenting capacity evaluation, which concluded
    Mother’s inability to provide safety and permanency for the Children, noting
    her lack of insight and acceptance of responsibility as to issues for which the
    Children were brought into care. (Id. at 49; DHS Exhibit 14 at 10.) As this
    court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent
    attempts     to     attain   the   maturity   necessary   to   assume   parenting
    responsibilities.     The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a
    child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
    and hope for the future.” 
    R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513
    .
    Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
    discretion in the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights
    under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
    Lastly, we turn to Mother’s first issue, the question of whether the trial
    court appropriately changed the permanency goal to adoption. In so doing,
    our standard of review is the same abuse of discretion standard as noted
    above.     See In the Interest of L.Z., 
    111 A.3d 1164
    , 1174 (Pa. 2015),
    citing In re R.J.T., 
    9 A.3d 1179
    , 1190 (Pa. 2010), for the proposition that
    the abuse of discretion standard applies in a dependency matter.         Further,
    following an examination and findings of factors provided in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 6351(f) and (f.1), regarding matters to be determined at the permanency
    hearing, the trial court must also find that a goal change is in Children’s best
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    J. S25032/17
    interests.   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g); In re R.J.T., 
    9 A.3d 1179
    (Pa.
    2010).
    The primary purpose of the disposition of a dependent child is to
    examine what is in the best interest of the child. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(a);
    In the Interest of Z.W., et al., 
    710 A.2d 1176
    , 1178 (Pa.Super. 1998).
    See also In re Tameka M., 
    580 A.2d 750
    , 753 (Pa. 1990) (stating, “In
    ordering a disposition under Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, the court acts
    not in the role of adjudicator reviewing the action of an administrative
    agency, . . . rather the court acts pursuant to a separate discretionary role
    with the purpose of meeting the child’s best interests.”), quoting In re
    Lowry, 
    484 A.2d 383
    , 386 (Pa. 1984).
    In the case at bar, Mother posits that the trial court should not have
    changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption, as the court failed to
    consider the “totality of the circumstances” pursuant to Section 6351(f).
    (Mother’s brief at 9-10.)   Again, Mother challenges the court’s evidentiary
    rulings as to the testimony of the caseworker.       (Id. at 10-12.)   Mother
    argues, “It is this pattern of biased [sic] against Mother that accentuates the
    [c]ourt’s unwillingness to comply with the ‘totality of the circumstances’
    outlined in 6351(f) and which is proof that the court abused its discretion in
    terminating [M]other[’s] parental rights.”     (Id. at 12.)    Mother further
    asserts that she accomplished all goals for which she received referrals in
    2015, and the remaining obstacle of therapy “was in progress and could
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    J. S25032/17
    have rectified Mother’s parenting deficits within a reasonable time.” (Id. at
    12-13.)
    However, supporting the goal change to adoption, the court reasoned:
    Mother expressed an interest in signing voluntary
    relinquishments of her parental rights to the
    Children, but only if her conditions for placement
    were met.        Mother has interfered with the
    permanency of the Children before, asking that they
    be removed from relatives and have less contact
    with family. This conduct was clearly against the
    purposes of the Juvenile Act. Mother then lied in
    court, testifying that she had never asked for the
    Children to be removed. Mother intended to have
    the Children adopted by a sex offender. Mother
    improperly coached the Children and her visits had
    to be changed to supervised.         Mother has not
    provided proof of her employment or income.
    Mother has not engaged in mental health treatment,
    despite it being an objective routinely discussed at
    SCP meetings and court hearings. Mother completed
    parenting classes but did not learn anything at all.
    Mother denied that there had ever been any issues in
    her house, and that her Children’s teeth had rotted
    because they ate too much candy. Mother did not
    present the capacity to provide the Children with a
    safe and permanent home. Mother confused these
    Children with another one of her children. Mother
    does not have a healthy parental relationship with
    the Children. Adoption is in the best interest of the
    Children. Because of these facts, and the stipulated
    facts in the termination petition, it was clearly and
    convincingly established by credible testimony of
    DHS’s witness that the court’s change of permanency
    goal from reunification to adoption was proper.
    Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 11-12 (citations to record omitted).    With
    this, we agree.
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    J. S25032/17
    Upon review of the record, Mother’s claim lacks merit.        The record
    reveals that a change of the permanency goal to adoption was in Children’s
    best interests. Again, Mother failed to provide CUA with documentation as
    to completion with respect to all of her objectives, notably therapy and
    income.   (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 43-44.)        Moreover, and more
    importantly, a parenting capacity evaluation revealed Mother’s inability to
    provide for the Children’s safety and permanency, noting her denial and
    minimization of issues related to the Children’s placement in care, as well as
    her financial instability and inability to name appropriate forms of discipline.
    (DHS Exhibit 14 at 9-10.) In addition, Mother’s visitation with the Children
    was changed to and remained supervised, and the caseworker testified as to
    no irreparable harm to either child if Mother’s parental rights were
    terminated.    (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 44, 73-75.)      Further, as we
    find no abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s evidentiary determinations,
    we do not disturb them. Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 
    959 A.2d 1260
    , 1263
    (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted). See also Schuenemann v. Dreemz,
    LLC, 
    34 A.3d 94
    , 100-101 (Pa.Super. 2011); Jacobs v. Chatwani, 
    922 A.2d 950
    (Pa.Super. 2007).       Therefore, the record supports that a goal
    change was in the best interests of Children.     Accordingly, after review of
    the record, we again discern no abuse of discretion, and conclude that the
    trial court properly changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption.
    - 19 -
    J. S25032/17
    Based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s termination of
    Mother’s parental rights and change of the Children’s permanency goal, we
    affirm the decrees and orders of the trial court.
    Decrees and orders affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/26/2017
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