In the Interest of: C.E.R., Jr., a Minor ( 2018 )


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  • J-S76001-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: C.E.R., Jr., A         :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :           PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: C.R., FATHER                    :
    :          No. 2182 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Family Court at No. CP-51-AP 0000601-2017
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                           FILED JANUARY 25, 2018
    C.R. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of
    Philadelphia County, entered on June 13, 2017, that terminated his parental
    rights to his son, C.E.R., Jr. (“Child”), born in May 2008, and changed Child’s
    goal to adoption.1 We affirm.
    Child first encountered Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services
    (DHS) in June 2009, when DHS removed Child, who was thirteen months old,
    and his siblings2 from Mother’s care. Child and his siblings remained in foster
    care until January 2011, when the court ended supervision and reunified Child
    with Mother.
       Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.
    1  The court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, T.D.A.P.
    (“Mother”). Mother did not appeal that termination.
    2   Child’s siblings have different fathers and are not subjects of this appeal.
    J-S76001-17
    Child came back into care in March 2014, when DHS received a General
    Protective Services report alleging that Philadelphia police officers had found
    Mother under the influence of Phencyclidine (PCP)3 and unable to care for her
    children. The police placed the children with DHS because no family members
    were available to care for them and their fathers were not identified. The
    report   also    alleged   Mother’s   home   was   unkempt.   This   report   was
    substantiated.
    DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody for all Mother’s children,
    including Child, on March 5, 2014, and placed them in foster care. The court
    adjudicated Child dependent on March 14, 2014, and committed him to the
    custody of DHS.
    DHS developed a Family Service Plan with the goal of reunification.
    Father’s objective was to make his whereabouts known to DHS. Rodney Hill,
    the DHS social worker responsible for the case, testified that Father never was
    in contact with DHS, nor did he make it known to DHS in any way that he was
    ready, willing, and able to care for Child. According to Hill, Father never
    appeared at any court listing prior to the termination hearing. Hill testified
    further that when he took over the case in August 2015, he sent
    correspondence for Father to the last known address DHS had for him. He did
    not receive a response, and the correspondence was not returned as
    3For a description of the pernicious effects of this drug, we refer the interested
    reader to Drugs.com, PCP (Phencyclidine) Effects of PCP Use, available at
    https://www.drugs.com/illicit/pcp.html (last visited January 3, 2018).
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    J-S76001-17
    undeliverable. In January 2017, Hill learned Father had been in prison, but
    was out on parole.
    In March 2017, Father put his current address on his marriage license,
    which enabled DHS to issue a subpoena to him when it ran another parent
    locator search in May 2017. Father contacted Hill when he received the
    subpoena. Hill arranged for Father to visit Child in May 2017. This one visit
    was the only contact Father had with Child during the life of the case.
    Father testified he was incarcerated at a state correctional facility from
    June 9, 2013, until his release on December 19, 2016. Father claimed that
    during his time in prison, he sent letters to Mother at least once a month but
    that she never responded. Father stated he did not know Child was in DHS
    custody and believed he was with Mother. Father also claimed that after his
    release from prison, he attempted to contact Child at Mother’s last known
    address, and then her mother’s house, but she no longer resided there.
    Father agreed that Child appeared to be well taken care of and he knew
    Child was doing well in the home of his pre-adoptive caregiver. He stated,
    however, that he wanted to build a relationship with Child.
    Child is in a pre-adoptive home where he shares a strong bond with his
    foster mother and looks to her for all his daily needs. She attends to his
    schooling and medical care. Father never inquired about Child’s birthdays,
    holidays, school or educational events. Hill did not believe Child would suffer
    irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated because Child
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    never knew who his father was, had just recently met him, and there is no
    bond between them.
    DHS filed its termination petition on May 26, 2017. The court entered
    its decree terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
    2511(a) (1), (2), and (b), and changing Child’s goal to adoption on June 13,
    2017. Father then timely filed his notice of appeal and concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal.
    Father raises the following questions for our review:
    1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in [t]erminating [Father’s]
    [p]arental [r]ights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. section 2511(a)(1), the
    evidence having been insufficient to establish Father had
    evidenced a settled purpose of reliquishing [sic] parental claim, or
    having refused or failed to perform parental duties[?]
    2. Whether the the [sic] evidence was sufficient to establish that
    [Father] had refused or failed to perform parental duties, caused
    Child to be without essential parental care, that conditions having
    led to placement had continued to exist, or finally that any of
    above could not have been remedied[?]
    3. Whether the [e]vidence was sufficient to establish that
    [t]ermination of [p]arental [r]ights would best serve the [n]eeds
    and [w]elfare of the [m]inor [c]hild, under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] section
    2511(b)[?]
    Father’s Brief, at 5.4
    We review Father’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review.
    The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
    requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
    credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
    by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    4   Father did not raise the question of the trial court’s change of Child’s goal.
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    or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
    of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration     of     manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
    court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
    the record would support a different result. We have previously
    emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
    observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
    Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
    Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
    termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
    determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
    or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
    the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
    of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
    concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
    parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
    of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
    The court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). We need only agree with the court as to any one
    subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b), to affirm. See In re B.L.W.,
    
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We analyze the court’s
    decision to terminate under subsection (a)(1) which provides:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
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    be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
    six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
    either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
    parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
    parental duties.
    And subsection (b) provides:
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    We begin our analysis with subsection (a)(1). To terminate parental
    rights pursuant to that subsection, the agency seeking termination must
    demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that, for a period of at
    least six months prior to the filing of the petition, the parent’s conduct
    demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental rights or that the parent
    has refused or failed to perform parental duties. See In re Adoption of
    M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d 1266
    , 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties
    or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court
    must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation
    for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
    parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination
    of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
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    In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 
    708 A.2d 88
    , 92 (Pa. 1998) (citation
    omitted). Further,
    the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and
    not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The
    court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and
    consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination
    of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light
    of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the
    involuntary termination.
    In re B., N.M., 
    856 A.2d 847
    , 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
    Father claims that DHS presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate
    that he refused or failed to perform parental duties or caused Child to be
    without essential parental care. We disagree.
    Father only saw Child once after his release from prison on December
    19, 2016—that visit occurred in May 2017. See N.T., Termination Hearing,
    6/13/17, at 33. The only effort he made to find Child from December 19 until
    the May 2017 visit was to look for Child at Mother’s last known address “like
    maybe a month after I was released.” Id., at 32. His sole effort to maintain
    contact with Child while he was in in prison was the sending of monthly letters
    to Mother that Mother never answered. See id., at 31.
    By his actions and failures to act, Father has evidenced a settled purpose
    of relinquishing his parental claim to Child or has refused or failed to perform
    his parental duties. As the court found: The court did not abuse its discretion
    when it terminated his parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).
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    We next consider whether the court abused its discretion by
    involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to subsection (b).
    Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
    would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
    needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained,
    Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and
    the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
    however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
    between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
    our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
    is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
    it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
    court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
    [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
    equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
    should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
    comfort, security, and stability the child might have
    with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
    that the trial court should consider the importance of
    continuity of relationships and whether any existing
    parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
    effects on the child.
    In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    , 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation
    marks and citations omitted; brackets in original).
    Child is doing well in a pre-adoptive home where he has formed a bond
    with his foster mother. As mentioned, Father has seen Child for one visit—just
    one visit in the history of this case. Not surprisingly, we find no evidence in
    the record before us of a bond between Father and Child. “In cases where
    there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable
    to infer that no bond exists.” In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 762-763 (Pa. Super.
    2008) (citation omitted).
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    The court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the termination
    of Father’s parental rights would be in Child’s best interests. Accordingly, we
    affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that
    terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and
    (b) and changed Child’s goal to adoption.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/25/18
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2182 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 1/25/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024