In the Interest of: S.R.T., a Minor ( 2015 )


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  • J-S37031-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: S.R.T., A MINOR                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: W.Y.O., MOTHER
    No. 3311 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order October 21, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0025185-2008,
    DP-51-AP-0000439-2013
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and LAZARUS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                               FILED JULY 06, 2015
    W.Y.O. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order that granted a
    goal change to adoption and involuntarily terminated her parental rights to
    her child, S.R.T. (born September 2006).1 Due to Mother’s failure to comply
    with treatment plans and her inability to provide a safe and adequate
    environment to fulfill S.R.T.’s needs, we affirm.
    S.R.T. lived with Mother, her natural father, C.T. (Father), and half-
    sibling, D.D., until she was removed from the home in September 2008.
    Prior to S.R.T. being removed from the home, the family was receiving
    Services to Children in Their Own Home (SCOH) based upon a substantiated
    General Protective Services (GPS) report indicating inadequate supervision
    ____________________________________________
    1
    S.R.T.’s father’s parental rights were also terminated during the same
    proceeding; he did not file an appeal.
    J-S37031-15
    and medical neglect in the home; S.R.T. was diagnosed with failure to
    thrive.
    On September 24, 2008, the Department of Human Services (DHS)
    received a Child Protective Services (CPS) report alleging that Father was
    sexually molesting D.D.     According to D.D., Father also allegedly sexually
    abused S.R.T.    The person making the CPS report alleged that Mother’s
    response to this allegation was that Father “was just fondling the child and
    didn’t penetrate.” DHS Exhibit 4. Mother also struggled with drug addiction
    and depression. S.R.T. was placed in foster care based upon Mother’s lack
    of capacity to provide S.R.T. with adequate care and supervision.      S.R.T.
    was taken into DHS custody on September 26, 2008, and she has remained
    in the same pre-adoptive foster home since placement.
    DHS created a service plan for Mother with a permanency goal of
    reunification with S.R.T.   The service plan objectives included that Mother
    maintain her sobriety; participate in mental health treatment regularly;
    complete all treatment recommendations and provide documentation of her
    progress; learn to use age-appropriate behavior; learn to understand sexual
    victimization; obtain and maintain adequate housing; obtain and maintain
    job training or employment; and maintain regular visitation and contact with
    S.R.T.    DHS referred Mother to the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC)
    program for services, referred her to Shelter Care Plus for housing needs,
    and provided tokens for transportation to attend visits with S.R.T.
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    Due to Mother’s failure to comply with the majority of the services
    required to meet the objectives set forth in the service plan, DHS filed a
    petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s rights on August 2, 2013,
    pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8)2 and (b) of the Adoption
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act provides, in relevant part:
    (a) General rule. – The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be
    terminated after a petition is filed on any of the following grounds:
    (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
    months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has
    evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child
    or has refused or failed to perform parental duties;
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of
    the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care,
    control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being
    and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
    refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent;
    ...
    (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
    court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at
    least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
    of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy
    those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or
    assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
    the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
    within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
    rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
    ...
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
    court or under voluntary agreement with an agency, twelve months or
    more have elapsed from the date of the removal or placement, the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Act.3    At this point, S.R.T. had been in foster care for nearly five years.
    After a hearing on October 21, 2014, the trial court entered a final decree
    terminating Mother’s parental rights to S.R.T. Mother subsequently filed this
    timely appeal.4
    Mother presents the following issues for our review:
    1.    Did DHS make reasonable efforts to assist [M]other in
    being reunited with [S.R.T.]?
    2.    Did the department sustain [its] burden that [M]other’s
    rights should be terminated?
    Brief for Appellant, at 5.
    It is well established that:
    In a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the
    burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish
    by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for
    doing so. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is
    defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
    convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
    conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
    issue.” It is well established that a court must examine the
    individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all
    explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    to exist and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
    needs and welfare of the child.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a).
    3
    23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.
    4
    It is noted that though a timely notice of appeal was filed, the trial court
    provided the certified record well beyond its due date and Mother filed two
    applications for extension of time to file briefs, resulting in this case’s panel
    listing being delayed for multiple months.
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    in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants
    termination.
    In re Adoption of S.M., 
    816 A.2d 1117
    , 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
    omitted). See also In re C.P., 
    901 A.2d 516
    , 520 (Pa. Super. 2006) (party
    seeking termination of parental rights bears burden of proving by clear and
    convincing evidence that at least one of eight grounds for termination under
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) exists and that termination promotes emotional needs
    and welfare of child as set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)).
    We review a trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate parental
    rights for an abuse of discretion or error of law. In re A.R., 
    837 A.2d 560
    ,
    563 (Pa. Super. 2003).           Our scope of review is limited to determining
    whether the trial court’s order or decree is supported by competent
    evidence. 
    Id. Mother asserts
    that reasonable efforts were not made to assist her in
    reunification with S.R.T. Specifically, Mother claims that reasonable efforts
    were not made during the period between March 27, 2013, when a Family
    Service Plan (FSP) meeting was held in which DHS changed S.R.T.’s
    permanency goal to adoption,5 and October 21, 2014, the date Mother’s
    ____________________________________________
    5
    After the FSP meeting in which DHS changed S.R.T.’s goal to adoption, a
    hearing was held in which the trial court acknowledged the appropriateness
    of the goal change due to Mother’s lack of compliance and scheduled a goal
    change and termination of parental rights hearing for August 19, 2013. The
    August 19, 2013 hearing was continued several times, due to court functions
    and a request made by Father’s counsel, before it was finally held on
    October 21, 2014.
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    rights were terminated.    Mother bases this argument upon social worker
    Bessie Lee indicating at the termination hearing that after the permanency
    goal was changed to adoption, extra efforts were not made to assist Mother
    in meeting her service plan objectives.
    However, our Supreme Court has held that an agency making
    “reasonable efforts” is not a requirement for termination under 23 Pa.C.S. §
    2511(a)(2). In re D.C.D., 
    105 A.3d 662
    , 673 (Pa. 2014). Additionally, this
    argument fails to take into account that for four and one-half years prior to
    the goal change, DHS made significant efforts to assist Mother in achieving
    reunification.   Those efforts were apparent by the fact that for a period of
    time in 2011 and 2012, Mother regularly attended mental health treatment
    and was permitted to have unsupervised visits with S.R.T.        Because of
    compliance in these areas, reunification remained the goal for several years
    despite Mother consistently failing to engage in programs to assist her in
    obtaining housing and employment.
    The goal was ultimately changed to adoption rather than reunification
    because Mother became completely non-compliant with the reunification
    plan in late 2012 and 2013.     Mother stopped pursuing a relationship with
    S.R.T.; visits were inconsistent and Mother refused to participate in family
    therapy with S.R.T. Mother was discharged from ARC for non-compliance,
    refused a second chance at the program when it was offered to her, and
    failed to participate in the Shelter Care Plus program. Mother cannot blame
    DHS for her failure to avail herself of the programs and services offered to
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    her.   See In re R.T., 
    778 A.2d 670
    (Pa. Super. 2001) (indicating that
    agencies are not required to provide services indefinitely where parent is
    unwilling or unable to apply instructions received). Moreover, the trial court
    made findings at several proceedings for Mother and S.R.T., including the
    termination hearing, that DHS made reasonable reunification efforts.          We
    discern no reason to disturb these findings.
    Mother also claims that DHS did not sustain its burden of presenting
    clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination. In support of this
    argument, Mother asserts that she had appropriate visits with S.R.T.,
    participated in mental health services, completed a parenting class, and
    looked for jobs. Mother argues that she “made positive changes in her life
    and was near completion of her goals. Therefore, [DHS] failed to prove 23
    Pa.C.S.A. §[§] 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), and (8).” Brief for Appellant, at 17.
    Mother’s claim that she was “near completion of her goals” at the time
    DHS filed the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights is completely
    unfounded. While Mother allegedly attended mental health treatment, she
    provided no documentation of this treatment to the court and failed to
    obtain a court-ordered bonding evaluation.        Likewise, no evidence was
    presented to demonstrate that Mother’s mental health had been stabilized.
    Mother’s visits with S.R.T. may have been appropriate, but they were not
    consistent; she missed approximately two-thirds of her scheduled visits in
    2013. Mother indicated the lack of consistency occurred in part because she
    was babysitting another child.    Moreover, Mother had been permitted to
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    have unsupervised visits previously, but regressed to supervised visits prior
    to the filing of the termination petition.
    Mother repeatedly refused to utilize services to obtain housing,
    employment,     and    financial   stability   to   provide   for    an      appropriate
    environment for S.R.T.      At the termination hearing, Mother indicated she
    was sleeping on the floor at her sister’s house. She also stated that she was
    in the process of reapplying for Social Security Income (SSI) since she was
    previously denied coverage, and her welfare benefits would cease if she did
    not apply for SSI.       Despite applying for SSI benefits, Mother readily
    admitted her ability to work. However, Mother has not worked since 2001.
    While Mother completed parenting classes prior to January 2010, DHS
    presented evidence that Mother continued to lack appropriate parenting
    practices. Despite suggestions to bring nutritious food to S.R.T. at visits as
    a response to S.R.T.’s failure to thrive issues, Mother failed to do so. Mother
    was made aware of S.R.T.’s medical appointments but did not attend them.
    Mother   was   unaware     of   the   name     of   the   school    S.R.T.    attended.
    Additionally, Mother remained in communication with Father, creating the
    possibility that S.R.T. could have further unsupervised exposure to Father at
    some point.
    Overall, Mother’s inability to recognize Father’s sexually abusive
    behavior, difficulty following through with parenting recommendations,
    failure to obtain a bonding evaluation and provide proof of mental health
    treatment, dismissal from ARC, refusal to participate in Shelter Care Plus,
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    and failure to maintain consistent contact with S.R.T. demonstrate her lack
    of compliance with her service plan. Significantly, Mother’s failure to comply
    and to remedy her ability to perform parental duties was not for lack of time,
    since at the termination hearing S.R.T. had been in DHS custody for more
    than six of the eight years of her life.
    Ultimately, Mother’s lack of compliance is indicative of both a failure to
    perform her parental duties and an inability to remedy the situation to
    provide for S.R.T.’s essential needs. As the trial court noted, “Mother still
    need[ed] to acquire sufficient parental skills, [obtain] appropriate housing
    [and] a job, complete a drug and alcohol program, and overcome her major
    depression disorder to put herself in a position to care for the Child.” Trial
    Court Opinion, 2/9/2015, at 9.                 Accordingly, the trial court properly
    terminated Mother’s parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1) and (a)(2).6
    See    Commonwealth v. Arnold, 
    665 A.2d 836
    , 840 (Pa. Super. 1995)
    (finding termination of parental rights appropriate where mother was
    continually unable to improve financial and residential condition, was
    uncooperative with DHS attempts to assist her, and failed to visit child
    consistently.)
    ____________________________________________
    6
    We need only agree with trial court’s decision as to any one subsection
    under section 2511(a) in order to affirm termination of parental rights. In
    the Interest of B.C., 
    36 A.3d 601
    , 606 (Pa. Super. 2012)
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    Section   2511(b)     requires    a   determination   regarding   whether
    termination best serves the developmental, physical, and emotional needs
    and welfare of the child.
    Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
    involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of a child. . . .
    [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
    emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also
    consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and
    stability the child might have with the foster parent.
    Additionally, . . . the trial court should consider the importance
    of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-
    child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the
    child.
    In re K.M., 
    53 A.3d 781
    , 791 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
    Here, the trial court specifically found a lack of a bond between Mother
    and S.R.T. and that S.R.T would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s
    rights were terminated.      See Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/15, at 10.         In
    particular, S.R.T. desired to return to her foster parent at the conclusion of
    visits with Mother, knew that she would be safe with her foster parent, and
    expressed a desire not to visit with Mother.
    Moreover, the record shows that S.R.T.’s bond with her foster parent is
    strong, and S.R.T. has resided with the same individual since placement.
    S.R.T. refers to her foster parent as “Mommy” and would prefer to live with
    her rather than Mother. We agree with the trial court that “[i]t is in the best
    interest of the Child to be adopted” and that “Child has been in foster care
    for too long and needs permanency.”         Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/15, at 10;
    see In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 764 (Pa. Super. 2008) (no parent-child
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    bond worth preserving where child has been in foster care most of child’s life
    and result is attenuated bond with parent).
    Accordingly, termination of Mother’s parental rights promotes S.R.T.’s
    needs and welfare under section 2511(b), and S.R.T. would suffer no
    detriment from permanently severing her connection with Mother.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/6/2015
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