In the Interest of: N.I.D., a Minor ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.I.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.C., MOTHER : No. 2735 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree August 9, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0001127-2016,
CP-51-DP-0001433-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and RANSOM*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2018
A.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the August 9, 2017 decree that
involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, N.I.D.,
born in May 2013.1 We affirm.
The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) first became
involved with N.I.D. in April 2015, based on concerns that Mother was
engaging in drug use and neglecting N.I.D.’s medical needs. Mother suffered
from mental health issues, and she had a history of engaging in domestic
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The trial court continued the involuntarily termination proceedings as to
N.I.D.’s father, J.D. (“Father”). Although the certified record does not reveal
whether the court ultimately terminated Father’s parental rights, the result of
those proceedings is irrelevant to our review herein. See In re Burns, 379
A.2d 535, 541 (Pa.1977) (“When an agency having custody of a child petitions
for termination of parental rights, the rights of the respective natural parents
must be determined independently.”).
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violence with Father, who was a convicted child sex offender. DHS obtained
protective custody of N.I.D. on May 29, 2015, after Mother’s homeless shelter
evicted her for threatening a staff member. The trial court entered a shelter
care order on June 1, 2015, and it adjudicated N.I.D. dependent on June 16,
2015. The court placed N.I.D. in kinship care with the maternal grandmother,
whom N.I.D. refers to as “mommy.” While the initial permanency goal was
reunification, she remains in her grandmother’s and grandfather’s care.
Following N.I.D.’s adjudication of dependency, APM,2 the Community
Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) that administered the family services for DHS,
prepared a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) for Mother. Mother’s SCP objectives were
to: (1) sign releases of information for service providers; (2) provide CUA with
updated contact information; (3) attend a Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”)
referral for a dual diagnosis assessment and drug screens; (4) comply with
CEU recommendations; (5) follow medication management
recommendations; (6) continue weekly therapy; (7) attend weekly sessions
of supervised visitation with N.I.D.; (8) complete parenting classes; and (9)
locate appropriate housing.
For the ensuing eighteen months, Mother made minimal progress
toward her SCP objectives. She participated in a dual diagnosis assessment
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2 APM (Asociación Puertorriqueños en Marcha) “is a community-based agency
that is responsible to improve the safety, stability, and well-being of the
children and families in the 24th and 26th police districts through
Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services (DHS).” See
https://apmphila.org/services/family-services/community-umbrella-agency-
apm-cua/
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and compiled with CEU’s recommendation to attend intensive outpatient
treatment, but she exhibited little motivation to overcome her substance
abuse issues. In fact, during 2016, Mother submitted positive drug screens
for marijuana and oxycodone. In regard to her mental health, Mother
attended only two of seventeen mental health treatment sessions. Likewise,
she failed to complete a parenting program, remained without stable housing,
and inconsistently attended the weekly one-hour visitations with N.I.D.
On November 21, 2016, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights to N.I.D. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b). The trial court conducted a termination hearing on August
9, 2017, during which it heard the testimony of the CUA case manager
assigned to the family, Crystal Robinson, and Mother.3 Following the hearing,
the court entered a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother
timely filed a notice of appeal on August 24, 2017, along with a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Mother raises the following issues for our review.
1. Did the Trial Court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights
under 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)[?]
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3 The trial court appointed Joshua Weil, Esquire, to represent N.I.D.’s legal
interests. Her best interest was represented by the guardian ad litem, Ruth
Brice, Esquire. Neither attorney filed a brief in this appeal.
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2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that termination of parental
rights best served the child’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs under Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b)?
3. Did the Trial Court err in changing the child’s goal to adoption?
Mother’s brief at vi.4
We consider Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
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4 In her notice of appeal, concise statement, and brief, Mother indicates that
she is appealing both the termination of her parental rights and the trial court’s
decision to change N.I.D.’s permanent placement goal to adoption. In its
opinion, the trial court requests that we affirm its August 9, 2017 goal change
order. However, our review of the certified record confirms that no goal
change took place. The court did not indicate at the conclusion of the
termination hearing that it would be changing N.I.D.’s goal, and the court’s
August 9, 2017 permanency review order maintained N.I.D.’s goal as return
to parent or guardian. As the goal change is not a prerequisite to the
termination of parental rights, we address only the termination of Mother’s
parental rights. See In Re: Adoption of S.E.G., 901 A.2d 1017 (Pa. 2006)
(goal change is not condition precedent to termination of parental rights).
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Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with
the court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b), in order
to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc),
appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the court’s
decision to terminate under § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
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abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted).
It is a well-ensconced principle that “[t]he grounds for termination due
to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative
misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as
well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326,
337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted).
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Presently, the trial court concluded that Mother was incapable of
parenting N.I.D., and that she cannot, or will not, remedy her parental
incapacity, and that her “eleventh-hour attempt to . . . make it appear as if
she’s remedying some of the issues” was unconvincing. Trial Court Opinion,
10/26/17, at 14-15; N.T., 8/9/17, at 45. Specifically, the court determined
that the CUA case manager, Crystal Robinson, credibly testified that Mother
failed to comply with her SCP objectives. Id. at 15.
Mother counters that she demonstrated moderate compliance. She
contends that she was attending mental health and substance abuse
treatment, and making progress in both areas when DHS filed its petition to
terminate her parental rights. Mother’s brief at 3. Mother also contends that
she was searching for housing and attending visitation with N.I.D. Id.
The certified record supports the trial court’s findings. During the
termination hearing, Ms. Robinson testified that Mother’s substance abuse
issues remained unresolved. Ms. Robinson recalled that she spoke to Mother
in June 2017, and that Mother admitted that she was no longer attending a
substance abuse treatment program. N.T., 8/9/17, at 22. In addition, Mother
admitted that she was using Percocet to self-medicate her depression. Id. at
21-22. While Mother eventually re-enrolled in substance abuse treatment,
she did not do so until July 26, 2017. Id. at 31-32.
Mother’s mental health issues also continued to be a concern. Ms.
Robinson testified that, on the day of the termination hearing, Mother provided
her with a document indicating that she began attending mental health
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treatment at Best Behavioral Health during January 2017. Id. at 31.
However, Ms. Robinson stressed that she had not yet had time to contact the
facility and verify the consistency of Mother’s attendance. Id.
In addition, Ms. Robinson testified that Mother had not completed a
parenting program. Id. at 32. In fact, the record is replete with examples of
Mother’s parenting deficiencies. For instance, Ms. Robinson described a
particularly troubling event that occurred at supervised visitation when Mother
claims that she was progressing toward her goals. Id. at 23. Ms. Robinson
recalled that Mother “came [to] the visit dressed [in]appropriately . . . [a]nd
when staff asked her to leave, to cancel her visit, she became irate. [She
s]tarted yelling and cursing and threatening staff in the presence of her child.”
Id. at 23-24. N.I.D. began to cry and staff had to escort her away. Id. at
24. This conduct belies the image of the caring parent that Mother attempts
to project.
Mother also remained without appropriate housing. Id. at 25. Indeed,
Mother reported to CUA that she “lives in a room,” but she neglected to
provide the street address. Id. at 23. Finally, Mother’s attendance at
visitations with N.I.D. continued to be inconsistent. Id. Mother attended
visitation sporadically during May and June 2017, and in the month preceding
the August 2017 termination hearing, Mother participated in only one
supervised visitation with her daughter. Id. at 24.
Thus, the record confirms that Mother is incapable of parenting N.I.D.,
and that she cannot, or will not, remedy her parental incapacity. By the date
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of the termination hearing, N.I.D. had been in foster care for over two years.
During that time, Mother did little to comply with her SCP objectives and work
toward reunification. While Mother re-enrolled in substance abuse and mental
health treatment in 2017, those efforts were insufficient. It is well-settled
that “a parent's vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness
regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as
untimely or disingenuous.” A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (citing In re J.W., 578
A.2d 952, 959 (Pa.Super. 2002)). As this Court has stated, “a child’s life
cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of
R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). We find no basis to disturb the
trial court’s conclusion that DHS established the statutory grounds to
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2).
We next consider whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion
by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b).
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained,
Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and
the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
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it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
that the trial court should consider the importance of
continuity of relationships and whether any existing
parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The trial court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights would
best serve N.I.D.’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.
Again, the court found Ms. Robinson’s testimony credible. Specifically, in
relation to the lack of a meaningful parent-child bond, the court highlighted
Ms. Robinson’s testimony that N.I.D. established a primary bond with her
maternal grandparents, whom she calls “mommy” and “tata.” N.T., 8/9/17,
26. The court determined that N.I.D. does not have a meaningful bond with
Mother, and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would not cause
N.I.D. to suffer irreparable harm.
Mother argues that her visits with N.I.D. went well, and she challenges
the trial court’s finding that the bond she shares with N.I.D. was
inconsequential. In support of her position, Mother invokes the aspects of Ms.
Robinson’s testimony that indicated that the visitations usually went “pretty
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well,” and that Mother and daughter shared some type of a bond. N.T.,
8/9/17, at 32. Ms. Robinson recalled that there were “maybe one or two
occasions where [N.I.D.] would cry because she didn’t want the visit to be
over.” Id. at 33.
Our review of the certified record supports the trial court’s findings.
Consistent with the court’s conclusions, the record demonstrates that, while
the visitations that mother attended were uneventful, they did not illustrate a
meaningful mother-daughter relationship. The most compelling expression of
this reality is that, if N.I.D. acknowledged Mother at all during the visitations,
the four year old referred to Mother by her first name. Id. at 32. Thus, rather
than evince any of the hallmarks of a meaningful parent-child bond, N.I.D.’s
behavior indicated that she viewed Mother as a playmate.
In contrast to the tenuous connection that Ms. Robinson observed
between N.I.D. and Mother, she testified that N.I.D. has “a very healthy bond
and attachment” with her maternal grandparents, with whom she has resided
since June 2015, when she was two years old. Id. at 26. She characterized
the home as loving, nurturing, and safe. Id. Significantly, Ms. Robinson
opined that N.I.D. views her grandparents “in a parental role,” and as we
previously noted, the four-year-old child refers to them as “mommy,” and
“tata.” Id. Thus, it is evident that N.I.D.’s primary parental bond is with her
maternal grandparents.
Mindful that a trial court can “consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent”
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and “the importance of continuity of [those] relationships[,]” we find sufficient
evidence in the certified record to sustain the trial court's determination. See
In re Adoption of C.D.R., supra at 1219. Stated plainly, it was within the
trial court’s discretion to conclude that terminating Mother’s parental rights in
order for N.I.D. to attain permanency with maternal grandparents satisfied
the child’s developmental, emotional, and physical needs and welfare.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decree
involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to N.I.D. pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/16/18
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