Blough, J. v. Matkoskey, D. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JEANNIE L. BLOUGH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DARIN L. MATKOSKEY, : No. 1030 WDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered June 20, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
Domestic Relations Division at No. DRS 0008415/PACSES
No. 495115247
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., AND SOLANO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 30, 2017
Darin L. Matkoskey, pro se, appeals the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Somerset County that ordered him to pay a child support obligation
of $700 per month consisting of $630 per month for current support and $70
for arrearages with the arrearages totaling $2,855.69.
The facts and procedural history as recounted by the trial court are as
follows:
Jeannie L. Blough [“appellee”], and [appellant] are
the parents of IAB (D.O.B. Mar. 2, 2015). On
April 16, 2015, [appellee] filed a Complaint for
Support against [appellant]. The parties consented
on May 7, 2015 to a paternity test. The parties
agreed that “if the test results indicate a probability
of paternity 99% or higher, [appellant] shall be
stipulated to be the biological father of the minor
child. . . .” Stipulation, May 7, 2015. According to
the paternity test dated June 23, 2015, the
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probability that Defendant is IAB’s father is
99.9999999996%.
On July 22, 2015, child support was fixed at
$983.00 per month. [Appellant] filed a petition
seeking termination of his support obligation on
August 5, 2015 wherein he complained almost
exclusively of custody matters. [Appellant] also filed
a pro se “Petition to Strike Judgment” on
September 4, 2015 alleging, essentially, that the
parties had placed no facts on the record, and that
he had already “establish[ed] that material facts to
which there is substantial controversy are at issue in
this case.” [Appellee] filed a response wherein she
indicated that [appellant] had failed to aver a change
in circumstances, and, therefore, his petition should
be denied. [Appellant] then filed an “Objection to
Response to Petition to Strike Judgment Under
Rule 2967,” in which he, inter alia, accused
Domestic Relations, [appellee], and [appellee’s]
counsel, of “fraud and extortion.” He claimed that
the only way he could be liable for his child was by
contract; he challenged subject matter jurisdiction,
etc. On October 5, 2015, [appellant] filed a “Notice
to Court,” in which he stated, “I am an idiot in the
language of the legal society, I do not understand
the customs of the legal society, nor do I believe any
law exists which requires man to know or understand
these things.” He then posed several questions such
as whether he was required to know the law or hire
an attorney; whether there was a “charging
instrument or . . . contract that makes I [sic] a man
liable for this debt”; and “Who wrote this code [i.e.,
the Support Law?] and is here today to testify to the
intent?”
We held a hearing on [appellant’s] petition(s)
on October 6, 2015, and we denied them for the
reasons contained in our findings, which we read into
the record. On October 9, 2015, the Director of
Domestic Relations sent a letter to the Court
indicating that [appellant’s] earnings had been
mistakenly calculated in the original support order,
insofar as Domestic Relations used twenty-five (25)
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pay periods instead of twenty-nine (29); a modified
order was provided for Court approval and it was in
fact approved.
On October 19, 2015, [appellant] filed a
document titled “Appeal.” Upon review of this
document, we concluded [appellant] had failed to
state any sort of actionable claim, and we therefore
dismissed [appellant’s] so-called appeal.
[Appellant] filed with Domestic Relations a
Petition for Modification on October 23, 2015,
seeking termination of his support obligation, and
striking out “Defendant” and “petitioner” and
hand-writing “Man” in their stead. The basis of his
petition was, “Not able to pay, not member of legal
society. Causing me harm. Require return of
property. Wish to return to status of man prior to
contact with your agency. No government
assistance is needed. Wish for court of record and
jury.” It appears that this was submitted to the
Court on April 21, 2016. A scheduling praecipe was
filed by Domestic Relations on May 10, 2016.
Having heard argument from the parties on June 9,
2016 as to [appellant’s] petition, we directed
Domestic Relations to modify the support order if
warranted by the change of custody we had ordered
in a nonjury custody trial that had immediately
preceded this support hearing. We rejected the rest
of [appellant’s] arguments for modification/
termination of support.
A new support order was entered on June 20,
2016 obligating [appellant] to pay $630 per month in
support and $70 per month in arrears, with arrears
totaling $2,855.69. [Appellant] filed his Notice of
Appeal on July 12, 2016, and on that same date he
also filed a Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
We granted [appellant’s] IFP petition and ordered
him to file a concise statement of matters
complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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Trial court opinion, 8/24/16 at 1-3 (emphasis in original; citations to record
omitted).
Appellant raises the following issues for this court’s review:
1. Did the lower courts [sic] make an error of
discretion by failing to follow any portion of
Rule 1910 et al[.]?
2. Did [appellant] receive any disbursement of
Title IV-A funds which would allow recovery by
Domestic Relations Section, a Title IV-D
agency?
3. Was “Color of Law” applied in this case by
either Domestic Relations Section or the Lower
courts [sic]?
4. Did the lower courts [sic] make a decision
based on the beliefs of the courts [sic] creating
an appearance of forced religion?
5. Where [sic] any orders placed by the lower
courts [sic] that would give the appearance of
a conflict of interest?
6. Does the taking of mans [sic] property without
his consent by way of threats amount to
extortion as defined by Blacks Law 4th edition?
7. Have any elements of Involuntary Servitude as
defined by 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3012 et al[.], and
restricted by both the U.S. Constitution and
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania been used in this case?
8. Is the creation of a commercial debt obligation
without consent, equal exchange of value and
consideration, and created under threat and
duress, considered a forced contract even after
[a]ppellant expressly notified Domestic
Relations Section in writing that All Rights were
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reserved, and no waiver was given pursuant to
UCC 1-308?
9. Does the taking of property without trial and
opportunity to defend constitute a due process
violation, in accordance with The U.S.
Constitution and Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?
10. Does Domestic Relations Sections’ failure to
transfer all relevant evidence presented prior
to hearing in an effort to gain financially rise to
a level of Fraud?
11. Does [appellee’s] failure to disclose all income,
as defined in Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2, rise to a
level of fraud, when done in open court?
12. Did the courts [sic] fail to recognize the rights
of the [a]ppellant and trespass against his
constitutionally protected rights?
Appellant’s brief at 1-2.
When evaluating a support order, this Court may
only reverse the trial court’s determination where the
order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We
will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded
the trial court absent an abuse of discretion or
insufficient evidence to sustain the support order.
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court
overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment
exercised is shown by the record to be either
manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.
In addition, we note that the duty to support one’s
child is absolute, and the purpose of child support is
to promote the child’s best interests.
Rich v. Rich, 967 A.2d 400, 405 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citations omitted).
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Initially, appellant contends that his duty to provide support for his
child depends on the custody situation and that because appellee at one
point apparently declined to allow appellant to have contact with the child,
appellant did not have a duty to support the child. Appellant fails to cite any
pertinent authority for his position. Appellant waives this issue for lack of
development in the argument section of his brief. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (an
appellate brief must contain “discussion and citation of authorities” to each
issue raised); see also Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943, 944 (Pa.Super. 2000)
(“When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when briefs
are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, [this] court will
not consider the merits thereof.” (citations omitted)).
Appellant next contends that he did not receive any disbursement of
Title IV-A funds which would allow recovery by the Domestic Relations
Section of the trial court which he calls a Title IV-D agency. Title IV refers to
Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-687. Appellant argues
that because he, appellee, and their child are not receiving public assistance
under Title IV-A that the Domestic Relations Section has no compelling
interest in facilitating child support orders because no public funding has
been provided to any party involved.
However, regardless of whether a person is receiving public assistance
under the Social Security Act, Section 4321(2) of the Domestic Relations
Code, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(2), provides that “Parents are liable for the
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support of their children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or
younger.” Here, I.A.B. is younger than two years old, so appellant is
definitely liable for the child’s support.
Appellant next contends that “Color of Law” was not applied in this
case by either the Domestic Relations Section or the trial court. He argues
that it is unconstitutional for him to have to pay for the support of his child
through an agency, government, or private corporation. Once again, the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has established
that a parent has an obligation to support his or her child. Appellant’s
contention has no merit.
Appellant next contends that the trial court’s decision created an
appearance of “forced religion.” Appellant’s brief at 23-25. Appellant makes
this argument because he believes that the trial court’s decision reflected a
belief in a duty to obey the legislator which “would imply that the legislature
was somehow the creator of [appellant]. . . . [Appellant] is the creation of
God.” (Appellant’s brief at 23.) Appellant further argues that God is the
creator of man and man is the creator of government. He argues that he
must follow the teachings of the Holy Bible rather than legislative
enactments which interfere with those teachings. The trial court termed this
argument “frivolous.” This court agrees.
Appellant next contends that the trial court’s orders gave the
appearance of a conflict of interest because appellee was a long-time
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employee of the trial court. However, the trial court stated in its opinion
that the Somerset County Court Administrator requested that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania assign a judge from outside the county to preside over
this matter. Our supreme court did so. The trial court determined that
there was not even the appearance of impropriety. This court agrees.
Similarly, this court finds no merit in appellant’s claims that the Domestic
Relations Section has a financial interest in obtaining fees and that because
appellee’s attorney is also an assistant district attorney for Somerset County
there is a conflict.
Appellant next contends that the taking of his property through threats
amounts to extortion because he was:
threatened by communication both verbally and in
written form to supply information and property to
Domestic Relations Section. Domestic Relations
Section demanded the earnings of [appellant] and
took said earnings via an income withholding
attachment against [appellant’s] will under threat.
The specific threat was jail, fines or both as well as
charges of contempt which is considered a crime.
Appellant’s brief at 28. What appellant terms “extortion,” appears to be the
Domestic Relations Section doing its job to establish the extent of appellant’s
support obligation. Again, this contention has no merit.
Similarly, appellant’s contention that the Domestic Relations Section
used extortion tactics to create a condition of involuntary servitude has no
merit.
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Next, appellant contends that the trial court’s creation of a support
obligation without his consent and imposed under threat and duress
constituted a forced contract. Appellant attempts to argue that the
Domestic Relations Section was acting as a “private citizen” and not as the
government when it imposed the support obligation. Appellant’s brief at 31.
Appellant is incorrect. The Domestic Relations Section was not entering into
a private contract as the government would when it hired someone to paint
a government-owned bridge. Under Rule 1920.31 of the Somerset County
Rules of Civil Procedure, Som. R.C.P. 1920.31, all claims for child support
are processed through the Domestic Relations Section. The Domestic
Relations Section was acting to make appellant comply with the law to
provide support for one’s children.
Appellant next contends that because employees of the Domestic
Relations Section are not required to swear to an oath of office as judges
are, any order such an employee recommends would be equivalent to a
private citizen creating an order. Appellant asserts that if the trier-of-fact
does not properly present or collect a complete representation of the
relevant facts, it is left to the injured party to find all of the issues and
present them for defense. Appellant terms this a complete breakdown of the
federal and Pennsylvania right to due process.
It is unclear exactly what appellant is arguing. The trial court did
enter the order which he appeals. Due process calls for such procedural
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safeguards that are necessary depending on the circumstances of a
particular case. As this court stated in In re F.C., III, 966 A.2d 1131
(Pa.Super. 2009), “due process is a flexible concept incapable of exact
definition and is concerned with the procedural safeguards demanded by
each particular situation in light of the legitimate goals of the applicable
law.” Id. at 1138. Appellant presented his petition and had the opportunity
to present witnesses and argument. This court discerns no due process
violation.
Appellant next contends that the Domestic Relations Section’s failure
to transfer all relevant evidence presented prior to hearing in an effort to
gain financially constitutes fraud. Appellant bases his contention on his
belief that the Domestic Relations Section acted in order to enrich its own
coffers rather than to enforce the statutory obligation of a parent to support
his or her child. “The duty to support one’s child is absolute. . . .”
Saunders v. Saunders, 908 A.2d 356, 359 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Appellant next argues that appellee committed fraud when she failed
to disclose all of her income. Appellant argued at the hearing that appellee
failed to include a $6,000 payout that she received as a pension and AFLAC
insurance payments that she received as a result of maternity leave. (Notes
of testimony, 10/6/16 at 10.) Appellee’s attorney reported that the pension
payment was actually property appellee inherited and the AFLAC payments
were made some time ago. Appellee’s attorney stated that the income was
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correct. (Id. at 17.) Based on a review of the record, there was a
disagreement between the parties as to what constituted appellee’s income.
Appellant claims that appellee committed fraud, but this bald assertion is
unsupported by the record.
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court failed to recognize his
rights and trespassed against his constitutionally protected rights. He
basically asserts that the trial court, in ordering him to pay support for his
minor child, caused harm to him and that his family is private and not public
so that the government has no right to impose a support obligation. The
trial court termed this argument “frivolous.” This court agrees.
Appellant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its
discretion in issuing the support order.
Order affirmed.
Solano, J. joins this Memorandum.
Gantman, P.J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/30/2017
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