Com. v. Atcheson, M. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S11036-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    MATTHEW DUANE ATCHESON                     :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1198 WDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 7, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-16-CR-0000013-2019
    BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                               FILED: APRIL 30, 2021
    Appellant, Matthew Duane Atcheson, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence of 20 to 40 years’ confinement imposed following his conviction of
    attempted murder and related offenses. We affirm.
    On the evening of October 27, 2018, Appellant was involved in an
    incident where he was ejected from a bar in New Bethlehem, Pennsylvania for
    disruptive behavior. Appellant left the bar and a group of individuals, including
    Damen Dubrock, followed him outside where Appellant and Dubrock were
    involved in a physical altercation. Dubrock then went back inside the bar. A
    short time later, Appellant also reentered the bar, approached Dubrock, and
    slashed Dubrock’s neck with a knife.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S11036-21
    Appellant proceeded to a jury trial in December 2019. On December
    20, 2019, the jury convicted Appellant of attempted murder of the first degree,
    two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of simple assault, and recklessly
    endangering another person (“REAP”).1 On February 7, 2020, the trial court
    sentenced Appellant to a term of 20 to 40 years’ confinement on the
    attempted murder charge and concurrent terms of 33 to 66 months on one of
    the aggravated assault charges and 12 to 24 months on the REAP charge. The
    remaining convictions merged for purposes of sentencing.
    Appellant was granted leave to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro
    tunc and thereafter filed his motion on September 1, 2020. The trial court
    denied the post-sentence motion on October 8, 2020. Appellant thereafter
    filed a timely appeal.2        On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:
    “Whether the sentence of the Court for the Attempted Homicide charge for a
    period of not less than 240 months nor more than 480 months was manifestly
    unreasonable and excessive?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    The issue that Appellant raises on appeal is a challenge to the
    discretionary aspect of his sentence, which is not appealable as of right.
    ____________________________________________
    1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), (4), 2701(a)(1), (2), and 2705,
    respectively.
    2 Appellant filed his statement of errors complained of on appeal on November
    24, 2020. On December 10, 2020, the trial court entered an opinion pursuant
    to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, in which it indicated that it was relying on the reasons
    stated in its October 8, 2020 opinion filed in support of the order denying
    Appellant’s post-sentence motion.
    -2-
    J-S11036-21
    Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 
    216 A.3d 307
    , 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en
    banc).
    Rather, an appellant challenging the sentencing court’s discretion
    must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by (1) filing a timely notice of
    appeal; (2) properly preserving the issue at sentencing or in a
    motion to reconsider and modify the sentence; (3) complying with
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate section of the brief
    setting forth “a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
    allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a
    sentence[;]” and (4) presenting a substantial question that the
    sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
    Code[.]
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted). Only once the appellant has satisfied each of the four
    requirements to invoke our jurisdiction will we proceed to review the merits
    of the discretionary sentencing issue under an abuse of discretion standard.
    
    Id. at 328-29
    .
    In this case, Appellant preserved his sentencing issue in a post-sentence
    motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and he included a Rule 2119(f)
    statement in his brief. We therefore must examine the Rule 2119(f) statement
    to determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial question meriting our
    review. 
    Id. at 328
    ; see also Commonwealth v. Radecki, 
    180 A.3d 441
    ,
    468 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions
    presented and the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to determine whether
    a substantial question exists.”) (citation omitted). A substantial question is
    present where the appellant advances an argument that the sentence was
    inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to
    the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. Akhmedov, 216
    -3-
    J-S11036-21
    A.3d at 328. “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is
    sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary
    only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether a
    defendant has raised a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-
    case basis. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 
    244 A.3d 1261
    , 1278 (Pa. Super.
    2021).
    Appellant asserts in his Rule 2119(f) statement that his claim that the
    sentence was “manifestly excessive, inflicting too severe a punishment”
    presents a substantial question. Appellant’s Brief at 10. However, as this
    Court has repeatedly held, “a generic claim that a sentence is excessive does
    not raise a substantial question for our review.”       Commonwealth v.
    Andrews, 
    213 A.3d 1004
    , 1017 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted); see
    also Commonwealth v. Banks, 
    198 A.3d 391
    , 401 (Pa. Super. 2018);
    Commonwealth v. Fisher, 
    47 A.3d 155
    , 159 (Pa. Super. 2012). Appellant
    relies on our decision in Commonwealth v. Haynes, 
    125 A.3d 800
     (Pa.
    Super. 2015), to support his claim that he raised a substantial question.
    However, in Haynes we reiterated that a “bald claim of excessiveness does
    not present a substantial question,” and the issue deemed to be substantial
    was a claim the sentence was manifestly excessive because it exceeded the
    aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 807-08. Haynes is
    distinguishable from the present case as it is undisputed that Appellant’s
    sentence was within the standard guideline range, albeit at the maximum of
    the standard range. N.T., 2/7/20, at 21. Because Appellant’s “bald claim of
    -4-
    J-S11036-21
    excessiveness” in his Rule 2119(f) statement does not raise a substantial
    question, we do not reach the merits of his discretionary sentencing issue.
    Haynes, 125 A.3d at 807-08; see also Fisher, 
    47 A.3d at 159
    .3
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    3 In the argument section of his brief, Appellant asserts that the trial court
    failed to consider the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing hearing,
    including his lack of a violent history, the staleness of his criminal record, and
    Appellant’s statement at sentencing that he was “sorry for everything that
    happened.” Appellant’s Brief at 11-13 (citing N.T., 2/7/20, at 13-15). This
    Court has held that an excessive sentence claim “pair[ed] . . . with an
    assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating evidence” constitutes a
    substantial question. Wallace, 244 A.3d at 1278; see also Akhmedov, 216
    A.3d at 328; but see Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 
    227 A.3d 358
    , 375 (Pa.
    Super. 2020) (“[A]n allegation that a sentencing court failed to consider or did
    not adequately consider certain mitigating factors does not raise a substantial
    question that the sentence was inappropriate.”), appeal granted on other
    grounds, 
    237 A.3d 396
     (Pa. 2020). Even if we were to address this argument
    on the merits, however, we would not find that the trial court abused its
    discretion at sentencing. The record reflects that the trial court was aware of
    the facts of the case, was in possession of and had reviewed the pre-sentence
    investigative report (“PSI”), and considered the relevant factors set forth in
    Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). N.T., 2/7/20,
    at 21-22; see also Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/20, at unnumbered page 8.
    Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI, we presume that the
    court was aware of information related to the defendant’s character and
    properly weighed any mitigating factors. Commonwealth v. Knox, 
    165 A.3d 925
    , 930-31 (Pa. Super. 2017). Appellant makes no showing to rebut this
    presumption. Furthermore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial
    court’s determination that Appellant had not taken “full responsibility for the
    incident” in spite of his expression of contrition at the sentencing hearing, as
    the court’s determination was based on contrary statements by Appellant
    reported in the PSI. N.T., 2/7/20, at 13, 15, 20-22.
    -5-
    J-S11036-21
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/30/2021
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1198 WDA 2020

Filed Date: 4/30/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/30/2021