Com. v. Elia, J. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S41040-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    JAMES ANTHONY ELIA,
    Appellee                 No. 3403 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order October 8, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0009201-2010
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                         FILED MAY 18, 2016
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals the order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Montgomery County granting Appellee James Anthony
    Elia’s petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act1 and vacating his sentence
    based on the decisions in Alleyne v. U.S., 
    133 S.Ct. 2151
     (2013) and
    Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 
    106 A.3d 800
     (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
    granted, 
    121 A.3d 433
     (Pa. August 12, 2015). For the foregoing reasons,
    we are constrained to affirm.
    On February 14, 2011, Appellee was charged with several counts of
    Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse (IDSI) involving a child less than 16
    years of age, Statutory Sexual Assault, Aggravated Indecent Assault
    ____________________________________________
    1
    42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S41040-16
    involving a person less than 16 years of age, Corruption of Minors, Indecent
    Assault of a person less than 16 years of age, and Unlawful Contact or
    Communication with a Minor.2
    Initially, Appellee pled guilty to one count each of IDSI and Statutory
    Sexual Assault, but later was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellee
    waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial. On January
    19, 2012, the trial court convicted Appellee of one count each of IDSI
    involving a child less than 16 years of age, Statutory Sexual Assault,
    Aggravated Indecent Assault involving a person less than 16 years of age,
    Corruption of Minors, Indecent Assault of a person less than 16 years of age,
    and Unlawful Contact or Communication with a Minor.
    On May 19, 2012, the Commonwealth notified Appellee of its intention
    to seek the ten year mandatory minimum sentence for the IDSI count under
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1) (“Sentences for offenses against infant persons”).
    On April 25, 2012, Appellee was sentenced to ten to twenty years
    imprisonment.      Appellee filed a post-sentence motion, claiming inter alia,
    that his mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional. After the trial
    court denied his motion, Appellee filed a timely appeal. On December 24,
    2013, this Court affirmed Appellee’s judgment of sentence, and the Supreme
    Court denied Appellee’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal on July 1, 2014.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(7), 3122.1, 3125(a)(8), 6301(a)(1), 3126(a)(8),
    and 6318(a)(1), respectively.
    -2-
    J-S41040-16
    On August 15, 2014, Appellee filed a timely PCRA petition.            On
    September 15, 2015, Appellee amended his petition to include a challenge
    the legality of his sentence under the decision in Alleyne, in which the
    Supreme Court of the United States held that “facts that increase mandatory
    minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury” and must be found
    beyond a reasonable doubt.      Alleyne, 
    133 S.Ct. at 2163
    .       Following a
    hearing, the PCRA court granted Appellee’s petition based on the Alleyne
    claim and vacated his sentence. The Commonwealth filed this timely appeal
    and complied with the PCRA court’s direction to file a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    The Commonwealth argues that the PCRA court erred in finding that
    the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 9718 was
    unconstitutional. Section 9718 states in relevant part:
    § 9718. Sentences for offenses against infant persons
    (a) Mandatory sentence.—
    (1) A person convicted of the following offenses when the victim
    is less than 16 years of age shall be sentenced to a mandatory
    term of imprisonment as follows:
    ***
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual
    intercourse)--not less than ten years.
    ***
    (b) Eligibility for parole.--Parole shall not be granted until the
    minimum term of imprisonment has been served.
    (c) Proof at sentencing.--The provisions of this section shall
    not be an element of the crime, and notice of the provisions of
    this section to the defendant shall not be required prior to
    conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's
    intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after
    conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section
    -3-
    J-S41040-16
    shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider any
    evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Commonwealth
    and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary
    additional evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of
    the evidence, if this section is applicable.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.
    The Commonwealth contends that the application of the mandatory
    minimum sentence in Section 9718 does not offend Alleyne as the operative
    fact triggering the application of the mandatory minimum – that the victim
    was less than sixteen years old – was found by the trier of fact beyond a
    reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth notes that it was required to prove
    this fact as an element of the offense of IDSI under Section 3123(a)(7),
    which provides that a person commits a felony of the first degree when he
    “engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant … who is less than
    16 years of age and the person is four or more years older than the
    complainant.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7).
    However, the Commonwealth concedes that this case is controlled by
    this Court’s decision in Wolfe, in which a three-judge panel determined that
    the holding in Alleyne rendered Section 9718 void in its entirety, finding the
    statutory language permitting the facts triggering the mandatory minimum
    to be determined at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence was not
    severable from the remaining provisions. The panel in Wolfe relied on the
    en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Newman, 
    99 A.3d 86
     (Pa. Super.
    2014) (en banc) for the proposition that “mandatory minimum sentencing
    -4-
    J-S41040-16
    statutes in Pennsylvania of this format are void in their entirety.”      Wolfe,
    106 A.3d at 805-806.
    Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argues that Wolfe was wrongly
    decided and should be overruled.3              The Commonwealth distinguishes the
    statutes in this case and in Wolfe (Section 9718) from those applied in
    Alleyne and Newman, where the triggering facts for the mandatory
    minimum were not elements of the offenses in the Crimes Code, but were
    solely set forth in the sentencing statutes. The Commonwealth points out
    that our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in Wolfe and decided
    to review the case on an expedited schedule to consider “[w]hether the
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania's sua sponte determination that the ten year
    mandatory minimum sentence for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
    (Person less than 16 years) imposed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(a)(1)
    is facially unconstitutional is erroneous as a matter of law[.]” Wolfe, 
    121 A.3d at 434
    .
    Although the holding in Wolfe has been called into question by the
    Supreme Court’s decision to grant further review of that decision, Wolfe is
    binding precedent unless and until reversed by the Supreme Court.            See
    Commonwealth v. Beck, 
    78 A.3d 656
    , 659 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting that
    ____________________________________________
    3
    See also Wolfe, 106 A.3d at 807 (Bowes, J., concurring) (contending that
    this Court’s decision in Newman was erroneous as the burden of proof
    provision of § 9178 should be deemed severable from the remainder of the
    statute).
    -5-
    J-S41040-16
    one panel of the Superior Court is not empowered to overrule another panel
    of the Superior Court).   Accordingly, as the relevant facts and contested
    issue in this case are identical to those in Wolfe, we have no choice but to
    uphold the PCRA court’s decision to vacate Appellee’s sentence as
    unconstitutional.
    Order affirmed. Remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent
    with the PCRA court opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/18/2016
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3403 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 5/18/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024