Com. v. Beatty, D. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
DAVID C. BEATTY
Appellee No. 197 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered on January 14, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-04-0001646-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DONOHUE, J., and WECHT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals the January 14, 2015 order granting
David Beatty’s pre-trial petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
The trial court aptly summarized the tragic factual and procedural
history of this case as follows:
On July 4, 2014, a bedroom clothes dresser fell on [top of
Beatty’s] two children, Ryeley, age three, and Brooklyn, age
two, while they were in . . . their home in Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania and caused their death. On October 6, 2014,
[Beatty] was charged in a four count criminal information with
two counts of involuntary manslaughter, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a),
and two counts of endangering the welfare of children, 18
Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1). [Beatty’s] wife and the mother of the
deceased children, Jennifer Beatty, also resided in the home, but
was not present during the incident. She was charged with two
counts of endangering the welfare of children[.]
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 3/17/2015, at 1-2 (minor modifications for
clarity).
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On September 11, 2014, Beatty appeared for his preliminary hearing
before Magisterial District Judge Andrew M. Hladio. The trial court
summarized the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at that hearing
as follows:
On July 4, 2014, Detective [Steven Roberts, of the Aliquippa
Police Department] received a report of two unresponsive
children at [Beatty’s] residence. [When] he arrived at the
residence, one child was laying on the front porch and the other
child was laying on the front yard; both were being treated by
firemen, police officers, [and] paramedics. The children were
transported to the local Heritage Valley Hospital. Brooklyn was
pronounced dead at Heritage Valley Hospital. Ryeley was flown
to Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh, where she later died.
Shortly after his arrival at the residence, Detective Roberts
asked [Beatty] how the children were injured. [Beatty] told him
that he observed the children sitting on a dresser drawer and
then [he] went to the bathroom to prepare a bath for them.
While in the bathroom, he heard a crash, returned to the room
within seconds, and found the dresser on top of the children.
[Beatty] advised that he then moved the dresser, placed the
children on the bed, called 911, and began preforming
[Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (“CPR”)] until first responders
arrived.
After the children were transported from the scene, Detective
Roberts asked [Beatty] to once again describe how the children
were injured and to show him where this incident occurred inside
of his home. Once inside the home, Detective Roberts observed
“a high amount of clutter” and described the house as “very
filthy.” [Beatty] showed Detective Roberts the bedroom where
the children were injured and the bathroom where he was at the
time of the incident. [Beatty] also showed Detective Roberts the
dresser drawer, and demonstrated that it was pulled out
approximately three to four inches at the time he observed the
children sitting upon it.
Later that evening, Detective Roberts, along with Captain [Ryan
Pudik from the Aliquippa Police Department,] spoke with
[Beatty] at Children’s hospital. During this interview, [Beatty]
stated that he had been using the bathroom when he heard a
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“bang,” he then called out to the children and received no
response. [Beatty] estimated that he checked on the children
within one or two minutes of hearing the noise. Upon further
questioning, [Beatty] stated that, after hearing the “bang,” he
many have remained in the bathroom for up to five minutes
before he checked on the children. Due to the discrepancies in
[Beatty’s] recitation of the events, Detective Roberts asked
Detective [Timmie Patrick, a Beaver County Detective] to
interview [Beatty] further.
****
On July 4, 2014, Detective Patrick interviewed [Beatty] at
Children’s Hospital, at Detective Roberts’ request. [Beatty] told
Detective Patrick that he was in the bathroom for approximately
five minutes when he heard a “bang” from the children’s room,
and assumed they were jumping on the bed; he then responded
within 30 seconds to one minute and discovered the dresser on
[top of] the children. Upon further questioning, [Beatty] stated
that, after he heard the “bang,” he called out to Ryeley, did not
receive a response, and stayed in the bathroom for another ten
to twelve minutes before checking on the children.
Detective Patrick spoke with [Beatty] again on July 7, 2014.
Detective Patrick advised [Beatty] that there were
“discrepancies,” and [Beatty] then told him, “Yeah, I know.
There’s [] a lot more time that I was in the bathroom.” During
the interview, [Beatty] advised that after hearing the “bang,”
calling out to Ryeley, and receiving no response, he remained in
the bathroom for an additional 20 to 25 minutes. [Beatty]
explained to Detective Patrick that he remained in the bathroom
because he suffers from irritable bowel syndrome.
****
Dr. [Todd Luckasevic, an expert in forensic pathology,]
performed an autopsy on Brooklyn on July 5, 2014, and an
autopsy on Ryeley on July 6, 2014. Dr. Luckasevic found that
each child died as a result of asphyxiation due to compression of
the chest. Dr. Luckasevic also found that the “manner of death”
for each child was accidental; he went on to explain, “accidental
is [an] unforeseen outcome. You get in your car this afternoon
and you drive home, and you . . . get in an accident. That’s
unforeseen. That these children were playing during the day[,]
it was unforeseen that they would wind up dead that evening.”
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Dr. Luckasevic further testified as to the . . . children’s likelihood
of survival had they received care within certain periods of time:
 Had the children received care within thirty seconds of the
dresser falling on them, there was a good chance that they
would survive with a full recovery, though they may have
required assistance, such as an “external rub” or CPR.
 Had the children received care within ninety seconds after
the dresser fell on them, or later, there was no chance of
meaningful survival; the children could have been kept
alive indefinitely on life support, but at ninety seconds they
would have been clinically brain dead.
 Had the children received care within thirty to ninety
seconds, there is a “gray zone” in which they may or may
not have survived. Dr. Luckasevic explained that for
survival during this time period “[y]ou’re going to need to
know how to do CPR. You’re going to need to know basic
life support, and potentially it’s going need to be done by
either an emergency nurse or physician at this point . . . .”
Id. at 2-6 (minor modifications for clarity; citations to preliminary hearing
transcript omitted).
At the conclusion of his preliminary hearing, the Magisterial District
Judge held all of Beatty’s charges for trial. On November 12, 2014, Beatty
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, averring that the Commonwealth
failed to present a prima facie case as to the two counts of involuntary
manslaughter. On December 15, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on
Beatty’s petition. The Commonwealth submitted into evidence the
September 11, 2014 preliminary hearing transcript, the children’s autopsy
reports, and another report drafted by Dr. Luckasevic. On January 14,
2015, the trial court granted Beatty’s petition and dismissed both counts of
involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, the trial court held that the
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Commonwealth failed to establish the mens rea necessary to support either
involuntary manslaughter charge.
On January 30, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal. On
February 9, 2015, the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
The Commonwealth timely complied. On March 17, 2015, the trial court
filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
The Commonwealth presents one issue for our consideration:
“Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in granting the [habeas p]etition for the
charge of [i]nvoluntary [m]anslaughter.” Brief for Commonwealth at i.
Appellate review of an order granting habeas corpus relief is subject to
the following principles:
The decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus
will be reversed on appeal only for a manifest abuse of
discretion. It is settled that a petition for writ of habeas corpus
is the proper means for testing a pre-trial finding that the
Commonwealth has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case. Although a habeas corpus hearing is similar to a
preliminary hearing, in a habeas corpus proceeding the
Commonwealth has the opportunity to present additional
evidence to establish that the defendant has committed the
elements of the offense charged.
A prima facie case consists of evidence, read in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, that sufficiently establishes
both the commission of a crime and that the accused is probably
the perpetrator of that crime. The Commonwealth need not
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather,
the Commonwealth must show sufficient probable cause that the
defendant committed the offense, and the evidence should be
such that if presented at trial, and accepted as true, the judge
would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury.
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Commonwealth v. Keller, 823 A.2d 1004, 1010-11 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citations omitted). “In determining the presence or absence of a prima
facie case, inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record that
would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, but suspicion and
conjecture are not evidence and are unacceptable as such.”
Commonwealth v. Packard, 767 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(citation omitted).
The Crimes Code defines involuntary manslaughter as follows:
A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct
result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly
negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or
grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another
person.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a).
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct
and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor’s situation.
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3).
Although Section 2504 extends to conduct that is either reckless or
grossly negligent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has construed those
terms identically in this context. See Commonwealth v. Comer, 716 A.2d
593, 597 (Pa. 1998) (holding that the definition of “recklessly” set forth in
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Section 302 encompasses “gross negligence” in Section 2504). Therefore, in
order to overcome Beatty’s petition for habeas corpus, the Commonwealth
needed to offer evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case that Beatty
acted recklessly. The Commonwealth concedes that it failed to do so. See
Brief for Commonwealth at 5 (“The Commonwealth believes that Beatty did
not consciously act or in act [sic] to create [a] substantial risk, rather it was
unconscious inadvertent conduct of Beatty which created risk [sic] and
caused the children’s death.”). Instead, the Commonwealth argues that
Beatty acted “negligently.”
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of
an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
intent of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(4).
The Commonwealth maintains that it produced sufficient evidence that
Beatty acted with the above defined mens rea. This may be true, but the
involuntary manslaughter statute speaks in terms of “gross negligence”
rather than mere negligence. Our Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that these two levels of culpability are one in the same.
[T]he fact that criminal negligence differs from tort negligence
does not mean that the negligence defined in Section 302 of the
Code is the equivalent of the “gross negligence” contemplated in
Section 2504. If the General Assembly had intended for Section
302 negligence to be sufficient to establish the mens rea
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necessary for involuntary manslaughter, it need not have added
the modifier “gross.” Given the principle of statutory
construction requiring that we view the language of a statute in
such a way as to give effect to all of its terms, see 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 822 A.2d
676, 679 (Pa. 2003), we cannot construe the reference to “gross
negligence” in Section 2504 as requiring mere proof of the
“negligent” (or “criminally negligent”) state of mind defined in
Section 302.
Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 867 (Pa. 2003).
The law is clear that a showing of mere negligence or “criminal
negligence” does not satisfy the Commonwealth’s burden of proving the
necessary mens rea for involuntary manslaughter. Because the
Commonwealth concedes that it failed to demonstrate that Beatty acted
recklessly, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3), the trial court neither erred
nor abused its discretion in granting Beatty’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/22/2015
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