Lauer, A. v. Lauer, L. ( 2023 )


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  • J-A04005-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    ANDREW S. LAUER                                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    LAUREN LAUER
    Appellant                   No. 1140 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the Order Entered July 27, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Civil Division at No.: 2020-FC-000908-03
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J. and MCCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                    FILED: APRIL 3, 2023
    In this child custody dispute, Appellant, Lauren Lauer (“Mother”),
    appeals from an order awarding Appellee, Andrew Lauer (“Father”), partial
    physical custody over their child, S.L. (“Child”). Mother argues that the trial
    court failed to address whether this award is in Child’s best interests under
    the sixteen-factor test articulated in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328. We vacate the order
    awarding partial physical custody to Father and remand for a new evidentiary
    hearing.
    Mother and Father are the natural parents of Child who was born in
    2017. On July 27, 2020, Father filed a complaint seeking custody of Child.
    On February 2, 2021, the parties entered into a stipulation that, inter alia,
    provided Mother with primary physical custody of Child and Father with partial
    physical custody of Child on alternating weekends. The same stipulation also
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    provided Mother sole legal custody. On March 1, 2021, the court adopted the
    stipulation as a final order of custody.
    On May 28, 2021, Mother filed a petition for special relief to suspend
    Father’s physical custody rights, alleging that Father possibly sexually abused
    Child. The thrust of Mother’s claim was that (1) Father and Child engaged in
    “sexualized play,” and (2) Child made statements that linked such play with
    things she might have seen or experienced while with Father. Father filed a
    responsive answer and counter-petition for contempt.
    On June 22, 2021, the court held the first of several hearings on the
    parties’ petitions.   On June 23, 2021, the court entered an interim order
    modifying the portion of the order relating to the form of Father’s custody
    from partial physical custody to supervised physical custody, pending
    completion of proceedings on Mother’s petition for special relief.            The
    remainder of the March 1, 2021 order remained in place.
    On July 26, 2021, the court held a second hearing. A Lancaster County
    Children   and   Youth   Services   (“CYS”)   caseworker   testified   that   CYS
    investigated the sexualized play and statements Child had allegedly made in
    play therapy and deemed Mother’s allegations unfounded. An Ephrata Police
    Department detective testified that she conducted a criminal investigation of
    the allegations, including a forensic interview with Child in which Child made
    no disclosures nor used the language alleged by Mother and Child’s therapist.
    The detective determined that Mother’s allegations were entirely fabricated.
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    On September 1, 2021, the court entered an order prescribing location
    and transportation requirements for Father’s supervised partial physical
    custody.
    On November 18, 2021, the court held a third hearing. Among other
    witnesses, a York County CYS caseworker testified that the agency had
    investigated, and deemed unfounded, Mother’s allegations.
    On December 8, 2021, the court ordered Father’s partial physical
    custody to remain supervised. The court added, however, that Father would
    have a basis to request reconsideration of the supervision requirement by
    undergoing an evaluation and successfully completing a denial polygraph from
    Pennsylvania Counseling.
    Father obtained an evaluation from Jamie Raubenstine, a Specialized
    Outpatient Therapist at Triad Treatment Specialists who often performs sex
    offender evaluations for courts in central Pennsylvania.         On May 2, 2022,
    Raubenstine authored an assessment that Father passed a denial polygraph
    and did not pose a risk or threat of harm to Child. On May 17, 2022, Father
    filed a petition to reinstate partial physical custody rights.
    On July 22, 2022, the court held a hearing in which Father, Mother and
    Raubenstine testified. The court admitted Raubenstine as an expert “in the
    field of threat of harm evaluations with the component of denial polygraphs.”
    N.T., 7/22/22, at 8. Based on information provided by Father, including but
    not limited to a polygraph, Raubenstine concluded that Father did not present
    a risk of harm to Child. Raubenstine emphasized that even if court had not
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    asked for a denial polygraph, her conclusion that Father did not present a risk
    of harm would have remained the same. Id. at 52.
    In an order docketed on July 27, 2022, the court changed the form of
    Father’s custody from supervised physical custody to partial physical custody.
    The July 27, 2022 order did not address whether this modification was in
    Child’s best interests.
    On August 16, 2022, Mother filed a timely appeal to this Court from the
    July 27, 2022 order. Mother did not appeal any order entered before July 27,
    2022. Mother complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On August 26, 2022, the court
    filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion which stated that it was not necessary to
    address whether the change in the form of Father’s custody was in Child’s best
    interests. Opinion, 8/26/22, at 4.
    On August 29, 2022, Mother filed an application for supersedeas to stay
    the July 27, 2022 order.     On August 30, 2022, this Court granted the
    application for supersedeas, stayed the July 27, 2022 order and directed the
    trial court to reinstate its December 8, 2021 custody order.
    Mother raises the following issues in her appeal:
    I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
    matter of law in failing to consider the sixteen (16) relevant
    factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5328(a)(1-16) when awarding
    Appellee/Father unsupervised partial physical custody?
    II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
    matter of law in considering the results of polygraph examinations
    of the Appellee/Father in awarding Appellee/Father unsupervised
    partial physical custody?
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    III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
    matter of law in permitting Appellee/Father’s expert witness to
    testify despite Appellant/Mother never having been provided the
    expert’s curriculum vitae prior to the hearing, preventing
    Appellant/Mother from a full and fair opportunity to properly
    challenge said expert’s qualifications?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    The lone order under review in this appeal is the July 27, 2022 order
    awarding Father partial physical custody over Child. In her first argument,
    Mother asserts that this award is defective because the trial court failed to
    apply the sixteen-factor “best interests” test prescribed in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
    5328(a). We agree.
    In an appeal from a custody order, we apply the following scope and
    standard of review:
    [T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or inferences
    made by the trial court from its findings of fact, nor must the
    reviewing court accept a finding that has no competent evidence
    to support it.... However, this broad scope of review does not vest
    in the reviewing court the duty or the privilege of making its own
    independent determination.... Thus, an appellate court is
    empowered to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible
    factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not
    interfere with those conclusions unless they are unreasonable in
    view of the trial court’s factual findings; and thus, represent a
    gross abuse of discretion.
    C.M. v. M.M., 
    215 A.3d 588
    , 591 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    In Pennsylvania, custody disputes are governed by the Child Custody
    Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340. The primary focus in any custody case is
    the best interests of the child. “The best-interests standard, decided on a
    case-by-case basis, considers all factors that legitimately have an effect upon
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    the child’s physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well[-]being.” Saintz v.
    Rinker, 
    902 A.2d 509
    , 512 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    A series of provisions in the Child Custody Act are relevant to the present
    custody dispute. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323, entitled “Award of Custody,” provides
    in relevant part:
    (a) Type of award. After considering the factors set forth in
    section 5328 (relating to factors to consider when awarding
    custody), the court may award any of the following types of
    custody if it is in the best interest of the child:
    (1) Shared physical custody.
    (2) Primary physical custody.
    (3) Partial physical custody.
    (4) Sole physical custody.
    (5) Supervised physical custody.
    (6) Shared legal custody.
    (7) Sole legal custody.
    In turn, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 provides:
    § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.
    (a) Factors. - In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
    determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
    factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
    affect the safety of the child, including the following:
    (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent
    and continuing contact between the child and another party.
    (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member
    of the party’s household, whether there is a continued risk of harm
    to the child or an abused party and which party can better provide
    adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.
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    (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and (2)
    (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with
    protective services).
    (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the
    child.
    (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education,
    family life and community life.
    (5) The availability of extended family.
    (6) The child’s sibling relationships.
    (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child’s
    maturity and judgment.
    (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other
    parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable
    safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.
    (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
    consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for
    the child’s emotional needs.
    (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,
    emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the
    child.
    (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
    (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to make
    appropriate child-care arrangements.
    (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness
    and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A party’s
    effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is not
    evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.
    (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of
    a party’s household.
    (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of a
    party’s household.
    (16) Any other relevant factor.
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    Id. The court must “expressly consider all of the Section 5328(a) factors”
    when deciding a request to modify custody. M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 
    62 A.3d 331
    ,
    336 (Pa. Super. 2013) (emphasis added).
    When the court enters a custody order, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323 requires
    the trial court to “delineate the reasons for its decision on the record in open
    court or in a written opinion or order.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(d). Additionally,
    section 5323(d) requires the trial court to set forth its mandatory
    assessment of the sixteen Section 5328 custody factors prior to
    the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.
    In expressing the reasons for its decision, there is no required
    amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all that is
    required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that
    the custody decision is based on those considerations. A court’s
    explanation of reasons for its decision, which adequately
    addresses the relevant factors, complies with Section 5323(d).
    C.M., 215 A.3d at 592-93 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    The court has the duty to consider Section 5328(a)’s best-interest
    factors when any party requests a change in the “form of physical custody.”
    C.M., 215 A.3d at 593. This duty exists “even in cases where the trial court
    merely reaffirms its prior custody order.”      Id. at 593. Furthermore, we
    interpret “form of custody” to mean “the seven types of custody listed at 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a).” S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 
    96 A.3d 396
    , 402 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    Thus, “a trial court must apply the § 5328(a) factors and issue a written
    explanation of its decision when it orders any of the seven forms of custody
    provided for by the [Child Custody] Act.” Id.
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    Consideration of the Section 5328 factors is not necessary, however,
    when the custody decision “merely modifie[s] a discrete custody-related
    issue” instead of changing the form of custody. M.O. v. J.T.R., 
    85 A.3d 1058
    ,
    1063 (Pa. Super. 2014).         In a recent memorandum, we fleshed out when
    custody disputes involve mere “discrete custody-related issues” instead of a
    change to the form of custody:
    [I]t makes little sense for a trial court to analyze each of the
    sixteen 5328(a) factors when arbitrating, for example, a dispute
    over a custody-exchange location; which youth sports the children
    should play; or whether a parent should be required to have
    children’s toys, beds, or other things in his or her house. Rather,
    when read as a whole, it is apparent that the [Section] 5328(a)
    factors were designed to guide the best-interest analysis when a
    trial court is ordering which party has the right to a form of
    custody. S.W.D., 
    96 A.3d at 403
     (emphasis in original; footnote
    omitted). Thus, we have not required a trial court to address the
    Section 5328(a) factors when considering the following disputes
    between the parties: (1) “whether Father was required to be off
    from work while the Children stayed with him” during part of the
    summer; (2) which primary school Child would attend; and (3)
    whether to grant Mother permission for Child to receive the
    COVID-19 vaccination. The issue presented in the present appeal
    — how the parties will pay for Child’s therapy sessions — is the
    same type of discrete custody related issue that does not involve
    an “award of custody.” See M.O., 
    85 A.3d at 1063
    .
    Bowman v. Bowman, 
    2022 WL 17258587
    , *4 (Pa. Super., Nov. 29, 2022)
    (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).1
    In the present case, the July 27, 2022 order changed Father’s custody
    from supervised physical custody to partial physical custody.       This was a
    ____________________________________________
    1 Although Bowman is not a published opinion, we may unpublished
    memoranda filed by this Court after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value.
    Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
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    change in the form of custody, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a), not a mere
    modification of a discrete custody-related issue such as those catalogued in
    Bowman.     Consequently, the court was required to examine whether this
    change was in Child’s best interests by analyzing the sixteen Section 5328
    factors. S.W.D., 
    96 A.3d at 402
    . The court erred by failing to undertake this
    analysis in its July 27, 2022 order or in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion.
    Our decision in C.M. confirms that a Section 5328 analysis is necessary.
    There, the original child custody order awarded Mother primary physical
    custody and Father supervised physical custody on alternating Saturday
    afternoons. Subsequently, the court modified the custody order to provide
    Father partial physical custody on the first weekend of each month from
    Saturday at 10:00 a.m. through Sunday at 5:00 p.m.           Mother appealed,
    objecting to the court’s failure to consider the Section 5328 factors in its
    modification order. We reasoned:
    [T]he trial court modified Father’s supervised physical custody and
    removed the requirement that Mother was to supervise Father’s
    custodial period. The subject order modified the existing custody
    order by awarding Father “partial physical custody,” rather than
    “supervised physical custody.” In addition, the order increased
    Father’s custodial time by granting him overnight custody on the
    first Saturday of each month from 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 5:00
    p.m. Erroneously, the trial court offered no explanation as to how
    Father’s partial physical custody award was in Child’s best
    interests. We reiterate that the trial court was required to
    consider Child’s best interests and assess the Section 5328(a)
    custody factors.
    
    Id.,
     215 A.3d at 593-94.      Thus, we remanded the case for the court to
    consider the Section 5328 factors on the record or in a written opinion. In the
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    present case, as in C.M., the trial court ordered a change in the form of
    Father’s custody from supervised physical custody to partial physical custody.
    Therefore, the trial court was required to consider Child’s best interests and
    assess the Section 5328(a) custody factors. Id.
    The trial court claims that analysis of the Section 5328 factors was
    unnecessary because the “sole issue . . . was whether Father’s visitation rights
    should be restored to what was stipulated to by the parties” in March 2021.
    Opinion, 8/26/22, at 4. The custody rights that Father enjoyed in March 2021
    were not relevant at the time of the court’s order on July 27, 2022. The only
    issue on July 27, 2022 was whether to change supervised physical custody,
    the form of custody then in place, to partial physical custody. This issue
    required examination of the Section 5328 factors to determine what was in
    Child’s best interests. C.M., 215 A.3d at 593.
    The trial court then stated that “to the extent review of the Section 5328
    factor was necessary,” there “were no changes in the case dynamics” after
    March 2021 “outside of the issue whether Father’s custody should be
    supervised or not.” Opinion at 4. In our view, the change from supervised to
    partial physical custody was a significant “change in case dynamics” that
    required analysis under Section 5328. To perform this task satisfactorily, the
    court must “expressly consider all of the Section 5328(a) factors” either in its
    order or its Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion. M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 
    62 A.3d 331
    , 336 (Pa.
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    Super. 2013) (emphasis added). This analysis is missing from the trial court’s
    opinion.
    Under these circumstances, we are constrained to remand this case to
    the trial court for a new evidentiary hearing concerning the form of Father’s
    custody.   A new hearing is necessary because Child’s best interests might
    have changed between the July 27, 2022 order and the present date. Due to
    the already protracted nature of this case, the hearing shall take place within
    45 days after the return of the certified record to the trial court.     At the
    conclusion of the new hearing, the trial court shall consider all of the Section
    5328 factors to determine the proper form of Father’s custody. Our decision
    to remand makes it unnecessary to review the other issues raised in Mother’s
    appeal.
    Case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
    memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 04/03/2023
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1140 MDA 2022

Judges: Stabile, J.

Filed Date: 4/3/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024