Com. v. Quadrel, S. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S30030-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    STEVEN M. QUADREL                          :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 216 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 3, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
    at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003620-2019
    BEFORE:      STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                             FILED APRIL 20, 2023
    Steven M. Quadrel (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after an open
    guilty plea to one count each of third-degree murder, aggravated assault —
    victim less than 13 years of age, and possession of an instrument of crime
    (PIC).1    On appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence, alleging the court ignored his rehabilitative needs and imposed a
    sentence that was “too harsh for the specific facts of this case[.]” Appellant’s
    Brief at 33. After careful review, we affirm.
    We glean the underlying facts of this case from Appellant’s June 14,
    2021, open guilty plea hearing and the trial court opinion.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 2702(a)(9), 907(a).
    J-S30030-22
    On October 24[,] 2018[, Appellant’s] father, Dr. Mark Quadrel
    [(Father)], who was 61 years old, came to visit [Appellant, who at
    the time was 24 years old,] at [his] apartment located [on] East
    Airy Street in Norristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.
    [Appellant and Father] ended up in an argument, so [Appellant]
    went out to [his] truck and retrieved [his] nine-millimeter Beretta
    pistol. [Appellant] returned to the bedroom in [his] apartment
    and loaded the pistol and proceeded to shoot [Father] 23 times in
    the back and the head which ultimately caused [Father’s] death.
    [Appellant] reloaded the clip multiple times while shooting
    [Father].
    After shooting and killing [Father, Appellant] exited [his]
    apartment and pointed the laser sight of [his] gun at a 12-year-
    old boy’s face who was outside riding his scooter with his brother
    and a friend, ultimately lowering the gun and shooting at him,
    hitting his hand. The boy was unknown to [Appellant] at the time,
    but was later identified as [J.G.].
    N.T. Open Guilty Plea, 6/14/21, at 10-11.               After agreeing to the
    Commonwealth’s recitation of facts, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of
    third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and PIC.2
    This matter proceeded to sentencing on December 3, 2021, where the
    following was adduced.         It was undisputed that Appellant was raised in a
    supportive and loving family. Trial Ct. Op., 3/25/22, at 3-7. When Appellant
    was in high school, he was prescribed opiates for an injury, and eventually
    became addicted to drugs. Id. at 7. Appellant later “turned his life around[,]”
    and during this time, Father provided him with support.        See id. at 5, 7.
    ____________________________________________
    2 Appellant was also charged with one count each of first-degree murder,
    aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person (REAP). See
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 2702(a)(1), 2705. The Commonwealth nolle prossed
    these charges in exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea.
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    Appellant described Father as his “best friend[.]” Id. at 6. Leading up to this
    incident, Father was allegedly “concerned about Appellant[’s] behavior[,]
    believed Appellant was acting paranoid, and . . . was trying to arrange mental
    health help for [him].” Id. at 8-9; see also N.T. Sentencing, 12/3/21, at 54-
    55. At the sentencing hearing, Appellant stated that in the weeks before the
    incident, he was “hearing voices [and] having delusions and hallucinations[,]”
    and believed “people [and Father] were trying to kill [his] family and friends.”
    N.T. Sentencing at 42. Appellant thought he “could save everyone’s lives if
    [he] could stop” Father, and that he was “acting for the greater good of
    everyone.” Id. He also said he was remorseful for his crimes and believed
    he was having a “psychotic episode.” Id. at 40-42.
    The Commonwealth presented testimony from, inter alia, the minor
    victim J.G. and his mother. Additionally, Appellant’s aunt and Appellant’s two
    brothers expressed concerns about Appellant’s drug use and fears that
    Appellant would reoffend and hurt other family members.              See N.T.
    Sentencing at 15, 18, 23-24, 28, 31.
    Appellant then presented the testimony of a family friend, as well as
    another aunt, who stated she did “not fear” him and thought he needed help.
    N.T. Sentencing at 40. Counsel for Appellant noted that after a psychological
    evaluation, one of Appellant’s doctors stated it is “likely that [Appellant’s]
    mental health symptoms can be effectively treated and maintained through a
    combination of psychiatric medications, counseling, and social support.” Id.
    at 58.
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    After the conclusion of testimony and argument, the trial court imposed
    a sentence of 17 to 40 years’ incarceration for third-degree murder, a
    consecutive term of five to 10 years’ incarceration for aggravated assault, and
    a concurrent term of one to five years’ incarceration for PIC — all standard
    range sentences under the sentencing guidelines.          Appellant’s aggregate
    sentence is thus 22 to 50 years’ incarceration.
    On December 12, 2021, Appellant, through his counsel Coley O.
    Reynolds, Esquire, filed a timely post-sentence motion alleging the trial court:
    A. Sentenced [Appellant] without providing sufficient reasons for
    the sentence imposed;
    B. Failed to give careful consideration to all relevant factors;
    C. Failed to give careful consideration and proper weight to
    [Appellant’s] acceptance of responsibility;
    D. Failed to consider and give proper weight to the serious mental
    breakdown [Appellant] was suffering from at the time of the
    incident, as evidenced by the physical observations of police
    officers, medical staff and the expert opinions of [two] doctors
    who evaluated [Appellant]; and,
    E. Failed to take into account the remorse and shame felt by
    [Appellant].
    Appellant’s Motion for Post-Sentence Relief, 12/12/21, at 2 (unpaginated).
    That same day, Attorney Reynolds also filed a motion to withdraw from
    representation, stating that Appellant “is indigent, will not be retaining
    [Attorney Reynolds] on appeal[,] and wishes to have counsel appointed for all
    future proceedings.” Motion to Withdraw and Appoint Counsel, 12/12/21, at
    2. On December 16, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence
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    motion. Order, 12/16/21. On December 20th, the court granted Attorney
    Reynold’s motion to withdraw and appointed Jeffrey Matus, Esquire, from the
    Montgomery County Public Defender’s Office to represent Appellant.         See
    Order, 12/20/21. Appellant then filed this timely appeal and a court-ordered
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b). Appellant raises the following claim on appeal:
    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
    Appellant to a manifestly excessive and clearly unreasonable
    aggregate term of [22] to [50] years[’] imprisonment for third-
    degree murder and aggravated assault given the individual
    circumstances of the case and the rehabilitative needs of . . .
    Appellant?
    Appellant’s Brief at 6.
    Preliminarily, we note the Commonwealth argues Appellant’s issue is
    waived because his concise statement did not adequately identify his claim
    and the trial court had to guess what he would argue in his brief.         See
    Commonwealth Brief at 11-12. Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement alleged
    the following:
    The trial court abused its discretion in this matter by imposing a
    manifestly excessive aggregate sentence of not less than [22] nor
    more than [50] years of incarceration.
    Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 2/3/22.
    Indeed, the trial court stated in its opinion that Appellant did not raise
    a specific claim in his statement:
    Appellant does not set forth in his 1925(b) Statement any reasons
    as to why he believes the aggregate sentence to be “manifestly
    excessive.” However, reading his post-sentence motion along
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    with his [Rule] 1925(b) Statement, [the trial c]ourt surmises that
    he will argue that [the c]ourt failed to consider the various factors
    mentioned in sentencing him.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 14.
    We remind Appellant’s counsel, Attorney Matus, that when raising a
    challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, Rule 1925(b) requires
    that statements “identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with
    sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b)(4)(ii). Further, a Rule 1925(b) statement cannot be “too vague to
    allow the [trial] court to identify the issues raised on appeal[.]”           See
    Commonwealth v. Hansley, 
    24 A.3d 410
    , 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Rule
    1925(b) Statement must be specific enough to allow a trial court to identify
    and address the appellant’s claim on appeal, or it may be subject to waiver).
    Nevertheless, on this particular record, we decline to find waiver.
    In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant avers that the court abused its
    discretion when it “ignored [his] rehabilitative needs” and imposed a sentence
    that was not “individualized” and “too harsh for the specific facts of this
    case[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 30, 33.
    “Generally, a plea of guilty amounts to a waiver of all defects and
    defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of
    the sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea.”        Commonwealth v.
    Morrison, 
    173 A.3d 286
    , 290 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). However,
    an appellant who enters an open plea may challenge the discretionary aspects
    of their sentence on appeal. Commonwealth v. Luketic, 
    162 A.3d 1149
    ,
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    1159 (Pa. Super. 2017). It is well established that such a challenge does not
    entitle an appellant to “review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell,
    
    117 A.3d 763
    , 768 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). Rather,
    An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
    must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
    (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
    Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
    preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
    sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
    has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
    substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
    *    *      *
    A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a
    colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
    either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
    Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie
    the sentencing process.
    
    Id.
     (citations omitted). Further, an allegation that the trial court failed to
    consider rehabilitative needs and imposed an excessive sentence, absent
    consideration of mitigating factors, raises a substantial question for our
    review. See Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 
    216 A.3d 307
    , 328 (Pa. Super.
    2019) (en banc) (“[A]n excessive sentence claim — in conjunction with an
    assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors — raises a
    substantial question.”) (citation omitted).
    In the present case, Appellant filed both a timely notice of appeal and a
    timely post-sentence motion.     In addition, his brief includes the requisite
    concise statement of reasons relied upon for appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
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    2119(f), wherein he alleged his sentence was manifestly excessive because it
    is “too severe a punishment for the individual circumstances of the case” and
    did not properly consider the protection of the public, the gravity of the
    offense, or his rehabilitative needs.    See Appellant’s Brief at 22-24.      We
    conclude Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review and
    properly invoked this Court’s jurisdiction. See Akhmedov, 216 A.3d at 328;
    Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d at 768
    .
    Returning to Appellant’s argument, he avers the trial court did not
    properly consider the sentencing factors in Section 9721(b) and imposed a
    manifestly excessive sentence.     Though he concedes that his actions were
    “completely senseless, entirely unjustified, and an extremely devastating
    event to many people[,]” Appellant contends that his aggregate sentence of
    22 to 50 years’ incarceration remains too severe a punishment. Appellant’s
    Brief at 27.     Instead, he suggests that “a sentence in the middle of the
    guideline range” would be more appropriate. Id. at 34. Appellant insists the
    trial court merely “paid lip service” to the sentencing factors, and instead “was
    only concerned about the seriousness” of the offenses “and not the reasoning
    behind them.” Id. at 28, 34 (record citation omitted). He emphasizes that
    he did not have a criminal record prior to this “isolated incident” and that there
    is “strong evidence” that he can be rehabilitated. Id. at 30. We conclude no
    relief is due.
    We consider the following standard of review:
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    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
    of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
    sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
    judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
    Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 
    107 A.3d 127
    , 132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).   When fashioning a sentence, the trial court must consider the
    “protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
    on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs
    of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S § 9721(b).
    Though Appellant has raised a substantial question, we conclude he is
    not entitled to relief.   The sentencing transcript reveals the trial court
    considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and the surrounding factors of the
    incident:
    [The court considered] the presentence investigation and report
    together with the Rise Above, also known as the PPI evaluation,
    summary and report.          I have received the sentencing
    memorandums from . . . the Commonwealth and [Appellant].
    There are letters, reports, and statements attached.          I’ve
    considered all that. Of course, I’ve considered the sentencing
    code and the sentencing guidelines. We referred to the guidelines
    at the beginning of this proceeding.
    Turning for a moment to the PPI evaluation, the diagnosis
    in that report which was done July 15th, 2021, the diagnosis is
    cannabis use disorder severe in a controlled environment. Other
    substance abuse disorders in sustained remission. Unspecified
    depression disorder and ADHD.
    They do recommend treatment based on those findings
    including drug and alcohol, anger management, life skills, and
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    J-S30030-22
    other treatment while he’s in the custody of the Department of
    Corrections.
    The presentence investigation and report . . . set[ ] forth
    the offense conduct[.] It sets forth his statement regarding the
    offense which is lengthy. I have considered it, of course. His
    criminal history, which is insignificant, there was a traffic offense
    listed.
    The family situation and background is set forth at length in
    the report. That, of course, was supplemented today by testimony
    and by the various submissions from the various people by way of
    letters and otherwise.        [Appellant’s] physical and mental
    conditions are also set forth in the presentence investigation and
    report. They refer to records from the Montgomery County
    Correctional Facility, things that have been mentioned otherwise
    during this proceeding. The drug and alcohol use is mentioned in
    this report as is his education and employment and economic
    status.
    The Court has, of course, considered in detail [Appellant’s]
    mental status before, during, and after this murder of his father.
    The mental status at the time of the offense, of course, is not a
    defense, nor is it any justification for the conduct that he engaged
    in.
    I do note that neither [v]ictim, his father, nor the 12-year-
    old child, did anything to cause [Appellant] to have any reason to
    take the conduct that he did to the degree that he did.
    I have considered the substance abuse issues as raised also.
    I, of course, considered the support that [Appellant] has among
    many friends and family. I do believe he is remorseful. I note
    that he quickly accepted responsibility for his actions in his early
    encounters with the police and that he did enter a guilty plea to
    third-degree murder in this case.
    But certainly the question of total confinement is
    appropriate under the circumstances of this case given the need
    for the protection of the public, the gravity of the offenses, and I
    say offenses because in my mind they’re two separate offenses to
    some extent. The impact on the victims and the community is
    extreme as stated by the prosecution. You can’t have any worse
    impact on a victim than the taking of their life, and that was his
    father, by all accounts a good man, a good doctor, a contributing
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    J-S30030-22
    member of the community, a good family man, just all in all a
    good person who didn’t deserve to die that day.
    And then we have the 12-year-old innocent child at play in
    a peaceful neighborhood, the impact on that child and his mother
    in the community is extensive and extreme.
    I’ve considered the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant]. I do
    believe that any lesser sentence than the sentence that I will
    impose would depreciate the seriousness of these crimes.
    In reviewing the facts of this case, it is significant that
    [Appellant] pointed the gun, the nine-millimeter with a laser sight,
    at the forehead of this child and then he shot the child. The
    shooting of the child was in no way necessary to complete the
    murder or to facilitate his flight after the murder of his father. So
    that was extremely dangerous and terrorizing conduct after the
    fact of the murder.
    I do note that the various witnesses did raise concerns about
    the future dangerousness of [Appellant]. They expressed their
    reasoning on the witness stand or in their letters. In my mind, a
    consecutive sentence is clearly appropriate on the aggravated
    assault charge given the separate danger and serious criminal
    activity. This child was in no way a threat to [Appellant].
    N.T. Sentencing, 12/3/21, at 60-64.
    Further, in its opinion, the trial court noted that it “found Appellant[’s]
    expressions of remorse credible[,]” and reiterated that it considered the
    sentencing factors in Section 9721(b) as well as Appellant’s mental state
    “before, during, and after” the murder and aggravated assault of the child
    victim.   See Trial Ct. Op. at 16-17.    The record supports the trial court’s
    conclusions.
    The trial court considered each of the sentencing factors thoughtfully
    before imposing Appellant’s sentence. Appellant shot his father 23 times in
    the head and back, killing him, and then fired a gun at a child, grazing his
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    hand.    The court imposed a standard range sentence for each conviction,
    considered the acts against Father and the child victim were separate
    offenses, and imposed the sentences for murder and aggravated assault to
    run consecutively. While the court recognized Appellant’s remorse and mental
    health needs, it nevertheless determined that the severity of the crimes
    necessitated the above sentence. Appellant’s disagreement with his sentence
    does not amount to the trial court merely “pa[ying] lip service” to the Section
    9721(b) factors or an abuse of its discretion, and this Court cannot reconsider
    the above factors to fashion a sentence more favorable to Appellant. See
    Appellant’s Brief at 28. Appellant has failed to establish that the trial court
    imposed a manifestly excessive sentence, and as such, no relief is due. See
    Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 132.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/20/2023
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Document Info

Docket Number: 216 EDA 2022

Judges: McCaffery, J.

Filed Date: 4/20/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/20/2023