Com. v. Coit, D. ( 2015 )

J-S68028-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
DAVID COIT, :
:
Appellant : No. 2531 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 4, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0003188-2011
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE and MUNDY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2015
Appellant, David Coit (“Coit”), appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on April 4, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
following his conviction of possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a). For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following summary of the facts:
On the night of December 4, 2010, [Coit] resided
at 4149 North Franklin Street with his mother and
several children including the victim, [Coit’s] then
nineteen[-]year-old daughter, Bernice Santiago
[(“Santiago”)]. Benjamin Baker [(“Baker”)], a
neighbor and resident of 4150 North Franklin Street
located directly across the street from [Coit’s] home,
testified that shortly before 7 p.m. he heard multiple
people yelling and fighting outside of [Coit’s] home
immediately before [] Santiago ran into his home
screaming hysterically and bleeding profusely. N.T.
1/8/2014 at 46-47. [] Santiago ran into [] Baker’s
kitchen and yelled for him to call the police. Id. at
47, 49. Within minutes[, Coit] followed his daughter
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into [] Baker’s home, armed with a double edged Jim
Bowie hunting knife in his hand. Id. at 47-48. By
the time [] Baker was able to reach [] Santiago,
[Coit] was attacking her. Id. at 49. As his daughter
lay on the floor struggling and attempting to defend
herself [Coit] was punching her with the knife in his
hand. Id. at 49, 54. [] Baker further testified that
during the attack, he saw [] Santiago grab and hold
onto the knife that [Coit] held within inches of her
face. Id. at 62. As [] Santiago continued to scream
for [] Baker to call 911, [Coit] dragged her out of []
Baker’s home by her hair, leaving a trail of blood
behind. Id. at 47, 50.
Within minutes, officers responded to a radio call
of a person with a weapon in the area of 4149 North
Franklin Street in Philadelphia County. N.T.
1/7/2014 at 5-6, 35. Officers arrived at that location
and observed [Coit’s] daughter with blood on her
chest, both hands and arms, and screaming for help.
Id. at 6-7. [] Santiago had numerous cut marks,
and her left hand appeared to be severely injured.
Id. at 12, 23. She was hysterical, hostile, nervous
and crying. Id. at 7, 23. Officers observed a blood
trail from the steps of the victim’s home, 4149 North
Franklin Street to [] Baker’s home across the street,
4150 North Franklin Street. Id. at 7-8, 13-14.
At the time of the above, other officers observed
a half[-]clothed young black male, armed with a
knife, approach and stop an older black man. Id. at
22, 52. The younger male, later identified as [Coit’s]
son and [Santiago’s] brother Kevin Coit, was briefly
detained, while the older male, not yet identified as
[Coit], walked away and was not immediately
pursued. Id. at 6-7, 12-13, 22, 52. Officers
questioned [Coit’s] son and concluded that he was
not the assailant. Id. at 52. Officers then placed
Kevin Coit in their vehicle to escort him to the police
station for further questioning. Id. at 52-53. As the
vehicle drove eastbound on Bristol Street, Kevin Coit
tapped on the window and yelled “that’s him, that’s
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him[,]” which alerted the officers that [Coit] had just
entered a neighborhood bar. Id.
After receiving a description of [Coit], other
officers while approaching the crime scene, also
observed [Coit] walk into the neighborhood bar
which was located at 8th and Bristol Street,
approximately [one and a half] blocks away from the
crime scene. Id. at 36. These officers exited their
patrol vehicle, entered the bar and observed [Coit]
inside. Id. at 37. [Coit] was wearing a grey
sweatshirt that was covered in blood with identifiable
bloodstains on both shoulders, the right sleeve, the
back of the neck area, and scattered all over the
front particularly on the pocket area. Id. at 40-41,
54, 125-26. As the officers approached [Coit], he
was noticeably “wound up,” erratic, hostile and
noncompliant. Id. When officers attempted to
detain him, [Coit] resisted and a brief struggle
ensued before he was secured by force. Id. After
[Coit] was detained, he was taken back to [] Baker’s
home, where [] Baker positively identified him as []
Santiago’s attacker. Id. at 51.
Paramedics arrived on the scene and assessed,
treated and transported [] Santiago to Einstein
Medical Center. Id. at 73. Paramedics identified []
Santiago’s injuries as lacerations or stab wounds to
the hands and arms, and bruises and bite marks to
other parts of the body. Id. at 75. Detective
Ramonita King examined the inside of [Coit’s] and
[Santiago’s] home and observed that the furniture
was thrown around and appeared out of place,
evidencing signs of a struggle. Id. at 85. Detective
King also observed a trail of blood beginning inside
of the living room area of the home leading down the
steps of the property, onto the sidewalk, across the
street and inside [] Baker’s home, 4150 North
Franklin Street. Id. at 85-86, 88. Detective King
then traveled to the Einstein Medical Center
emergency room where she unsuccessfully
attempted to interview the victim who was
hysterical, screaming and crying “I’m scared[.]” Id.
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at 89-90. Detective King observed that the fingers
on [] Santiago’s left hand were severely lacerated
and appeared to be dangling, nearly completely
severed. Id. at 90. The victim was extremely
frightened and was visibly shaking while crying and
screaming “I’m afraid, don’t let him in here” every
time medical staff entered the examination room.
Id. at 90-91. Detective King’s attempts to console
and ease [Santiago’s] fears were unsuccessful and
medical staff was forced to restrain and sedate her in
order to render medical assistance. Id. at 90-93.
Thereafter, Detective King and other officers were
unable to locate, interview or subpoena [] Santiago
for trial. Id. at 93-94, 129. [] Santiago did not
appear or testify at trial.
Dr. Ralph Riviello [(“Dr. Riviello”)], Professor of
Emergency Medicine at Drexel University College of
Medicine and the Attending Physician at Hahnemann
University Hospital Emergency Room, testified as the
Commonwealth’s expert witness and offered his
opinions after reviewing [] Santiago’s medical
records. N.T. 1/8/2014 at 7, 16, 30. Dr. Riviello
testified that he reviewed [] Santiago’s December 4,
2010 Albert Einstein Medical Center medical records
which identified her as a trauma patient. Id. at 8,
18. Dr. Riviello stated that [] Santiago’s injuries
were a three [] x two [] centimeter incise wound or
cut to the outside of her upper left arm and a
continuing slash stretching across the palm surface
of her left hand fingers, as well as multiple bruises
from being punched all over her body. Id. at 19-21.
In addition, [] Santiago was diagnosed with a
complex finger laceration, a lower lip abrasion and a
human bite to the right shoulder. Id. at 22-23. Dr.
Riviello opined that [] Santiago’s incise wounds or
cuts appeared to be defensive wounds that were
likely sustained when she attempted to protect the
central core of her body. In raising her hands to
protect her face, the knife cut across her fingers and
potentially stabbed into them in the process. Id. at
24. Dr. Riviello further explained that when an
awake and alert person’s face or other core area is
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attacked with a sharp weapon, the natural instinct is
to raise one’s hands as a defensive mechanism,
thereby often suffering injury to the hands. Id. at
25. Dr. Riviello also testified that [] Santiago
sustained a significantly concerning tendon laceration
in her left hand fingers. Id. at 26.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/18/15, at 2-5 (footnote omitted).
Coit was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault,
burglary, criminal trespass, PIC, terroristic threats, simple assault, recklessly
endangering another person, resisting arrest, and criminal mischief. 1 A jury
trial commenced on January 7, 2014 and on January 9, 2014, the jury
returned a verdict of not guilty on the attempted murder and aggravated
assault charges, but found Coit guilty of PIC.2 On April 4, 2014, the trial
court sentenced Coit to two and a half to five years of incarceration, to run
consecutive to the sentence he was already serving.3
On April 13, 2014, Coit filed a post-sentence motion alleging that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the sentence was
excessive. Coit requested that the trial court vacate his conviction and grant
a new trial, or in the alternative, vacate the sentence and resentence him.
On April 17, 2014, while his post-sentence motion was pending, Coit filed a
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2502, 2702(a), 3502(a), 3503(a)(1)(i), 907(a),
2706(a)(1), 2701(a), 2705, 5104, 3304(a)(4).
2
All other charges were nolle prossed prior to trial.
3
At the time of sentencing, Coit was serving a sentence of seven to
fourteen years of incarceration for aggravated assault stemming from an
unrelated incident docketed at CR-0005384-2010.
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pro se motion for reconsideration of sentence requesting that his sentence
run concurrent with his current state sentence. On August 12, 2014, the
trial court denied Coit’s post-sentence motion and motion for
reconsideration.
On August 18, 2014, Coit filed a notice of appeal to this Court and
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, Coit raises the
following two issues for our review:
1. Was not the verdict contrary to the weight of the
evidence because the evidence presented during trial
was unreliable and untrustworthy to such a degree
that the verdict based on that evidence shocks one’s
sense of justice and, therefore, a new trial is
necessary to cure the injustice?
2. Was not the sentence excessive because [Coit’s]
prior record score, sentencing guidelines, current
time of incarceration, and the maximum penalty for
the crime for which [he] was found guilty would all
suggest that the sentence imposed is excessive?
Coit’s Brief at 5.
For his first issue on appeal, Coit argues that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a new trial because the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. Id. at 15, 19. Coit asserts that the eyewitness
testimony by Baker was inconsistent and “at odds with the expert’s opinion
and the medical records” regarding the injuries Santiago sustained. Id. at
15-16. He further argues that the police officers that testified “offered little
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to no corroboration,” failed to recover the knife, lost photographs of the
scene of the crime, and failed to secure Santiago as a witness at trial. Id. at
17-18. As our Supreme Court has held:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of
the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge
has had the opportunity to hear and see the
evidence presented, an appellate court will give the
gravest consideration to the findings and reasons
advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court's determination that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the
lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was
not against the weight of the evidence and that a
new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion
by the trial court in granting or denying a motion for
a new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
trial court's discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
conclusion within the framework of the law, and is
not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the
will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
Discretion is abused where the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in the
original) (citations omitted).
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Accordingly, our review of Coit’s claim does not involve revisiting the
underlying question of whether the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. Instead, our review is limited to determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion, by considering evidence that the judgment was
“manifestly unreasonable or where the law [was] not applied or where the
record shows that the action [was] a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-
will.” Id.In this case, Coit failed to present any argument as to how he believes
the trial court abused its discretion. Instead, he directs his entire argument
to the underlying question of whether his convictions are against the weight
of the evidence, and argues that the inconsistencies in Baker’s testimony are
sufficient to invalidate the jury’s findings. Coit’s Brief at 15-17. As stated
above, this is not the question before us for review.
Coit failed to provide us with any argument relative to our standard of
review, and this Court will not develop an argument on his behalf. See
Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006). In
addition, our independent review of the record provides us with ample
support for the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding that the verdicts in this case were not against the weight of the
evidence. We therefore find no merit to Coit’s first issue.
For his second issue on appeal, Coit argues that the trial court
imposed an excessive sentence. Coit’s Brief at 20. Coit’s challenge to his
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sentence is directed to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. This Court
has held, “Where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a
sentence, there is no automatic right to appeal and an appellant’s appeal
should be considered a petition for allowance of appeal.” Commonwealth
v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Before we reach the merits of this [issue], we must
engage in a four part analysis to determine: (1)
whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant
preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief
includes a concise statement of the reasons relied
upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether
the concise statement raises a substantial question
that the sentence is appropriate under the
sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
In this case, Coit filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his
claim on appeal in a post-sentence motion as well as in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. Coit also included a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure in his brief, which requires an
appellant to “set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied
upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a
sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We are therefore left to determine whether a
substantial question exists.
The determination of what constitutes a
substantial question must be evaluated on a case-
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by-case basis. A substantial question exists “only
when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Coit presents two arguments that the
trial court imposed a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence.
Coit’s Brief at 7. Coit argues that the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive
sentence to the sentence he is currently serving resulted in an excessive
sentence. Id. at 7, 21. Coit further maintains that the trial court “only
focused on the severity of the crimes and the retribution of the complainants
and did not consider [his] rehabilitative needs [] at all.” Id.
In addressing Coit’s claim, we recognize that “prior decisions from this
Court involving whether a substantial question has been raised by claims
that the sentencing court ‘failed to consider’ or ‘failed to adequately
consider’ sentencing factors ‘has been less than a model of clarity and
consistency.’” Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1272 n.8
(Pa. Super. 2013)).
In Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013), this Court held that “[t]here is ample
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precedent to support a determination that [a claim that the trial court failed
to consider an appellant’s rehabilitative needs] fails to raise a substantial
question.” Id. at 936-37 (citing cases). A panel of this Court recently held,
however, that an appellant’s “challenge to the imposition of [] consecutive
sentences as unduly excessive, together with his claim that the court failed
to consider his rehabilitative needs upon fashioning its sentence, presents a
substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770
(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). As Caldwell addresses the precise issue that
is presently before this Court, we conclude that Coit’s assertion that the trial
court imposed an excessive sentence by imposing a consecutive sentence
and failing to consider his rehabilitative needs presents a substantial
question for our review. Accordingly, we will address the merits of his claim.
In reviewing Coit’s claim, we are mindful of our well-settled standard
of review:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound
discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest
abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of
discretion is not shown merely by an error in
judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
reference to the record, that the sentencing court
ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or
ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable
decision.
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Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 143 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 214 (Pa. Super. 1999)
(en banc)).
“When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider the
particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant.”
Griffin, 65 A.3d at 937 (quoting Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10
(Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 868 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied,
545 U.S. 1148 (2005)). “In considering these factors, the court should refer
to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics and
potential for rehabilitation.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736,
761 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal citations omitted). This Court may not
reweigh those factors or substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing
court. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super.
2009); Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 616 (Pa. Super 2005).
Moreover, our Supreme Court established that
[w]here pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue
to presume that the sentencing judge was aware of
relevant information regarding the defendant's
character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors. A pre-sentence
report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. In
order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention
of engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state
clearly that sentencers are under no compulsion to
employ checklists or any extended or systematic
definitions of their punishment procedure. Having
been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the
sentencing court's discretion should not be disturbed.
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This is particularly true, we repeat, in those
circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the
judge had any degree of awareness of the sentencing
considerations, and there we will presume also that
the weighing process took place in a meaningful
fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the
position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it
will fail to apply them to the case at hand.
Macias, 968 A.2d at 778 (quoting Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d
12, 18 (Pa. 1988)).
In this case, the trial court stated on the record that it considered
Coit’s presentence investigation report, his mental health evaluation, his
need for rehabilitation, and society’s need for protection. N.T., 4/4/14, at
39-41. The trial court found that “[t]here [was] no reason for mitigation in
this case” because Coit was vicious, manipulative, failed to accept
responsibility or show remorse for his actions, choosing instead to deflect
accountability, and “show[ed] little interest in advancing the interest of
society.” Id. at 40. The trial court also reviewed Coit’s record and found
that Coit had been arrested twenty times in his life (approximately half of
which were rearrests and in satisfaction of bench warrants). Id. at 15-16;
41-42. Based on all of the factors and circumstances considered, the trial
court determined that Coit should be sentenced to the maximum term of two
and half to five years of incarceration. Id. at 42.
Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court
adequately considered the relevant factors, including Coit’s rehabilitative
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needs, prior to issuing Coit’s sentence. The record supports the trial court’s
findings, and thus, we find no abuse of discretion.
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by
imposing Coit’s sentence consecutively to the sentence he is currently
serving. This Court has held that
the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent
sentences lies within the sound discretion of the
sentencing court. Long standing precedent of this
Court recognizes that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 affords
the sentencing court discretion to impose its
sentence concurrently or consecutively to other
sentences being imposed at the same time or to
sentences already imposed.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(internal citations omitted). Thus, finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm
Coit’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/7/2015
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